MORAL  EVOLUTION 


BY 


GEORGE   HARRIS 

PROFESSOR   IN   ANDOVER   THEOLOGICAL  SEMINARY 


UII7IRSITT 


BOSTON   AND    NEW   YORK 
HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND   COMPANY 

(£be  fitoersibe  press,  Cam6nD0e 
1896 


5 


Copyright,  1896, 
BY  GEORGE  HARRIS. 

All  rights  reserved. 


SECOND  EDITION. 


The  Riverside  Press,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  U.  S.  A. 
Electrotyped  and  Printed  by  H.  O.  Houghtou  &  Co. 


PKEFACE 

THE  purpose  of  this  book,  as  stated  in  the  first 
chapter,  is  to  establish  the  harmony  of  personal 
and  social  morality  with  the  facts  of  evolution. 
The  unity  of  the  entire  process  of  development, 
even  in  respect  to  tendencies  which  seem  to  con- 
flict, is  recognized. 

The  discussion  has  been  wrought  out  in  obedi- 
ence to  the  impulse  which  seizes  every  one  who 
has  discovered,  or  believes  he  has  discovered,  a 
truth,  or  the  clue  to  a  truth,  —  the  impulse  of 
communication.  The  author  has  not  gone  into  the 
technicalities  of  science  nor  into  the  abstractions 
of  philosophy,  but  has  attempted  to  set  forth  his 
conclusions  and  reasons  with  as  much  clearness, 
directness,  and  concreteness  as  possible. 

The  distinctiveness  of  the  book,  if  it  has  any, 
is  the  recovery  of  self  from  the  mistaken  neglect 
into  which  it  has  fallen  at  the  hands  of  many 
philosophers,  to  its  proper  value.  Self-preserva- 
tion, with  all  its  incident  evils  of  struggle,  waste, 
and  cruelty,  is  shown  to  be  in  the  line  of  progress, 
and  an  essential  condition  of  progress.  The  so- 
cial, sympathetic,  altruistic  feelings  are  not  forced 


iv  PREFACE. 

to  bear  all  the  mighty  burden  of  human  advance- 
ment. Social  regeneration  is  not  allowed,  with 
the  author's  consent,  to  overbalance  personal  good. 
The  two  values,  the  personal  and  the  social,  are 
carried  along  together  from  the  beginning  to  the 
end  of  the  volume,  even  as  they  are  inseparable 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  moral  evolu- 
tion. 

ANDOVEB, 

MASSACHUSETTS, 

January,  1896. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

EVOLUTION   AND  ETHICS 

I.  Evolution  Accepted              1 

II.  Revival  of  Ethical  Studies       ....  4 

III.  Time  Ripe  for  Adjustment                   ...  7 

IV.  Antagonism      .         .         .         .         .         .         .  11 

V.  Independence 13 

VI.  Identity 21 

VII.  Harmony 26 

CHAPTER  II 

PERSONALITY  IN   SOCIETY 

I.  Society  and  Persons 30 

II.  Heredity 32 

III.  Knowledge  Transmitted 33 

IV.  Dependence  on  Contemporaries        ...  36 
V.  Increase  of  Social  Functions         .        .                 .37 

VI.  Development  of  Personality    ....  39 

VII.  Great  Men 45 

VIII.  Institutions  and  Individuals     ....  49 

IX.  Limitations 52 

CHAPTER  III 

THE  MORAL  IDEAL  —  THE  GOOD 

I.  An  Ideal  Essential 54 

II.  Historical  Ethics 59 

III.  The  Ideal  Personal 62 

IV.  The  Ideal  is  the  Good 64 

V.  Worth 64 

VI.  Happiness 72 

VII.  Personal  and  Social     .         .        .        .        .        .76 


vi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  IV 

THE   MORAL  LAW  —  THE  BIGHT 

I.  The  Imperative  of  Right 82 

II.  The  Right  and  the  Good          ....  84 

,       III.  Law  ;  Duty  ;  Obligation 86 

IV.  Good  and  Right  Correlative  88 

V.  The  Uniting  Principle 93 

VI.  Origin  of  Obligation 96 

VII.  Conscience 104 

CHAPTER  V 

THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

I.  Various  Forms 108 

II.  The  Hedonistic  Theory 109 

III.  Pleasures  Comparable          .....  110 

IV.  Happiness  Measurable     .....       112 
V.  Not  Gained  by  Seeking 114 

VI.  Satisfaction 117 

VII.  Utilitarianism 122 

VIII.  Agreement 126 

CHAPTER  VI 

SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

I.  Sympathy  and  Self-Regard          ....  130 

II.  Self 134 

III.  Self-Love 138 

IV.  Self-Realization 141 

V.  Altruism 146 

VI.  Altruism  Receptive  and  Reflex        ...       148 
VII.  The  Mutual  Relation 153 

CHAPTER  VII 

ETHICS   AND  EVOLUTION 

I.  The  Common  Principle 156 

II.  Progressive  Realization   .....       159 
III.  Morality  and  Sympathy 164 


CONTENTS  ,  vii 

IV.  Self-Assertion  and  Struggle     .        .  .167 

V.  Perversion  Incidental 173 

VI.  The  Higher  Values 177 

VII.  The  Twofold  Relation 181 

CHAPTER  VIII 

MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

I.  Reason  in  the  Universe 185 

II.  The  Moral  Order  of  History  ....  189 
III.  The  Ideal  Order  of  Humanity  .  .  .  .195 
IV.  The  Imperative  of  Duty  .  .  .  .202 

V.  Moral  Law  Universal 203 

VI.  The  Righteousness  of  God       .        .        .        .205 

VII.  Morality  without  Religion  .         .         .  .  207 

VIII.  Historically  Together       .         .         .         .         '.      212 

IX..  Religion  Inspires  Morality 215 

X.  Morality  and  Immortality        ....       216 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE   CHRISTIAN   IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

I.  Principles  Instead  of  Rules          ....  220 

II.  Personal  and  Social 221 

III.  Individualism 222 

IV.  The  Worth  of  the  Person         ....       224 
V.  The  Character  of  Jesus 226 

VI.  The  Law  of  Love 229 

VII.  Eternal  Life 232 

VIII.  The  Ideal  Perfect  and  Final    ....      237 

IK.  A  Present  Reality 238 

X.  From  Person  to  Society 244 

CHAPTER  X 

THE   CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  SOCIAL 

I.  The  Kingdom  of  God 248 

II.  Fulfillment 252 

III.  The  Kingdom  Universal  .         .         .         .255 

IV.  The  Forms  of  Righteousness       .        .        .        .256 


viii  CONTENTS 

V.  Related  Personalities 260 

VI.  The  Kingdom  Established 264 

VII.  Real  and  Ideal 266 

CHAPTER  XI 

DEGENERATION 

I.  A  Theme  of  Literature 271 

II.  Degeneration  and  Evolution         ....  273 

III.  Fact  and  Extent 275 

IV.  Abnormity   ........  278 

V.  Freedom  .        .         .         .      '  .        .         .        .285 

VI.  Moral  Power  not  Destroyed         ....  293 

CHAPTER  XII 

PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

I.  Recovery 299 

II.  Self-Impartation  of  Jesus         ....       303 

III.  The  Obedience  of  Jesus 311 

IV.  The  Ever-Living  Christ 314 

V.  Faith 316 

VI.  Conflict  and  Reciprocity  ....       319 

VII.  The  Positive  Method 328 

CHAPTER  XIII 

SOCIAL  REGENERATION  —  ECONOMICS 

I.  Economics  and  Ethics           .....  332 
II.  Material  Values 335 

III.  Moral  Values 340 

IV.  Competition 346 

V.  Specific  Evils 350 

VI.  Correction  of  Evils 353 

CHAPTER  XIV 

SOCIAL  REGENERATION  —  INSTITUTIONS 

I.  The  Family 362 

II.  The  State  —  Democracy 368 


CONTENTS  ,  ix 

III.  The  Church .375 

IV.  Relation  of  Institutions 379 

V.  Church  and  State 382 

VI.  Religion  in  Public  Schools 385 

VII.  Rate  of  Social  Progress 388 

CHAPTER  XV 

ETHICS   AND  THEOLOGY 

I.  Prejudice  against  Theology      ....      391 
II.  Historical  Review 392 

III.  Nomism  and  Antinomianism    .         .         ...       395 

IV.  Sovereignty  and  Fatherhood        ....  399 
V.  The  Humanity  of  Christ  .         .         .         .403 

VI.  Total  Depravity 405 

VII.  Redemption 407 

VIII.  The  Kingdom  of  God 408 

CHAPTER  XVI 

CHRISTIANITY   AND  EVOLUTION 

I.  Revelation 410 

II.  The  Idea  of  God 415 

III.  Sin 418 

IV.  The  Character  of  Jesus 419 

V.  Immanence  of  the  Spirit  ....       422 

VI.  Immortality 423 

VII.  The  Evolution  of  Religion  ....  424 

VIII.  The  Person  of  Christ 427 

IX.  Miracles  and  Resurrection        ....  432 

CONCLUSION 
The  Path  and  the  Goal  .  440 


MORAL  EVOLUTION 


CHAPTER   I 

EVOLUTION    AND    ETHICS 

THESE  words  designate  two  of  the  most  impor- 
tant, possibly  the  two  most  important  interests  of 
the  present  time.  Their  general  relation  will  be 
indicated  in  this  chapter,  and  their  specific  mean- 
ing and  connection  in  the  chapters  which  follow. 


One  dominant  factor  in  thought,  without  doubt, 
is  evolution,  which  thirty  years  ago  was  a  theory 
advocated  by  a  few  biologists  and  opposed  by 
others,  but  which  is  now  adopted  by  all  scientific 
authorities  and  accepted  by  the  vast  majority  of 
educated  men.  A  generation  ago  it  was  an  hypo- 
thesis presented  in  scientific  treatises  and  in  tech- 
nical terms.  To-day  it  is  taught  in  the  colleges, 
illustrated  in  magazines,  popularized  on  the  plat- 
form, and  recognized  even  in  the  pulpit.  The 
method  of  evolution  has,  indeed,  become  so  fa- 
miliar that  the  word  is  overworked  and  misap- 
plied, as  is  usually  the  case  when  the  theory  for 
which  a  phrase  stands  makes  rapid  way  into 
general  acceptance.  The  locomotive  is  spoken  of 


2  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

as  an  evolution  from  the  stage-coach,  although 
they  are  purely  mechanical  contrivances  without 
organic  connection,  the  evolution  being  in  the 
brain  of  man.  To  every  sort  of  improvement,  and 
to  every  observed  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  evo- 
lutionary terms  are  applied.  This  inexact  applica- 
tion, or  rather  misapplication,  indicates  both  the 
familiarity  and  the  popularity  of  the  theory.  And, 
indeed,  in  its  exact  signification  and  within  its 
proper  limits,  it  takes  rank  as  a  universal  method. 
For  no  existence  is  detached.  All  things  are  in 
relation.  There  is  an  all-embracing  unity.  The 
world  is  a  cosmos,  a  universe.  The  stability  which 
is  conserved  and  the  change  which  is  promoted  are 
in  accordance  with  a  development  which  includes 
the  inorganic  as  well  as  the  organic,  and  is  not  in- 
applicable to  the  planetary  and  stellar  systems. 
The  various  features  of  organic  evolution,  charac- 
terized as  natural  selection,  struggle  for  existence, 
survival  of  the  fittest,  and  to  which  reproduction 
and  cooperation  should  be  added,  are  coextensive 
with  all  forms  of  life.  These  laws  of  vegetable 
and  animal  life  have  furnished  the  clue  to  the 
origin  and  progress  of  man.  The  human  species 
came  into  existence,  not  by  abrupt  creation  in 
entire  independence  of  preexisting  animals,  but 
by  evolution  from  them  through  organic  deriva- 
tion. The  dominant  races,  it  is  believed,  have 
gained  and  held  their  place  by  a  fierce  struggle, 
which,  on  the  lower  plane  of  savagery,  proceeded 
by  wars  of  extermination ;  on  the  higher  plane  of 
civilization,  by  foreign  conquest,  acquisition  of 
territory,  and  the  skill  of  diplomacy.  Industrial 


EVOLUTION  ACCEPTED    ,  3 

and  commercial  advantage  has  been  gained  by 
clever  inventions  and  by  competition.  The  ad- 
vance of  the  toilers  has  been  made  by  struggle 
with  landholders,  by  agrarian  revolutions,  by  the 
organized  conflict  of  labor  with  capital.  Thus 
every  chapter  of  history  is  read,  and  this  term, 
evolution,  is  applied  to  every  institution,  custom, 
and  legal  code.  There  are  books  on  the  evolution 
of  industry,  the  evolution  of  art,  of  music,  of  ar- 
chitecture, of  philosophy,  of  morality,  of  religion. 
This  law  is  carried  upwards  and  outwards  till  it  is 
seen  to  be  as  comprehensive  as  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion. No  one  claims  that  organic  development  was 
unknown  until  thirty  years  ago.  The  birth  and 
growth  of  individuals,  the  influence  of  heredity, 
the  history  of  nations,  the  phenomena  of  physical 
nature,  have  been  interpreted  in  philosophies, 
cosmogonies,  and  sciences,  some  of  which  are  very 
ancient.  The  tradition  of  Genesis  depicted  six 
successive  days  of  ascending  orders,  rather  than 
creation  in  a  single  day  or  by  an  instantaneous 
stroke.  But  evolution  is  new  and  distinctive  as  a 
theory  of  the  derivation  of  one  species  from  an- 
other, of  the  descent  of  man  from  inferior  animals, 
of  the  progress  of  man  in  his  habits,  arts,  morality, 
and  religion,  in  accordance  with  the  methods 
which  control  the  development  of  all  life  below 
and  around  him.  Evolution,  then,  is  regarded  as 
a  dominant  factor  in  the  interpretation  of  human 
origins  and  human  history.  It  has  become  an  im- 
portant interest,  both  in  the  extent  of  its  applica- 
tion and  as  readjusting  and  even  revolutionizing 
long-accepted  theories  of  man  and  society. 


[UIIVIRSXTY 


4  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

II 

The  other  interest,  almost  as  commanding  in 
recognized  importance,  is  morality.  During  the 
same  period  there  has  been  a  genuine  revival  of 
the  study  of  ethics.  Treatises  on  the  science  and 
philosophy  of  morality  have  multiplied  in  England, 
Germany,  France,  and  America.  In  England 
especially,  the  most  eminent  authors  are  writers 
on  ethics.  The  names  of  Mill,  Sidgwick,  Stephen, 
Green,  Martineau,  and  others,  have  distinction 
chiefly  by  their  works  on  the  history  and  principles 
of  morality. 

Discussion  has  proceeded  in  advocacy  of  one 
system  as  against  another,  with  differences  appar- 
ently radical,  yet  with  the  result  of  establishing  in 
all  the  systems  essential  elements  which  had  been 
minimized,  ignored,  or  denied  on  the  one  side,  and 
exaggerated  or  over-emphasized  on  the  other.  The 
intuitive  philosophy  of  morality  has  been  modified 
by  wider  knowledge  of  the  historical  development 
of  moral  sentiments,  of  the  variety  and  advance  of 
moral  standards,  of  certain  correspondences  of 
men  with  lower  orders,  of  heredity,  of  pleasure  and 
pain  as  determining  motives,  and  the  like.  The 
utilitarian  philosophy  of  morality  has  been  modi- 
fied by  clearer  perception  of  the  lofty  ideals  that 
sway  conduct,  of  the  imperative  of  conscience,  of 
the  sharp  distinction  practically  made  between 
happiness  and  virtue,  of  the  difficulty  of  applying 
its  own  standard  to  the  finest  and  noblest  good- 
ness, and  of  other  kindred  considerations.  That 
is,  a  reconstruction  of  theories  of  morality  has  been 
going  on,  and  partly  by  the  aid  of  evolution. 


REVIVAL   OF  ETHICAL  STUDIES  5 

One  result  is  the  interpretation  of  all  the  move- 
ments of  human  progress  ethically.  When  a  short 
perspective  covering  a  century  is  taken,  it  is  seen 
that  each  separate  line  of  advance  has  been  largely 
or  wholly  moral.  The  industrial  and  economic 
movement  in  respect  to  increase  of  wages,  the 
standard  of  comfort,  the  rights  and  safety  of 
laborers,  the  care  of  the  unproductive  classes,  has  •-. 
meant  right  and  wrong  as  well  as  profit  and  loss.  ' 
It  is  no  longer  held  that  political  economy  is  a  non- 
ethical  science.  Marshall  and  other  writers  find 
in  the  moral  life  and  relations  an  essential  element 
of  material  prosperity.  The  political  movement  in 
democracy,  in  government  by  the  people  for  the 
people,  in  the  effective  administration  of  justice, 
in  the  restriction  of  vice,  in  the  protection  of  the 
family,  and  in  the  very  conception  of  the  State  as 
the  institute  of  rights,  has  meant  morality  as  truly 
as  it  has  meant  finance,  or  tariffs,  or  public  office, 
which  indeed,  in  the  last  analysis,  are  moral  inter- 
ests. Even  the  modifications  of  religious  beliefs 
are  found  to  consist  largely  in  the  rejection  of 
immoral  notions,  and  the  recovery  of  the  moral 
value  of  doctrine.  When  a  longer  perspective  is 
taken,  and  the  range  sweeps  into  prehistoric  and 
savage  conditions,  the  advance  which  can  be  traced 
is  seen  to  be  moral  progress.  The  evolution  of 
the  monogamic  family  from  polygamy,  consolida- 
tion into  tribes  affording  protection  and  adminis- 
tering a  rude  justice,  alliances  of  tribes  in  coopera- 
tion, transition  from  the  nomadic  life  of  hunting 
to  the  settled  life  of  grazing  and  agriculture,  the 
religious  or  even  superstitious  belief  in  higher 


6  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

powers,  and  all  that  converts  savagery  into  barbar- 
ism and  barbarism  into  civilization,  are  progress 
in  morality. /The  advance  from  lower  to  higher 
civilization  is  moral  advance,  in  liberation  of  the 
masses  from  slavery,  serfdom,  and  feudalism ;  in 
the  emancipation  of  women  and  children  from 
legal  disabilities;  in  adequate  and  sympathetic 
support  of  the  defective  and  dependent ;  in  the  re- 
formation as  well  as  punishment  of  the  delinquent ; 
in  the  decline  of  the  warlike  spirit,  although,  or 
because,  the  engines  of  war  become  more  destruc- 
tive ;  in  the  growth  of  international  comity ;  in  the 
cessation  of  religious  persecution,  and  in  freedom 
of  religious  opinion.  Progress  is  traced,  not  only 
in  improvement  of  material  appliances,  in  swifter 
locomotion,  in  the  thousand-fold  multiplication  of 
the  power  of  muscle  by  the  power  of  machine,  in 
conversion  of  the  mighty  and  invisible  forces  of 
nature  to  be  the  thralls  of  man,  but  also  and 
chiefly  in  moral  reforms,  in  education,  culture, 
taste,  refinement,  and  pure  religion,  —  from  which 
material  masteries  are  by  no  means  separate.  The 
moral  movement,  like  the  evolutional,  is  observed 
in  every  direction,  backwards  in  history  to  the 
ancient  nations,  outwards  to  the  savage  tribes, 
downwards  to,  or  even  into,  the  animal  societies ; 
extensively,  to  all  families,  tribes,  and  races,  in- 
tensively, to  all  the  conditions  of  society,  indus- 
trial, political,  educational,  aesthetic,  and  religious. 
A  curious  illustration  of  the  tendency  to  inter- 
pret history  and  progress  ethically  may  be  found, 
by  way  of  contrast,  in  a  book  which,  at  the  time  of 
its  publication  in  1857,  created  a  sensation  in  Eng- 


TIME  RIPE  FOR  ADJUSTMENT  7 

land  and  America,  and  made  its  author  famous.1 
Mr.  Buckle  maintained  that  progress  is  wholly 
due  to  intellectual  and  not  at  all  to  moral  causes. 
Morality,  he  argued,  is  stationary.  There  is  no 
perceptible  difference  in  the  moral  sentiments  and 
standards  of  modern  and  ancient  peoples,  but 
intellectually  there  has  been  marked  advance.  The 
progress  of  civilization,  he  affirmed,  is  owing,  not 
to  the  stationary,  but  to  the  moving  agent.  What 
is  regarded  as  moral  improvement  is  due  to  intel- 
lectual discoveries  and  attainments,  as,  for  example, 
the  decline  of  the  warlike  spirit  by  reason  of  the 
discovery  of  gunpowder  and  the  modern  science  of 
political  economy.  But  now,  to  say  nothing  of 
the  absurdity  of  dividing  the  nature  of  man  into 
stationary  and  advancing  parts,  especially  when 
the  parts  are  mutually  dependent,  it  is  a  favorite 
tenet  of  science  that  there  has  been  an  uninter- 
rupted development  of  morality  ;  that  it  originated 
in  the  reproductive  and  social  instincts  of  animals ; 
that  each  moral  sentiment  and  practice  established 
itself  as  an  advantage  in  the  long  struggle  of  the 
human  species  for  existence  and  supremacy ;  that 
intellectual  and  moral  progress  have  gone  hand 
in  hand  up  to  the  present  moment,  or  indeed  are 
two  constant  phases  of  one  and  the  same  thing. 

in 

The  time  is  now  ripe  for  determining  the  rela- 
tion of  these  important  interests.  Adjustment 
waits  for,  but  necessarily  follows,  recognition  of 

1  History  of    Civilization   in  England.     By  Henry  Thomas 
Buckle. 


8  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

values.  Hitherto  evolution  and  ethics,  with  a  cer- 
tain independence  of  each  other,  have  been  work- 
ing their  way  to  clearness  and  certainty.  Each 
has  been  almost  exclusively  occupied  in  substanti- 
ating its  own  truth.  Investigation  has  been  busy 
in  the  verification  of  theory.  Students  have  been 
absorbed  in  collating  facts,  weighing  objections^ 
modifying  hypotheses,  and  giving  exact  definition 
to  principles.  Adjustment  of  the  one  value  withi 
the  other  could  not  be  attempted  until  each  value 
was  known  for  what  it  is.  Evolution  and  ethic^ 
could  not  at  any  time  lose  sight  of  each  other/ 
The  material  of  each  all  along  was  found  partly  in 
the  other.  Yet,  until  each  had  vindicated  itself, 
had  established  its  own  essential  truth,  and  had 
won  its  way  to  general  acceptance,  there  could  be 
no  satisfactory  settlement  of  accounts.  But  when 
theory  has  passed  from  the  tentative  to  the  as- 
sured stage,  when  it  has  made  its  way  from  the 
schools  into  intelligent  and  popular  recognition, 
then  adjustment  of  it  to  the  sum  of  knowledge, 
and  to  other  accepted  principles,  is  demanded 
with  pressing  insistence.  While  thoughtful  and 
honest  minds  were  still  asking  whether  the  theory 
of  evolution  is  demonstrated  or  not,  it  was  prema- 
ture either  to  antagonize  it  or  appropriate  it  in 
the  interest  of  other  principles.  While  students  of 
ethics  were  debating  with  one  another  about  the 
significance  of  elements  which  had  been  ignored 
or  overworked,  and  until  the  necessary  reconstruc- 
tion of  ethics  had  been  accomplished,  there  could 
be  no  satisfactory  harmonizing  with  evolution. 
And  although  there  is  not  the  unanimity  of  opin- 


TIME  RIPE  FOR  ADJUSTMENT  9 

ion  which  obtains  in  respect  to  evolution,  nor  per- 
haps ever  can  be,  yet  certain  principles  have  be- 
come so  well  established  that  the  ethical  theories 
which  cling  to  different  names  are  in  an  agree- 
ment larger  than  is  commonly  supposed.  The  two 
great  interests  now  know  each  other  well  enough 
to  enter  into  conference.  They  are  within  speak- 
ing distance  and  on  speaking  terms.  Like  mercy 
and  truth,  they  are  met  together,  even  if,  like  right- 
eousness and  peace,  they  have  not  yet  kissed  each 
other. 

The  last  three  or  four  years  have,  therefore, 
witnessed  the  appearance  of  treatises  on  the  rela- 
tion of  the  two  values.  There  are  books  on  evolu- 
tion and  ethics,  the  evolution  of  ethics,  the  ethics 
of  evolution,  the  evolution  of  morality,  and  evo- 
lutional theories  of  ethics.  Nearly  all  of  these  dis- 
cussions have  approached  morality  from  the  evolu- 
tionary point  of  view.  The  books  are  written  by 
scientists,  or  upon  the  basis  of  scientific  theory. 
But  it  is  important  to  stand  in  both  points  of  view, 
in  order  to  hear  what  morality  says  to  evolution 
as  well  as  what  evolution  says  to  morality.  Ethics, 
indeed,  being  the  older  science,  may  be  expected, 
in  courtesy,  to  take  the  initiative,  and  to  show  cor- 
diality to  the  newcomer  who  appears  with  the 
proper  scientific  and  philosophical  credentials.  I 
therefore  approach  the  discussion  from  the  ethical 
side.  I  have  studied  ethics  with  some  careful- 
ness, and  have  reached  certain  conclusions.  The 
theory  of  evolution  I  accept,  and  accept  heartily, 
on  the  agreeing  authority  of  its  acknowledged 
interpreters,  but  without  professing  to  be  an  inves- 


10  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

tigator  of  the  facts.  I  therefore  come  from  ethics, 
of  which  I  am  a  student,  to  evolution,  in  which  1 
am  a  believer,  in  imitation  of  scientists  who  come 
from  the  evolution  they  have  tested  to  the  ethics 
they  have  accepted.  I  find  in  evolution  correspond- 
ences to  the  moral  customs  and  convictions  of 
men,  correspondences  which  amount  to  conditions 
of  morality,  and  I  find  them  even  in  those  features 
of  evolution  which  have  been  considered  foreign  or 
hostile  to  morality.  The  moral  is  based,  not  only 
on  the  sympathetic  feelings,  which  exist  in  lower 
orders,  but  as  truly  on  the  self-regarding  feelings. 
Kegard  of  self  being  as  truly  moral  as  regard  of 
others,  the  relation  of  morality  to  evolution  is  not 
limited  to  the  sympathetic  feelings.  The  percep- 
tion that  self-preservation,  self-assertion,  self-en- 
joyment, and  self-perfection,  which  constitute  one 
hemisphere  of  morality,  have  a  vital  relation  to 
the  fundamental  facts  of  evolution  —  even  the  facts 
of  natural  selection  and  survival  of  the  fittest  — 
has  been  to  me  in  the  nature  of  a  discovery,  both 
as  to  the  truth  and  the  value  of  the  relation.  In 
those  elements  of  morality  I  find  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  conflicting  theories  of  ethics,  as  well  as  the 
larger  harmony  of  ethical  with  evolutionary  doc- 
trine. The  impulse  has  therefore  become  strong 
upon  me  to  set  forth  these  elements  of  morality  in 
themselves  and  in  their  relation  to  development,  in 
the  hope  that  the  truth  I  have  found  may  be  made 
clear  and  helpful  to  others.  This  book  is  cast  into 
the  stream  of  discussion  to  contribute  the  modicum 
of  truth  it  may  contain,  and  to  receive  correction,  if 
need  be,  of  its  errors  and  limitations.  While  the 


ANTA 


u 


following  chapters  are  not  directed  at  every  point 
to  the  relation  of  the  two  great  interests,  yet  the 
study  of  the  principles  of  ethics,  even  in  their 
highest  development  under  Christianity,  will  fur- 
nish material  and  criteria  for  determining  the 
relation  of  morality  and  evolution. 

There  are  four  possible  relations  between  evolu- 
tion and  ethics.  They  may  be  regarded  as  antago- 
nistic, as  independent,  as  identical,  or  as  harmo- 
nious. Every  one  of  these  four  relations  has  in 
fact  been  supposed  to  exist,  and  has  had  its  advo- 
cates. They  are  briefly  indicated  at  this  point  in 
the  order  named,  so  as  to  clear  the  way  for  the 
discussion,  later  on,  of  that  relation  which  I  be- 
lieve to  be  the  true  relation. 

IV 

Evolution  and  morality  are  regarded  by  some 
ethical  writers  as  antagonistic.  The  struggle  for 
existence,  the  rivalry,  the  crowding  out,  the  rejec- 
tion of  the  unfit,  the  destruction  of  the  weaker, 
the  enormous  waste  of  life,  the  remorseless  exter- 
mination, seem  to  be  selfishness,  or  at  least  very 
like  it.  Even  if,  in  the  sub-human  orders,  the 
method  is  non-moral,  yet  the  same  method  appear- 
ing in  the  so-called  progress  of  mankind  is  cer- 
tainly contrary  to  that  which  is  moral,  is  posi- 
tively immoral.  It  is  argued  that  the  strife  which 
has  accompanied  the  advance  of  men  into  and 
along  the  path  of  civilization  has  not  been  the 
cause,  nor  even  the  incident,  but  rather  the  hin- 
drance, of  progress.  The  rivalry  that  marks  that 
path  along  its  entire  length,  from  the  mass  of  con- 


12  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

fused  footprints  left  by  the  cruel  fighting  of  sav- 
ages to  the  broad  but  hard-paved  highway  beaten 
down  by  the  battles  of  nations,  the  competitions  of 
industry,  and  the  persecutions  and  controversies  of 
religion,  are  distinctly  wicked.  The  very  instinct 
that  yields  such  issues  is  purely  selfish.  Moral  pro- 
gress has  another  root.  It  is  found  in  sympathy. 
Sympathy  is  not  a  disguised  form  of  selfishness, 
but  a  native  instinct  of  man  in  the  family  and  in 
society.  Sympathy  combats  selfishness.  So  far  as 
selfishness  is  reduced  by  sympathy,  progress  is 
made.  When  selfishness  is  dethroned  by  sym- 
pathy, the  true  kingdom  of  humanity  is  come.  But 
when  selfishness  controls ;  when  there  is  a  gladiato- 
rial contest  of  nation  against  nation,  of  tribe  against 
tribe,  of  individual  against  individual ;  when  man 
seems  worse  than  nature,  the  human  process  worse 
than  the  cosmic  process,  —  it  must  be  concluded  that 
the  law  of  evolution  through  struggle  and  survival 
is  antagonistic  to  morality.  There  is  strong  pro- 
test against  evolution,  not  merely  because  the 
derivation  of  man  from  animals  is  thought  to  be 
degrading,  but  chiefly  because  moral  sentiments 
recoil  from  the  process  of  strife,  subjection,  and 
extinction.  Must  not  morality  look  upon  evolu- 
tion as  an  enemy  if  it  is  true  that  nature  is  regard- 
less of  the  individual,  and  regardful  only  of  the 
type,  and  not  even  careful  of  the  type  ? 

"  So  careful  of  the  type  ?  but  no, 

From  scarped  cliff  and  quarried  stone 
She  cries,  '  A  thousand  types  are  gone, 
I  care  for  nothing,  all  must  go.'  "  1 

1  Tennyson,  In  Memoriam. 


INDEPENDENCE        t  13 

Another  reason  for  antagonizing  evolution,  when 
it  is  extended  to  the  life  of  man,  is  the  apparent 
exclusion  of  freedom,  choice,  and  responsibility. 
Evolution  is  necessity.  It  reverses  the  maxim,  for 
it  is  necessity  which  knows  nothing  but  law.  If 
man's  life  has  been  shaped  by  inevitable  law,  the 
foundations  of  morality  are  destroyed ;  and  if  the 
foundations  be  destroyed,  the  old  question,  What 
shall  the  righteous  do?  need  not  even  be  asked, 
for  there  are  no  righteous  ones  to  be  asked  about, 
nor  to  ask  about  themselves.  Much  of  the  opposi- 
tion of  religion  to  science  is  really  for  this  reason, 
rather  than  because  science  does  not  square  with 
an  ancient  cosmogony  of  the  Hebrews. 

There  is,  no  doubt,  a  degree  of  truth  in  the 
opinion  that  the  evolution  of  man  in  some  of  its 
aspects  and  incidents  is  in  conflict  with  morality. 
There  is  such  a  thing  as  reversal  in  nature.  There 
is  such  a  thing  as  degeneration  in  man.  Proper 
discrimination,  however,  of  the  essential  law  of 
evolution  from  some  of  its  accompaniments  re- 
moves occasion  for  antagonism.  If  evolution  is 
true,  there  can  be  no  hostility  towards  any  other 
truth.  The  true  cannot  be  in  conflict  with  the 
right.  The  ethical  man  may  find  a  war  in  his 
members,  but  the  war  does  not  rage  because  the 
ethical  man  is  the  evolved  man. 


The  second  view  of  the  relation  of  the  two  in- 
terests is  that  they  are  independent  of  each  other. 
According  to  this  view,  it  is  maintained  that,  while 
the  physical  nature  of  man  is  developed  by  natural 


14  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

selection  from  animals,  his  intellectual  and  moral 
faculties  are  not  so  accounted  for,  or,  if  they  are 
so  derived  as  faculties,  the  use  of  them  is  inde- 
pendent of  evolution.  The  mental  and  moral 
man  is  on  a  plane  above  the  level  of  physical  na- 
ture, and  under  different  conditions.  Man  is  like 
a  ship,  the  physical  hull  in  the  waves,  tides,  and 
currents  of  the  ocean,  the  intellectual,  moral,  and 
spiritual  sails  spread  to  the  breezes  of  heaven  ;  or, 
to  adapt  the  figure  to  improved  navigation,  his 
brain  and  heart  are  the  twin  engines  within  the 
hull,  and  carry  the  ship  across  or  even  against  the 
waves  and  currents  on  which  it  would  otherwise 
drift  helplessly.  Man's  moral  powers,  and,  as 
some  think,  his  intellectual  powers,  appeared,  no 
one  knows  how ;  perhaps,  according  to  the  strik- 
ing but  sinister  Scriptural  figure  employed  by  Mr. 
John  Fiske,  like  a  thief  in  the  night.  Having 
appeared,  these  faculties  have  improved  and  re- 
fined, not  by  struggle  and  survival,  but  under 
other  laws,  which  are  sympathetic  or  social. 

There  certainly  is  much  truth  in  this  view. 
There  are  higher  and  lower  orders,  of  which  man 
is  the  highest.  There  are  higher  and  lower  pow- 
ers in  man,  and  assuredly  the  higher  are  not  pre- 
cisely like  the  lower  in  constitution  or  in  method 
of  progress.  But  it  is  much  to  be  doubted  whether 
a  process  which  obtains  in  the  physical  nature,  and 
to  a  degree  in  the  intellectual  and  moral  nature, 
is  ever  discarded  so  as  to  give  virtual  independ- 
ence of  it  at  any  point. 

One  of  the  distinguished  representatives  of  this 
opinion  is  Mr.  Alfred  R.  Wallace.  In  his  "  Dar- 


INDEPENDENCE  15 

winism  "  he  parts  company  with  Mr.  Darwin  when 
it  comes  to  the  moral,  mathematical,  musical,  and 
artistic  faculties  of  man.  He  regards  it  as  impos- 
sible that  these  faculties  should  have  been  derived 
from  anything  to  be  found  in  animals.  He  does 
not  argue  this  definitely  with  respect  to  moral 
powers,  confining  his  discussion  to  the  other  facul- 
ties named,  but  he  emphatically  affirms  this  opin- 
ion concerning  the  moral  convictions.1 

Another  representative  of  this  view  is  Mr.  Hux- 
ley, whose  "  Komanes  Lecture  "  created  a  genuine 
surprise.  It  was  supposed  that  he  regarded  mo- 
rality merely  as  a  phase  of  evolution,  as  an  outcome 
of  the  struggle  for  existence.  But  he  declared 
that  ethics  is  independent  of  evolution ;  that  moral 
sentiments  and  practices  are  under  other  laws  than 
the  laws  of  the  great  cosmic  process ;  that  convic- 
tions of  right  and  wrong  can  by  no  possibility 
have  been  developed  in  the  struggle  for  existence ; 
and  that  the  business  of  morality  is  to  combat  the 
selfishness  which  controls  the  process  styled  cos- 
mic. He  maintains  that  humanity  is  differentiated 
from  other  orders  in  such  ways,  chiefly  moral,  that 
it  pursues  a  method  of  its  own,  and  is  not  a  mere 
projection  a  little  farther  in  the  same  direction 
with  inferior  beings.  A  single  quotation  must 
suffice  to  define  Mr.  Huxley's  opinions  :  — 

"  Cosmic  evolution  may  teach  us  how  the  good 
and  the  evil  tendencies  of  man  may  have  come 
about;  but  in  itself  it  is  incompetent  to  furnish 
any  better  reason  why  what  we  call  good  is  prefer- 
able to  what  we  call  evil  than  we  had  before. 
1  Darwinism,  pp.  461-478. 


16  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

Some  day,  I  doubt  not,  we  shall  arrive  at  an  un- 
derstanding of  the  evolution  of  the  aesthetic  faculty ; 
but  all  the  understanding  in  the  world  will  neither 
increase  nor  diminish  the  force  of  the  intuition 
that  this  is  beautiful  and  that  is  ugly.  There  is 
another  fallacy  which  appears  to  me  to  pervade 
the  so-called  4  ethics  of  evolution.'  It  is  the  notion 
that  because,  on  the  whole,  animals  and  plants 
have  advanced  in  perfection  of  organization  by 
means  of  the  struggle  for  existence  and  the  conse- 
quent 'survival  of  the  fittest,'  therefore  men  in 
society,  men  as  ethical  beings,  must  look  to  the 
same  process  to  help  them  towards  perfection.  .  .  . 
As  I  have  already  urged,  the  practice  of  that 
which  is  ethically  best  —  what  we  call  goodness  or 
virtue — involves  a  course  of  conduct  which  in 
all  respects  is  opposed  to  that  which  leads  to  suc- 
cess in  the  cosmic  struggle  for  existence.  In  place 
of  ruthless  self-assertion,  it  demands  self-restraint ; 
in  place  of  thrusting  aside  or  treading  down  all 
competitors,  it  requires  that  the  individual  shall 
not  merely  respect  but  shall  help  his  fellows ;  its 
influence  is  directed,  not  so  much  to  the  survi- 
val of  the  fittest,  as  to  the  fitting  of  as  many  as 
possible  to  survive.  It  repudiates  the  gladiatorial 
theory  of  existence.  It  demands  that  each  man 
who  enters  into  the  advantages  of  a  polity  shall 
be  mindful  of  his  debt  to  those  who  have  labori- 
ously constructed  it,  and  shall  take  heed  that  no 
act  of  his  weakens  the  fabric  in  which  he  has 
been  permitted  to  live.  ...  It  is  from  the  neglect 
of  plain  considerations  like  these  that  the  fanatical 
individualism  of  our  time  attempts  to  apply  the 


INDEPENDENCE  17 

analogy  of  cosmic  nature  to  society.  .  .  .  Let  us 
understand,  once  for  all,  that  the  ethical  progress 
of  society  depends,  not  on  imitating  the  cosmic 
process,  still  less  in  running  away  from  it,  but  on 
combating  it."  1 

This  signifies  that,  on  the  whole,  the  moral  acts 
independently  of  the  evolutionary  process,  except 
as  the  moral  turns  about  and  combats  the  cosmic 
method.  Not  moral  practices,  but  only  moral  fac- 
ulties, are  derived  from  the  animal  orders.  The 
methods  of  evolution  do  not  apply  to  duty  and 
right  in  the  social  life.  Now,  it  is  true  enough 
that  man  has  moral  distinctiveness  and  acts  ac- 
cordingly. But  he  is  not  therefore  independent 
of  the  cosmic  process,  unless  the  social  part  of  the 
process  is  ignored,  and  also  unless  the  self-regard- 
ing part  is  held  to  have  no  moral  value,  as  at 
least  an  analogue  or  prophecy  of  the  moral  self- 
perfection  of  man. 

Still  another  representative  of  the  opinion  that 
morality  is  independent  of  evolution  is  Mr.  Benja- 
min Kidd,  whose  "  Social  Evolution  "  has  attracted 
much  notice.  The  author  traces  the  evolutionary 
process  far  on  into  the  history  of  man.  Individ- 
ual self-assertion  expressed  in  struggle  and  rivalry 
is  the  line  every  man  follows.  He  can  see  no 
other  road  to  success.  Modern  life  is  not  different 
from  ancient  and  savage  life  in  this  respect.  To 
do  otherwise  would  be  irrational.  But  the  social 
organism  subordinates  the  individual  against  his 
reason,  against  his  will,  and  even  against  his 
knowledge.  Progress  is  really  made  and  only 
1  Evolution  and  Ethics,  pp.  31-34. 


18  EVOLUTION  AND  ETHICS 

made  by  this  subordination.  The  organic  life  is 
controlled  by  religion,  which  is  the  self-conscious- 
ness, as  it  were,  of  the  corporate  body.  By  reli- 
gion the  author  means  morality,  for  he  frequently 
characterizes  it  as  the  fund  of  altruistic  feel- 
ing. In  this  so-called  religious  life  of  society  the 
progress  of  the  race  is  found.  He  calls  it  social 
evolution,  but  means  something  quite  unlike  evolu- 
tion in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  It  is  an 
evolution  of  society  altogether  different  from  the 
evolution  of  individuals  by  selection.  Individuals 
themselves  do  not  see  it.  If  they  should  see  it 
they  would  deem  it  absurd,  as  contravening  their 
own  interests.  But  in  fact  the  social  man  is  soft- 
ening, improving,  refining,  moralizing  the  selfish 
man.  They  are  one  and  the  same  being  as  a 
visible  phenomenon.  They  are  different  beings 
regarded  as  in  or  as  out  of  the  corporate  life. 
The  conclusion  Mr.  Kidd  reaches,  and  which  fur- 
nishes the  title  of  a  chapter,  is  that  social  evolu- 
tion (by  which  he  means  human  progress)  is  not 
primarily  intellectual.  Modern  Europeans  are 
not  as  intellectual  as  the  ancient  Greeks.  The 
cranial  capacity  of  man  does  not  increase  with  his 
progress.  The  mental  power  of  a  savage  is  as 
great  as  that  of  a  civilized  man  ;  he  only  needs 
training.  Progress  is  due  to  religion,  which,  as 
has  been  observed,  is  the  author's  term  for  social 
morality. 

It  may  be  noticed  in  passing  that  there  is  a  re- 
markable contrast  between  this  book  and  that  of 
Mr.  Buckle  already  referred  to.  Both  authors  were 
previously  unknown.  Each  was  brought  into  sud- 


INDEPENDENCE  19 

den  notoriety  by  his  first  publication.  For  a  year 
or  two,  in  each  case,  the  author's  name  was  on  all 
lips.  The  one  maintained  —  and  the  credulous 
public  for  a  time  believed  and  repeated  it  —  that 
human  progress  is  not  primarily  moral,  but  almost 
wholly  intellectual.  The  other  maintained  to  the 
next  generation  of  English-speaking  people  —  and 
that  generation  applauded  vociferously  —  that  hu- 
man progress  is  not  primarily  intellectual,  but  is 
almost  wholly  moral.  Unlike  the  children  in  the 
market-place,  unlike  the  stiff-necked  generation  of 
old,  our  fathers  mourned  when  Mr.  Buckle  wailed, 
and  their  sons  danced  when  Mr.  Kidd  piped.  Sin- 
gularly enough,  also,  both  drew  their  illustrations 
from  pretty  much  the  same  sources. 

Now,  the  point  I  am  making  is,  that  here  is  a 
popular  writer  on  civilization  who  draws  a  line 
above  which  morality  appears  and  is  independent 
of  evolution.  He  merely  draws  it  higher  up  than 
the  lines  drawn  by  the  other  two.  Wallace  draws 
his  at  the  origin  of  the  moral  nature.  It  could 
not,  he  thinks,  have  been  derived  from  the  powers 
observed  in  animals.  Huxley  draws  his  at  the 
moral  development  and  practices  of  man.  Man's 
moral  nature  may  have  originated  from  animals, 
as  his  physical  nature  has ;  but  actual  goodness  is 
on  another  plane,  above,  different  from,  and  inde- 
pendent of  the  evolution  of  lower  orders.  Kidd 
draws  his  still  higher.  Evolution,  as  a  struggle 
for  existence  and  survival,  goes  far  on  in  the  pro- 
gress of  men.  Their  intellectual  judgments  are 
wholly  after  the  manner  of  evolution.  The  fund 
of  altruistic  feeling  accumulated  by  social  secre- 


20  EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS 

tion,  in  a  way  mysterious,  ultra-rational,  supernat- 
ural, pays  out  interest  as  morality.  To  that  high 
level  man  at  last  swings  himself  up,  quite  free  and 
clear  of  evolution.  Dazed  at  first,  he  scarcely 
knows  where  he  is,  till  the  ropes  are  cut  which 
bound  him  to  earth,  and  he  sails  away  in  a  "  super- 
rational,"  "  ultra-rational "  balloon.  Now,  it  is  dif- 
ficult to  draw  a  line  low  enough  down  to  lie  under 
the  moral  nature  of  man,  so  that  nothing  like 
moral  sentiments  can  be  found  below  it,  and  Mr. 
Wallace  does  not  succeed.  It  is  still  more  diffi- 
cult to  draw  a  line  high  enough  up  to  keep 
heredity,  physical  and  intellectual  conditions,  self- 
assertion,  and  all  that  has  already  gone  to  make 
the  man,  from  appearing  above  it,  and  Mr.  Kidd 
does  not  succeed.  No  part  of  man's  nature  or 
history  can  be  separated  from  any  other  part.  If 
evolution  accompanies  him  any  appreciable  dis- 
tance on  his  journey,  it  will  stick  to  him  till  the 
end.  If  it  starts  with  him  in  the  morning,  it  will 
be  with  him  at  sundown,  and  will  lie  down  to  sleep 
with  him.  In  the  description  of  an  infirmary  pro- 
vided for  a  New  England  college,  it  was  stated 
that  the  third  story  would  be  fitted  up  for  conta- 
gious cases,  and  would  be  entirely  separate  from 
the  rest  of  the  building.  Man  has,  indeed,  an 
ample  upper  story  well  furnished  intellectually  and 
morally,  but  it  is  not  separate  from  the  rest  of 
the  building  and  the  hidden  foundations.  The 
view  that  ethics  and  evolution  are  independent 
recognizes  many  important  facts,  but  it  sees  them 
out  of  focus. 


IDENTITY  21 


VI 

The  third  view  of  our  two  great  interests  re- 
gards them  as  practically  identical.  Morality  is 
thought  to  be  simply  and  entirely  one  phase  of 
evolution.  Both  the  origin  and  the  development 
of  moral  sentiments  have  been  under  evolutionary 
methods.  There  is  neither  antagonism  nor  in- 
dependence, but  only  identity.  The  stages  of 
society  succeed  each  other  in  an  invariable  order, 
wherever  and  whenever  progress  appears ;  out  of 
savagery  into  barbarism,  out  of  barbarism  into 
civilization,  always.  As  the  tools  with  which 
man  increases  his  power  are  first  stone  and  then 
metal,  so  —  with  slight  variations  —  families,  gov- 
ernments, cities,  manufactures,  commerce,  religions 
appear  in  an  unchanging  order.  When,  centuries 
later,  a  bit  of  enameled  pottery  or  a  rusted  iron 
implement  is  excavated,  a  tolerably  correct 
sketch  can  be  given  of  the  arts,  the  customs,  the 
achievements  of  the  buried  peoples  over  whom 
later  generations  had  been  heedlessly  moving. 
However  progress  may  be  characterized, — whether 
from  war  to  work  and  from  work  to  culture,  or 
from  selfishness  to  sympathy,  or  from  the  material 
to  the  moral, —  it  is  evident  that  there  is  always 
one  and  the  same  order,  law,  evolution.  Soil  and 
climate  have  been  important  factors  in  the  progress 
of  man.  Material  welfare  has  had  much  to  do 
with  social  morality.  As  the  expression  of  the 
aesthetic  has  been  determined  by  external  condi- 
tions, —  the  Dutch  artists  of  the  north  painting 
interiors,  the  southern  artists  of  Italy  painting 


22  EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS 

landscapes,  the  English  artists  painting  seacoasts 
,  and  horses  and  dogs,  the  religious  artists  painting 
Madonnas  and  saints,  —  so  morality  is  geographi- 
cal. The  essence  of  it  does  not  vary.  The  differ- 
ent customs  are  moral,  as  the  different  pictures  are 
aesthetic.  But  the  expression  of  it  in  diverse  forms 
is  determined  by  degrees  of  latitude  and  longitude. 
The  variant  customs  were  formerly,  by  some 
writers,  confounded  with  the  unvarying  nature 
of  morality,  and  led  them  to  conclude  that  there 
is  no  universal  morality,  as  when  Montaigne  having 
cited  many  examples  to  show  that  the  vice  of  one 
country  or  age  may  be  the  virtue  of  another,  in- 
quires, "  What  kind  of  virtue  is  that  which  I  see 
one  day  in  repute,  and  that  to-morrow  shall  be  in 
none,  and  which  the  crossing  of  a  river  makes  a 
crime  ?  What  sort  of  truth  can  that  be  which  these 
mountains  limit  to  us,  and  make  a  lie  to  all  the 
world  beyond  them  ?  " l  —  a  notion  borrowed  and 
amplified  by  Pascal  when  he  exclaims,  "Three 
degrees  of  higher  latitude  overturn  all  jurispru- 
dence. A  meridian  decides  the  truth ;  fundamental 
laws  change  in  a  few  years  ;  right  has  its  epochs. 
.  .  .  Pitiable  justice  bounded  by  a  river.  Truth 
this  side  the  Pyrenees,  error  that  side."2  Mac- 
aulay  apologizes  for  the  perfidy  of  Machiavelli 
in  view  of  the  peculiar  moral  standards  of  Italy 
in  the  sixteenth  century ;  and  Burke  found  it 
necessary  to  expose  Warren  Hastings  for  haying 
administered  the  affairs  of  India  on  "a  plan  of 
geographical  morality  by  which  the  duties  of  men, 

1  Apology  far  Raimond  Sebond. 

2  Pascal's  Thoughts,  translated  by  0.  W.  Wight,  p.  183. 


IDENTITY  23 

in  public  and  in  private  situations,  are  not  to  be 
governed  by  their  relation  to  the  great  Governor 
of  the  universe,  or  by  their  relation  to  mankind, 
but  by  climates,  degrees  of  longitude,  —  paral- 
lels, not  of  life,  but  of  latitudes."  l  These  facts 
are  not  now  interpreted  to  mean  that  moral 
sentiments  have  no  basis  in  the  nature  of  man, 
and  that  morality  is  exhaustively  defined  by  the 
etymology  of  the  word,  as  that  which  is  custom- 
ary, but  rather  to  mean  that  morality  is  a  pro- 
duct and  at  the  same  time  a  factor  of  evolution, 
in  which  the  forms  and  expressions  of  universal 
convictions  of  duty  are  determined  by  environ- 
ment, and  therefore  to  mean  that  morality  is 
precisely  and  merely  one  phase  of  evolution. 
Ultimately,  the  moral  sentiments  of  man  origi- 
nate in  the  feelings  of  those  animals  from  which 
man  is  derived.  That  feeling  or  instinct  which 
in  animals  is  the  condition  of  reproduction,  of 
gregariousness,  and  of  cooperation,  and  to  which 
the  human  word,  sympathy,  is  applied,  becomes  in 
man  the  sentiment  of  morality  in  social  relations. 
It  gave  man  his  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence, as  an  individual  and  as  a  species.  It 
consolidated  his  strength.  Each  man  was  safer 
by  reason  of  the  protection  afforded  by  combina- 
tion. Mutual  dependence  forbids  stealing,  lying, 
and  murder.  Thus  hurtful  habits  are  suppressed, 
helpful  habits  are  developed,  and  the  convictions 
of  right  and  wrong,  of  good  and  evil,  are  rooted. 
The  keenest  enjoyments  are  felt  in  the  exercise 
of  the  affections  and  services  of  love.  Thus  the 

1  The  Works  of  Edmund  Burke,  vol.  ix.,  pp.  447,  448. 


24  EVOLUTION   AND   ETHICS 

highest  phase  of  evolution  is  that  morality  which 
has  become  the  conscience  of  civilized  humanity. 
This  may  seem  far  away  from  the  cruelty  of  ani- 
mals defending  their  young  with  tooth  and  claw, 
from  the  fighting  of  one  savage  tribe  with  another, 
from  the  polygamy  under  which  a  man  has  right 
of  property  in  several  women  ;  but  this  rudimen- 
lary  and  that  efflorescent  morality  are  from  one 
and  the  same  stock.  A  flower  is  unlike  a  root,  a 
rose  is  different  from  a  thorn  ;  but  the  flower  is 
the  beautiful  and  fragrant  product  of  that  in 
which  leaf,  branch,  bark,  root,  and  even  soil  and 
climate  are  essential.  Do  we  not,  indeed,  speak 
of  art,  culture,  and  morality  as  the  consummate 
flower  of  civilization  ?  In  view  of  such  consider- 
tions,  it  is  maintained  by  many  that  morality  and 
evolution  are  neither  antagonistic  nor  indepen- 
dent, but  that  they  are  simply  identical.  One 
might  as  well  ask  whether  the  eye  and  the  ear  are 
opposed  or  independent.  Hearing  and  sight  are 
not  the  same  sensation,  but  in  a  normal  body  both 
are  functions  of  the  one  organism.  They  are  only 
separate  phases  of  a  form  of  life  called  human, 
which  in  turn  is  a  phase  of  the  infinitely  vast 
yet  infinitesimally  discriminating  process  of  evo- 
lution. 

These  statements  are,  or  are  intended  to  be,  a 
fair  and  intelligible  account  of  the  opinion  that 
evolution  and  morality  are  identical.  It  is  the 
theory  which  is  characterized  as  the  evolution  of 
ethics.  The  opinion  is,  in  my  judgment,  nearer 
the  truth  than  either  of  those  previously  noticed. 
It  is  open  to  criticism  as  failing  to  distinguish 


IDENTITY  ,  25 

different  factors  in  the  process  of  development. 
It  confuses  the  mode,  the  method,  in  which  various 
kinds  of  forces  act,  with  the  forces  themselves,  with 
the  causes  and  nature  of  things.  The  mode,  it  is 
true,  resides  in  the  nature.  The  how  is  conditioned 
on  the  what.  The  various  beings  and  the  various 
forces  are  related  also,  and  their  differences  are 
brought  about  by  evolution.  But  differences  exist. 
This  very  differentiation  is  in  fact  a  law  and  at 
the  same  time  a  mystery  of  evolution.  It  is  a 
lengthy  and  imposing  word  to  indicate  that  at  cer- 
tain points  something  new  appears.  The  new  is 
not  unrelated  to  the  old,  but  it  is  unlike  the  old, 
and  breaks  out  a  path  of  its  own.  The  wondering 
beholder  asks  the  evolutionist  how  this  difference 
is  produced,  and  must  be  contented  with  the  pro- 
found answer  that  the  difference  is  produced  by  a 
process  of  differentiation.  I  would  not  intimate 
that  at  these  points,  or  at  any  points,  the  process  of 
evolution  is  suspended,  nor  that  the  new  force  in 
turn  refuses  to  comply  with  evolutionary  conditions. 
My  meaning  is,  that  the  relation  of  one  thing  to 
another  does  not  amount  to  the  two  things  ;  that 
functions  must  be  distinguished ;  that  it  is  as  im- 
possible to  identify  morality  with  evolution  as  it 
is  to  put  them  out  of  relation.  The  law  of  gravi- 
tation is  universal,  but  it  does  not  enable  us  to 
distinguish  nitrogen  from  hydrogen.  Without 
gravitation  there  might  be  no  chemical  elements 
nor  affinities,  but  phosphorus  is  not  identical  with 
gravitation.  They  are  not  antagonistic.  They  are 
not  independent.  But  assuredly  they  are  not  iden- 
tical. Neither  are  morality  and  evolution  identical. 


26  EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS 


VII 

The  fourth  view  of  the  relation  of  evolution  and 
ethics  is  the  view  that  they  are  harmonious.  They 
are  not  antagonistic,  for  then  one  theory  or  the 
other  must  be  untrue.  They  are  not  independent, 
for  a  line  cannot  be  drawn  low  enough  to  keep  the 
moral  above  it,  nor  high  enough  to  keep  evolution 
beneath  it.  They  are  not  identical,  for  the  very 
excellent  reason  that  they  are  different.  They 
must  therefore  be  coincident  and  harmonious. 
Evolution  is  the  mode  in  which  life  develops  from 
the  lower  to  the  higher  orders  of  plants  and  ani- 
mals ;  the  mode  in  which  man,  the  vertebrate  mam- 
mal, is  derived  from  other  vertebrate  mammals; 
probably  the  mode  in  which  the  psychical  powers 
of  man  are  derived  from  animals  which  are  intelli- 
gent and  can  communicate  by  tone  and  gesture ; 
and  not  improbably  the  mode  in  which  the  moral 
sentiments  of  man  are  derived  from  certain  in- 
stincts and  feelings  of  animals.  Those  instincts 
and  feelings,  which  certainly  simulate  our  moral 
convictions,  are  not  only  the  sympathetic  but  also 
the  .gelf -regarding  impulses.  It  has  been  strangely 
overlooked  that  self-preservation  and  self-perfection 
are  as  truly  in  the  nature  of  morality  as  sympathy 
and  self-sacrifice. 

The  harmony  may  be  found  on  several  lines  of 
comparison.  For  example,  evolution  is  understood 
by  perceiving  the  ends  towards  which  it  works. 
It  is  known  to  be  evolution  only  when  the  results 
are  seen.  Otherwise  the  universe  is  chance  or  chaos. 
If  an  observer  could  have  been  stationed  at  the 


HARMONY  27 

point  where  life  began  to  advance  unconsciously, 
and  had  been  able  to  prophesy  all  the  struggle  for 
existence  and  survival  of  the  fittest,  he  could  have 
discovered  the  law  of  evolution  only  by  discerning 
the  ends  towards  which  the  creation  would  move. 
The  final  cause  is  indispensable  to  evolution.  But 
the  most  fundamental  principle  of  ethics  is  the 
recognition  and  pursuit  of  ideals. 

Again,  the  coincidence  may  be  found  in  re- 
spect to  the  materials,  the  very  constituents,  which 
are  the  working  forces  of  ethics  and  evolution  in 
human  development.  These  have  already  been 
noticed,  the  self-regarding  and  the  other-regarding 
feelings,  self-assertion  and  altruism.  To  recog- 
nize these  correspondences  it  will  be  necessary 
to  consider  the  personality  of  man  in  society,  a 
subject  with  which  some  of  the  following  chapters 
are  occupied. 

And,  once  more,  the  coincidence  is  found,  as  has 
been  suggested,  in  the  method  of  all  that  can  be 
called  progress  in  any  department  of  life,  namely, 
the  method  of  gradual  advance.  It  is  a  method 
usually  of  slow  and  always  of  connected  develop- 
ment. The  advance  of  society,  like  that  of  nature, 
is  not  spasmodic,  but  graduated.  Even  revolu- 
tions and  reformations  are  now  known  to  be  results 
rather  than  causes,  although  every  event  of  mag- 
nitude, if  it  is  a  great  result,  must  become  in  turn 
a  great  cause.  They  are  thunder-storms  clearing 
the  atmosphere,  in  which,  however,  electricity  has 
been  accumulating  during  days  of  excessive  heat. 
The  knowledge  that  society  develops  under  appro- 
priate influences,  and  does  not  advance  by  leaps 


28  EVOLUTION  AND   ETHICS 

and  jerks,  affects  all  schemes  of  social  reformation. 
Reforms  are  planned  for  the  campaign  of  a  decade 
or  a  generation,  rather  than  for  a  season  or  an  an- 
nual election.  The  corporate  life  of  society,  the 
antecedents  of  heredity,  custom,  national  history, 
climate,  are  taken  into  account.  Negroes  and  Jap- 
anese will  not  advance  at  the  same  rate,  nor  in  the 
same  direction.  The  slow  process  by  which  per- 
sistency of  type  is  gained  is  not  ignored.  Schemes 
for  the  elevation  of  society  are  modified  as  to  time 
and  enlarged  as  to  scope. 

The  coincidence  as  to  method  is  found  finally 
in  the  expectation  of  progress.  Evolutionists  are 
optimistic.  They  believe  that  the  goal  of  human 
progress  has  not  yet  been  reached.  They  antici- 
pate enormous  advances  in  knowledge,  art,  industry, 
government.  Man  will  penetrate  into  secrets  which 
are  now  hidden.  Society  will  develop  new  econo- 
mies, new  aesthetics,  new  ethics.  The  moral  stand- 
ards of  the  England  of  to-day  are  no  farther  in 
advance  of  the  coarse  customs  of  Merrie  England 
than  the  ethical  refinements  of  England  in  the 
twenty-third  century  will  be  in  advance  of  that 
rapacity  and  oppression  to  which  its  aristocracy  is 
so  indifferent  now.  The  social  reciprocities  will  be 
developed  more  and  more.  Society  is  in  the  midst 
of  a  moral  evolution  which  has  done  little  more 
than  to  make  a  good  beginning  in  the  temperate 
zones.  In  this  expectation  of  progress,  evolution 
and  ethics  agree.  The  moral  prophet  is  perhaps 
somewhat  more  sober  than  the  prophet  of  evolu- 
tion ;  for  the  latter,  it  must  be  confessed,  often 
peems  more  at  home  in  the  twentieth  or  thirtieth 


HARMONY  ,  29 

century  than  in  the  nineteeth.  And  the  ethical 
prophet  is  not  as  likely  as  the  evolutionary  seer 
to  believe  that  progress,  because  it  is  gradual  and 
connected,  can  be  left  to  take  care  of  itself. 

The  opinion  that  evolution  is  antagonistic  to 
morality,  and  the  opinion  that  they  are  indepen- 
dent, make  the  same  mistake.  Both  opinions 
think  of  evolution  as  struggle  and  survival,  and  not 
also  as  reproduction  and  sympathy.  Both  find 
morality  only  in  the  social  and  not  also  in  the  self- 
regarding  feelings.  They  both  confine  morality 
to  the  sympathetic  and  evolution  to  the  self -assert- 
ing feelings.  But  there  is  morality  in  self-regard 
as  well  as  in  sympathy,  and  there  is  evolution  in 
sympathy  as  well  as  in  self-regard.  And  the  opin- 
ion that  ethics  and  evolution  are  identical  reduces 
regard  for  others  to  self-regard,  altruism  to  selfish- 
ness, morality  to  a  phase  of  self-preservation.  I 
shall  return  to  the  comparison  after  indicating  the 
essential  principles  of  ethics,  with  the  expectation 
of  establishing  in  the  main,  even  if  not  at  every 
point,  the  harmony  of  evolution  with  morality. 
My  confidence  that  this  can  be  accomplished  rests 
in  no  small  measure  on  the  spirit  of  candor  and 
the  irenic  temper  with  which  it  is  generally  agreed 
that  the  discussion  of  important  interests  should 
be  conducted. 


CHAPTER  II 

PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

IT  is  necessary  to  know  what  the  moral  man  is 
in  order  to  know  how  he  has  become  what  he  is. 
The  present  contains  the  past.  The  product  reg- 
isters its  own  history.  The  pattern  of  a  fabric 
must  be  seen  before  the  separate  threads  can  be 
woven  together..  Its  constituent  elements,  what 
may  be  called  its  creation,  production,  or  evolution, 
are  best  known  by  unraveling  it.  If  the  method 
is  reversed,  if  the  separate  threads  are  taken  up 
at  each  point  where  the  weaving  began  and  are 
traced  along  their  several  lines,  they  can  be  under- 
stood only  because  the  finished  pattern  is  all  the 
time  before  the  eye.  The  interpreter  of  the  past 
is  himself  the  moral  personality  who  is  the  product 
of  the  past  he  interprets.  He  knows  his  own 
evolution  by  present  analysis  rather  than  by  an- 
cient prophecy.  We  must  therefore  take  our 
stand  by  the  ethical  man  where  he  is,  if  we  would 
know  that  and  how  he  is  the  evolved  man. 


We  find  ourselves  in  a  society  of  human  beings. 
Every  one  is  a  moral  personality  living  in  relation 
with  others  like  himself.  Society  consists  of  re- 
lated moral  personalities.  Personality  and  society 
produce  each  other,  condition  each  other,  promote 


SOCIETY  AND  PERSONS,  31 

each  other.  Society  does  not  become  more  highly 
organized  at  the  expense  of  individuals,  but  is  only 
individuals  more  highly  potentialized  and  more 
variously  related.  The  advance  of  society  multi- 
plies the  relations,  and  at  the  same  time  enhances 
the  importance  of  the  individual.  The  more  vari- 
ous the  social  life,  the  more  distinctive  is  person- 
ality. The  more  characteristic  individuals  are,  the 
more  diversified  society  is.  That  is  the  best  so- 
ciety which  includes  the  largest  number  of  unique 
persons.  Savagery  is  uniform.  A  thousand  sav- 
ages live  as  close  together  as  a  thousand  New  Eng- 
landers,  but  are  distinguished  from  one  another 
only,  or  chiefly,  by  sex,  age,  and  size.  They  divide 
up  the  work  a  little.  They  think  alike,  or  not  at 
all,  and  converse  therefore  in  monosyllables.  That 
is  not  society.  There  is  no  development  of  per- 
sonality, but  only  a  horde  of  men,  women,  and 
children.  The  more  highly  society  is  articulated 
the  more  distinctive  is  the  specializing  of  talents. 
The  best  society,  while  certain  outward  conven- 
tionalities of  dress  and  manners  are  observed  alike 
by  all,  brings  together  persons  of  diverse  gifts. 
The  bond  of  union  and  interest  is  the  contribution 
each  makes  to  the  common  enjoyment ;  one  bring- 
ing information,  another  flashing  with  brilliancy  of 
repartee,  another  supplying  musical  skill.  What 
agreeable  society !  it  is  said.  It  is  agreeable  because 
with  no  clashing  there  are  so  many  kinds  of  talents 
and  gifts.  As  we  go  down,  monotony.  As  we  go 
up,  variety.  As  we  go  down,  social  life  is  mechan- 
ical. As  we  go  up,  it  is  organic.  As  we  go  down, 
personality  is  reduced.  As  we  go  up,  the  separate 


32  PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

members  are  differentiated  more  and  more,  yet  are 
more  closely  united. 

It  is  an  exploded  notion  that  the  individual  is 
distinct  from  society,  and  can  be  considered  as 
separate  from  it ;  that  the  individual  comes  first 
and  society  comes  afterwards ;  that  there  ever  was 
a  compact  made  by  individuals  coming  from  scat- 
tered points  of  a  remote  circumference  down  the 
radii  to  the  centre  where  they  held  a  convention 
and  voted  to  become  a  society.  On  the  other  hand 
it  is  an  incorrect  notion  that  society  is  a  Grand 
Being,  the  Grand  Eire  of  Comte,  with  a  con- 
sciousness, a  spirit,  a  personality  of  its  own.  For 
convenience,  it  may  for  some  purposes  be  so  desig- 
nated, but  only  in  an  accommodated  sense.  There 
is  no  central  consciousness  of  humanity,  or  of  a 
nation,  but  only  a  distributed  consciousness.  Hu- 
manity as  a  whole  is  not  conscious  of  aims  and 
tendencies.  These  can  be  known  only  by  God, 
who  knows  all  things  perfectly  because  his  thought 
and  life  are  in  all  and  through  all,  and  by  indi- 
viduals who  observe  and  in  a  measure  control 
the  movements  of  society.  The  Zeit-Geist  is 
merely  the  effect  of  knowledge  upon  the  thought 
of  large  numbers  of  men  at  the  same  time.  We 
may  now  trace  more  in  detail  the  relation  of  in- 
dividuals to  society. 

ii 

By  inheritance  the  individual  is  the  product  of 
the  race.  He  receives  his  physical  organs  and  all 
his  powers  by  reproduction,  in  which  immediate 
and  remote  ancestors  bore  a  part.  A  man  is  one 


KNOWLEDGE   TRANSMITTED  33 

who  belongs  to  and  is  derived  from  the  human 
race.  He  is  a  being  born  of  woman.  A  Robin- 
son Crusoe  may  be  isolated  from  all  other  men, 
but  he  must  have  been  born  from  human  parents, 
must  have  inherited  his  qualities  from  them,  and 
must  have  been  nurtured  by  them  in  infancy. 
Leslie  Stephen  says  that  "a  man  not  dependent 
upon  a  race  is  as  meaningless  a  phrase  as  an  apple 
that  does  not  grow  upon  a  tree  ;  "  that  one  cannot 
therefore  say  that  "  an  apple  owes  certain  quali- 
ties to  the  fact  of  its  growing  upon  a  tree,  for  it 
owes  all  its  qualities  to  that  fact ; "  that  the  non- 
tree-grown  apple  is  a  nonentity.1  It  is  due  to  a 
pre-existing  society  that  the  individual  is,  and  that 
he  is  what  he  is. 

in 

Society  accumulates  knowledge  and  experience 
which  it  makes  over  to  newcomers.  The  enor- 
mous advantage  of  modern  over  ancient  life  is 
not  due  apparently  to  any  radical  change  in  the 
human  organization,  but  to  the  legacy  which  each 
generation,  after  adding  its  own  increment,  has 
transmitted  to  the  following  generation.  Material 
and  mental  wealth  have  been  accumulated  and 
handed  down.  The  Englishman  of  the  Victorian 
era  has  no  greater  capacity,  it  may  be,  than  the 
Saxon  who  fought  against  and  surrendered  to 
William  the  Conqueror  ;  but  the  intervening  mil- 
lennium has  stored  up  mechanical  appliances,  lit- 
erature, science,  art,  laws,  which  multiply  the  power 
of  the  modern  man  a  hundredfold.  "  He  in- 
1  The  Science  of  Ethics,  pp.  96,  97. 


34  PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

herits,"  says  Mr.  Stephen,  "  not  merely  the  tan- 
gible products  of  labor,  but  the  methods  of  labor. 
Our  ancestors  transmit  to  us  both  results,  and  the 
means  of  obtaining  fresh  results ;  they  transmit 
their  mechanical  skill  and  their  logic,  although 
they  do  not  transmit  any  modification  of  structure. 
The  infant  always  starts  at  the  same  point  of  in- 
telligence, but  the  path  has  been  cleared  for  him, 
so  that  he  can  reach  an  enormously  more  distant 
goal.  A  child  is  not  born  a  clock-maker  now  any 
more  than  he  was  three  thousand  years  ago,  but 
not  the  less  does  he  inherit  the  power  of  making 
clocks." l  Language  is  the  vehicle  which  conveys 
this  legacy.  It  is  a  ready-made  instrument  which 
the  child  receives  from  its  nurse  or  mother.  In  lan- 
guage, signs  are  given  by  which  things  are  remem- 
bered, and  which  are  a  medium  of  exchange.  It 
preserves  logic,  science,  philosophy,  religion.  The 
writer  just  quoted  adds  that  "  to  teach  a  child  to 
speak  is  to  educate  it,  to  prepare  it  for  association 
with  others,  to  lay  it  open  to  all  manner  of  influ- 
ences, to  start  it  with  a  mass  of  knowledge  already 
elaborately  organized,  to  teach  it  methods  of 
thinking  and  imagining,  to  insinuate  into  its 
mind  philosophical  and  religious  principles,  and  to 
inoculate  it  with  innumerable  associations  which 
must  be  important  elements  in  the  development  of 
its  character."  2  While  some  of  the  experiences  of 
men  are  recorded  in  modifications  of  the  physical 
structure,  and  so  are  transmitted  by  reproduction, 
such  changes  being  very  slight  and  very  slow,  as 

1  The  Science  of  Ethics,  p.  105. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  106, 107, 


KNOWLEDGE  TRANSMITTED  35 

witli  animals,  other  experiences  which  create  the 
quicker  progress  of  civilization  are  recorded  in 
language,  both  oral  and  written,  by  which  the  tra- 
ditions, the  literature,  the  poetry,  the  philosophy, 
the  science,  the  religion  of  all  the  ages  are  heaped 
up  in  the  lap  of  the  latest  generation,  and  by 
them  in  turn,  with  some  accretions,  made  over 
to  their  successors.  The  moderns  must  say  what 
the  ancients  said,  but  with  added  emphasis  :  "  Other 
men  labored,  and  we  have  entered  into  their 
labors."  The  talents  we  have  received  gratuitously 
we  must  bequeath  with  interest,  giving  heed  to 
that  other  maxim,  "Freely  ye  have  received, 
freely  give." 

An  inheritance  may,  it  is  true,  be  diminished  by 
the  individual  who  receives  it,  as  in  the  case,  cited 
by  Lotze,1  of  a  great  fortune,  which  the  children 
who  were  brought  up  in  the  presence  of  the  labor 
by  which  it  was  produced  preserve,  even  if  they 
will  not  toil  as  their  fathers  did  to  increase  it,  but 
which  the  grandchildren,  who  know  nothing  of 
the  worth  of  the  labor  which  created  it,  soon 
squander.  But  this  is  only  material  wealth,  and, 
even  so,  it  is  not  lost  to  society,  but  only  to  par- 
ticular individuals.  The  inheritance  of  culture, 
when  it  has  really  come  into  possession,  cannot  be 
lost.  It  may  seem,  also,  that  the  eagerness  of  dis- 
covery has  an  advantage  over  the  familiarity  of 
later  knowledge  ;  but  this  is  the  advantage  of  curi- 
osity rather  than  of  value  and  use,  and  may  even 
be  a  disadvantage  by  attaching  undue  importance 
to  new  truth,  which,  when  it  has  become  familiar, 

1  Microcosmus,  English  translation,  vol.  ii.,  p.  151. 


36  PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

is  rightly  adjusted  to  old  truth.     The  exaggerated 
claim  made  for  evolution  is  an  instance  in  point. 

IV 

The  individual  is  also  dependent  on  his  contem- 
poraries. If  a  cross-section  showing  a  single  day 
in  the  life  of  a  civilized  man  could  be  exposed, 
it  would  disclose  the  services  of  a  multitude  of 
helpers.  When  he  rises,  a  sponge  is  placed  in  his 
hand  by  a  Pacific  Islander,  a  cake  of  soap  by  a 
Frenchman,  a  rough  towel  by  a  Turk.  His 
merino  underwear  he  takes  from  the  hand  of  a 
Spaniard,  his  linen  from  a  Belfast  manufacturer, 
his  outer  garments  from  a  Birmingham  weaver, 
his  scarf  from  a  French  silk-grower,  his  shoes 
from  a  Brazilian  grazier.  At  breakfast,  his  cup  of 
coffee  is  poured  by  natives  of  Java  and  Arabia; 
his  rolls  are  passed  by  a  Kansas  farmer,  his  beef- 
steak by  a  Texan  ranchman,  his  orange  by  a 
Florida  negro.  He  is  taken  to  the  city  by  the 
descendants  of  James  Watt ;  his  messages  are 
carried  hither  and  thither  by  Edison,  the  grandson 
by  electrical  consanguinity  of  Benjamin  Franklin ; 
his  day's  stint  of  work  is  done  for  him  by  a  thou- 
sand Irishmen  in  his  factory;  or  he  pleads  in  a 
court  which  was  founded  by  ancient  Romans,  and 
for  the  support  of  which  all  citizens  are  taxed; 
or  in  his  study  at  home  he  reads  books  composed 
by  English  historians  and  French  scientists,  and 
which  were  printed  by  the  typographical  descend- 
ants of  Gutenberg.  In  the  evening  he  is  enter- 
tained by  German  singers  who  repeat  the  myths 
of  Norsemen,  or  by  a  company  of  actors  who  ren- 


INCREASE  OF  SOCIAL  FUNCTIONS       37 

der  the  plays  of  Shakespeare ;  and,  finally,  he  is 
put  to  bed  by  South  Americans  who  bring  hair, 
by  Pennsylvania  miners  and  furnace- workers  who 
bring  steel,  by  Mississippi  planters  who  bring 
cotton,  or,  if  he  prefers,  by  Russian  peasants  who 
bring  flax,  and  by  Labrador  fowlers  who  smooth 
his  pillow.  A  million  men,  women,  and  children 
have  been  working  for  him  that  he  may  have  his 
day  of  comfort  and  pleasure.  In  return  he  has 
contributed  his  mite  to  add  a  unit  to  the  common 
stock  of  necessaries  and  luxuries  from  which  the 
world  draws.  Each  is  working  for  all;  all  are 
working  for  each.  When  Robert  Louis  Stevenson 
was  living  near  a  deserted  mine  in  the  heart  of  the 
California  mountains,  it  was  almost  impossible  to 
get  fresh  meat  and  milk ;  and  in  his  sketch  entitled 
"The  Silverado  Squatters  "  he  observes  parenthet- 
ically that  "  it  is  really  disheartening  how  we 
depend  011  other  people  in  this  life."  Man  is 
never  separate  from  mankind.  It  has  been  truly 
said  that  no  comparison  can  be  made  between  man 
alone  and  society,  but  only  between  man  in  early 
and  later  stages  of  social  development. 


In  view  of  the  dependence  of  the  individual  on 
society,  a  dependence  which  increases  with  the  pro- 
gress of  civilization,  it  may  next  be  observed  that 
the  advances  of  society  are  towards  more  highly 
organized  life,  and  towards  an  increasing  partici- 
pation of  each  individual  in  social  functions.  Po- 
litical, industrial,  philanthropic,  and  ecclesiastical 
organizations  multiply  as  society  advances,  and  at 


38  PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

the  same  time  the  individual  identifies  himself  with 
a  greater  number  of  those  organizations.  It  is  not 
the  case  that  people  are  parceled  out  into  separate 
groups  until  all  have  been  distributed,  but  that  the 
individual  is  found  in  many  groups.  The  same 
man  is  a  husband,  a  father,  a  brother,  a  citizen,  a 
Democrat,  an  Episcopalian,  a  director  of  a  bank, 
a  Freemason,  an  officer  in  several  charitable  soci- 
eties, the  president  of  a  Browning  club,  and  a 
member  of  twenty  other  sodalities  and  fraternities. 
Neither  is  he  divided  up  among  them,  except  in 
some  division  of  his  time.  He  puts  the  whole  of 
himself,  all  his  wisdom  and  energy,  into  each  and 
all.  He  is  not  one  quarter  father,  one  tenth  a 
churchman,  one  fifth  a  politician,  but  is  the  same 
interested  and  efficient  man  and  shows  the  same 
personal  characteristics,  in  all  the  relations. 

Social  combinations  are  appraised  at  a  high 
valuation.  We  have  a  regard,  even  an  affection, 
for  the  corporation  to  which  we  belong.  The 
college  from  which  one  graduates  is  alma  mater. 
The  church  is  she.  Institutions  in  which  we  are 
members  without  our  own  choice,  as  the  State, 
call  out  feelings  which  are  not  easily  analyzed  but 
are  among  our  deepest  and  strongest  emotions.  In 
a  foreign  land,  the  sight  of  our  own  national  flag 
starts  a  tear.  The  heart  beats  quicker  as  our 
returning  ship  steams  up  the  harbor.  We  are 
almost  saddened  by  the  reminder  that  corporations 
have  no  souls,  and  are  comforted  with  the  reflection 
that  the  maxim  is  true  only  of  business  corpora- 
tions. Even  temporary  and  accidental  associations, 
as  of  travelers  on  a  stage-coach  or  ocean  steamship, 


DEVELOPMENT    OF  PERSONALITY       39 

create  a  sympathetic  society  in  community  of  inter- 
ests and  dangers.  We  are  not  willing  to  be 
passed  by  another  coach  or  steamship,  although,  as 
Mr.  Stephen  remarks,  when  using  this  illustration, 
our  merits  have  no  influence  upon  the  success  of 
our  own  company.  This  increase  of  organization, 
which  does  not  reduce  but  enhances  personality, 
which  multiplies  rather  than  divides  the  individual 
by  the  number  of  interests  with  which  he  is  identi- 
fied, is  coincident  with  the  advance  of  civilization. 
In  the  nomad  state  of  hunting,  when  room  is 
needed,  there  is  scarcely  any  coherence.  There  is 
no  permanent  residence,  no  local  home.  Grazing 
and  agriculture  require  combination  of  efforts,  the 
accumulation  of  products,  the  dwelling-place,  the 
home,  the  community.  The  storing  and  distribu- 
tion of  products  require  towns  and  cities,  and  with 
them  appears  the  political  community,  the  State. 
As  area  is  narrowed  and  men  dwell  more  closely 
together,  organization  becomes  more  compact  and 
diversified. 

VI 

This  increasing  participation  of  individuals  in 
social  functions  may  be  best  characterized  as  the 
development  of  personality.  Complexity  of  organ- 
ization signifies  increasing  wants  and  the  develop- 
ing talents  of  individuals.  Progress  means  wants. 
The  lower  man  is  on  the  scale  of  civilization, 
the  fewer  are  his  wants.  The  savage  is  satisfied 
with  the  bare  necessaries  of  life.  A  precarious 
food-supply,  scanty  or  no  clothing  in  the  torrid, 
undressed  furs  in  the  frigid  zones,  rude  huts  for 
shelter,  satisfy  him.  He  takes  no  thought  for 


40  PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

the  morrow.  The  wants  of  the  civilized  man  are 
so  numerous  that  the  primitive  physical  needs  con- 
stitute but  a  small  item  of  his  demands.  Luxu- 
ries become  more  important  than  necessaries.  His 
wants  are  intellectual,  social,  artistic.  As  soon  as 
wants  for  which  he  craved  satisfaction  are  realized, 
he  is  conscious  of  new  wants.  Most  men  have 
no  margin  of  income.  Increase  of  income  brings 
advance  in  the  scale  of  living.  One  imagines  that 
if  his  income  were  doubled  he  would  soon  be  rich. 
But,  on  the  contrary,  he  spends  twice  as  much,  or 
even  a  little  more  than  that.  It  is  like  the  manna 
in  the  wilderness.  He  that  gathered  much  had 
nothing  over,  and  he  that  gathered  little  had  no 
lack.  The  reason  then  offered  is  reversed,  however, 
in  the  history  of  supply  and  demand.  Then  they 
gathered  every  man  according  to  his  eating.  Now 
every  man  eats  according  to  his  gathering.  In- 
crease of  conscious  wants  means  a  growing  man. 
Enjoyment  is  measured  by  capacity.  An  ignorant 
person  may  have  money  enough  to  buy  a  book, 
which  belongs  to  him  by  legal  possession,  but  which 
corresponds  to  no  existing  want.  He  gets  neither 
information  nor  inspiration  from  it.  It  is  only  so 
much  paper  and  ink.  The  man  who  wants  litera- 
ture, poetry,  music,  art,  science,  and  philosophy  is 
the  man  who  is  himself  literary,  poetic,  musical, 
artistic,  scentific,  and  philosophical.  The  myriad 
supply,  material,  intellectual,  and  aesthetic,  which 
society  creates,  is  a  supply  provided  by  and  pro- 
vided for  the  more  highly  potentialized  man.  It 
is,  then,  the  function  of  society  to  develop  persons. 
Its  product  is  not  an  impersonal  something,  a  Zeit- 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  PERSONALITY        41 

Geist,  a  spirit,  an  atmosphere,  nor  even  institu- 
tions, governments,  and  codes,  to  be  regarded  as 
final  ends.  Organized  social  forms  are  for  per- 
sons. Jesus  enunciated  the  principle  when  he  said 
that  the  Sabbath  was  made  for  man,  not  man  for 
the  Sabbath.  Institutions,  codes,  and  customs  are 
for  the  welfare  of  the  persons  who  constitute  society, 
and  persons  are  not  to  be  used  to  maintain  the 
integrity  of  institutions.  If  individuals  lay  down 
their  lives  for  the  State,  it  is  not  for  the  State,  as 
an  abstract,  impersonal  institution,  sacred  in  itself, 
but  for  the  State  as  essential  to  the  welfare  of  the 
persons  who  compose  it.  The  State  may  call  on 
the  individual  to  sacrifice  his  goods  or  his  life,  but 
not  to  sacrifice  the  goods  of  the  soul,  —  truthfulness, 
honor,  purity.  The  standards  of  society  must  be 
the  standards  of  personal  value.  While  individuals 
can  be  what  they  are  only  in  the  conditions  of 
society,  political,  economic,  and  educational,  yet  the 
end  in  view  is  the  welfare  of  persons,  —  a  com- 
munity of  self-conscious,  related  persons,  each  of 
whom  is  an  end,  and  never  to  be  used  simply  as 
a  means.  Analyze  any  pursuit  or  relation,  indus- 
trial, intellectual,  aesthetic,  political,  and  it  will  be 
found  that  in  every  case  the  final  object  is  man. 
Society  may  be  seen  to  consist  of  industries,  gov- 
ernment, art,  culture ;  but  men  enter  into  these 
pursuits,  not  to  make  the  pursuits  greater,  but  for 
their  own  advantage  and  the  advantage  of  others, 
and,  in  the  last  analysis,  to  enhance  the  value  of 
personality.  So  we  judge  any  past  civilization. 
When  a  buried  city  is  explored,  and  one  sees  all 
the  signs  of  throbbing  life,  —  implements  as  they 


42  PERSONALITY  IN  SOCIETY 

fell  from  the  hand  of  the  workman,  seats  as  they 
were  arranged  for  a  feast  or  for  a  spectacle,  —  and 
marks  the  point  to  which  the  useful  and  aesthetic 
arts  had  advanced,  he  knows  that  judgment  of  the 
city  must  be  upon  the  persons  who  thronged  its 
streets  and  palaces ;  and  in  view  of  the  virtues  and 
vices  of  princes,  the  condition  of  slaves,  the  position 
of  women,  and  in  general  the  simplicity  or  effem- 
inacy, the  moral  health  or  the  corruption,  of  the 
people.  Granting  that  the  improvement  effected 
by  that  city  and  by  similar  cities  in  respect  to 
arts  and  sciences  was  handed  on  to  the  following 
period  of  antiquity,  still  the  value  of  the  legacy 
would  be  judged  in  turn  by  the  quality  of  personal 
life  to  which  it  was  made  tributary,  and  so  the  en- 
tire development  of  an  ancient  civilization  must  be 
appraised.  When  a  future  generation  looks  back 
on  the  appliances  and  activities  of  this  century,  — 
its  railroads,  factories,  residences,  literature,  gal- 
leries, orchestras,  and  legislatures,  —  judgment  will 
be  passed  on  the  product  rather  than  on  the  mecha- 
nism, and  the  product  is  individual  character. 
Granting  that  the  mechanism  of  to-day  is  a  stage 
in  the  evolution  of  a  superior  mechanism,  so  that 
by  reason  of  what  is  done  now  there  will  be  swifter 
locomotion,  finer  fabrics,  statelier  houses,  nobler 
literature,  more  spendid  galleries,  more  magnificent 
orchestras,  and  wiser  legislatures,  still  the  value  of 
the  later  result  will  be  judged  by  the  character 
of  the  men  who  can  travel  more  swiftly,  live  more 
luxuriously,  gain  a  finer  culture,  and  appreciate  a 
purer  art.  In  the  use,  at  the  present  time,  of  that 
improved  mechanism  which  all  nations  have  in 


TWIVIH! 


DEVELOPMENT   OF  PERSONALITY        43 

common,  —  railroads,  telegraphs,  and  the  like, — 
we  ask  what  type  of  personality  is  developing  in 
Russia,  in  Japan,  in  France,  in  America,  what 
ideal  of  personality  is  reflected  and  realized  by  the 
pursuits,  the  literature,  the  art  of  modern  life. 

It  would  probably  be  admitted  that  the  highest 
types  of  civilization  are  the  English  and  German, 
branches  of  the  same  stock.  They  present  two 
related  phenomena,  —  the  most  highly  organized 
government  and  the  most  distinctive  individual- 
ity ;  the  most  complex  social  organization,  in  which 
the  people  participate,  and  the  most  strongly  ac- 
centuated personality ;  society  in  the  most  various 
relations,  and  personality  in  its  greatest  strength. 
Some  students  of  the  philosophy  of  history  find 
the  clue  by  which  they  trace  progress  from  ancient 
Greeks,  Romans,  and  Jews,  in  the  growth  and 
assertion  of  personality. 

It  is  seen  that  Greece  furnished  science,  through 
which  it  gained  insight  into  nature  as  a  rational 
order  revealing  the  Supreme  Reason ;  and  art, 
through  which  it  gained  insight  into  the  nature 
of  man  according  to  ideals  of  beauty.  It  is  seen 
that  Rome  provided  the  forms  of  justice,  which 
maintain  the  rights  of  individuals ;  and  created 
the  organization  of  states  and  municipalities,  which 
secure  the  possession  and  transmission  of  private 
property.  It  is  seen  that  Jud«a  supplied  belief 
in  the  personal  God  who  promulgates  law,  which  is 
addressed  to  the  individual  in  the  most  personal 
term,  thou.  It  has  therefore  often  been  noticed 
that  the  nomenclature  of  science  and  art  employs 
Greek  words ;  that  civil  procedure  is  defined  in 


44  PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

words  derived,  or  more  commonly  transferred,  from 
the  Latin  language ;  and  that  our  religious  con- 
ceptions '  are  expressed  in  terms  employed  in  the 
sacred  books  of  Judaea.  All  these  elements  unite 
in  producing  personality.  It  is  also  seen  that  the 
Germanic  tribes  of  northern  Europe,  before  they 
took  up  these  forms  of  civilization  and  religion, 
were  distinguished  for  self-assertion.  Personal 
prowess,  honor,  self-defense,  chivalry,  are  Teutonic 
characteristics.  But  they  were  expressed  in  feuds, 
piracy,  adventure,  cruelty,  oftener  than  in  deeds 
of  chivalrous  bravery.  Upon  this  virile  stock  the 
influences  of  the  older  civilizations  were  brought,  to 
refine  and  strengthen  it.  When  the  northern  peo- 
ples came  into  possession  of  the  science,  philoso- 
phy, and  art  given  by  Greece,  of  the  law,  justice, 
and  right  of  private  property  given  by  Rome,  and 
into  the  belief  in  one  personal  God  given  by  Judaea 
and  spiritualized  by  Christianity,  these  profound 
influences,  which  in  their  several  forms  signi- 
fied personality,  developed  the  fresh,  young,  self- 
asserting  barbarian  into  the  strongest  personality 
the  world  has  seen.  The  German  who  remained 
at  home  became  the  profound,  solitary  thinker,  the 
independent  and  indefatigable  investigator.  The 
Anglo-Saxon  who  went  abroad  became  the  pioneer, 
the  sailor,  the  colonist,  the  persistent,  courageous, 
indomitable  Englishman.  In  discerning  the  phi- 
losophy of  history  there  may  be  differences  of  opin- 
ion as  to  many  details,  while  there  is  practical 
agreement  on  some  such  an  outline  as  I  have 
sketched.  Progress  may  be  characterized,  summa- 
rily, as  the  growing  power  and  sacredness  of  per- 


GREAT   MEN  45 

sonality.  A  lowest  class  exists,  brutalized  and 
incompetent,  a  muddy  mass  of  social  sediment. 
But  the  personal  life  above  is  not  indifferent  to 
the  sodden  deposit  below.  The  rights  of  the  low- 
est are  asserted.  Personality  is  aroused,  till  one 
and  another  is  emancipated  and  rises  into  the  rank 
above.  The  mass  is  aerated,  and  when  a  bubble 
escapes  it  rises  to  the  surface. 

VII 

It  is  not  only  true  that  progress  promotes  per- 
sonality, but  also  that  it  is  produced,  or  at  least 
quickened,  by  great  personalities.  Every  epoch  in 
national  history,  every  revolution,  every  reform, 
every  religion,  is  associated  with  a  name.  They  are 
identified  with  the  names  of  conquerors,  patriots, 
leaders,  reformers,  founders.  The  significance  of 
great  personalities  in  history  has  been  too  much  re- 
duced of  late,  owing  to  the  disposition  to  find  pro- 
gress in  general  movements  and  gradual  changes. 
But  great  men  have  arisen,  who  have  been  taken 
possession  of  by  some  idea  or  ideal  which  has  dawned 
upon  them  by  intuition  or  inspiration  rather  than  by 
processes  of  reasoning,  who  have  been  so  aflame  that 
they  have  kindled  a  responsive  flame  in  the  breasts 
of  multitudes.  It  cannot  be  maintained  that  in 
such  cases  prophets  and  leaders  merely  voice  beliefs 
which  have  become  general,  and  which  wait  only 
for  expression,  for  usually  they  find  the  majority 
opposed  to  them.  Reformers  are  at  first  in  the 
minority,  not  seldom  a  minority  of  one,  Athana- 
sius  against  the  world.  They  represent  the  thought 
of  only  the  best  men  of  their  time,  or  of  the  few 


46  PERSONALITY   IN   SOCIETY 

who  have  dimly  seen  and  faintly  hoped  for  the 
better  day.  Yet  at  last  they  succeed  in  opening 
the  eyes  of  the  masses,  in  making  them  aware  of 
wrongs,  in  arousing  them  to  the  maintenance  of 
rights,  until  the  fetters  of  error  and  injustice  are 
broken.  The  leader  consolidates  sentiment  and 
organizes  action.  He  is  the  focus  to  which  scat- 
tered rays  converge,  and  in  which  they  are  concen- 
trated until  the  fires  of  revolution  or  reformation 
are  kindled  and  ablaze.  Mr.  Charles  H.  Pearson, 
in  his  interesting  and  instructive  book  entitled 
"  National  Life  and  Character,"  contends,  in  the 
closing  chapter  on  the  Decay  of  Character,  that 
the  world  is  not  likely  to  see  any  more  great  men. 
He  thinks  that  States  show  a  growing  disposition 
to  form  alliances  that  will  prevent  war,  and  that 
the  masses,  as  they  gain  influence  and  are  educated, 
will  throw  their  weight  more  and  more  into  the 
scale  of  peace,  and  that  therefore  there  will  be  no 
more  Cromwells,  Napoleons,  and  Grants.  He 
thinks  that  the  importance  of  the  statesman  is  cir- 
cumscribed, because  the  most  momentous  political 
changes  are  already  accomplished,  such  as  the  abo- 
lition of  slavery,  the  right  to  express  opinions  with 
fearlessness,  the  humanizing  of  the  penal  code,  the 
practical  separation  of  Church  and  State,  and  the 
enfranchisement  of  the  people.  Henceforth,  he 
believes,  changes  will  not  be  sensational,  but  so 
orderly  and  gradual  that  their  full  importance  can 
be  estimated  only  by  surveying  them  in  review. 
He  argues  that  there  will  be  no  great  poets,  be- 
cause all  the  epic  and  dramatic  situations  have 
been  exhausted.  Science  can  publish  no  discov- 


GREAT  MEN  47 

eries  comparable  to  those  already  made.  At  the 
best,  astronomy  will  find  only  an  asteroid,  biology 
only  minor  confirmations  of  evolution.  Besides, 
there  are  so  many  people  now,  that  no  individual 
can  be  as  conspicuous  as  when  the  population  of  a 
country  was  no  greater  than  that  of  a  modern  city. 
He  thinks  there  is  more  comfort,  more  happiness, 
and  more  intelligence  than  when  changes  were 
startling,  but  that  the  individual  is  relatively  less 
important. 

The  admission  underlies  Mr.  Pearson's  argu- 
ment that  progress,  or  at  least  change,  has  hitherto 
been  due,  in  a  large  degree,  to  forceful  personali- 
ties. It  is  rather  rash  to  predict  that  there  are  to 
be  no  more  distinguished  statesmen  while  Bismarck 
and  Gladstone  are  still  living,  and  are  more  widely 
famous  than  Pitt,  or  Burke,  or  Machiavelli  were ; 
to  affirm  that  there  will  be  no  more  eminent  scien- 
tific discoverers,  considering  that  Darwin  was  un- 
known forty  years  ago;  to  prophesy  that  there 
will  be  no  more  great  poets,  when  it  is  remembered 
that  the  entire  life  of  Tennyson  and  Browning  was 
included  in  the  present  century.  It  might  with 
equal  force  be  argued  that  social  discontent  and 
democratic  government  furnish  unprecedented  con- 
ditions for  leadership  and  fame ;  that  national  rela- 
tions are  so  sensitive  and  the  balance  of  power  so 
delicate  that,  in  use  of  the  modern  enginery  of  war, 
a  soldier  may  yet  appear  more  famous  than  any 
military  genius  of  the  past ;  that  not  all  mysteries 
of  nature  are  explored  ;  that  life  does  not  cease  to 
be  dramatic  because  it  is  comfortable,  but  with 
refinement  and  culture  becomes  more  sensitive,  and 


48  PERSONALITY  IN  SOCIETY 

so  will  give  the  poet  ample  material.  It  may  be, 
indeed,  that  the  individual  is  relatively  less  impor- 
tant when  the  number  of  people  is  greater ;  but  he 
may  lead  and  inspire  as  many  as  others  before  him 
have  aroused,  and,  by  reason  of  the  press,  which 
informs  the  world  of  all  events,  may  be  more  dis- 
tinguished than  his  predecessors.  The  logic  of  the 
argument  is  that  the  number  of  influential  persons 
will  increase  rather  than  decrease  with  greater 
populations  and  the  facilities  of  communication. 
But  however  that  may  be,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  personality  reaches  a  higher  level  all  through 
society.  The  distance  between  leaders  and  people 
is  not  so  wide  as  in  ancient  and  mediasval  times. 
That,  indeed,  is  the  principal  reason  for  believing 
that  individuals  will  not  be  conspicuous  above  the 
multitude.  From  an  elevated  table-land  the  moun- 
tain peak  does  not  stand  for  its  real  altitude  above 
the  sea.  It  is  the  suppression  of  individuality 
which  marks  a  wide  distance  between  great  men 
and  the  masses.  Moses  was  a  great  prophet  by 
contrast  with  the  people  as  well  as  in  himself.  But 
his  wish  that  all  the  people  were  prophets  was  a 
wish  for  the  uplifting  of  the  masses  into  a  higher 
personality.  If  all  had  been  prophets,  he  might 
not  have  been  as  great  in  contrast.  But  in  reality 
he  would  have  seemed  greater,  for  some  greatness 
is  required  to  appreciate  greatness.  A  scholar  or 
philosopher  is  admired  by  his  equal  more  than  he 
is  by  his  servant.  The  saying  that  a  man  is  not  a 
hero  to  his  valet  has  been  wittily  justified  by  the 
explanation  that  it  is  not  because  the  hero  is  not  a 
hero,  but  because  the  valet  is  a  valet.  But  if  there 


INSTITUTIONS  AND  INDIVIDUALS       49 

should  be  in  the  future  few  men  or  none  who  stand 
conspicuous  above  their  fellows,  it  will  be  because 
personality  is  developed  more  generally  and  rises 
nearer  the  highest  point.  It  is  therefore  in  the 
growth  and  power  and  rights  of  personality  that 
social  progress  consists.  Browning,  in  his  youth, 
saw  that  progress  is  the  development  of  personality 
in  all  men :  — 

"  For  these  things  tend  still  upward,  progress  is 
The  law  of  life,  man  is  not  Man  as  yet.      * 
Nor  shall  I  deem  his  object  served,  his  end 
Attained,  his  genuine  strength  put  fairly  forth, 
While  only  here  and  there  a  star  dispels 
The  darkness,  here  and  there  a  towering  mind 
O'erlooks  its  prostrate  fellows :  when  the  host 
Is  out  at  once  to  the  despair  of  night, 
When  all  mankind  alike  is  perfected, 
Equal  in  full-blown  powers  —  then,  not  till  then, 
I  say,  begins  man's  general  infancy. 

Then  shall  his  long  triumphal  march  begin, 
Thence  shall  his  being  date,  —  thus  wholly  roused, 
What  he  achieves  shall  be  set  down  to  him. 
When  all  the  race  is  perfected  alike 
As  man,  that  is." l 

VIII 

The  considerations  which  have  been  presented 
make  it  clear  that  personality  and  society  are  in- 
separable. Personality  consists  largely  of  social 
potencies  and  relations  ;  society  is  simply  related 
persons.  There  could  be  no  satisfaction  in  a  life 
of  solitude.  It  is,  indeed,  almost  inconceivable. 
The  myths  and  legends  of  human  origins  picture 
two  persons,  an  original  pair,  as  necessary,  not 

1  Paracelsus, 


50  PERSONALITY  IN  SOCIETY 

only  for  the  production  of  society,  but  also  for 
mutual  satisfaction.  One  of  the  earliest  words 
attributed  to  divine  wisdom  is  the  word  that  it  is 
not  good  for  man  to  be  alone.  Even  a  pair  of 
individuals  needs  a  larger  society.  One  of  the  feli- 
citous touches  in  Lotze's  representation  of  society 
is  his  delineation  of  the  need  of  a  social  background 
even  for  a  pair  of  happy  lovers.  "  The  drama  of 
life,"  he  says,  "  is  too  tame  when  it  is  played  by 
only  two  persons ;  they  want  at  least  the  chorus  to 
keep  them  in  mind  of  the  inexhaustible  fullness  of 
human  interests,  of  which  only  a  small  portion  can 
be  brought  into  consciousness  by  their  own  rela- 
tions to  one  another.  Men  and  women  cannot  be 
satisfied  by  the  solitary  companionship  of  one  other 
human  being.  They  wish  to  observe  his  attitude  to 
some  third  person,  and  to  know  that  he  also  ob- 
serves theirs.  Finally,  they  wish  that  the  recipro- 
cal influence  of  themselves  and  their  companion 
should  be  seen  and  recognized  by  other  intelligent 
beings  ;  for  to  enjoy  without  other  people's  know- 
ing anything  about  it,  is  not  much  better  than  to 
be  non-existent."  l 

The  most  interesting  and  profitable  subject  of 
conversation  is  our  neighbors.  Even  if  our  obser- 
vations are  somewhat  censorious,  yet  the  discrimi- 
nating recognition  of  faults  and  foibles,  which  may 
enable  us  to  perceive  our  own  advantages  and  de- 
fects, is  better  than  indifference  and  silence.  The 
proper  study  of  mankind  is  man.  One  who  says 
that  he  never  talks  about  people,  but  only  about 
facts  and  ideas,  may  be  set  down  as  an  egregious 
1  Microcosmus,  vol.  ii.,  p.  92, 


INSTITUTIONS  AND  INDIVIDUALS      51 

and  also  probably  an  inconsistent  fool.  Literature, 
history,  and  philosophy  are  regarded  as  the  higher 
range  of  studies,  and  are  justly  called  the  humani- 
ties. 

Society  and  persons,  then,  are  correlative.  The 
individual  is  not  the  centre  from  which  alone  the 
circumference  is  measured.  Society  considered  as  a 
whole,  a  unified  aggregate,  is  not  the  centre  from 
which  alone  the  circumference  is  measured.  Per- 
sonality and  society  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as 
the  foci  of  an  ellipse.  The  human  curve  is  swept 
by  a  chord,  the  two  ends  of  which  are  fastened 
at  these  foci.  The  chord  subtends  various  angles, 
as  the  several  points  on  the  circumference  are  at 
different  distances  from  the  two  foci.  At  some 
points  the  chord  is  a  straight  line  folded  in  part 
upon  itself.  But  at  every  point  the  foci  deter- 
mine the  direction  of  the  circumference,  and  make 
the  curve  an  ellipse,  not  a  circle,  and  not  a  small 
circle  inside  a  large  circle. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  consider  at  any  length,  in 
this  connection,  the  institutional  forms  of  society, 
the  Family,  the  State,  and  the  Church ;  nor  to  dis- 
cuss the  proper  classification  of  social  forms,  a 
subject  which  is  reserved  for  a  later  chapter.  It 
is  enough  to  observe  now  that  the  very  existence 
of  society  and  the  completeness  of  personality  re- 
quire these  institutions,  and  that  they  therefore  are 
based  on  the  very  nature  of  society.  There  is  the 
idea  of  a  common  good  to  be  sought  and  shared, 
and  which  must  express  itself  in  some  regulation 
of  the  common  life.  Institutions  are  the  visible 
embodiments  of  the  aims  and  interests  of  all  the 


52  PERSONALITY  IN  SOCIETY 

persons  who  constitute  society.  These  institutions 
may  take  particular  forms  by  agreement.  They 
may  have  written  constitutions  and  laws.  A  State 
may  be  founded  by  a  compact,  as  was  the  case  with 
tlie  American  Commonwealth.  But  the  founders 
of  the  State  did  not  create  government  and  laws. 
The  civilization  of  the  centuries  furnished  the 
principles  of  constitutional  government.  Laws 
which  can  be  enacted  and  repealed  are  merely 
adaptations  to  particular  conditions.  Laws  which 
do  not  conform  to  the  social  structure  must  be  re- 
pealed sooner  or  later,  or  become  a  dead  letter. 
These  institutions  are  referred  to  now  because  the 
State  furnishes  one  of  the  best  illustrations  of  the 
parallel  advance  of  society  and  personality.  There 
was  never  so  much  personal  liberty.  The  individ- 
ual was  never  so  free  to  go  his  own  way  without 
interference.  There  was  never  so  wide  scope  given 
to  individual  enterprise  and  pursuit.  But,  at  the 
same  time,  the  power  of  the  State  has  never  been 
greater  to  lay  hold  of  and  to  punish  the  offender, 
to  mete  out  justice,  and  to  promote  the  welfare  of 
the  people. 

IX 

The  principal  limitation  on  the  importance  of 
personality  is  found  in  the  minute  subdivision  of 
labor  in  mechanical  occupations.  When  a  man 
spends  all  his  working  hours  in  cutting  out  the 
lifts  of  a  shoe-heel,  or  in  performing  one  out  of 
the  ten  processes  by  which  a  pinhead  is  made, 
he  seems  to  be  narrowed  and  belittled.  There  are, 
however,  corrections  of  this  in  reduction  of  hours 
of  labor,  by  which  some  leisure  is  gained  for  other 


LIMITATIONS  ,  53 

interests ;  in  the  organization  of  laborers,  by  which 
each  learns  what  the  others  are  doing  and  what  the 
values  of  industry  are ;  by  the  reading  of  news- 
papers, which  tell  him  every  day  the  story  of  what 
the  world  is  doing ;  by  the  study  of  science,  in 
which  many  workmen  engage  ;  and  by  the  chances 
of  promotion  which  are  open  to  skilled  artisans. 
The  workman  who  makes  only  part  of  a  shoe  may 
be  as  intelligent  as  the  shoemaker  of  the  last  cen- 
tury at  whose  shop  the  village  loafers  congregated. 

So  one  who  specializes  in  scientific,  linguistic, 
or  historical  investigation  is  in  some  danger  of 
narrowing.  But  the  danger  is  less  than  in  me- 
chanical occupations,  because  the  student  must 
have  some  appreciation  of  other  departments  of 
knowledge  in  order  to  know  his  own.  The  special- 
ist also,  as  a  rule,  lives  in  a  community  of  scholars 
with  whom  he  is  constantly  exchanging  intellectual 
values.  In  fact  the  man  who  is  most  likely  to  be 
a  walking  encyclopedia  is  the  accurate  and  eminent 
specialist. 

The  discussion  of  ethics  will  proceed  in  clear 
view  of  the  mutual  dependence  and  relations  of 
persons  in  society.  Personality  is  the  fibre  of  soci- 
ety. Society  is  made  up  of  personal  tissue.  They 
can  be  separated  in  thought,  but  never  in  fact. 
"We  may  expect  therefore  to  find  that  morality  is 
both  personal  and  social ;  that  the  individual  serves 
society  best,  not  by  obliterating  but  by  perfecting 
himself ;  and  that,  on  the  other  hand,  his  morality 
is  not  cultivated  and  himself  perfected  in  solitude, 
but  only  and  always  in  the  relations  of  the  social 
organism,  and  in  service  of  his  fellow-men. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE  MORAL   IDEAL  —  THE   GOOD 

THE  person  in  society  is  a  moral  person.  The 
moral  person  may  be  characterized  as  one  who  per- 
ceives an  ideal  which  he  ought  to  realize.  Morality 
is  the  endeavor  to  realize  an  ideal.  An  ideal  is 
essential  to  the  very  existence  of  morality.  This 
is  seen  when  the  conception  of  duty  is  examined. 
Duty  is  that  which  ought  to  be.  That  which  ought 
to  be  is  not  real  as  yet.  It  is  a  notion  of  the  mind, 
an  idea,  a  picture,  an  ideal,  which  is  perceived  be- 
fore it  is  realized,  and  which  is  perceived  as  that 
which  ought  to  be  realized.  Other  ideals  may  be 
images  before  the  mind,  which  come  and  go,  which 
are  true  or  fictitious,  which  are  visitors  by  courtesy. 
The  moral  ideal  is  imperative.  It  issues  orders. 
It  is  an  ideal  which  insists  on  becoming  real.  As 
requiring  realization,  it  is  none  the  less  but  all  the 
more  an  ideal.  It  is  an  ideal  of  the  true  and 
perfect  man,  and  so  lays  command  on  the  actual 
man.  The  moral  ideal  represents  a  good,  a  value, 
a  worth.  It  has  content,  and  rich  content.  It  is 
not  mere  authority,  nor  bald  imperative.  It  is  a 
human  good  of  such  value  that  it  cannot  remain  a 
thought,  but  must  become  a  fact. 


The  first  and  most  vital  inquiry  of  ethical  philo- 
sophy is  inquiry  concerning  the  nature  of  the  ideal. 


AN  IDEAL  ESSENTIAL  55 

Systems  of  ethics  find  their  chief  differences  in 
definition  of  the  moral  ideal.  The  questions  and 
answers  pertain  to  the  good  which  men  should 
desire  and  realize.  Right,  duty,  law,  obligation, 
are  determined,  as  we  shall  see,  by  the  character 
and  value  of  the  ideal,  which  in  ethics  is  designated 
as  the  good,  or  the  highest  good,  the  summum 
bonum.  We  therefore  observe,  first,  that  an  ideal 
of  some  kind  is  essential  and  fundamental  in  mo- 
rality. 

A  moral  teacher  is  one  who  sets  forth  an  ideal. 
His  teaching  may  be  the  representation  of  a  partic- 
ular good,  some  reform,  under  which  the  present 
condition  will  be  replaced  by  a  better  condition 
not  yet  existing.  The  specific  good  may  be  tem- 
perance. In  that  case  the  teacher  or  reformer  pic- 
tures the  advantage  of  a  temperate  life,  in  physical 
health,  in  saving  of  money  for  desirable  uses,  in  a 
happy  home,  and  in  self-respect,  which  are  con- 
trasted with  the  unhealthiness  and  wretchedness 
and  folly  of  intemperance.  The  ideal  is  easily 
pictured  because  it  may  be  seen  in  actual  persons, 
but  to  the  intemperate  it  is  none  the  less  an  ideal. 
Any  virtue  which  is  inculcated,  any  reform,  per- 
sonal, municipal,  educational,  which  is  advocated, 
is  enforced  by  picturing  the  ideal  and  contrasting 
it  with  the  real.  On  a  wider  range,  a  complete 
ethical  system  of  comprehensive  principles,  rules, 
and  maxims  is  the  ideal  of  a  perfect  and  symmet- 
rical character.  It  is  a  delineation  of  the  man  who 
combines  all  good  qualities  and  of  a  society  com- 
posed of  such  men.  The  enumeration  of  virtues  and 
duties,  although  the  terms  are  abstract,  as  patience, 


56          THE  MORAL  IDEAL— THE   GOOD 

courage,  justice,  is  but  the  sketch  of  an  imagi- 
nary person  in  an  imaginary  society,  according  to 
which  real  men  in  real  society  should  be  patterned. 
The  condemnation  of  existing  evil  is  possible  only 
by  recognizing  the  good  which  is  violated  or  disre- 
garded. 

The  moral  lawgiver  brings  an  ideal  to  the  actual 
practice  of  the  people.  He  comes  down  to  them 
from  some  elevation,  from  some  higher  moral  level, 
from  a  mountain  top.  He  has  seen  a  pattern  in 
the  mount.  The  ten  words  on  stone  tablets  are 
ten  bold  lines  which  trace  the  salient  features  of  a 
good  man.  The  Decalogue  may  be  regarded  as  the 
profile  of  a  perfect  man,  like  some  great  stone  face 
showing  clear-cut  in  massive  features  against  the 
sky.  If  the  attempt  had  been  made  by  the  an- 
cient worthies  of  Israel  to  describe  the  good  man, 
the  ten  words  of  the  law  would  have  been  used  to 
personify  him.  The  good  man,  they  would  have 
said,  is  reverent ;  he  is  obedient  to  the  will  of  God, 
who  is  the  supreme  reason  and  righteousness ;  he 
works  honestly  and  faithfully ;  he  rests  regularly 
and  religiously ;  he  reveres  his  parents  and  respects 
the  venerable  ;  he  will  not  destroy  nor  diminish  his 
neighbor's  life,  nor  sully  a  neighbor's  purity,  nor 
impair  his  property,  nor  injure  his  reputation,  nor 
even  long  selfishly  for  anything  that  properly  be- 
longs to  another.  Every  system  of  morality,  the 
Confucian,  the  Buddhistic,  the  Christian,  sets  forth 
an  ideal  man.  That  is  the  best  system  which  is 
nearest  the  correct  perspective.  Some  systems  are 
without  due  sense  of  proportion  between  the  great 
and  the  little.  Japanese  ethics  is  like  a  Japanese 


AN  IDEAL  ESSENTIAL  57 

painting,  in  which  a  shrub  is  as  large  as  a  temple. 
The  criticism  passed  by  Jesus  on  the  Pharisaic  code 
of  morals  pointed  out  false  perspective.  The  tithe 
on  mint,  anise,  and  cummin  had  been  made  as  im- 
portant as  judgment,  mercy  and  faith. 

Teachers  and  lawgivers  are  not  satisfied  to  con- 
struct abstract  codes,  but  usually  personify  the 
moral  ideal  in  descriptions  of  an  imaginary  man. 
This  is  a  favorite  method  in  Buddhism.  One  who 
has  been  converted  is  an  Arahat,  a  term  meaning 
one  who  is  worthy,  and  he  is  described  as  having, 
in  succession,  thirty-seven  states  of  mind.  His 
course  through  them  is  traced  in  meditations, 
struggles,  self-control,  faith,  contemplation,  seren- 
ity, by  which  he  attains  the  thirty  graces.  The 
Arahat  who  attains  is  described  in  beautiful  im- 
agery, of  which  one  example  may  be  given :  "  Just, 
O  King,  as  a  lotus  flower  of  glorious,  pure,  and 
high  descent  and  origin  is  glossy,  soft,  desirable, 
sweet-smelling,  longed  for,  loved,  and  praised,  un- 
tarnished by  the  water  or  the  mud,  crossed  with 
tiny  petals  and  filaments  and  pericarps,  the  resort 
of  many  bees,  a  child  of  the  clear,  cold  stream,  — 
just  so  is  that  disciple  of  the  Noble  Ones  endowed 
with  the  thirty  graces."  l  The  Hebrew  psalmist 
employs  the  same  method  of  personifying  virtue 
in  the  description  of  a  good  man,  and  uses  a 
similar  figure :  "  Blessed  is  the  man  that  walketh 
not  in  the  counsel  of  the  wicked,  nor  standeth 
in  the  way  of  sinners,  nor  sitteth  in  the  seat  of 
the  scornful.  But  his  delight  is  in  the  law  of  the 
Lord ;  and  in  his  law  doth  he  meditate  day  and 

1  Religious  Systems  of  the  World,  p.  148. 


58          THE  MORAL  IDEAL— THE   GOOD 

night.  And  he  shall  be  like  a  tree  planted  by  the 
streams  of  water,  that  bringeth  forth  its  fruit  in 
its  season,  whose  leaf  also  doth  not  wither;  and 
whatsoever  he  doeth  shall  prosper."  In  the  dia- 
logues of  Plato,  Socrates  is  always  imagining  some 
person,  and  inventing  situations  in  which  a  moral 
principle  is  realized. 

Now,  there  never  was  such  a  man  as  the  Arahat 
who  is  likened  to  a  lotus  flower,  nor  as  the  Israelite 
who  is  compared  to  a  tree.  The  Stoic  philoso- 
phers could  not  claim  that  a  real  Stoic  had  ever  been 
seen.  Epictetus,  after  describing  the  ideal  Stoic, 
exclaims :  "  Ah,  show  me  a  Stoic !  By  the  gods,  I 
long  to  see  one.  It  is  quite  out  of  your  power  to 
show  me  one  well  cast.  Show  me,  then,  at  least 
one  that  lies  in  the  crucible  ready  to  be  cast."  But 
morality  must  have  in  view  an  ideal,  partial  or 
complete,  and  either  must  take  actual  men  who 
have  exhibited  virtue  in  some  of  its  aspects,  or 
must  take  virtues  which  are  scattered  and  suggested 
in  actual  persons  and  combine  them  in  an  ideal 
character.  An  end  is  in  view.  The  end  is  a  good 
to  be  desired  and  realized.  An  aim  is  directed  to 
the  end.  In  this  respect  moralists,  from  the  earli- 
est to  the  present  time,  have  agreed.  If  any  deny 
that  the  right  is  determined  by  the  good,  if  they 
contend  that  duty  is  imperative,  whatever  the  re- 
sult may  be,  it  is  found  that  they  set  up  some  ideal 
which  is  the  supreme  good  of  man,  even  if  they 
call  it  the  will  of  God,  or  if  they  maintain  that 
right  is  right  merely  because  it  is  right.  In  the 
opening  sentences  of  Aristotle's  Ethics  is  a  clear 
statement,  which  has  not  been  improved  upon,  of 


HISTORICAL  ETHICS       ,  59 

the  truth  that  the  end  in  view  constitutes  morality  : 
"  Every  art  and  every  scientific  inquiry,  and  simi- 
larly every  action  and  purpose,  may  be  said  to  aim 
at  some  good.  Hence  the  good  has  been  defined 
as  that  at  which  all  things  aim.  .  .  .  Thus  health  is 
the  end  of  medicine,  a  vessel  of  ship-building,  vic- 
tory of  strategy,  and  wealth  of  domestic  economy. 
...  If  it  is  true  that  in  the  sphere  of  action  there 
is  an  end  which  we  wish  for  its  own  sake,  and  for 
the  sake  of  which  we  wish  everything  else,  and  that 
we  do  not  desire  all  things  for  the  sake  of  some- 
thing else  (for,  if  that  is  so,  the  process  will  go  on 
ad  infinitum,  and  our  desire  will  be  idle  and  futile) 
it  is  clear  that  this  will  be  the  good,  or  the  supreme 
good.  Does  it  not  follow,  then,  that  the  knowledge 
of  this  supreme  good  is  of  great  importance  for  the 
conduct  of  life,  and  that,  if  ive  know  it,  we  shall 
be  like  archers  who  have  a  mark  at  which  to  aim, 
we  shall  have  a  better  chance  of  attaining  what 
we  want?"  * 

II 

Historical  ethics  is  occupied  with  the  actual 
practices  and  customs  which  have  prevailed  in  the 
past,  and  has  sometimes  made  the  assumption  that 
these  show  perfectly  what  morality  is.  Then 
these  practices  have  been  explained  by  various 
causes,  chiefly  external,  such  as  climate,  the  differ- 
ent conditions  of  mountainous  and  seaboard  coun- 
tries, industries,  governments,  and  the  like.  But 
the  history  of  morality  is  not  complete  unless  the 
standards  as  well  as  the  customs  of  a  people  are 

1  The  Nicomachean  Ethics  of  Aristotle,  translated  by  J.  E.  C. 
Welldon,  pp.  1,  2. 


60         THE  MORAL  IDEAL— THE   GOOD 

included.  Peoples  which  have  had  written  language 
have  had  books  of  the  law,  collections  of  maxims 
and  precepts,  legal  codes.  These  explain  because 
they  influence  moral  practice.  The  morality  of 
China  is  not  understood  merely  by  noticing  the 
habits  of  the  people.  The  books  of  Confucius  are 
the  most  important  part  of  the  history  of  Chinese 
morality.  Some  actions  which  may  be  very  common 
the  people  themselves  regard  as  wrong.  Even 
those  tribes  which  have  no  writings  do  have  stand- 
ards of  right  and  wrong  which  are  above  their 
actual  practice.  To  understand  the  morality  of  a 
savage  tribe  it  is  necessary  to  know  their  senti- 
ments as  well  as  their  acts :  to  know  their  senti- 
ments in  order  to  understand  their  acts  ;  to  know 
their  approvals  and  disapprovals,  as  well  as  their 
kindnesses  and  cruelties. 

It  may  be  asked  if  there  is  not  among  some 
nations  and  tribes  a  stationary  morality,  a  repeti- 
tion century  after  century  of  the  very  same  cus- 
toms which  are  always  and  sufficiently  justified  by 
the  saying,  "  We  have  always  done  so,  and  our 
fathers  and  grandfathers  did  so."  Chinese  mo- 
rality and  savage  morality  are  often  characterized 
as  stationary  and  stereotyped.  How  is  it  then,  in 
such  cases,  that  morality  is  determined  by  an  ideal, 
when  there  is  only  a  perpetual  round  of  unpro- 
gressive  customs  ?  The  answer  is,  that  the  existing 
state  is  regarded  as  the  perfect  state,  and  that  de- 
viation from  it  is  considered  wrong.  Individuals 
who  violate  any  of  the  precepts  which  are  gener- 
ally practiced,  are  condemned  by  comparison  with 
the  time-honored  standards.  The  ideal  is  distinct 


HISTORICAL   ETHICS  61 

as  actually  and  constantly  practiced.  Effort  is 
required  and  demanded  to  bring  it  into  constant 
realization.  Actions  are  justified  by  comparison 
with  such  a  standard,  which  is  defined  by  a  body 
of  generalized  precepts  or  proverbs.  It  could  be 
claimed  that  there  is  no  ideal  only  if  conduct  is 
automatic  and  blind,  only  if  individuals  are  unable 
to  furnish  any  explanation  or  justification  of  their 
actions,  and  are  never  aware  of  any  deviations 
which  they  regard  as  transgressions  to  be  con- 
demned. Necessitated  action  is  not  moral.  If 
conduct  can  be  called  moral,  it  is  because  it  is  cho- 
sen and  approved ;  and  if  there  is  choice  and  ap- 
proval, there  is  a  standard  or  ideal  of  comparison, 
however  imperfect  the  standard  may  be.  It  is  not 
believed,  however,  that  the  present  or  past  state  of 
any  society  is  entirely  stationary.  The  least  pro- 
gressive peoples  have  some  perception  of  that 
which  is  better.  A  savage  who  has  one  cow  or 
one  wife  thinks  it  is  better  to  have  two,  and  how 
he  shall  get  another  is  a  moral  question  pertaining 
to  the  rights  of  other  savages.  Material  betterment 
is  conditioned  on  moral  standards.  Any  progress 
desired  or  achieved  is  with  some  idea,  more  or 
less  clear,  of  that  which  ought  to  be,  but  which  is 
not  now.  There  is  an  ideal  in  advance  which  pre- 
sents itself  to  the  imagination  and  stimulates  to 
action.  It  may  be  said  that  the  distinction  of  man 
is  the  power  of  forming  ideals.  All  ethical  phi- 
losophers, as  I  have  already  stated,  agree  that 
morality  consists  in  the  realization  of  the  good, 
which  is  seen  as  ideal  before  it  is  made  actual,  and 
is  recognized  as  good  that  ought  to  be  made  actual, 


62     THE  MORAL  IDEAL  — THE  GOOD 

as  an  ideal  which  is  imperative.  The  systems  dif- 
fer only  as  to  the  nature  of  the  ideal.  It  is  defined 
as '  pleasure,  as  happiness,  as  usefulness,  as  perfec- 
tion. All  the  systems  assume  that  men  see  some- 
thing desirable  which  is  a  good,  a  better,  or  a  best, 
and  that  they  strive,  or  know  they  ought  to  strive, 
to  attain  it.  The  ethical  systems  are  therefore 
chiefly  occupied  in  showing  or  proving  what  the 
ideal  is.  The  summum  bonum  is  fundamental  in 
ethics. 

in 

However  the  ideal  may  be  defined,  it  evidently 
is  an  ideal  of  personality.  It  consists  in  character. 
It  is  a  picture  of  good  persons,  or  of  better  per^ 
sons.  If  the  good  to  be  done  is  regarded  as  exter- 
nal,—  for  example,  a  ton  of  coal  given  to  a  poor 
widow,  —  the  good  is  in  the  kindness  of  the  giver 
and  the  comfortable  warmth  of  the  receiver. 
There  is  no  virtue  in  the  coal.  If  the  source  of 
pleasure  is  outside  the  person,  as  music,  a  book,  a 
game,  which  it  is  a  right  or  even  a  duty  to  enjoy, 
there  is  enjoyment  only  because  it  is  pleasant  to  a 
person,  who  is  himself  changed  by  experience  of 
the  enjoyment.  He  cannot  remain  identically  the 
same,  a  subject  over  whom  waves  of  pleasurable 
sensation  pass.  The  theory  that  the  greatest  hap- 
piness is  the  good  which  men  ought  to  seek  and  do 
seek,  is  a  theory  of  the  happiness  of  persons  to 
whom  external  things  are  only  the  occasions  of 
pleasure.  If  new  sources  of  enjoyment  are  dis- 
covered, it  is  by  persons  capable  of  such  enjoy- 
ment. As  we  have  already  seen,  more  refined 
sources  of  pleasure  mean  more  refined  persons. 


THE  IDEAL  PERSONAL  63 

Any  theory  of  duty  which  enumerates  external 
things  to  be  done  resolves  itself  into  a  theory  of 
character,  that  is,  of  persons  disposed  to  do  such 
things,  —  persons  whose  character  is  expressed  in 
such  external  conduct.  Every  act,  every  enjoy- 
ment, every  kindness  is  an  expression  of  person- 
ality. The  whole  of  character  goes  into  the  slight- 
est acts.  Two  sentences  in  conversation  show 
whether  the  speaker  is  a  scholar  or  an  ignoramus. 
We  say  of  a  single  remark  made  by  an  acquaint- 
ance or  repeated  by  one  who  heard  him,  "That 
sounds  just  like  him."  We  say  of  an  effective 
writer,  not  how  well  he  expresses  his  thought,  but 
how  well  he  expresses  himself.  Tradition  has  it 
that  Michel  Angelo,  finding  a  friend  was  not  at 
home,  drew  swiftly  with  a  bit  of  charcoal  a  circle 
on  the  door,  and  the  friend  on  returning  knew 
who  had  been  there,  for  no  other  could  sweep  such 
a  curve.  It  is  considered  wrong  to  mar  the  beauty 
of  nature  by  glaring  advertisements  painted  on 
picturesque  ledges.  The  wrong  is  not  to  nature, 
but  to  persons  who  are  deprived  of  enjoyment,  or 
are  offended  by  the  obtruding  and  impertinent 
ugliness.  The  moral  ideal,  expressed  in  rules  or 
in  principles,  is  the  ideal  of  a  person.  The  person 
is  the  end  or  object  in  view.  There  is  nothing 
beyond,  no  abstract  right  or  good,  for  the  sake  of 
which,  or  for  the  glory  of  which,  the  person  is  a 
means.  There  is  no  goodness  which  is  not  the 
goodness  of  persons.  There  is  no  reservoir  of  good- 
ness stored  up  somewhere.  The  only  fountain  of 
goodness  is  the  heart. 


64         THE  MORAL  IDEAL  — THE   GOOD 

IV 

The  Moral  Ideal  is  an  ideal  of  the  Good  or 
Well-being  of  persons.  It  is  an  ideal,  not  of  their 
being,  but  of  their  well-being.  That  is  a  partial, 
or  even  erroneous  theory  which  regards  morality 
as  merely  an  advantage  for  the  preservation  of 
the  species.  Such  a  theory  reduces  morality  to  a 
struggle  for  existence.  Being,  or  existence,  is 
the  condition  of  well-being.  Man  exists  in  order 
to  be  of  a  certain  character,  in  order  to  enjoy 
certain  goods.  While  virtue  is  conducive  to  pro- 
longed life,  the  end  in  view  is  the  breadth  and 
depth,  as  well  as  the  length  of  life.  Longevity 
does  not  measure  wickedness.  About  the  worst 
thing  the  wise  man  could  think  of  was  gray  hairs 
and  wickedness  therewith.  Moreover,  immoral 
persons  do  not  cease  to  exist.  Gray-headed  sin- 
ners are  not  uncommon.  The  race  has  survived 
periods  of  almost  universal  immorality.  Not  all 
bad  communities  have  had  the  fate  of  Sodom.  — 
The  relation  of  morality  to  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence is  to  be  considered  at  a  later  stage  of  the 
discussion,  and  need  not  now  be  introduced  into 
the  inquiry  concerning  the  nature  of  the  ideal,  to 
which  we  therefore  proceed. 


The  ideal  of  the  good  has  two  elements,  one 
of  which  is  primary,  the  other  secondary.  The 
primary  element  may  be  best  characterized,  al- 
though with  more  or  less  vagueness,  as  worth ; 
the  secondary  element,  also  with  some  vagueness, 


WORTH  65 

as  happiness.  The  vagueness  is  in  the  nature 
of  the  thing.  A  human  value,  experience,  pleas- 
ure, cannot  be  exactly  weighed  and  measured. 
Quality  cannot  be  reduced  to  quantitative  inches 
and  ounces.  Ideal  satisfactions  are  even  less 
capable  of  precise  definition  than  actual  experi- 
ences. The  charge  of  vagueness  is  brought  by 
the  opponents  of  every  ethical  theory,  and  always 
with  some  success.  But  also  it  is  a  charge  which 
can  always  be  retorted.  Those  who  declare  that 
happiness  is  the  primary  element,  the  very  original 
stuff,  of  virtue,  say  that  the  theory  which  makes 
worth  or  perfection  primary  is  vague.  But,  so 
far  as  that  is  concerned,  happiness  is  a  condition 
which  eludes  or  even  defies  analysis,  just  as  it 
proverbially  escapes  pursuit.  I  will  indicate,  as 
well  as  I  can,  what  is  meant  by  the  theory  that 
the  moral  ideal  is  an  ideal  of  personal  worth.  The 
moral  ideal  is  the  person  himself  in  the  quality  and 
completeness  of  his  character.  It  is  the  better 
person.  Various  terms  are  employed  to  desig- 
nate this  good ;  worth,  perfection,  value,  dignity, 
self-realization,  character,  satisfaction.  Man  has 
a  certain  constitution.  He  has  certain  powers,  fac- 
ulties, sensibilities,  capacities,  relations.  The  ideal 
of  man,  of  his  well-being  or  good,  is  an  ideal  of  the 
harmony  of  all  his  powers,  the  symmetrical  pro- 
portions of  his  faculties  in  use  and  satisfaction. 
There  is  a  gradation  of  higher  and  lower  desires, 
each  of  which  has  its  right  and  place.  The 
good  man  satisfies  his  desires  in  right  measure. 
He  does  not  allow  the  lower  to  be  the  masters,  but 
makes  them  the  servants  of  the  higher.  To  live 


66          THE  MORAL  IDEAL  — THE  GOOD 

for  physical  indulgence  is  unworthy.  To  cultivate 
the  intellectual  faculties  and  neglect  the  sym- 
pathetic is  wrong.  Whatever  classification  of 
man's  powers  may  be  adopted,  some  gradation 
of  higher  and  lower  is  recognized.  Actions  are 
measured  and  described  according  to  such  a  scale. 
A  wrong  act  is  base,  low,  groveling.  A  good 
act  is  high,  lofty,  or  even  sublime.  The  good  man, 
we  say,  is  above  certain  actions  ;  it  would  be  be- 
neath him  to  do  them  ;  he  would  not  condescend 
or  stoop  to  such  behavior.  In  the  gradation  and 
proportion  of  powers  is  the  ideal  of  well-being. 
The  good  man  is  the  symmetrical  man.  He  is  one 
in  whom  there  is  no  inner  discord,  no  conflict,  no 
disharmony.  The  man  himself  is  already  given. 
He  is  a  physical,  intellectual,  sympathetic  being. 
He  has  his  powers,  and  their  harmony  is  his 
perfection.  Holiness  is  wholeness.  As  matter 
of  fact  he  has  misused  some  of  his  powers.  He 
has  cultivated  or  satisfied  some  and  neglected 
others.  The  ideal,  however,  is  not  of  a  different 
kind  of  creature,  but  of  this  creature  in  the  right 
and  proportionate  exercise  of  his  powers.  Curious 
questions  may  be  asked  which  attempt  to  go 
farther  back.  But  such  questions  cannot  be  an- 
swered. If  it  is  asked  why  the  intellectual  is 
superior  to  the  physical,  and  why  kindness  is  su- 
perior to  knowledge,  and  whether  our  ideas  of 
morality  would  not  have  been  different  if  this 
gradation  had  been  reversed  so  that  the  physical 
should  be  of  higher  value  than  the  intellectual 
and  the  intellectual  than  the  moral  and  spiritual, 
no  answer  can  be  given.  Certain  good  results  of 


WORTH  67 

the  existing  constitution  may  be  pointed  out, 
but  they  merely  reiterate  the  well-known  facts 
of  man's  actual  endowments,  of  his  social  rela- 
tions, and  his  place  in  the  world.  There  might 
conceivably  be  a  different  order  of  beings,  but 
they  could  be  regarded  as  moral  or  non-moral  only 
by  a  being  who  is  himself  moral,  a  being,  that  is, 
who,  to  all  practical  intents  and  purposes,  is  a 
man.  Darwin  did,  indeed,  try  to  picture  moral 
beings  entirely  different  from  men,  but  he  had  to 
apply  his  own  moral  judgment  to  determine  what 
would  be  right  and  wrong  for  them,  and  discov- 
ered that  morality  would  be  that  which  corresponds 
to  their  constitution,  that  which  would  be  best  for 
the  species  and  for  each  individual  in  it,  according 
to  their  nature.  By  accommodation,  morality  is 
thus  ascribed  to  imaginary  orders,  because  the 
morality  of  men  consists  in  their  perfection  accord- 
ing to  their  constitution.  But  no  other  morality 
is  conceivable  for  man,  just  because  man  is  him- 
self and  not  some  other  creature.  There  is  man 
to  begin  with.  Unless  we  can  get  rid  of  ourselves 
we  cannot  enact  different  laws  of  morality.  Evo- 
lution supports  the  theory  that  the  moral  ideal 
is  worth  or  perfection  rather  than  pleasure  or 
bare  existence,  for  evolution  is  the  law  of  the 
fullness  or  completenesss  of  life  according  to  its 
kind.  Self-preservation  in  order  to  self-realization 
is  the  complete  formula  of  evolution.  Professor 
Friedrich  Paulsen  of  Berlin,  one  of  the  foremost 
ethical  philosophers  of  Germany,  and  a  thorough 
believer  in  evolution,  discards  the  theory  that 
pleasure  is  the  highest  good,  and  maintains  that 


68          THE  MORAL   IDEAL— THE   GOOD 

it  is  the  energy  of  being,  directed  to  its  own  real- 
ization or  perfection.  He  contrasts  the  two  theo- 
ries under  the  names  of  Hedonism  and  Energism. 
Different  forms  of  energism,  he  says,  are  styled 
self-preservation  and  self-realization,  the  harmo- 
nious development  and  exercise  of  all  our  powers, 
perfection,  and  the  like.  He  remarks  as  a  fact 
that  will  not  be  disputed  that  "  the  evolutionistic 
ethics  of  modern  times  accepts  this  view  :  a  spe- 
cific type  of  life  and  the  exercise  of  the  same  is  the 
real  aim  of  all  life  and  striving."  He  says  that 
the  perfect  is  like  the  beautiful,  not  easily  defined, 
consisting  of  an  infinite  variety  of  individual 
creations,  portraying  an  ideal  or  type  of  perfec- 
tion.1 Ethics  and  evolution  agree  that  there  is  a 
type,  an  ideal,  a  normal  life,  which  in  the  case 
of  man  is  realized  as  morality.  The  duty  laid 
on  every  one  is  to  make  the  most  and  the  best 
of  himself.  When  duty  is  thus  recognized,  man 
obviously  has  an  ideal  of  himself  as  better  than 
he  is,  even  perfect  according  to  his  type  as  a  man, 
and  according  to  his  measure  and  characteristics 
as  an  individual.  That  which  is  ultimate  is  the 
person  in  his  worth  or  perfection,  and  it  is  impos- 
sible to  go  farther  back.  The  attempt  is  only 
.movement  in  a  circle,  in  which  the  pursuer  chases 
his  own  vanishing  and  reappearing  figure. 

There  is  an  intrinsic  value  in  character,  which 
is  sometimes  expressed  in  striking  ways.  It  is 
the  wisdom  which  the  Hebrews  distinguished  from 
knowledge,  and  which  they  said  could  not  be  got- 

1  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  translated  by  Frank  Thilly,  pp. 
421-424. 


WORTH  69 

ten  for  gold  nor  weighed  against  silver.  No  men- 
tion could  be  made  of  the  ordinary  coral  or  crystal, 
for  the  price  of  wisdom  is  above  the  incomparable 
ruby.  The  estimation  of  a  true  man  is  of  one  who 
cannot  be  bought.  If  a  man  is  said  to  be  worth  a 
million  dollars  the  phrase  is  used  carelessly,  unless 
indeed  he  has  sold  himself  for  sordid  gold,  has 
bartered  away  honor  and  truth  for  material  wealth. 
The  absolute  worth  of  man  received  forcible  and 
final  expression  in  the  question  of  Jesus,  What  shall 
it  profit  a  man  if  he  gain  the  whole  world  and  lose 
his  own  soul,  or  what  shall  a  man  give  in  exchange 
for  his  soul?  The  best  works  of  man  have  no 
equivalent  in  any  other  value.  The  twenty  pounds 
given  by  a  publisher  for  the  "  Paradise  Lost,"  the 
price  paid  to  Michel  Angelo  for  building  St. 
Peter's,  or  to  Eaphael  for  painting  the  Sistine 
Madonna,  or  for  any  of  the  artistic,  intellectual, 
and  spiritual  creations  which  have  permanently 
enriched  the  world,  are  no  representative  of  the 
human  value  of  those  works.  The  stipend  is  in- 
tended only  to  supply  the  coarser  wants,  that  all 
time  and  thought  may  be  given  to  the  finer  crea- 
tions. The  choicest  works  of  art,  works  which 
cannot  be  multiplied  by  the  cleverest  copyists,  pass 
out  of  the  market  and  cease  to  have  a  monetary 
value.  Kant's  distinction  between  exchangeable 
and  unexchangeable  possessions  recognizes  an  ab- 
solute worth  which  is  unpurchasable.  The  one 
kind  of  possession  can  be  replaced  by  something 
which  is  equivalent,  that  is,  it  can  be  bought  and 
sold.  The  other  kind  of  possession  admits  of  no 
equivalent  and  has  dignity.  He  reckons  fidelity 


70          THE  MORAL  IDEAL  —  THE  GOOD 

to  promises,  benevolence  from  principle,  and  all 
the  virtues,  as  having  intrinsic  or  absolute  worth, 
whether  or  not  these  particular  distinctions  are 
adopted.  The  fact  is  recognized  by  all  that  every 
person  is  an  end  in  himself,  as  having  intrinsic 
worth  and  value,  and  that  the  man  himself,  in  the 
harmony  and  perfection  of  his  powers,  is  the  end  at 
which  all  things  aim,  not  that  which  aims  at  some- 
thing else. 

The  intrinsic  worth  of  character  is  very  clearly 
recognized  in  the  opinion  that  one  may  not  for  any 
apparent  good  to  another  sacrifice  his  own  worthi- 
ness, and  that  he  may  not  appeal  to  unworthy 
motives.  Paul  was  debtor  to  Greeks  and  Barbari- 
ans, but  he  owed  them  no  service  which  would  be 
a  sacrifice  of  truth  or  of  his  own  conscientious 
convictions.  Anything  but  his  character  he  could 
sacrifice  for  his  countrymen.  It  was  only  in 
imagination  that  he  could  wish  himself  anathema 
from  Christ  Jesus,  for  their  sakes.  There  may 
have  been  those  who  thought  they  were  willing 
to  be  damned  for  the  glory  of  God,  but  it  was 
only  because  damnation  was  regarded  as  external 
pain,  a  condition  of  physical  suffering,  and  not  as 
hatred  of  God  and  of  righteousness.  We  disap- 
prove an  intentional  appeal  to  unworthy  motives. 
Nothing  angers  us  §o  much  as  the  suspicion  that 
we  have  been  used,  that  we  have  been  flattered,  to 
promote  another  person's  objects,  and  then  have 
been  cast  aside.  The  question  whether  it  is  ever 
justifiable  to  tell  a  lie,  as  in  sickness,  in  danger,  in 
war,  where  the  advantage  is  obvious,  may  be  an- 
swered in  the  affirmative,  and  yet  one  is  not  satis- 


WORTH  71 

fied  with  himself  however  cogent  the  justification 
may  be.  The  best  reason  that  can  be  given  for 
this  dissatisfaction  is  that  it  is  an  offense  against 
one's  own  dignity,  a  denial  of  his  very  self.  He 
goes  against  reality.  He  professes  to  be  what  he 
is  not.  Kant  says  that  a  lie  is  the  abandonment, 
or,  as  it  were,  the  very  annihilation  of  the  dignity 
of  man.  Dr.  Martineau,  who  discusses  the  ques- 
tion at  length,  says  that  the  liar  commits  offense 
against  his  own  thoughts  and  feelings,  which  he 
assumes  to  be  expressing,  and  also  against  the 
beliefs  and  feelings  which  are  authorized  by  reality 
as  accordant  with  the  nature  of  things  and  the 
course  of  the  world.  This  accounts  for  the  duty  of 
accepting  martyrdom  rather  than  to  be  false  to  a 
genuine  conviction,  which  is  to  be  false  to  one's 
own  self.  The  abolition  of  slavery,  which,  for  a 
time,  may  make  men  more  wretched,  rests  on  the 
conviction  that  every  human  being  has  an  inalien- 
able right  to  his  own  person.  All  such  considerations 
suggest  the  absolute  worth  of  man  as  man,  his 
right  to  himself,  his  own  perfection  or  worth  as 
the  end  he  should  seek.  The  moral  ideal  is  the  ideal 
of  the  person  having  the  powers  with  which  he  is 
endowed,  and  cultivating  them,  in  their  true  pro- 
portion and  symmetry,  into  the  perfect  character. 
This  is  the  end  for  which  all  things  exist,  and  there 
is  no  higher  end  beyond  it.  I  have  admitted  that 
there  is  some  vagueness  in  the  definition  of  the 
moral  ideal  as  perfection  or  worth,  but  if  it  stands 
for  reality  and  experience,  which  are  felt  more 
easily  than  they  are  described,  the  vagueness  is  a 
minor  objection  which  need  not  be  regarded,  and 


72    THE  MORAL  IDEAL  — THE  GOOD 

especially  as  it  pertains  to  every  theory  of  morality, 
as  will  be  seen  when  we  consider  some  alternative 
theories. 

VI 

The  other  element,  which  I  have  mentioned  as 
secondary,  but  which  is  not  readily  distinguished 
and  is  never  separated  from  morality,  is  the  sat- 
isfaction or  happiness  which  accompanies  moral 
action.  The  ideal  may  be  regarded  as  consisting 
of  worth  and  happiness,  the  happiness  being  con- 
sequent upon,  or  incident  to,  the  worth  attained. 
The  relation  is  that  of  cause  and  effect,  and  there- 
fore one  is  never  found  without  the  other,  one  is 
often  mistaken  for  the  other.  Neither  alone  con- 
stitutes the  moral  ideal.  Neither  alone  is  aimed 
at.  They  are  together,  like  heat  and  light.  A 
theory  which  regards  only  one  has  truth  enough 
to  be  plausible,  but  not  truth  enough  to  be  satis- 
factory. I  indicate,  at  this  point,  the  presence 
of  happiness  or  satisfaction,  and  postpone  to  the 
chapter  on  Hedonism  a  criticism  of  the  theory 
which  makes  morality  nothing  but  happiness. 

Man  is  so  constituted  that  whatever  promotes 
his  right  development  promotes  his  happiness,  and 
whatever  hinders  or  disturbs  his  right  development 
gives  him  discomfort,  pain,  or  wretchedness.  He 
is  happy  in  his  righteousness  and  unhappy  in  his 
sin.  Virtue  and  pleasure  are  inseparable.  Wrong- 
doing and  pain  are  inseparable.  If  goodness  is 
according  to  the  constitution  of  man,  and  badness 
contrary  to  his  constitution,  it  cannot  be  otherwise. 
One  measure  of  virtue  is  its  agreeableness.  One 
measure  of  vice  is  its  disagreeableness.  The  very 


HAPPINESS  ,  73 

words,  agreeable,  and  disagreeable,  are  not  without 
suggestiveness.  Virtue  is  that  which  agrees  with 
a  man,  which  is  in  the  agreement  or  harmony  of 
his  powers.  Sin  is  that  which  disagrees  with  a 
man,  which  is  in  the  disagreement  or  disharmony 
of  his  powers.  Virtue  agrees  with  him  and  so 
is  agreeable.  Vice  disagrees  with  him  and  so  is 
disagreeable.  One  may  not,  at  the  moment  of 
choice,  be  conscious  of  the  happiness  or  unhappi- 
ness.  The  virtue  may  seem  to  bring  pain,  the  vice 
to  bring  pleasure.  But  in  the  end  and  on  the  whole 
there  is  satisfaction  in  virtue  and  dissatisfaction" 
in  vice.  It  has  therefore  seemed  to  some  ethical 
philosophers  that  happiness  is  the  object  and  the 
very  nature  of  virtue,  that  they  are  interchangea- 
ble terms,  and  that  unhappiness  is  the  very  nature 
of  wrong,  although  it  may  be  chosen  under  the 
mistaken  impression  that  it  will  give  pleasure. 
That  remains  to  be  considered,  but  there  certainly 
can  be  no  question  that  happiness  or  satisfaction  is 
an  essential  element  of  virtue.  The  notion  that 
the  degree  of  virtue  is  measured  by  the  amount  of 
disagreeableness  is  a  singular  perversion  of  the 
truth.  It  is  sometimes  said  that  there  is  no  virtue 
in  the  act  of  a  person,  because  he  likes  to  do  it, 
would  rather  do  it  than  not.  But  inclination  en- 
hances virtue  rather  than  reduces  it.  Goodness 
which  struggles  against  perverse  inclinations  is  of 
a  lower  grade  than  goodness  which  runs  parallel 
with  inclination.  One  who  can  say  of  his  obedi- 
ence that  it  is  his  meat  and  drink,  his  very  life,  is 
better  than  one  whose  obedience  is  reluctant,  who 
thinks  he  would  be  happier  in  disobedience.  Ex- 


74         THE  MORAL  IDEAL  — THE  GOOD 

ternal  compliance  without  inward  disposition  is 
not  real  goodness.  If  one  is  living  in  accordance 
with  his  natural  and  moral  constitution,  and  with 
the  constitution  of  society,  he  cannot  but  be  happy. 
There  can  be  no  satisfaction  to  compare  with  the 
realization  of  that  good  which  is  the  harmony  of 
man  with  himself  and  with  his  fellow-men. 

Incapacity  for  enjoyment  is  a  defect.  A  sour 
man  is  as  unnatural  as  a  sad  child.  One  who 
never  smiles  should  be  kept  in  solitary  confine- 
ment. Zest  is  the  secret  of  perpetual  youth. 
Genius  has  been  characterized  as  the  feelings  of 
youth  carried  over  into  the  pursuits  of  manhood. 
Enthusiasm  is  the  glad,  free  movement  of  good- 
ness flowing  spontaneously  along,  like  a  living 
stream.  It  bubbles  up  from  the  spring.  It  dances 
laughingly  on  in  the  brook.  It  widens  its  banks 
and  deepens  its  currents  in  the  river,  as  with 
silent,  powerful  strength  it  seeks  the  ocean.  The 
joy  of  age  is  not  the  joy  of  youth.  It  is  not  bois- 
terous and  demonstrative.  Its  waters  are  more 
still  because  they  are  more  deep.  It  is  peace 
rather  than  joy ;  blessedness  rather  than  happi- 
ness. It  is  serene  but  not  stagnant.  I  am  not 
saying  that  virtue  avoids  pains  and  cares.  But  in 
the  ideal  state  there  would  be  none.  They  are  due 
to  the  neglect  and  contradiction  of  virtue  in  self 
or  in  others.  Goodness  may  be  refined  by  bearing 
them.  But  it  is  not  overcome  by  them,  does  not 
lose  hope,  and  even  has  a  deeper  peace  as  it  con- 
verts them  into  helpers  of  its  joy.  Virtue  may  be 
rugged,  severe,  majestic,  but  strength  is  not  the 
foe  of  gladness.  Strength  rejoices  in  its  power. 


HAPPINESS  75 

If  to  be  weak  is  miserable,  doing  or  suffering,  to 
be  strong  is  glorious,  achieving  or  enduring.  The 
joy  of  massive  strength  is  not  frivolous,  but  is 
therefore  all  the  more  glad,  and  all  the  more  ca- 
pable of  awakening  hope  in  others.  It  rings  with 
denunciation  of  the  wrong.  It  turns  a  wrathful 
countenance  on  meanness  and  baseness.  It  may 
even  lay  violent  hands  on  the  workers  of  iniquity. 
But  righteous  indignation,  which  succeeds  in  over- 
throwing wickedness  in  high  places,  is  not  un- 
happy. It  sings  the  song  of  triumph,  which  is 
reechoed  in  the  plaudits  of  the  people.  The  virtue 
which  is  massive  and  even  ponderous  in  its  move- 
ments, which  is  unyielding,  unrelenting,  severe,  is 
oftenest  the  virtue  which  is  clothed  with  gentle 
graces,  as  a  craggy  mountain  is  beautiful  with  ver- 
dure and  flowers.  The  strongest  muscles  have  the 
softest  touch.  Chivalry  unites  strength  and  gen- 
tleness. The  truth,  then,  is  that  goodness  in  its 
every  form  has  gladness.  In  its  virile  and  its 
womanly  forms,  in  its  severest  aspects,  in  'its 
achievement  and  in  its  endurance,  it  has  conscious 
worth  as  the  real  value  of  character  in  the  satis- 
faction of  the  person  true  to  his  ideal  self. 

The  happiness  of  virtue  may  be  compared  to  the 
joy  of  scholarship.  The  scholar  searching  after 
truth,  absorbed  in  pursuit  of  knowledge,  eager  to 
discover  facts,  may  forego  comforts,  deny  himself 
pleasures,  sacrifice  sleep,  and  endure  poverty.  But 
such  deprivations  are  no  hardships.  His  delight  in 
finding  truth,  in  gaining  the  clue  to  facts,  in  dis- 
covering the  law  of  phenomena,  is  keener  than  all 
the  happiness  from  which  he  turns  away.  When- 


76         THE  MORAL  IDEAL— THE   GOOD 

ever  the  scientist,  the  linguist,  the  philosopher  dis- 
covers a  fact,  a  law,  a  principle,  he  can  scarcely  be 
restrained  from  rushing  though  the  streets  with  the 
old  Eureka  shout.  And  while  it  is  not  that  final 
shout  for  which  he  expends  his  toil,  yet  the  satis- 
faction of  knowing  the  truth  is  essential  to  the 
search  for  truth.  It  is  the  truth  which  is  valued. 
The  satisfaction  does  not  create  the  value,  but  the 
value  creates  the  satisfaction.  Yet  the  two  are  in- 
separable. The  purity,  the  unselfishness,  and  the 
satisfaction  of  a  scholar's  devotion  is  the  likest 
thing  there  is  to  virtue.  It  is,  in  fact,  intellectual 
virtue.  It  is  love  of  truth  for  truth's  sake.  We  have 
to  apply  ethical  terms  to  the  scholar's  devotion.  We 
describe  it  as  intellectual  honesty,  or  disinterested 
scholarship,  or  love  of  the  truth.  The  two  ele- 
ments, intrinsic  value  and  happiness,  are  there,  as 
they  are  in  virtue,  distinguishable  but  inseparable. 

VII 

'The  moral  ideal,  then,  is  the  highest  good  of 
persons,  a  good  from  which  happiness  or  satisfac- 
tion is  never  absent.  It  remains  only  to  observe 
that  it  is  an  ideal  of  persons  in  society,  a  social 
ideal.  This  would  follow  from  the  considerations 
presented  in  the  previous  chapter.  There  are, 
however,  conditions  in  the  absolute  value  of  every 
person  and  in  extension  of  regard  for  personal  rights 
which  require  recognition  of  the  social  ideal.  The 
ideal  as  personal  is  of  the  person  regarded  as  an 
end  in  himself.  It  is  therefore  the  ideal  of  other 
persons  as  ends  in  themselves,  and  to  be  served  as 
such.  Every  one  has  inalienable  rights  which  he 


PERSONAL   AND  SOCIAL     ,  77 

can  claim  and  exercise  on  grounds  of  simple  jus- 
tice. Every  one  therefore  has  duties  correspond- 
ing to  the  rights  of  others.  Emphasis  may  vary  in 
precedence  given  to  rights  or  to  duties,  and  the 
emphasis  may  mark  the  difference  between  a  sinner 
and  a  saint.  The  sinner  says :  My  rights,  your 
duties.  The  saint  says  :  Your  rights,  my  duties. 
But  in  an  ideal  state  there  would  be  exact  corre- 
spondence, a  perfect  relation  of  justice  and  benevo- 
lence. Every  man  has  his  own  indefeasible  rights 
which  another  may  not  take  from  him  nor  invade. 
This  is  perfectly  expressed  in  one  of  the  maxims  of 
Kant :  "  Act  so  as  to  treat  humanity,  whether  in 
your  own  person  or  in  that  of  others,  always  as  an 
end,  never  merely  as  a  means."  It  is  stated  rather 
mechanically  as  a  numerical  finality  in  the  axiom 
of  Utilitarian  ethics :  "  Every  one  should  count 
for  one,  and  no  one  for  more  than  one."  It  is 
embodied  in  the  old  definition  of  justice  as  Suum 
cuique,  giving  to  each  his  own.  The  ideal  of 
personal  worth  means  that  every  human  being  has 
an  absolute  value.  The  attainment  of  good  by  one 
should  therefore  promote  the  attainment  of  it  by 
all.  If  the  possession  or  enjoyment  of  one  deprives 
others  of  that  to  which  they  are  entitled,  it  is  not 
a  good  even  to  the  person  who  so  regards  it. 

A  vast  deal  of  energy  has  been  expended  in 
debating  the  question  how  the  passage  is  effected 
from  the  rights  of  the  individual  to  the  rights  of 
others.  Those  who  are  familiar  with  the  history 
of  the  discussion  will  recall  the  challenge  thrown 
down  to  the  Utilitarians  on  this  very  question. 
They  had  taken  the  theory  of  the  Hedonists  that  the 


78          THE  MORAL  IDEAL  — THE   GOOD 

greatest  happiness  determines  all  moral  actions  of 
the  individual.  The  reason  he  is  kind  to  others 
is  that  he  is  thereby  made  happy  himself.  The 
Utilitarians  maintained  that  it  is  the  duty  of  every 
one  to  seek  the  happiness  of  others,  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number.  But  they  were 
challenged  to  explain  how,  if  one's  own  happiness 
is  decisive  for  all  his  action,  it  can  possibly  be  his 
duty  to  seek  equally  the  happiness  of  others  — 
except  as  their  happiness  makes  him  happy,  in 
which  case  he  is  really  seeking  not  their  happiness 
but  his  own.  It  was  a  foolish  debate,  for  it  made 
the  false  assumption  that  there  is,  or  ever  was,  or 
ever  will  be,  an  isolated  individual,  seeking  exclu- 
sively his  own  happiness,  or  anything  else,  out  of 
relation  to  his  fellow-men.  He  is  part  of  society. 
His  life  is  in  relation.  He  receives  and  gives  con- 
stantly in  the  organism  of  which  he  is  a  member. 
Separation  from  it  is  death.  As  the  leaf  of  a  rose, 
after  it  is  pulled  out,  is  not  a  complete  leaf,  but  is 
already  decomposing  as  it  falls  to  the  ground,  so  a 
man  is  not  a  true  man  who  is  not  in  vital  relation 
with  his  fellow-men  in  society.  He  is  not  an  end 
to  which  other  men  are  means,  nor  are  other  men 
ends  to  which  he  is  means,  but  every  man  is  at  the 
same  time  end  and  means  in  the  social  organism. 
The  Utilitarians  were  said  to  have  taken  a  leap  in 
getting  from  the  happiness  of  the  individual  to  the 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number,  or  at  least  to 
have  thrown  across  the  chasm  the  insecure  bridge 
of  native  sympathetic  instincts,  which  their  oppo- 
nents regarded  merely  as  sentiments  that  make 
the  sympathizer  happy.  But  there  really  was  no 


PERSONAL  AND  SOCIAL    ,  79 

chasm  to  cross.  There  can  be  no  true  happiness  of 
an  individual  which  is  not  the  happiness  of  others. 
There  can  be  no  happiness  of  others  which  is  not 
the  happiness  of  the  individual  who  perceives  or 
promotes  it. 

The  advance  of  morality  is  towards  a  widening 
extension  of  the  range  of  persons  until  in  fact 
as  well  as  in  name  all  are  included.  The  change 
which  has  been  going  on  is  not  so  much,  perhaps, 
in  the  intensity  of  the  feeling  of  duty  to  a  fellow- 
man, —  because  it  has  always  been  strong  in  the 
family,  the  tribe,  and  the  nation,  —  but  in  the  range. 
This  universal  extension  has  been  gained  by  recog- 
nition of  the  rights  and  possibilities  of  man  as  a 
rational  and  moral  being,  regardless  of  artificial 
conditions  of  place  or  race.  The  late  Professor 
T.  H.  Green  epitomized  it  by  saying  that  it  is  not 
the  sense  of  duty  to  a  neighbor,  but  the  practical 
answer  to  the  question,  Who  is  my  neighbor,  that 
has  varied. l  Some  are  doubtful  whether  men  are 
the  better  for  this  widening  of  range.  It  is  said 
that  the  friend  of  man  is  apt  to  be  the  friend  of 
no  one  in  particular.  Enthusiasm  for  humanity 
does  indeed  become  a  cant  phrase.  Any  prin- 
ciple may  be  abused.  Phrases  may  become  so 
smoothly  worn  that  they  cease  to  represent  any 
value.  But  it  may  well  be  believed  that  the  value 
of  one's  own  morality  increases  by  the  removal  of 
limitations  which  had  narrowed  his  conception  of 
the  rights  of  humanity.  The  habit  of  duty  is  cer- 
tainly strengthened  by  constant  and  varied  calls 
for  its  practice.  The  very  discussion  of  a  possible 
1  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  220. 


80          THE  MORAL   IDEAL— THE   GOOD 

loss  of  depth  by  the  extension  of  breadth  shows 
how  wide  the  enlargement  is.  Social  sentiment 
condemns  the  refusal  to  help  any  one  in  need, 
however  alien  he  may  be  by  language,  condi- 
tion, or  distance.  A  famine  in  any  part  of  the 
world  appeals  successfully  to  the  humane  feelings. 
The  point  has  been  reached  at  which  the  ques- 
tion arises  whether  it  is  right,  even  in  war,  to  sus- 
pend the  claims  of  common  humanity.  Atrocities 
which  were  once  unrebuked  are  now  condemned. 
The  Japanese  have  learned  to  be  humane  in  the 
treatment  of  prisoners  of  war.  Mr.  Pearson 
argues  that  the  practical  limit  of  human  interest 
and  duty  is  national,  and  believes  this  is  as  it 
should  be,  that  progress  is  to  be  expected  through 
national  prosperity.  This  may  be  true  in  respect 
to  diplomacy  and  economics,  although  the  nations 
are  bound  together  by  a  commercial  reciprocity 
which  is  a  surer  preventive  of  war  than  the 
shrewdest  diplomacy.  When  swords  have  once 
been  beaten  into  plowshares,  it  is  no  easy  task  to 
reverse  the  process  and  to  forge  plowshares  into 
swords.  The  farmer  has  no  notion  of  fighting 
with  his  best  customers.  Free  trade  in  intellectual 
produce  is  so  unrestricted  that  foreign  science,  lit- 
erature, philosophy,  and  theology  are  appraised 
at  a  higher  value  than  the  native.  Americans,  at 
least,  prefer  to  import  their  intellectual  supplies. 
The  missionary  impulse,  on  the  other  hand,  ex- 
ports its  values.  Christians  and  Buddhists  carry 
their  spiritual  product  to  foreign  nations.  While 
duties  are  practically  determined  by  neighborhood 
of  locality  and  nation,  yet  the  rights  and  needs  of 


PERSONAL  AND  SOCIAL       /  81 

any  one  in  the  whole  wide  world  may  place  obliga- 
tion upon  any  other. 

The  moral  law  has  now  been  recognized  as 
personal,  as  personal  good  or  well-being,  as  that 
good  which  consists  in  value,  worth,  or  perfection 
of  character  according  to  the  normal  human  type, 
as  a  value  which  produces  happiness,  and  as  a 
value  which  is  absolute  and  therefore  the  right  of 
every  person.  The  moral  ideal  is  a  social  ideal. 
The  sense  of  obligation  has  not  been  discussed, 
but  only  mentioned.  But  morality  is  imperative. 
Duty,  right,  conscience,  law,  are  distinctive  char- 
acteristics and  conditions  of  morality.  I  therefore 
proceed  in  the  next  chapter  to  the  consideration  of 
Moral  Law,  or  the  Eight.  After  the  relation  of 
the  Good  and  the  Right  has  been  recognized,  the 
theory  that  happiness  is  the  object  and  motive  of 
virtue  will  be  criticised. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   MORAL   LAW THE   RIGHT 

THE  Good  is  an  ideal  which  is  imperative.  It 
issues  orders.  The  authoritative  character  of  mo- 
rality is  generally  and  popularly  recognized  in  the 
terms  commonly  employed  to  designate  the  moral : 
duty,  right,  law,  obligation,  ought,  conscience.  The 
imperative  of  morality  is  the  Eight.  The  author- 
ity of  morality  is  Law.  Eight  and  Law  are,  prac- 
tically, equivalent  terms.  The  Eight  is  that  which 
ought  to  be  done.  It  is  a  Law  to  be  obeyed. 


This  characteristic  of  morality,  or  of  man  as 
moral,  excites  wonder  and  admiration.  That  feel- 
ing of  obligation  which  impels  one  to  sacrifice 
comfort,  pleasure,  reputation,  friendship,  and  life 
itself,  gives  man  his  nobility.  It  has  sacredness. 
Every  one  has  the  feeling,  and  has  it  every  day  of 
his  life,  yet  regards  it  with  reverence,  almost  with 
awe.  As  familiar  as  the  starry  heavens,  it  also,  like 
those  countless  and  distant  orbs,  excites  unfailing 
wonder.  This,  in  fact,  is  the  standard  comparison, 
constantly  repeated  in  the  .well-known  saying  of 
Kant :  "  Two  things  fill  the  mind  with  ever  new 
and  increasing  admiration  and  awe,  the  starry 
heavens  above  and  the  moral  law  within."  The 
poet's  apostrophe  to  duty  takes  up  the  same  figure 


THE  IMPERATIVE  OF  RIGHT  83 

and  pursues  it  still  farther  in  the  obedience  to  law 
which  controls  the  sweep  of  the  silent  spheres  in 
their  orbits :  — 

"  Thou  dost  preserve  the  stars  from  wrong  ; 
And  the  most  ancient  heavens,  through  Thee,  are  fresh  and 
strong." 

It  is  not  strange  that  the  sacred  sense  of  obliga- 
tion has  been  regarded  as  the  whole  of  *morality, 
as  the  very  nature  of  it,  and  the  strengthening  of 
this  sense  as  the  object  of  morality.  The  inviola- 
bility of  conscience,  even  when  judgment  is  mis- 
taken, seems  to  make  oughtness  the  sum  and 
substance  of  virtue.  It  is  thought  that  there  is 
nothing  back  of  that,  that  the  right  is  right  be- 
cause it  is  right,  that  it  is  intuitive,  and  incapable 
of  analysis  into  other  elements.  It  is  considered 
almost  a  profanation  to  seek  the  origin  of  the  sense 
of  obligation  in  other  feelings,  to  trace  it  to  some 
advantage  gained  by  it,  or  to  regard  it  as  in  any 
way  subordinate  to  other  ends.  And,  indeed,  even 
if  something  may  be  learned  about  the  circum- 
stances which  first  called  it  into  exercise,  and  even 
if  it  is  found  that  there  has  been  a  development 
of  it,  it  still  remains  so  distinctive  of  man,  and  so 
absolute  in  its  imperative,  that  wonder  is  only  in- 
creased. The  genesis  of  conscience  is  of  less  con- 
sequence than  its  nature  and  reality.  We  should 
recognize  it  for  what  it  is  before  we  discuss  and 
in  order  that  we  may  discuss  theories  of  its  origin. 
It  may  not  be  possible  to  understand  its  origin. 
We  may  conclude  that  it  is  a  native  endowment 
which  differentiated  man  from  lower  beings,  and 
which,  with  other  endowments,  simply  constituted 


84          THE  MORAL  LAW  —  THE  RIGHT 

him  man.  At  the  best,  beginnings  are  obscure, 
and  cannot  be  fully  understood.  The  genesis  of  a 
thing  may  go  but  a  little  way  to  explain  the  nature 
of  the  thing.  We  will  pursue  our  inquiry  con- 
cerning the  Right  in  the  reality  as  we  know  it, 
and  consider  its  origin  afterwards. 

II 

The  Right  is  determined  by  and  is  correlative 
to  the  Good.  Obligation  is  the  requirement  we 
make  of  ourselves  to  realize  the  Good.  I  do  not 
regard  obligation  as  ultimate,  in  the  sense  that  it 
is  independent,  that  it  is  a  conviction  or  sentiment 
which  rests  on  nothing  other  than  itself.  Unless 
an  ideal  is  perceived,  there  is  no  meaning  in  obli- 
gation. The  good  determines  the  right.  In  this 
respect,  I  am  aware  that  I  seem  to  differ  from 
some  ethical  writers,  who  put  the  right  first,  and 
endeavor  to  determine  the  good  by  the  right,  who 
maintain  that  the  good  is  known  by  knowing  what 
duty  is.  This  relation  is  the  reverse  of  the  truth. 
The  law  which  proclaims  the  right  and  prescribes 
duty  is  derived  from  the  good  to  be  realized.  To 
turn  the  relation  about  is  simply  impossible.  It 
is  therefore  found  that  those  who  discuss  the  right 
first  and  the  good  afterwards  make  implicit  in  the 
representation  of  the  right  all  that  is  subsequently 
made  explicit  in  the  exposition  of  the  good.  If 
duty  is  for  the  sake  of  duty,  one  thing  might  as 
well  be  required  as  another.  An  apt  illustration 
given  by  Janet  disposes  of  that  notion  :  "  A  moral 
law  which  should  require  us  to  break  stones  with- 
out any  object,  for  the  sake  simply  of  breaking  our 


THE  RIGHT  AND   THE  GOOD,  85 

wills,  would  be  a  law  void  of  all  content,  and  con- 
sequently senseless.  The  recluses  of  the  Thebaid, 
who  tired  themselves  out  in  watering  dead  sticks, 
furnish  us  with  a  perfect  illustration  of  a  purely 
formal  law,  freed  from  every  material  object. 
Such  an  action  might  be  useful  as  an  ingenious 
apologue,  by  which  the  recluses  constantly  remind 
themselves  of  the  vanity  of  human  labor;  but  if 
we  take  it  as  the  perfect  type  of  morality,  we  fall 
into  the  absurd  and  impracticable."1  During  a 
season  of  industrial  depression,  a  manufacturer 
employed  his  workmen  in  grading  the  grounds 
about  the  mill.  He  said  it  was  really  and  only  to 
give  them  work,  but  that  he  allowed  them  to  think 
it  was  work  that  needed  to  be  done,  so  that  they 
might  do  it  with  self-respect.  A  popular  story 
tells  about  a  man  who  was  employed  in  copying 
from  the  "  Britannica  "  four  hours  a  day,  and  who 
finally  refused  to  go  on,  just  because  he  knew  the 
work  was  useless.  The  right  then  is  determined 
by  the  good,  the  moral  law  by  the  moral  ideal.  If 
this  relation  is  expressed  in  a  single  statement,  it 
would  give  the  following  proposition  :  Moral  Law, 
or  the  Right,  is  the  Moral  Ideal,  or  the  Good,  rec- 
ognized as  obligatory  and  authoritative.  In  other 
words,  the  right  is  completely  correlative  to  the 
good.  In  technical  language  it  would  be  said  that 
the  Good  is  the  material  principle  and  the  Eight 
is  the  formal  principle.  The  opinion  that  the 
right  is  intuitively  known  is  easily  explained. 
Certain  acts  have  long  been  believed  to  realize  the 
ideal  of  the  good,  and  opposite  acts  to  defeat  it. 

1  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  31. 


86          THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

These  are  the  virtues  which  are  always  and  every- 
where approved,  the  vices  which  are  universally 
condemned.  The  corresponding  commands  and 
prohibitions  seem  therefore  to  be  immediate,  and 
we  are  apt  to  regard  them  as  intrinsically  right, 
to  say  of  them  that  they  are  right  just  because 
they  are  right.  But,  on  reflection,  they  are  seen 
to  be  the  conditions  of  good  character  and  of  the 
well-being  of  society.  The  conviction  that  truth- 
fulness, honesty,  chastity  are  right,  seems  to  be 
intuitive,  but  the  conviction  is  really  recognition  of 
the  necessary  characteristics  of  the  moral  ideal. 

in 

For  the  purposes  of  the  present  inquiry  it  is  not 
necessary  to  enter  at  length  into  careful  definition 
of  the  various  terms  which  designate  the  Right. 
A  brief  statement  will  be  sufficent  to  indicate  that 
which  is  signified  by  all  of  them. 

Law  is  a  mode  of  energy  or  action.  It  is  the 
way  in  which  power  acts  or  should  act.  The  laws  of 
nature  are  the  modes  in  which  force  acts.  Intel- 
lectual laws  are  the  modes  in  which  mental  powers 
perceive  and  reason,  as  in  logic  and  mathematics ; 
and  moral  laws  are  the  modes  in  which  the  will 
acts.  Moral  law  is  the  requirement,  self-imposed 
or  imposed  by  others,  to  put  forth  power  in  order 
to  realize  some  end.  The  energy  of  the  forces  of 
nature  is  necessitated,  and  law  is  the  mode  of 
necessary  action.  The  action  of  man  is  self-deter- 
mined, and  law  is  requirement,  not  necessity.  It 
requires  the  realization  of  the  ideal  for  himself  and 
for  others.  Laws  therefore  are  not  abstract.  They 


LAW— DUTY— OBLIGATION  87 

have  no  independent  existence.  They  are  simply 
the  modes  in  which  energy  acts,  or  should  act. 
They  may  be  generalized  because  modes  of  action 
are  uniform  and  regular.  The  results  of  human 
action  may  be  perceived  as  the  ideal  before  they 
are  realized  in  conduct,  but  the  foreseen  results  are 
simply  the  man  himself  thought  of  as  having  a  cer- 
tain character  and  doing  certain  acts.  The  law  of 
God  is  simply  God  himself  as  he  is  and  as  he  acts, 
or  the  character  and  action  he  requires  of  man. 
There  is  nothing  impersonal  nor  abstract.  If  there 
were  no  persons  there  would  be  no  moral  law.  If 
there  were  no  universe  there  would  be  no  laws  of 
nature.  If  the  universe  was  created,  there  were  no 
laws  of  nature  when  it  was  uncreated,  except  as 
thoughts  in  the  Creator's  mind  of  the  energies  and 
phenomena  of  the  universe  to  be  created.  Moral 
laws  then  are  the  modes  in  which  man  acts,  or 
should  act.  The  laws  are  found  in  the  results  of 
action,  in  what  man  is  and  does.  The  ideal  gives 
the  law,  for  it  is  the  result  to  which  all  moral  aims 
and  actions  are  directed. 

The  other  terms,  obligation,  ought,  duty,  mean 
simply  the  feeling  or  conviction  of  man  that  he 
should  put  forth  his  energy  to  obey  the  law,  that 
is,  to  realize  the  ideal.  It  is  not  necessary  to  indi- 
cate, to  a  nicety,  the  exact  signification  of  each 
of  these  terms.  We  wish  to  recognize  the  nature, 
value,  and  origin  of  the  sense  of  duty,  and  it  is 
enough  to  note  that  moral  law  is  the  moral  ideal 
recognized  as  obligatory  and  authoritative. 


88          THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

IV 

The  good  and  the  right  are  completely  correla- 
tive. The  good  is  not  greater  than  the  right.  The 
right  is  not  less  than  the  good.  Not  part  but  the 
whole  of  the  ideal  is  obligatory.  Whatever  con- 
stitutes well-being  constitutes  duty.  If  it  is  said 
that  a  good  must  sometimes  be  sacrificed  for  the 
sake  of  duty,  the  reply  is  that  it  is  a  relative,  not 
an  absolute  good.  The  highest  good,  that  which 
is  good  on  the  whole,  cannot  be  sacrificed,  but 
for  the  sake  of  it  the  lower  good  is  relinquished. 
Health  is  a  good,  but  if  it  can  be  preserved  only 
by  sacrificing  a  higher  good,  it  is  no  part  of  duty. 
In  fact,  the  decision  of  right  is  made  on  that  very 
ground.  In  that  case,  health  is  not  a  good,  for 
the  good  is  the  best.  Health  or  pleasure  may  cost 
too  much.  The  price  might  be  another  person's 
life.  Soundness  of  limb  is  not  a  good  when  one 
pays  for  it  by  bankruptcy  of  patriotism.  The 
moral  ideal  is  the  greatest  good.  It  is  the  best 
character.  No  feature,  quality,  attainment,  or  sat- 
isfaction of  this  ideal  may  be  neglected.  All  of 
it  proclaims  law.  To'realize  it  is  right.  Not  to 
realize  it  is  wrong. 

There  are,  therefore,  no  works  of  supererogation. 
There  are  no  saintly  deeds  which  are  not  obliga- 
tory. If  penances,  pilgrimages,  and  retreats,  rather 
than  some  other  uses  of  time,  are  for  the  good  of 
one's  soul,  there  is  a  corresponding  duty.  Such 
acts  may  be  over  and  above  that  which  is  custom- 
ary. There  may  be  no  social  or  ecclesiastical  law 
which  requires  them,  as  there  is  no  civil  law  which 


GOOD  AND  RIGHT  CORRELATIVE        89 

requires  one  to  send  his  son  to  college.  Such  acts 
are  not  good  for  all  persons,  and  so  there  is  no  uni- 
versal law  requiring  them.  But  if  they  are  for 
the  good  of  the  person  himself,  and  are  not  at  the 
cost  of  a  greater  good,  they  are  his  bounden  duty. 
So-called  works  of  supererogation  are  usually  a  loss 
rather  than  a  gain,  both  in  waste  of  time  and  in 
impaired  fitness  for  the  real  work  of  life.  They 
might  better  be  called,  if  a  word  may  be  coined, 
works  of  suberogation  or  contraerogation.  But 
self -culture,  to  the  utmost  and  finest  degree  pos- 
sible, is  every  person's  duty.  If  any  works  or  de- 
privals  are  regarded  as  more  than  duty,  there  is 
comparison  with  an  imperfect  ideal,  an  ideal 
which  is  no  higher  than  the  actual  practice  of  the 
majority.  There  is  no  merit  which  is  a  surplus. 
All  duty  is  meritorious.  It  is  a  strange  perversion 
of  thought  when  one  remarks  of  the  act  of  another 
that  it  has  no  merit,  for  he  simply  did  his  duty. 
So  of  benevolence  and  heroism.  If  they  are  good 
they  are  right ;  and  if  they  are  right  they  are  oblig- 
atory. If  one  can  do  an  heroic  act  he  ought  to  do 
it.  It  would  be  wrong  not  to  do  it.  One  founds 
an  asylum,  establishes  a  library,  endows  a  college, 
goes  out  as  a  missionary.  Not  every  one  has  the 
wealth  or  the  qualifications  for  such  services.  No 
civil  law  requires  them.  But  if  he  thinks  such  ser- 
vices are  the  best  use  of  his  money  or  his  time, 
they  are  unmistakably  his  duty.  If  he  is  able  to 
do  such  things  he  ought  to  do  them.  He  may  be 
praised  because  the  service  is  large,  or  unusual,  or 
difficult,  or  dangerous,  and  because  he  was  under 
no  coercion.  But,  after  all,  he  has  done  only  what 


90          THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

was  his  duty  to  do.  Moreover,  a  man  who  amasses 
wealth  and  devotes  no  considerable  part  of  it,  either 
during  his  lifetime  or  by  testament,  to  the  public 
good,  is  severely  reprobated  for  neglect  of  duty. 
It  is  also  true  that  he  who  does  more  than  law  or 
custom  requires  is  likely  to  think  that  he  has  done 
less,  not  more,  than  his  duty.  He  sees  an  ideal 
better  than  his  best  doing.  If  he  regards  a  deed 
as  more  than  duty,  he  is  actuated  by  unworthy 
motives,  such  as  the  love  of  praise  or  fame,  and  his 
virtue  is  vitiated.  The  Christian  principle  of  stew- 
ardship is  good  ethics.  According  to  what  a  man 
hath  it  is  required  of  him.  Expressed  in  modern 
phrase,  it  is  the  principle  that  obligation  is  meas- 
ured by  ability.  This  man,  therefore,  may  not  go 
to  that  man  to  find  the  measure.  Each  is  a  law 
to  himself.  The  greatest  moral  teacher  carefully 
illustrates  the  gradation  of  duty  on  a  sliding  rather 
than  a  uniform  scale  in  the  parable  of  the  talents. 
To  one  man  ten  talents  were  given,  to  another  five, 
to  another  one,  to  each  according  to  his  several 
ability.  The  greatest  apostle  of  Jesus  estimated 
his  duty  or  debt  to  Greek  and  Barbarian  accord- 
ing to  the  measure  of  his  own  powers,  defining  it 
precisely  in  the  significant  words,  "  as  much  as  in 
me  is."  A  Syrian  farmer  of  the  time  had  no  such 
duty  because  he  had  no  such  power. 

But  still  it  is  thought  that  there  are  kinds  of 
good  which  impose  no  duty.  The  aesthetic  is  some- 
times distinguished  from  the  ethical.  The  culti- 
vation and  enjoyment  of  the  beautiful  is  not  re- 
garded as  obligatory.  Correct  taste  is  not  a  duty. 
Lack  of  appreciation  is  not  blameworthy.  The 


GOOD  AND  RIGHT  CORRELATIVE        91 

aesthetic  pertains  simply  to  pleasure.  It  is  refined 
pleasure.  It  is  a  lofty  good.  But  it  is  not  right- 
eousness. If  one  enjoys  art  and  music,  he  is  not 
the  better  morally ;  neither,  if  he  enjoys  them  not, 
is  he  the  worse.  Here,  then,  it  is  said,  is  a  kind  of 
good  which  has  no  moral  quality.  It  is  simply  non- 
moral.  It  is  unquestionably  a  good,  for  it  is  a 
source  of  pure  enjoyment  and  a  means  of  refine- 
ment. But  it  is  altogether  different  from  honesty 
and  truthfulness.  This  view  seems  to  find  justifi- 
cation in  the  division  of  values  into  the  true,  the 
beautiful,  and  the  good ;  the  true  being  the  ra- 
tional, the  beautiful  the  aesthetic,  and  the  good  the 
ethical.  It  is  further  maintained  that  when  moral 
terms  are  applied  to  art,  such  terms  as  "  a  consci- 
entious artist,"  "  a  vicious  taste,"  "  a  meritricious 
painting,"  it  is  only  by  way  of  accommodation  to 
indicate  correctness  of  taste  and  excellence  of  exe- 
cution, or  their  opposites. 

But  a  moment's  reflection  shows  that  art  is  not 
independent  of  morality.  If  art  is  a  human  good, 
there  is  a  corresponding  duty.  If  the  absence  of  art 
would  be  a  real  loss  to  humanity,  then  there  are 
some  who  ought  to  cultivate  it.  One  who  is  artistic 
has  a  duty  in  the  use  of  his  powers  of  creation,  both 
for  his  own  perfection  and  for  the  refinement  of 
those  who  appreciate  art.  It  was  Raphael's  duty 
to  paint  Madonnas,  Beethoven's  to  compose  sym- 
phonies, Shakespeare's  to  write  plays.  It  would 
have  been  wrong  for  them  to  do  anything  else,  even 
if  they  had  done  other  things  well ;  wrong  for  Ra- 
phael to  preach,  for  Beethoven  to  teach  philosophy, 
for  Shakespeare  to  be  a  country  squire  or  magis- 


92  THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

trate.  It  is  difficult  to  estimate  the  full  value  of  the 
aesthetic  for  the  education,  refinement,  and  eleva- 
tion of  multitudes.  Art  and  music  are  often  called 
the  handmaids  of  the  church,  and  the  church  is  the 
mightiest  moral  agency.  Men  should  worship  God 
in  the  beauty  of  holiness.  The  beauty  of  morality 
is  its  highest  praise.  The  gratification  of  aesthetic 
taste  may  be  disproportionate.  Music  or  art  may 
monopolize,  and  produce  one-sidedness  of  character. 
They  may  promote  an  artificial  sensibility.  Feel- 
ing may  be  stimulated  for  the  keen  pleasurableness 
of  the  feeling.  ^Estheticism  is  emotional  self-indul- 
gence. But  this  is  excess;  and  only  the  excess 
is  immoral.  The  significant  title  of  a  magazine 
article  is  :  "  The  Moral  Dangers  of  Musical  Devo- 
tees." At  certain  stages  of  civilization,  other 
interests  are  so  imperious  that  art  must  be  neg- 
lected, and  devotion  to  art  be  considered  an 
impertinence.  At  least,  there  are  some  who  think 
so.  For  my  own  part,  I  cannot  see  that  the  Puri- 
tan who  stripped  off  the  adornments  of  cathedrals 
was  any  stronger  for  being  an  iconoclast.  If  he 
had  destroyed  the  cathedrals,  as  perhaps  he  would 
have  liked  to  do,  he  could  not  be  forgiven.  Nor 
do  I  admit  that  the  Puritan  was  destitute  of  the 
sense  of  beauty,  in  view  of  his  own  domestic  archi- 
tecture remaining  in  some  of  the  old  houses  of 
New  England,  in  view  of  the  poetry  of  Milton,  and 
in  view  of  the  Puritan's  love  of  the  beauty  and 
sublimity  of  the  Hebrew  Scriptures.  At  certain 
periods  of  personal  life,  periods  of  trial  or  of 
grave  responsibility,  the  aesthetic  makes  no  appeal. 
One  is  building  up  character  on  other  foundations. 


THE   UNITING  PRINCIPLE  93 

But  he  may  meet  the  storm  and  bear  the  stress  of 
life  better  because  art  and  literature,  as  well  as 
religion,  have  refined  away  vulgarity  and  coarse- 
ness, and  have  helped  to  make  him  the  quiet, 
discerning,  patient,  and  hopeful  man  he  is.  And 
even  at  such  times,  the  beauty  of  rural  scenes,  the 
strains  of  solemn  music,  the  grace  of  culture  on 
some  open  page  or  in  the  talk  of  a  friend,  may  be 
ministers  of  comfort  and  of  strength.  In  what- 
ever measure,  I  repeat,  the  aesthetic  is  a  good,  in 
that  measure  it  is  a  duty.  There  is  a  morality  of 
beauty  and  a  beauty  of  morality.  If  it  is  true  of 
that  good  which  is  thought  to  be  most  distinct 
from  morality  that  it  ought  in  proper  conditions 
and  in  proportionate  measure  to  be  realized,  it 
must  be  true  of  other  human  goods,  —  industrial, 
political,  scientific,  literary,  —  and  they  need  not 
detain  us.  If  a  man  has  ten  talents,  every  one  of 
them  represents  a  value  and  implies  a  correspond- 
ing duty.  The  tenth  has  its  rights  as  truly  as  the 
first  or  the  second.  There  is  no  exception,  then,  to 
the  relation  of  the  moral  law  to  the  moral  ideal. 
The  good  determines  the  right,  and  the  right  is 
completely  correlative  to  the  good. 


We  now  look  for  a  principle  which  can  take 
these  related  values  of  perfection  and  sacred  obli- 
gation into  union.  As  they  can  be  separated  only 
in  thought,  may  there  not  be  some  conception  or 
sentiment  which  embodies  both,  which  combines 
the  worth  of  the  ideal  with  the  intensity  of  duty  ? 
There  is  a  single  word  which  includes  both  concep- 


94  THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

tions.  It  is,  on  the  whole,  the  best,  and  it  is  also 
the  most  familiar  conception  of  virtue.  It  is  a 
word  which  stands  with  equal  distinctiveness  for 
the  good  and  the  right.  This  word  is  "  love."  The 
object  of  love  is  persons  in  their  ideal  worth  ;  the 
devotion  of  love  to  its  object  is  sense  of  duty  car- 
ried to  the  highest  power.  Love  is  never  thought 
of  apart  from  its  object ;  it  is  never  thought  of 
except  as  complete  devotion  to  its  object.  Love 
has  in  view  the  worth  of  the  object ;  it  cannot  be 
turned  away  from  seeking  that  worth.  The  ideal 
it  promotes  is  nothing  short  of  perfection  ;  the  ob- 
ligation to  promote  the  ideal  is  the  supreme  law  of 
life.  Love  seeks  the  good  of  those  who  are  loved ; 
it  seeks  their  good  with  a  reigning  devotion.  It  is 
as  extensive  as  the  complete  ideal  of  character  ;  it 
is  as  intensive  as  the  utter  self-devotion  of  duty. 
It  is  comprehensive  in  scope  ;  it  is  all-absorbing  in 
consecration.  It  denotes  also  the  feeling  of  deep- 
est satisfaction  in  promoting  good  and  doing  right. 
Love  transfigures  duty  into  joy.  It  has  blessedness 
in  fulfilling  the  law.  It  has  delight  in  service. 
Thus  it  combines  all  the  elements  of  virtue.  It 
sees  and  seeks  the  good  of  persons ;  it  raises  duty 
to  the  highest  power ;  it  finds  happiness  in  perfect 
obedience  to  perfect  law.  It  also  has  the  advantage 
of  common  use.  The  word  has  been  fused  in  the 
heat  and  glow  of  human  experience.  From  birth 
to  death,  love  ennobles  and  beautifies  every  period 
of  existence.  It  gives  their  true  value  to  the  near- 
est relationships.  Love  is  the  dearest  word  of  child- 
hood, the  deepest  word  of  manhood  and  woman- 
hood, the  tenderest  word  of  age,  the  sacredest 


THE   UNITING  PRINCIPLE  ,  95 

word  of  religion.  It  was  gathering  meaning 
through  the  ages,  as  the  family  rooted  itself  in 
affection,  as  friendships  rang  more  true,  as  human- 
ity became  more  humane,  till  it  was  a  prepared 
word  seized  by  the  greatest  moral  teacher  to  char- 
acterize goodness.  In  the  fullness  of  time  the 
word  was  found  which  signifies  the  true  good, 
the  absolute  right,  the  complete  blessedness.  The 
truth  and  value  of  it  had  been  adumbrated  in  hu- 
manity's best,  and  so  could  be  adopted  as  the  final 
and  comprehensive  word  for  virtue  :  — 

"  Tho'  truths  in  manhood  darkly  join, 
Deep-seated  in  our  mystic  frame, 
We  yield  all  blessing1  to  the  name 
Of  Him  that  made  them  current  coin.  "  1 

In  plainer  speech,  we  are  indebted  to  Christian- 
ity for  the  truth  that  goodness  is  love  and  that  love 
is  the  fulfillment  of  the  law.  The  chief  of  the 
Christian  apostles  showed  this  in  detail  by  taking 
up  the  several  commandments  and  showing  that 
they  are  the  expressions  of  love,  and  that  love  is 
therefore  the  fulfilling  of  the  law.  The  most  forci- 
ble and  original  ethical  teacher  America  has  pro- 
duced adopted  for  his  published  system  the  title : 
"  The  Law  of  Love  and  Love  as  a  Law." 

Love  is  not  to  be  regarded,  however,  as  the  real- 
ization of  virtue  unless  it  is  taken  in  the  largest 
sense.  If  it  is  employed  only  to  signify  devotion 
to  others  at  the  cost  of  self-effacement,  if  it  is 
equivalent  only  to  that  which  ethics  designates  as 
altruism,  it  cannot  be  accepted  as  the  correct  and 
sufficient  principle  of  morality.  But  if  it  includes 
1  In  Memoriam. 


96  THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

self-love,  as  well  as  love  to  others,  and  makes  them 
the  reciprocal  condition  of  each  other,  it  is  the  best 
term  we  have  to  express  all  the  elements  of  moral- 
ity. In  the  sixth  chapter  I  shall  endeavor  to  show 
that  true  self-love  is  not  a  mere  accommodation  of 
language,  but  that  it  is  one  hemisphere  of  morality, 
that  it  is  distinguished  from  selfishness  on  the  one 
hand,  and  from  altruism  on  the  other  hand.  It 
will  be  seen  that  love  seeks  the  perfection  of  the 
one  loved,  and  that  therefore,  as  self-perfection  is 
every  one's  duty,  self-love  is  essential  to  morality. 
It  will  also  be  seen  that,  if  self-love  is  ignored, 
one  of  the  important  factors  of  evolution  is  con- 
verted from  an  ally  to  an  enemy  of  virtue.  With 
this  understanding,  "  love  "is  to  be  regarded  as 
the  most  satisfactory  term  for  the  good  and  the 
right,  for  love  seeks  the  good  in  character,  and 
obeys  law  in  every  energy  of  its  being.  It  does 
right  not  for  the  sake  of  right  but  for  the  sake  of 
persons.  It  does  not  do  away  with  obligation, 
but  makes  duty  sacred. 

VI 

Two  inquiries  remain.  One  pertains  to  the  ori- 
gin and  permanence  of  the  sense  of  obligation,  the 
other  to  the  nature  of  conscience.  The  origin  of  the 
sense  of  obligation  has  been  found,  by  some  writers, 
in  coercion.  The  chief  of  a  tribe  gains  power  and 
requires  certain  actions  under  threats  of  penalty. 
The  fear  or  experience  of  the  penalty  constrains 
men  to  obey.  Long  continuance  of  these  condi- 
tions establishes  requirements  as  rights  and  ser- 
vices as  duties.  Thus  arise  rights  of  property, 


ORIGIN  OF  OBLIGATION  97 

rights  in  certain  women,  rights  of  government, 
and  corresponding  duties  of  honesty,  chastity, 
patriotism.  Later  the  origin  of  rights  and  duties 
is  forgotten.  They  seem  to  be  inherent.  Custom 
has  strengthened  them.  But  they  really  originate 
in  coercion  on  the  one  side  and  fear  on  the  other. 
When  custom  is  ingrained,  coercion  is  relaxed. 
Men  believe  that  rights  and  duties  are  the  neces- 
sary conditions  of  society  and  of  individual  well- 
being.  But  this  theory,  at  the  most,  gives  only  the 
occasion  which  elicits  the  sense  of  obligation.  It 
does  not  find  the  producing  cause.  There  are  men 
to  start  with,  and  men  in  a  social  organism.  There 
are  chiefs  who  gain  power,  and  render  some  return 
of  protection  for  services  exacted.  Laws  must 
have  some  approximate  correspondence  to  the  good 
of  men  in  society.  A  chief  would  not  for  long  re- 
tain authority  if  he  required  every  savage  to  burn 
his  hut  as  soon  as  it  was  completed,  to  strangle 
every  child  as  soon  as  it  was  born,  to  surrender  all 
the  women  to  the  chief,  to  cut  off  one  hand  as  a 
token  of  fealty,  or  in  any  way  to  incapacitate  him- 
self totally  for  enjoyment  and  production.  Coer- 
cion could  not  convince  savages  that  what  is  bad 
for  them  is  good  for  them.  The  duties  required 
must  have  some  correspondence  to  their  desires  and 
needs  as  men.  Atrocious  cruelties  have  indeed 
been  practiced  by  those  who  had  power,  but  exces- 
sive straining  of  authority  to  the  injury  of  men  is  at 
length  resented  and  denied  with  a  vindictiveness 
which  is  rooted  in  the  sense  of  wrong.  It  is  quite 
unnecessary  to  argue  this  theory  of  coercion,  for  it 
assumes  that  the  moral  sense  was  added  to  human 


98  THE  MORAL  LA  W—  THE  RIGHT 

nature  at  a  time  when  social  reciprocity  was  already 
found  in  tribes  and  families.  Authority,  enforcing 
rights  and  demanding  duties,  may  appeal  to,  but 
cannot  create,  the  sense  of  obligation.  The  occa- 
sion of  morality  and  its  validity  are  not  identical. 
The  conviction  that  chastity  is  a  virtue  is  thought 
by  some  to  have  originated  in  the  possession  of 
women  as  private  property,  and  in  jealousy  to- 
wards those  who  infringe  on  the  ownership.  But 
when  property  rights  in  women  no  longer  exist, 
chastity  is  even  more  highly  regarded,  nor  does  its 
integrity  depend  on  jealousy.  Justice  is  thought 
by  some  to  have  originated  in  feelings  of  resent- 
ment and  revenge.  But  justice  abides  after  vin- 
dictiveness  is  regarded  as  wrong.  Revenge  is 
itself  a  rude  and  rudimentary  justice.  Truthful- 
ness may  have  been  demanded  on  pain  of  penalty, 
but  when  no  penalty  is  threatened,  truthfulness  is 
all  the  more  imperative.  The  validity  of  duty  re- 
mains when  the  occasion  which  first  elicited  and 
sanctioned  duty  ceases.  Coercion  cannot  account 
for  the  remorse  of  a  Judas  and  a  Macbeth  nor 
for  the  death  of  martyrs  and  patriots. 

The  origin  of  morality  is  placed  at  a  much 
earlier  date  by  those  who  believe  that  the  moral 
was  developed  from  the  non-moral.  Darwin  fixed 
the  exact  point  at  which,  as  he  conjectured,  moral 
faculties  appeared :  "  The  following  proposition 
seems  to  me  in  a  high  degree  probable,  namely, 
that  any  animal  whatever,  endowed  with  well- 
marked  social  instincts,  would  inevitably  acquire 
a  moral  sense  or  conscience  as  soon  as  the  intel- 
lectual powers  had  become  as  well  developed, 


ORIGIN  OF  OBLIGATION  99 

or  nearly  as  well  developed,  as  in  man."1  That 
is,  the  moral  sense  appeared  in  animals  which 
were  about  as  intelligent  as  man.  The  process  is 
described  as  a  comparison  of  the  social  with  the 
selfish  desires.  The  social  feelings  became  strong 
and  permanent,  and  asserted  themselves  against 
the  intermittent  selfish  feelings.  After  hunger 
was  satisfied  by  stolen  food,  the  feeling  of  hunger 
was  gone,  but  the  social  feeling  remained.  When 
the  reflective  powers  were  developed,  past  acts 
were  remembered  and  compared.  The  reflecting 
animal  perceived  that  the  social  is  more  important, 
or  is  better,  than  the  selfish  feeling.  He  saw  that 
he  should  not  have  injured  or  neglected  another 
to  satisfy  a  transient  desire.  This  conviction  was 
strengthened  by  the  approbation  and  disapproba- 
tion of  other  animals,  and,  when  language  was 
acquired,  by  the  clear  expression  of  such  judg- 
ments. This  theory  certainly  recognizes  some  of 
the  conditions  necessary  to  the  existence  and  ex- 
ercise of  moral  feelings,  but  it  may  be  questioned 
whether  morality  itself  existed  in  the  animals  which 
preceded  man.  I  go  farther  than  this  theory  goes, 
and  include  the  self-regarding  as  well  as  the  social 
feelings  in  the  conditions  of  morality.  But  apart 
from  that,  the  theory  stands  or  falls  on  comparison 
of  feelings  and  estimate  of  their  relative  worth. 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  animals  make 
or  ever  made  such  comparisons  and  estimates. 
It  does  not  appear  that  the  social  feelings  are 
stronger  or  more  permanent  than  the  selfish  feel- 
ings. Physical  appetites  may  be  satisfied  so  as  to 

1  The  Descent  of  Man,  vol.  i.,  pp.  68, 69. 


100        THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

be  dormant,  but  they  soon  assert  themselves  again. 
Social  instincts  also  may  be  satisfied,  and  then 
yield  to  the  selfish  instincts.  If  the  selfish  for  the 
time  is  stronger  and  gives  pleasure,  there  is  no 
sign  that  it  is  afterwards  remembered  with  regret 
or  remorse.  If  the  social  feelings  have  been  in- 
dulged, there  is  no  sign  of  regret  when  the  selfish 
feelings  again  have  the  upper  hand.  It  is  ex- 
tremely improbable  that  a  hen  thinks  she  was  a 
fool  to  hatch  out  eggs  when  she  might  have  been 
scratching  up  food  for  her  own  enjoyment,  or  that 
a  cow  regrets  having  filled  herself  with  grass  when 
she  might  have  been  suckling  her  calf.  If  com* 
parison  of  social  with  selfish  feelings  is  made,  and 
regret  or  approval  is  felt,  there  must  be  percep- 
tion of  the  relative  worth,  and  not  merely  of  the 
intensity  or  duration  of  feelings.  The  social  must 
be  regarded  as  nobler  or  better  than  the  selfish 
impulses.  The  assumption  is  made  that  a  simian 
ancestor  recognized  the  intrinsic  superiority  of 
sympathetic  over  self-regarding  feelings.  Now, 
undoubtedly,  the  creature  which  does  that  is  a 
moral  being.  He  is  thereby  differentiated  from 
all  non-moral  beings.  He  has  that  perception  not 
as  a  non-moral,  but  as  a  moral  being.  When 
such  comparisons  and  estimates  are  made,  the 
simple  fact  is  that  man  has  appeared.  A  being 
which  does  not  make  such  comparisons  is  an  ani- 
mal. A  being  who  does  make  such  comparisons 
is  a  man.  If  there  ever  was  a  being  which  in  the 
earlier  part  of  its  existence  did  not  form  such 
judgments,  and  in  the  later  part  of  its  existence 
did  make  them,  that  being  became  a  man.  The 


ORIGIN  OF  OBLIGATION  101 

instant  the  first  comparison  was  made  and  the  rel- 
ative value  of  feelings  was  judged,  the  transforma- 
tion was  so  radical  that,  even  if  there  was  physical 
continuity,  a  new  kind  of  being  appeared.  I  sup- 
pose every  one  would  have  to  confess  utter  igno- 
rance of  the  process  of  such  a  development,  and 
utter  inability  even  to  imagine  it.  All  we  can  say 
is,  that  man  and  animals  have  self-regarding  and 
sympathetic  feelings,  that  in  the  case  of  man  the 
adjustment  and  relation  of  those  feelings  constitute 
large  part  of  morality,  and  that  man's  estimate  of 
their  relative  worth,  value,  rightfulness  or  wrong- 
fulness,  is  a  perception  which  differentiates  him 
from  animals.  They  are  like  the  psychical  pecul- 
iarities of  man,  by  which  he  reasons,  judges,  and 
imagines,  which  differentiate  him  from  animals 
and  make  him  the  unique  being  he  is.  They 
appeared  as  something  new.  We  do  not  know 
how  the  psychical  and  rational  are  developed  from 
the  physical  and  instinctive  powers,  nor  how  the 
moral  is  developed  from  the  non-moral.  When 
man  appears,  he  is  moral.  When  morality  ap- 
pears, there  is  man.  It  should  be  noticed,  before 
leaving  this  theory,  that  a  very  strange  sort  of 
being  is  imagined  by  Mr.  Darwin  as  existing  just 
before  the  moral  sense  appeared.  It  was  a  being 
with  "  intellectual  powers  as  well  developed,  or 
nearly  as  well  developed,  as  in  man."  A  being 
with  man's  intellect  but  without  his  moral  percep- 
tions must  have  been  an  extraordinary  creature. 
It  is  evident  that  the  addition  of  the  moral  sense 
can  be  conceived  only  if  man  is  already  given. 
And  if  man  is  already  given,  he  is  a  being  of 


102        THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

moral  as  well  as  of  intellectual  faculties.  He  did 
not  get  his  intellect  before  he  got  his  conscience. 
They  appeared  simultaneously,  for  the  one  in- 
volves the  other.  I  am  very  far  from  denying 
that  the  materials  of  the  human  constitution  ex- 
isted in  lower  orders.  But  in  man  the  materials 
are  differently  compounded.  As  the  combination 
of  the  same  chemical  elements  at  different  poten- 
cies gives  essentially  different  products,  so  the 
combination  of  the  same  materials  gave  different 
creatures.  At  least,  it  may  have  been  so.  At  all 
events,  man  does  combine  self -regarding  and  social 
feelings  in  potencies  of  a  higher  degree  than  in 
any  other  order  of  beings.  The  new  combination, 
effected  perhaps  instantly,  as  an  electric  spark 
may  change  the  relation  of  chemical  elements, 
produced  man,  who  was  not  first  an  intellectual 
and  then  a  moral  being,  but  was  both  at  once,  and 
as  both  was  man.  Inquiry  concerning  the  origin 
of  the  sense  of  obligation  is  simply  inquiry  con- 
cerning the  origin  of  man.  Duty  was  not  merely 
an  advantage,  a  utility,  which  man  adopted  after 
he  had  been  man  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time. 
Without  it  man  would  not  be  man.  It  is  his 
nature. 

These  considerations  effectually  dispose  of  the 
opinion  that  sense  of  obligation  may  disappear. 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  believes  that  the  .sense  of 
duty  or  moral  obligation  is  transitory,  and  will 
diminish  as  fast  as  moralization  increases.  This 
opinion,  he  says,  will  be  to  most  persons  very 
startling.  He  instances  cases  in  which  duty  be- 
comes pleasure.  Husbands  and  wives,  parents 


ORIGIN  OF  OBLIGATION    ,  103 

and  children,  perform  mutual  duties  without  any 
thought  of  ought  or  must.  This  shows,  he  says, 
that  even  now,  with  some  of  the  fundamental, 
other-regarding  duties,  the  sense  of  obligation  has 
retreated  into  the  background  of  the  mind.  He 
argues  that,  with  complete  adaptation  to  the  social 
state,  that  element  in  the  moral  consciousness 
which  is  expressed  by  the  word,  obligation,  will 
disappear,  that,  in  their  proper  times  and  places 
and  proportions,  the  moral  sentiments  will  guide 
men  just  as  spontaneously  and  adequately  as  now 
do  the  sensations. 

If  by  obligation  no  more  is  meant  than  coer- 
cion from  without,  or  self-compulsion  overcoming 
unwillingness,  then,  indeed,  obligation  may  dis- 
appear, for  those  are  not  essential  elements  of 
morality.  But  the  conviction  of  Tightness,  ought- 
ness,  duty,  will  remain  as  long  as  man  has  before 
him  an  ideal  of  perfection  to  be  realized,  for  the 
ideal  is  that  which  ought  to  be.  Perfection  will 
always  be  in  advance.  The  point  will  never  be 
reached  where  there  is  not  a  better  and  higher  be- 
yond. There  is  real  attainment.  The  ideal  is  not 
a  constantly  receding  illusion.  But  each  height 
gained  commands  a  broader  view.  On  the  step- 
ping-stones of  our  living  selves  we  evermore  rise  to 
higher  things.  It  may  therefore  be  believed  that, 
as  the  ideal  is  enlarged  and  enriched,  the  feel- 
ing of  oughtness  will  become  stronger.  Duty  will 
be  more,  not  less,  sacred  and  imperative.  After 
all,  it  is  a  question  of  the  definition  of  terms.  If 
obligation  is  defined  as  coercion,  or  as  compulsion 
overcoming  reluctance,  it  may  disappear.  If  it  is 


104        THE  MORAL  LAW— THE  RIGHT 

recognition  of  the 'good  as  that  which  ought  to  be 
realized,  it  will  not  disappear.  At  any  rate,  if 
it  is  not  to  cease  until  there  is  "  complete  adapta- 
tion to  the  social  state,"  its  disappearance  will  be 
postponed  indefinitely.  Mr.  Spencer's  contention 
really  is,  that  in  heaven  there  will  be  no  sense  of 
obligation,  for  heaven  is  complete  adaptation  to  the 
social  state.  Even  that  is  not  to  be  taken  for 
granted,  unless  it  is  assumed  that  there  is  no 
progress  in  that  higher  state.  Obedience  to  the 
divine  will  is  about  as  good  a  conception  of  hea- 
ven as  can  be  found,  a  conception  expressed  in 
the  prayer :  Thy  will  be  done  in  earth  as  it  is  in 
heaven.  Will  means  law  and  obligation.  The 
absence  of  constraint  is  freedom  ;  and  freedom 
has  been  well  defined  as  perfect  obedience  to  per- 
fect law.  If  such  obedience  is  imagined  as  desti- 
tute of  the  feeling  of  obligation,  there  is  no  mean- 
ing in  words.  Above  all,  duty,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
at  its  highest  power  as  love,  in  which  there  is  joy. 
Obligation  is  most  sacred  when  there  is,  not  con- 
straint, but  glad  spontaneity. 

VII 

What  is  conscience?  It  is  the  moral  faculty. 
It  has  two  elements,  a  judgment  and  a  conviction. 
There  is  an  estimate  of  the  value  of  an  act.  An 
end  is  in  view  which  is  perceived  and  appraised. 
This  estimate  is  sometimes  a  comparison  of  values, 
or  of  satisfactions,  by  which  one  act  is  seen  to 
be  preferable  to  another,  or  better  than  another. 
Such  comparisons  and  estimates  are  intellectual. 
In  the  light  of  reason,  man  judges  acts,  impulses, 


CONSCIENCE  105 

qualities.  These  intellectual  estimates  are  moral 
when  they  pertain  to  action.  They  have  respect 
to  ends  which  should  be  realized.  Actions  are  ap- 
proved or  disapproved,  and  this  is  a  conviction ;  the 
other  element  in  conscience.  There  is  the  feeling 
of  oughtness,  of  obligation. 

In  some  cases  conscience  seems  to  act  without 
reflection.  There  is  apparently  no  deliberation. 
The  common  virtues  are  instantly  approved.  But 
the  acts  of  common  virtue  have  become  habitual  by 
constant  practice.  They  are  approved  by  every- 
body. They  do  not  need  new  appraisal.  In  other 
cases,  time  must  be  taken  for  reflection,  and  it  is 
not  always  easy  to  decide.  The  word  "  conscience  " 
suggests  knowing,  and  even  comparison.  When 
the  judgment  is  formed  the  feeling  of  obligation 
instantly  follows.  It  is  inseparable  from  the  judg- 
ment. Conscience  simply  means  the  moral  per- 
sonality perceiving  and  judging  moral  values,  and 
having  the  feeling  of  obligation  to  act  accord- 
ing to  the  judgment.  It  is  not  a  distinct  faculty. 
It  is  intellectual  judgment  and  moral  conviction. 
It  is  the  person  requiring  of  himself  action  which 
he  approves.  It  is  man  regarded  as  moral.  One 
of  the  best  statements  of  the  intellectual  and  moral 
elements  in  conscience  is  that  made  by  Professor 
Samuel  Harris :  "  What  is  true  to  the  reason  is 
law  to  the  will."  l 

Conscience  is  therefore  supreme.  It  is  the  final 
authority.  Appeal  cannot  be  taken  to  any  other 
tribunal.  There  may  be  an  appeal  back  to  con- 
science. The  judgment  may  be  revised  by  clearer 
1  The  Philosophical  Basis  of  Theism,  p.  193. 


106        THE  MORAL   LAW  —  THE  RIGHT 

knowledge  and  further  reflection.  There  is  such 
a  thing  as  an  enlightened  conscience.  If  any 
other  authority,  as  the  Bible,  is  accepted,  it  is  be- 
cause conscience  approves  it.  A  broadened  view  is 
gained  by  experience,  by  actual  progress  towards 
the  ideal.  The  more  one  realizes,  the  more  he  sees 
to  be  realized,  as  the  more  one  knows,  the  more 
he  sees  to  be  known.  In  the  largest  sense,  con- 
science, that  is,  man  knowing  and  approving  the 
right,  sees  the  ideal  with  increasing  clearness,  full- 
ness, and  fineness  of  perception.  It  is  as  Lotze 
says:  "But  that  other  part  of  conscience  which 
enjoins  us  to  make  very  large  claims  on  existence, 
can  only  raise  its  voice  in  proportion  as  insight 
into  the  destiny  of  man  and  his  place  in  nature 
increases.  This  nobler  morality  is  never  attained 
without  the  most  active  cooperation  of  the  intel- 
lect, indeed  never  wholly  without  the  cooperation 
of  really  scientific  reflection,  yet  indeed  never  by 
these  alone  ;  the  experience  of  life  itself  is  indis- 
pensable, life  that  in  the  increasing  multiplicity 
of  its  ethical  relations  is  ever  bringing  into  con- 
sciousness fresh  distinctions  which  before  to  a 
blunter  sense  seemed  indifferent,  but  now  to  the 
growing  moral  sensibility  seem  as  if  they  ought  to 
be  included  in  the  science  of  human  nature."  * 

1  Microcosmus,  vol.  L,  p.  712. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  HAPPINESS  THEORY 

IT  has  been  maintained  by  some  ethical  philoso- 
phers, ever  since  there  has  been  any  philosophy  of 
morality  at  all,  that  the  motive  of  conduct  is  found 
in  the  enjoyment  of  pleasure  and  the  avoidance  of 
pain.  The  term  most  commonly  employed  to  de- 
signate this  motive  is  "happiness."  The  Greek 
word  for  pleasure  has  been  appropriated  as  the  exact 
expression  of  the  theory,  which  is  therefore  known 
as  Hedonism.  I  have  already  stated  that  happi- 
ness is  an  essential  element  of  morality.  This 
chapter,  then,  is  not  necessary  to  the  progress  of 
the  discussion,  but  may  be  regarded  as  a  digression 
to  be  passed  over  by  those  who  are  not  interested 
in  weighing  the  reasons  for  and  against  the  theory 
that  virtue  consists  in  the  greatest  happiness.  It 
may  be,  however,  that  some  readers  would  consider 
the  discussion  incomplete  without  recognition  and 
criticism  of  the  hedonistic  theory,  inasmuch  as  the 
study  of  ethics  and  the  practice  of  morality  meet 
Hedonism  at  every  point.  I  take  the  ground  that 
it  contains  a  truth,  but  gives  that  truth  an  exagger- 
ated importance.  This  chapter  therefore  serves 
the  additional  purpose  of  showing  the  agreement 
which  ethical  philosophies  have  been  approaching 
in  recent  years,  an  agreement  alluded  to  in  the 
opening  chapter. 


108  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

I 

Hedonism,  which  means  the  happiness  of  the  in- 
dividual, and  Utilitarianism,  which  means  the  hap- 
piness of  the  greatest  possible  number  of  individu- 
als, have  for  a  long  time  preserved  their  separate 
names  to  signify  distinct  and  even  opposing  theories. 
They  are,  however,  in  principle  the  same,  for  both 
theories  make  happiness  the  object  of  conduct. 
The  difference  is  that  one  is  egoistic  and  the  other 
altruistic.  A  new  phrase  is  coming  into  use  which 
is  intended  to  include  both  theories.  This  phrase 
is,  Universalistic  Hedonism.  It  is  adopted,  prob- 
ably, because  Utilitarianism  is  too  suggestive  of 
prudence  and  calculation,  and  because  unqualified 
Hedonism  savors  too  much  of  selfishness.  Ra- 
tional Hedonism  is  a  designation  which  has  some 
currency,  and  which  is  employed  to  indicate  the 
happiness  approved  by  reason  rather  than  the  hap- 
piness of  sensual  enjoyment. 

I  have  advocated  the  opinion  that  right,  or  duty, 
is  determined  by  the  end  to  be  realized,  which  is 
the  worth  or  perfection  of  character,  and  with 
which  happiness  is  associated.  The  question  now 
before  us  pertains  to  the  nature  of  the  good  which 
is  obligatory.  One  school  says  it  is  happiness. 
Another  school  says  it  is  worth  or  perfection.  A 
third  school  says  it  is  both.  Differences  of  ethical 
theory  are  practically  reduced  to  these  opinions 
respecting  the  nature  of  the  good  ;  for  the  intuitive 
philosophy  which  regards  the  right  independently 
of  results,  as  right  because  it  is  right,  is  no  longer 
held,  except  with  concessions  which  amount  to  an 
abandonment  of  the  theory. 


THE  HEDONISTIC   THEORY  109 


II 

The  hedonistic  philosophy  justifies  itself  by  ask- 
ing these  questions  :  Do  we  find  ourselves  desiring 
or  choosing  any  course  of  action  from  which  we 
do  not  anticipate  pleasure  of  some  sort  ?  Is  it  not 
this  anticipation  which  leads  us  to  our  choices? 
Do  we  not  adopt  any  course  because  we  believe 
we  shall  be  happier  than  in  some  other  course? 
Can  an  action  be  determined  on  if  it  is  known  it 
will  bring  pain  or  unhappiness  on  the  whole? 
Does  any  one  desire  for  himself  or  others  that 
which  he  expects  will  bring  him  or  them  unhappi- 
ness? Bishop  Butler  is  always  quoted  by  the 
Hedonists,  in  his  deliberate  observation  :  "  Our 
ideas  of  happiness  and  misery  are  of  all  our  ideas 
the  nearest  and  most  important  to  us.  When  we 
sit  down  in  a  cool  hour,  we  can  neither  justify  to 
ourselves  this  or  any  other  pursuit,  till  we  are  con- 
vinced it  will  be  for  our  happiness,  or  at  least  not 
contrary  to  it." 

Mr.  Spencer  states  the  case  more  concretely  : 
"  Suppose  that  gashes  and  bruises  caused  agreea- 
Jble  sensations,  and  brought  in  their  train  increased 
power  of  doing  work  and  receiving  enjoyment ; 
should  we  regard  assault  in  the  same  manner  as 
at  present?  Or  suppose  that  self -mutilation,  say 
by  cutting  off  a  hand,  was  both  intrinsically  pleas- 
ant and  furthered  performance  of  the  processes 
by  which  personal  welfare  and  the  welfare  of  de- 
pendents is  achieved ;  should  we  hold,  as  now,  that 
deliberate  injury  to  one's  own  body  is  to  be  repro- 
bated? .  .  .  Imagine  that  ministering  to  a  sick 


110  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

person  always  increased  the  pains  of  illness.  Im- 
agine that  an  orphan's  relatives,  who  took  charge 
of  it,  thereby  necessarily  brought  miseries  upon  it. 
Imagine  that  liquidating  another  man's  pecuniary 
claims  on  you  redounded  to  his  disadvantage.  Im- 
agine that  crediting  a  man  with  noble  behavior 
hindered  his  social  welfare  and  consequent  gratifi- 
cation. What  should  we  say  to  those  acts  which 
now  fall  into  the  class  we  call  praiseworthy? 
Should  we  not  contrariwise  class  them  as  blame- 
worthy? Using,  then,  as  our  tests,  these  most 
pronounced  forms  of  good  and  bad  conduct,  we  find 
it  unquestionable  that  our  ideas  of  their  goodness 
or  badness  really  originate  from  our  consciousness 
of  the  certainty  or  probability  that  they  will  pro- 
duce pleasures  or  pains  somewhere." 1 

in 

The  first  attack  on  this  theory  was  very  confi- 
dent, but  cannot  be  regarded  as  successful.  The 
criticism  was  made  that  it  is  difficult,  if  not  impos- 
sible, to  estimate  pains  and  pleasures  beforehand 
so  as  to  be  certain  what  will  give  the  greatest 
amount  of  pleasurable  and  the  least  amount  of 
painful  feeling.  Even  on  the  basis  of  experience 
it  is  not  easy  to  forecast  future  pleasures.  The 
person  may  have  changed  so  that  he  cannot  again 
have  enjoyment  from  sources  of  former  pleasure. 
His  happiness  may  have  been  due  in  part  to  nov- 
elty. It  is  often  said  that  one  can  visit  Europe 
the  first  time  only  once,  or  that  we  can  be  young 
oiily  once.  Professor  Sidgwick  says  that  "  the 
1  Data  of  Ethics,  pp.  31,  32. 


PLEASURES   COMPARABLE  111 

most  careful  estimate  of  a  girl's  pleasures  (suppos- 
ing a  girl  gifted  with  the  abnormal  habit  of  reflec- 
tion that  would  be  necessary)  would  not  much 
profit  a  young  woman ;  and  the  hedonistic  calcula- 
tions of  youth  require  modification  as  we  advance 
in  years."  1  If  the  Hedonist  says  that  we  rely  on 
the  experience  of  others,  that  we  expect  happiness 
from  the  pursuits  and  possessions  on  which  civil- 
ized society  depends,  he  is  reminded  that  estimates 
vary  widely,  that  those  who  pursue  those  pleasures 
are  loud  in  declaring  disappointment.  He  is  also 
reminded  that  reliance  cannot  be  placed  on  the 
judgments  of  those  who  have  tried  certain  pleas- 
ures, for  their  susceptibility  may  have  weakened. 
Youth  suspects  that  age  cannot  enjoy  and  there- 
fore cannot  clearly  remember  former  raptures.  It 
is  also  true  that  some  are  not  qualified  to  enjoy 
pleasures  which  are  delightful  to  others.  It  is  a 
common  saying  that  every  one  must  learn  by  his 
own  experience.  There  are  always  those  who 

"  Compound  the  sins  they  are  inclined  to 
By  damning  those  they  have  no  mind  to." 

The  Hedonist  admits  all  this,  and  replies  that 
the  idea  of  that  which  will  give  happiness  is  the 
motive,  and  that  the  illustrations  show  it.  Youth 
either  discards  the  judgment  of  age,  and  persists 
in  its  own  idea  of  pleasure,  or  accepts  that  judg- 
ment, and  seeks  pleasure  accordingly.  There  may 
be  mistakes,  for  there  are  many  fools,  but  there  is 
an  estimate  of  prospective  pleasures.  It  is  based 
largely  on  the  experience  of  others,  for  the  major- 
1  The  Methods  of  Ethics,  pp.  147, 148. 


112  THE  HAPPINESS    THEORY 

ity  have  for  generations  been  seeking  happiness 
from  the  same  sources  of  wealth,  amusements,  cul- 
ture, and  religion.  It  is  idle  to  argue  that  there 
can  be  no  forecast  of  pleasures,  for  the  forecast  is 
continually  made.  It  can  only  be  argued  that 
there  is  frequent  disappointment. ' 

IV 

The  next  attack  on  Hedonism  was  directed 
against  the  word,  "  amount "  ;  the  greatest  amount 
of  happiness  and  the  least  amount  of  pain.  The 
objection  was  made  that  there  is  no  common  meas- 
ure of  pleasures  and  pains  by  which  a  balance  can 
be  struck ;  that  only  things  of  the  same  kind  can 
be  compared,  and  that  pleasures  are  of  totally  dif- 
ferent kinds ;  that  a  distinction  of  kind  or  quality 
introduces  other  criteria  of  judgment ;  that  in 
passing  from  quantitative  to  qualitative  sources  of 
pleasure,  the  theory  breaks  down.  This  objection 
was  urged  in  a  tone  which  was  quite  triumphant. 
It  is  quite  impossible,  said  the  objectors,  to  reduce 
all  pleasures  and  pains  to  a  common  denominator. 
A  college  classmate  placed  an  arithmetical  value 
on  reasons  for  and  against  a  proposed  course  of 
action.  In  deciding  whether  or  not  he  should 
accept  an  invitation  to  an  evening  party,  he  would 
write  down  the  inducements  and  objections  with  a 
number  against  each :  cultivation  of  social  feelings 
and  of  manners,  3 ;  a  good  supper,  5 ;  meeting  a  cer- 
tain young  lady,  7;  on  the  other  side,  the  trouble 
of  getting  ready,  2 ;  studying  late,  4 ;  overcoming 
bashfulness,  11;  and  accepted  the  difference  as  de- 
cisive. But  so  literal  an  estimate  is  not  usually 
attempted. 


HAPPINESS  MEASURABLE  113 

No  one  denies  that  there  are  different  kinds  of 
pleasure,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  they  cannot 
be  compared,  and  one  be  preferred   to   another. 
That  is  all  the  Hedonist  claims.     He  says  that  he 
does  not  care  about  the  word,  amount,  which  is 
only  convenient  in  use  as  equivalent  to  more,  or 
greater,  or  keener,  or  purer  pleasure.     Different 
kinds  of  pleasure,  he  claims,  must  be  comparable 
because  they  are  compared.     A  man  puts  beside 
each  other  the  delight  of  taking  strong  drink  and 
of  expending  his  savings  on  shoes  for  his  children. 
Stimulation  of  his  own  stomach  and  the  warmth 
of  his  children's  feet  are  two  different  kinds  of 
pleasure,   but    he   certainly   compares   them   and 
chooses  between  them.     A  cup  of  tea  is  not  of  the 
same  kind  as  a  sunset  or  an  oratorio.     But  a  tired 
woman  compares  them  as  sources  of  pleasure,  and 
prefers  her  cup  of  tea  to  gazing  at  the  sky  or  lis- 
tening to  music.     When  it  is  said  that  a  given 
course  of  action  is  better  or  worse  than  another 
course,  they  certainly  are  compared.     That  is  pre- 
cisely what  the  Hedonist  does  say.     For  instance, 
Miss   E.    E.  Constance   Jones   remarks:     "That 
men  do  constantly  compare  pleasures  and  pains, 
and  decide  that  some  are  greater  and  others  less, 
there  seems  absolutely  no  room  to  doubt ;  and  that 
they  are  influenced  by  the  prospect  of   pleasures 
and  pains  there  seems,  again,  no  doubt.     If  this 
is  not  so,  how  can  we  explain,  for  example,  the 
whole  penal  code,  or  the  whole  industrial  organiza- 
tion of  society,  or  the  whole  theory  of  purgatory  ? 
And  though  it  is  admitted  by  Hedonists  themselves 
that  the  hedonic  calculus  is  difficult  and  subject 


114  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

to  inaccuracy,  for  all  that  we  are  perforce  contin- 
ually making  the  calculation  and  trying  to  guide 
ourselves  by  it.  ...  We  may  not  indeed  be  able 
to  say  that  one  pleasure  or  pain  is  twice  or  half  as 
great  as  another,  or  that  any  given  pleasure  ex- 
actly outweighs  any  given  pain,  any  more  than  we 
can  say  that  one  life  or  one  action  is  twice  as  good 
as  another.  But  we  may  judge  that  an  hour  of 
one  pleasure  is  as  great  as  a  day  of  another,  or 
that  some  sharp  pain  or  wearisome  toil  is  cheaply 
purchased  by  a  desired  reward.  When  the  ter- 
rible choice  between  three  months'  flight  before 
his  enemies,  three  days'  pestilence,  or  seven  years' 
famine  was  put  before  David,  it  must  have  been 
by  a  calculation  of  the  greater  or  less  intensity  of 
suffering,  multiplied  by  the  less  or  greater  dura- 
tion, that  he  reached  a  decision.  He  did  not  com- 
plain that  the  calculation  was  impossible,  but  only 
that  each  alternative  was  frightful."  l  The  writer 
might  have  added  that  David  would  not  choose 
between  pestilence  and  famine,  but  distinctly  pre- 
ferred either  of  them  to  falling  into  the  hands  of 
his  enemies. 

v 

A  more  serious  objection  to  the  hedonistic  theory 
is  that  pleasure  is  seldom  gained  by  seeking  it  di- 
rectly, or  by  reflecting  on  the  best  means  of  attain- 
ing it.  If  the  desire  for  pleasure  is  made  control- 
ling, it  defeats  its  own  end.  The  only  way  to  get 
pleasure  is  to  forget  it.  This  means  that  pleas- 
ure is  the  incident  of  some  other  object.  Professor 
Sidgwick's  illustration  cannot  be  bettered :  "  Many 

1  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  October,  1894. 


NOT  GAINED  BY  SEEKING  115 

middle-aged  Englishmen  would  maintain  the  view 
that  business  is  more  agreeable  than  amusement ; 
but  they  would  hardly  find  it  so,  if  they  transacted 
the  business  with  a  perpetual  conscious  aim  at  the 
attendant  pleasure.  Similarly,  the  pleasures  of 
thought  and  study  can  only  be  enjoyed  in  the 
highest  degree  by  those  who  have  an  ardor  of 
curiosity  which  carries  the  mind  temporarily  away 
from  self  and  its  sensations.  In  all  kinds  of  Art, 
again,  the  exercise  of  the  creative  faculty  is  at- 
tended by  intense  and  exquisite  pleasures ;  but  in 
order  to  get  them,  one  must  forget  them ;  the 
desire  of  the  artist  is  always  said  to  be  concen- 
trated and  fixed  upon  the  realization  of  his  ideal 
of  beauty."  l 

It  is  true  that  arrangements  for  pleasure  parties, 
excursions,  and  picnics  often  yield  the  anticipated 
pleasure.  But  they  must  be  sparingly  resorted  to. 
A  three  months'  round  of  pleasure  is  more  likely 
to  be  satisfactory  than  a  twelve  months'  round  ; 
and  in  the  background  of  the  mind  must  be  the 
work  of  life,  from  which  the  pleasure  is  a  respite 
and  for  which  it  is  a  preparation.  Benevolent  ac- 
tion is  pleasurable,  but  the  pleasurableness  is  not 
the  immediate  object,  or,  if  it  is,  both  the  benevo- 
lence and  the  enjoyment  are  of  inferior  quality. 
The  luxury  of  giving  is  not  a  high  motive.  Lecky 
says  that  the  pleasure  of  virtue  is  one  which  can 
be  obtained  only  on  the  express  condition  of  its  not 
being  the  object  sought.  One  may,  indeed,  culti- 
vate those  appetites  and  desires  the  satisfaction  of 
which  gives  pleasure.  He  may  exercise  vigorously 
1  The  Methods  of  Ethics,  p.  50. 


116  TtiE  HAPPINESS    THEORY 

in  order  to  have  a  ravenous  appetite.  Mr.  Ward 
McAllister  gives  a  pathetic  account  of  a  bitter  dis- 
appointment he  suffered.  He  was  spending  the 
day  at  a  clergyman's  house,  and,  taking  no  lunch, 
walked  all  the  afternoon  so  as  to  have  a  huge  ap- 
petite for  dinner,  only  to  sit  down  disgusted  to  a 
cold  tea.  It  is  not  denied  that  enjoyment  may  be 
sought  and  attained.  But  this  is  easier  with  the 
pleasures  of  the  palate  than  with  intellectual  and 
artistic  pleasures.  Even  epicures  have  increasing 
difficulty  in  producing  satisfaction,  and  envy  the 
laborer  who  enjoys  the  contents  of  his  dinner-pail. 
Devotees  of  pleasure  are  afflicted  with  ennui.  It 
is  well  known  that  pleasure  is  not  gained  by  seeking 
it  directly,  and  this  seems  to  be  an  insuperable 
objection  to  the  theory  that  happiness  is  the  de- 
termining motive  of  conduct. 

In  reply  to  the  criticism  that  to  get  pleasures 
we  must  forget  them,  the  Hedonist  replies  that  in 
order  to  get  any  result,  which  in  all  cases  is  due  to 
causes,  we  must  sometimes  fix  our  attention  upon 
the  causes  rather  than  upon  the  result  itself.  But 
the  reply  is  inconsequent,  because  the  result  must 
be  in  view  before  the  causes  are  set  in  operation, 
and  is  not  lost  sight  of  in  the  process.  The  racer 
does  not  lose  sight  of  the  goal  while  his  energy 
goes  into  every  step.  The  reply  is  inconsequent, 
also,  because  the  pleasure  which  ensues  from  many 
pursuits,  as  study,  benevolence,  or  the  education  of 
children,  is  not  the  object  in  view,  even  before  one 
becomes  absorbed  in  the  pursuit.  The  object  is 
truth,  or  relief,  or  the  welfare  of  children,  not  one's 
own  enjoyment  in  realizing  those  objects.  Thus 


SATISFACTION  117 

pushed,  the  Hedonist  says  that  too  narrow  a  view 
of  pleasure  must  not  be  taken.  The  motive  is  not 
pleasure  in  the  final  result  by  and  by,  but  the  zest 
of  the  whole  pursuit,  the  idea  of  the  greater  value 
of  knowledge,  relief,  or  education  than  of  other 
goods.  He  has  to  be  cautious  at  this  point,  how- 
ever, lest  he  should  make  a  fatal  admission  con- 
cerning the  intrinsic  worth  or  value  of  objects  and 
pursuits. 

VI 

So  what  the  Hedonist  does  say,  and  is  saying  in 
his  latest  bulletins,  is  this  :  that  one  is  better  sat- 
isfied to  do  or  be  one  thing  than  another,  that  he 
would  be  dissatisfied  to  engage  in  a  different  pur- 
suit, and  that  this  satisfaction  is  the  motive  which 
actuates  him.  A  soldier  is  better  satisfied  to  risk 
his  life  than  to  remain  at  home  when  his  country 
is  in  danger.  A  martyr  is  better  satisfied  to  die 
than  to  surrender  his  convictions.  That  this  is 
true  no  one  will  deny.  But  it  is  merely  saying 
that  one  course  of  action  is  preferred  to  another ; 
that  to  be  satisfied  is  to  be  happy  and  to  be  unsat- 
isfied is  to  be  unhappy.  But  every  one  asks,  —  a 
child  would  ask,  —  Why  is  the  soldier  or  the  mar- 
tyr better  satisfied  ?  For  what  reason  is  patriot- 
ism or  fidelity  more  satisfactory  than  disloyalty  or 
timidity?  If  the  satisfaction  is  the  only  object, 
can  the  Hedonist  have  any  reply  except  to  say 
that  one  is  better  satisfied  to  take  a  certain  course 
because  it  gives  him  more  satisfaction  ?  We  are 
sure  there  is  a  reason  for  the  satisfaction  in  the 
value  of  patriotism  and  faithfulness.  Satisfac- 
tion is  not  the  last  word.  The  last  word  is,  some 


118  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

satisfactions  in  preference  to  others.  Some  sat- 
isfactions are  worthy  of  a  man  and  some  are  not. 
Duty  pertains  to  the  worthy  satisfactions.  Wrong 
pertains  to  the  unworthy  satisfactions.  Man  in 
society  is  capable  of  knowledge,  affection,  honor, 
purity,  loyalty.  To  promote  his  own  perfection 
and  that  of  others  is  right.  If  he  does  so  he  is 
satisfied,  and  should  expect  to  be.  If  he  fails  to 
do  so,  he  is  dissatisfied,  except  during  the  brief 
moment  of  lower  self-indulgence. 

Should  the  Hedonist  ask  why  a  man  should  seek 
his  own  perfection,  which  is  vague  and  indefinable, 
we  reply  that  a  man  cannot  get  back  of  himself ; 
that  he  cannot  find  his  explanation  in  something 
other  than  himself ;  that  he  must  conform  to  his 
own  nature  in  its  ideal ;  that  he  must  do  so  with- 
out careful  calculation  of  pleasures  and  pains  ;  and 
that  the  Hedonist  has  to  recognize  the  nature  of 
man  in  the  qualities  which  have  value,  in  order 
to  discriminate  among  the  pleasures  he  may  enjoy 
and  the  pains  he  may  avoid.  If  satisfaction  is  as- 
sociated with  worth  or  perfection,  we  gladly  recog- 
nize it  as  an  element  of  virtue.  But  if  satisfaction 
is  for  its  own  sake,  there  is  no  standard  to  distin- 
guish him  that  doeth  good  from  him  that  doeth  it 
not,  and  every  one  must  be  left  to  his  own  taste. 
If  one  pleasure  is  better  than  another,  there  must 
be  something  aside  from  the  mere  pleasurableness 
which  gives  it  superiority.  If  it  is  by  the  nobility, 
the  refinement,  the  purity  of  the  sources  of  satis- 
faction that  right  and  wrong  satisfactions  are  dis- 
tinguished, then  it  follows,  as  Janet  says,  that  good 
is  not  pleasure  as  such,  but  pleasure  in  so  far  as  it 


SATISFACTION  119 

is  noble  and  refined,  and  that  consequently  good 
is  this  something  noble  or  refined  which  places 
certain  pleasures  above  others.  It  amounts  to 
this,  that  some  objects  and  pursuits  are  worthy  of 
giving  satisfaction  and  some  are  not.  They  are 
of  different  kinds,  which  can  indeed  be  compared, 
but  which  do  not  have  their  difference  in  the 
degree  of  pleasure  they  yield.  Unless  another 
and  a  superior  element  is  introduced,  the  philoso- 
phy of  satisfaction  qua  satisfaction  cannot  explain 
why  some  enjoyments  are  better,  more  excellent, 
more  worthy  than  others,  nor  why  some  ought  to 
be  preferred  to  others.  John  Stuart  Mill's  em- 
phatic admission,  which  is  inconsistent  with  his 
own  theory,  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  :  "  Now 
it  is  an  unquestionable  fact  that  those  who  are 
equally  acquainted  with  and  equally  capable  of 
appreciating  and  enjoying  both,  do  give  a  most 
marked  preference  to  the  meaning  of  existence 
which  employs  their  higher  faculties.  Few  human 
creatures  would  consent  to  be  changed  into  any  of 
the  lower  animals  for  the  promise  of  the  fullest 
allowance  of  a  beast's  pleasure :  no  intelligent 
human  being  would  consent  to  be  a  fool,  no  in- 
structed person  would  be  an  ignoramus :  no  person 
of  feeling  and  conscience  would  consent  to  be  self- 
ish and  base,  even  though  they  should  be  per- 
suaded that  the  fool,  the  dunce,  or  the  rascal  is 
better  satisfied  with  his  lot  than  they  are  with 
theirs.  .  .  .  Better  be  Socrates  dissatisfied  than 
a  fool  satisfied."1  It  all  means  that  there  is  a 
right  way  to  be  happy  and  a  wrong  way  to  be 

1  Utilitarianism,  p.  42. 


120  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

happy,  and  that  happiness  depends  on  right,  not 
right  on  happiness.  The  happiness  of  duty  is  not 
the  same  thing  as  the  duty  of  happiness.  "  Be  vir- 
tuous and  you  will  be  happy  "  is  not  a  very  noble 
maxim,  but  it  is  nobler  and  truer  than  the  maxim, 
"  Be  happy  and  you  will  be  virtuous."  The  plain 
fact  is,  that  if  virtue  is  exclusively  identified  with 
happiness  or  satisfaction,  the  sense  of  duty  is  not 
accounted  for.  It  does  not  appear  that  it  is  every 
one's  duty  to  be  happy,  to  have  agreeable  feelings. 
The  conviction  is  too  common  to  be  mistaken,  that 
for  the  sake  of  duty  pleasure  should  be  sacrificed  ; 
as  also  is  that  other  conviction,  that  when  the  mo- 
tive of  duty  is  pleasure,  the  virtue  is  so  far  forth 
reduced.  It  is  wrong  to  seek  some  kinds  of  pleas- 
ure, as  it  could  not  be  if  pleasure  alone  were  the 
test  of  right. 

Hedonism  does  recognize  one  essential  element 
of  morality,  namely,  the  happiness  or  satisfaction 
which  accompanies  right  conduct.  It  has  rendered 
the  service  of  recovering  this  element  to  its  proper 
place.  It  conforms  to  the  religious  view  of  moral- 
ity that  the  final  outcome  of  a  right  life  hereafter 
is  the  union  of  happiness  and  holiness,  as  compared 
with  the  disparity  between  right  and  happiness  here, 
a  disparity  which  creates  the  problem  of  theodicy. 
Hedonism  is  a  protest  against  the  formal  and  empty 
conception  of  right  as  right,  regardless  of  conse- 
quences to  well-being.  Its  error  consists  in  mak- 
ing happiness  idtimate  and  controlling  for  morality. 
It  fails  to  show  why  some  pleasures  are  right  and 
some  wrong,  except  by  deserting  the  standard  of 
pleasure  and  by  bringing  in  some  other  criterion. 


SATISFACTION  ,          121 

Pleasurable  feeling  is  overworked  by  Hedonism. 
It  is  like  insisting,  because  the  atmosphere  contains 
nitrogen,  that  it  is  nothing  but  nitrogen.  Nitrogen 
alone,  like  pleasure  alone,  is  deadly  poison.  I 
admit  and  maintain  that  satisfaction  is  an  insep- 
arable element  of  virtue.  As  Janet  well  says : 
"  If  pleasure  always  accompanies  action,  if  each 
function  has  its  own  particular  pleasure,  it  follows 
plainly  that  every  development  of  our  activity, 
consequently  every  development  of  perfection  in 
man,  is  accompanied  by  pleasure,  whether  we  wish 
it  or  not.  Nature,  not  troubling  herself  to  inquire 
whether  it  will  suit  abstract  philosophies,  has  de- 
creed that  each  of  our  faculties,  the  highest  as 
well  as  the  lowest,  shall  have  its  own  peculiar 
pleasure  by  the  very  fact  of  being  exercised. 
Hence  the  perfection  of  being  cannot  be  acquired 
without  gaining  also  the  feeling  of  this  perfection, 
the  joy  of  possessing  it.  Now,  this  feeling,  this 
joy,  is  what  we  should  call  happiness^  inseparable, 
as  we  have  seen,  from  perfection  itself.  Good, 
then,  is  indissolubly  composed  of  perfection  and  of 
happiness."  1  The  Grecian  master  says  the  last 
word,  which  cannot  be  improved :  "  For  it  may  be 
added  that  a  person  is  not  good,  if  he  does  not 
take  delight  in  noble  actions,  as  nobody  would  call 
a  person  just  if  he  did  not  take  delight  in  just  ac- 
tions, or  liberal  if  he  did  not  take  delight  in  lib- 
eral actions,  and  so  on.  But  if  this  is  so,  it  follows 
that  actions  in  accordance  with  virtue  are  pleasant 
in  themselves.  .  .  .  Happiness,  then,  is  the  best  and 
noblest  and  pleasantest  thing  in  the  world."  2 

1  Theory  of  Morals,  p.  72. 

2  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Welldon's  translation,  p.  20. 


122  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 


VII 

In  the  discussion  of  theoretical  ethics  the  term, 
Utilitarianism,  is  giving  place  to  the  term,  Uni- 
versalistic  Hedonism,  perhaps  for  the  reason  that 
happiness  is  a  broader  and  better  term  than  useful- 
ness. By  adopting  this  term  the  Hedonist  aban- 
dons the  theory  of  egoistic  happiness  for  the  theory 
of  universal  happiness.  The  sympathetic  feelings 
are  recognized  as  natural  and  immediate,  and  the 
attempt  is  no  longer  made  to  reduce  altruism  to 
egoism.  The  theory  still  clings,  however,  to  hap- 
piness as  the  motive  of  conduct,  and  is  no  more 
nor  less  than  Utilitarianism  under  a  name  which 
is  considered  less  objectionable. 

Utilitarianism  has  two  decided  merits  as  com- 
pared with  individualistic  Hedonism.  It  recog- 
nizes the  obligation  which  rests  on  every  one  to  seek 
the  welfare  of  others.  It  falls  in  with  the  prevalent 
disposition  to  promote  the  well-being  of  mankind. 
It  has  probably  rendered  some  service  in  strength- 
ening this  disposition.  At  all  events,  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  rights  of  all  is  a  commendable  feature 
of  the  theory.  It  is  generally  admitted  that  one's 
fellow-creatures  have  claims  upon  him  which  are 
measured  by  needs.  That  man  is  an  exception 
who  has  no  public  spirit,  nor  philanthropic  motives. 
One  who  feels  no  inner  response  to  the  needs  of 
others  is  careful  to  simulate  sympathetic  feelings. 
Generosity  is  essential  to  respectability.  Neigh- 
borhood is  not  narrowly  confined.  Kelief  runs  to 
calamity  on  the  other  hemisphere,  announcing  by 
telegraph  that  it  is  on  the  way.  Benevolence,  in- 


UTILITARIANISM  123 

deed,  draws  instantly  on  the  deposits  commerce 
has  made  in  the  remotest  cities.  Charity  is  as 
great  a  traveler  as  enterprise. 

The  other  merit  of  Utilitarianism  is  that  it  em- 
phasizes the  impartiality  of  social  duty.  Each  to 
count  for  one,  and  no  one  for  more  than  one,  is 
a  maxim  which  signifies  that  no  one  should  be 
ignored,  since  each  is  a  distinct  person  with  his 
proper  claims ;  and  that  no  one  should  encroach 
on  the  rights  of  others  by  reason  of  any  adventi- 
tious importance,  since  each  has  only  the  rights  of 
a  single  individual.  Decided  opponents  of  Utilita- 
rianism admit  that  it  has  this  excellence.  Profes- 
sor T.  H.  Green  says  that  "  impartiality  of  refer- 
ence to  human  well-being "  has  been  the  great 
lesson  it  has  taught.  By  insisting  that  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number  must  be  sought,  a 
wide  range  has  been  given  to  social  obligation. 
The  Utilitarian,  although  his  interpretation  of  the 
greatest  good  has  not  been  correct,  has  been  per- 
fectly correct  with  regard  to  the  subjects  who  have 
claims.  No  person,  no  class,  should  be  left  out  of 
the  account.  The  theory,  as  Professor  Green  fur- 
ther observes,  "  has  made  men  watchful  of  custom- 
ary morality,  lest  its  rules  should  be  conceived  in 
the  interest  of  some  particular  class  of  persons, 
who,  probably  without  being  fully  aware  of  it, 
have  been  concerned  in  establishing  and  maintain- 
ing them."  :  It  is  a  real  merit  of  Utilitarianism, 
then,  especially  as  it  has  been  expounded  in  trea- 
tises, that  it  recognizes  the  right  of  all  men  to  the 
pursuit  of  some  kind  of  good,  that  it  enforces  im- 
1  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  p.  364. 


124  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

partiality  in  promoting  the  general  welfare,  andv 
that  it  perceives  in  sympathy  a  primary  human 
impulse.  This  merit  belongs  equally,  however,  to 
the  theory  that  virtue  consists  in  the  realization  of 
worth,  from  which  happiness  is  inseparable.  The 
universality  of  duty  was  recognized  as  early  as  the 
time  when  the  maxim  was  uttered  that  every  one 
is  to  love  his  neighbor  as  himself,  and  when  a 
human  answer  —  not  a  class  or  national  answer 
—  was  given  to  the  question,  "  Who  is  my  neigh- 
bor?" 

Utilitarianism  professes  to  be  more  practical 
than  the  ethics  of  worth  of  character.  Its  strong- 
est claim  is  that  it  furnishes  a  rule  which  is  easily 
applicable  under  all  circumstances.  It  may  be 
doubted,  however,  whether  it  has  any  advantage 
in  this  respect  over  the  ethics  of  character.  Un- 
til the  point  is  reached  at  which  perplexity  arises, 
moralists  of  all  schools  are  in  agreement  as  to 
what  should  be  done.  But  when  perplexity  does 
arise,  as  it  surely  does  when  physical  conditions 
are  transcended,  tests  of  mere  usefulness  are  found 
to  be  inadequate.  All  are  agreed  that  healthy 
dwellings,  thorough  drainage,  pure  water,  and 
constant  occupation  are  good  for  people.  But  all 
are  not  agreed  on  a  thousand  other  conditions. 
Shall  a  young  man  of  brilliant  parts  become  a 
lawyer,  or  a  journalist,  or  a  clergyman?  Shall 
a  gifted  woman  devote  herself  to  society,  or  music, 
or  literature,  or  her  family?  Shall  a  man  of 
wealth  endow  institutions,  or  support  missionary 
societies?  Shall  he  do  his  giving  while  he  is 
alive,  or  shall  his  benevolence  be  testamentary? 


UTILITARIANISM  125 

Shall  one  advocate  or  oppose  the  opening  of  libra- 
ries and  museums  on  Sunday?  Such  questions 
continually  arise,  and  on  correct  answers  progress 
principally  depends.  By  new  adjustments  the  old 
order  changes.  It  is  not  easy  to  foresee  what 
course  of  action  will  contribute  most  largely  and 
certainly  to  the  general  sum  of  happiness.  The 
pleasures  of  one  are  not  those  of  another  man. 
The  pleasures  of  one  are  not  those  of  another 
class.  If  a  certain  course  is  adopted,  success  in 
it  may  add  to  the  happiness  of  one  group  of  per- 
sons, but  at  the  expense  of  the  happiness  of 
another  group.  If  social  or  mercantile  customs 
are  maintained,  one  class  may  become  better 
contented,  but  another  class  more  miserable. 
Moreover,  the  way  in  which  people  ought  to  be 
happy  may  not  be  the  way  in  which  they  will  be 
happy.  There  is  no  pleasure  for  a  coarse  society 
in  refined  pursuits,  for  a  licentious  age  in  customs 
of  chastity,  for  an  ignorant  people  in  literature 
and  philosophy.  To  labor  for  that  which  people 
ought  to  desire,  or  to  create  right  desires  in  them, 
is  a  discouraging  task,  and  there  is  no  certainty, 
even  then,  that  their  enjoyment  will  be  increased. 
To  promote  the  conditions  of  a  better  society  of 
the  future,  so  that  posterity  will  desire  only  the 
higher  pleasures,  is  too  visionary  an  end  to  engage 
the  attention  of  a  practical  Utilitarian.  Thus, 
when  we  get  beyond  good  health  and  physical 
comfort,  it  is  difficult,  having  in  view  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number,  to  decide  how 
to  use  wealth,  how  to  rear  a  family,  how  to  culti- 
vate one's  mind,  how  to  act  with  regard  to  social 


126  THE  HAPPINESS    THEORY 

customs  and  recreations.  Choice  is  not  made  in- 
tuitively under  any  theory,  but  the  merit  of 
easy  decision  which  is  claimed  by  Utilitarianism 
is  only  an  apparent  merit.  Decisions  are  easy 
on  that  theory  only  when  they  are  easy  on  any 
theory.  Difficulties  arise  as  fast  as  new  problems 
arise,  and  therefore  in  respect  to  nearly  all  the 
conditions  of  life,  from  the  industrial  to  the  reli- 
gious. The  effect  of  Utilitarianism  is  to  contract 
the  field  of  obligation.  That  which  can  be 
proved  to  be  directly  useful  is  but  a  small  part 
of  the  service  society  needs.  If  efforts  are  re- 
stricted to  the  production  of  pleasures  which  can 
be  weighed  and  measured,  an  evil  here  and  there 
may  be  removed,  a  physical  good  may  be  secured. 
But  the  Utilitarian  abandons  those  difficult  under- 
takings which  reach  out  and  go  down  to  prevail- 
ing customs  and  to  conditions  rooted  in  selfish- 
ness, yet  which  pertain  to  the  more  urgent  needs 
of  society. 

VIII 

In  the  first  chapter  it  was  remarked  that 
ethical  writers  have  of  late  been  approaching 
agreement.  The  agreement  has  now  been  per- 
ceived in  several  particulars.  The  Hedonist  has 
become  a  Utilitarian.  He  has  gone  from  narrow 
individualism  to  broad  universalism.  The  Utili- 
tarian no  longer  limits  his  moral  philosophy  to 
happiness,  but  speaks  more  frequently  of  the 
welfare,  the  well-being,  the  good  of  society.  He 
contrasts  pleasures  which  are  right  with  pleas- 
ures which  are  wrong.  He  is  even  betrayed  at 
times  into  comparison  of  worthy  with  unworthy 


AGREEMENT  127 

sources  of  happiness,  and  into  comparison  of 
values  and  dignities  as  making  pleasure  right 
or  wrong.  He  thus  recognizes  worth  of  charac- 
ter as  the  proper  condition  of  satisfaction.  Hap- 
piness, he  still  insists,  is  an  essential  element  of 
virtue,  but  it  is  determined  by  value  and  worth 
of  character.  So  far  as  the  ideal  of  perfection 
is  realized  there  is  satisfaction,  and  it  is  this 
kind  of  satisfaction  which  is  virtuous. 

The  ethics  which  finds  virtue  in  the  formal 
law  of  right  has  disappeared.  It  could  not 
get  on  without  the  good, — the  actual,  concrete, 
apprehensible  good  of  character.  What  has  sur- 
vived is  its  insistence  on  the  imperative  of  duty, 
the  sacredness  of  obligation. 

The  ethics  which  identifies  the  right  with  the 
good,  which  makes  the  good  consist  in  worth  or 
perfection  of  character,  has  enlarged  its  borders 
to  include  the  satisfaction  that  accompanies  the 
realization  of  the  good.  Its  hesitancy  about  in- 
cluding pleasure  in  duty  arose  from  the  self-indul- 
gent and  physical  association  of  the  words  plea- 
sure, pain,  and  happiness.  When  it  had  com- 
pelled Hedonism  first  to  universalize  happiness 
and  then  to  define  happiness  as  satisfaction  in 
the  true  values  of  character,  it  admitted  and 
finally  insisted  that  satisfaction,  happiness,  pleas- 
ure, joy,  belong  to  virtue.  After  such  agreement 
is  reached,  there  remains  only  some  difference 
of  opinion  as  to  the  meaning  of  words.  When 
the  good  Greek  word,  Eudsemonism  (well-being) 
takes  the  place  of  Hedonism  (pleasure),  there 
is  no  real  occasion  for  dispute  even  over  words. 


7FI7SRSIT7] 


128  THE  HAPPINESS   THEORY 

An  impartial  judge  would  decide,  as  it  seems  to 
me,  that  the  difference  is  chiefly  difference  of  em- 
phasis, as  no  philosophy  of  ethics  can  get  on  with- 
out including  both  elements,  worth  and  happiness. 
He  would  decide,  also,  that  the  feelings  of  satisfac- 
tion which  virtue  excites  cannot  be  regarded  as 
the  sole  determining  motive  of  morality,  but  that 
the  practices  and  sentiments  of  men  distinguish 
the  value  of  goodness  from  the  pleasure  it  yields, 
and  regard  that  value  as  the  immediate  object  of 
duty.  There  is  agreement  that  the  good,  which 
determines  goodness,  is  not  found  in  outward  cir- 
cumstances, but  is  the  man  himself  realizing  the 
ideal  of  character,  in  the  exercise  of  all  his  vital 
functions,  realizing,  as  evolution  would  say,  the  full- 
ness of  life  ;  the  man  in  the  circumstance  capable 
of  the  pure  enjoyment  which  is  incident  to  his  self- 
realization  according  to  his  ideal  as  a  person  in  a 
society  of  persons  like  himself.  I  may  overesti- 
mate the  agreement  and  minimize  the  difference, 
and  yet  I  think  that  the  ideal,  or  God's  idea  of 
a  man,  as  expressed  in  Browning's  "  Rabbi  Ben 
Ezra,"  would  be  accepted  by  all  our  modern  ethical 
philosophers :  — 

"  Now,  who  shall  arbitrate  ? 
Ten  men  love  what  I  hate, 
Shun  what  I  follow,  slight  what  I  receive  ; 
Ten.  who  in  ears  and  eyes  .    > 

Match  me  :  we  all  surmise, 
They  this  thing,  and  I  that :  whom  shall  my  soul  believe  ? 

"  Not  on  the  vulgar  mass 
Called  '  work,'  must  sentence  pass, 
Things  done,  that  took  the  eye  and  had  the  price  ; 


AGREEMENT  129 

O'er  which,  from  level  stand, 
The  low  world  laid  its  hand, 
Found  straightway  to  its  mind,  could  value  in  a  trice  : 

"  But  all,  the  world's  coarse  thumb 
And  finger  failed  to  plumb, 
So  passed  in  making  up  the  main  account ; 
All  instincts  immature, 
All  purposes  unsure, 
That  weighed  not  as  his  work,  yet  swelled  the  man's  amount : 

"  Thoughts  hardly  to  be  packed 
Into  a  narrow  act, 

Fancies  that  broke  through  language  and  escaped ; 
All  I  could  never  be, 
All,  men  ignored  in  me, 
This,  I  was  worth  to  God,  whose  wheel  the  pitcher  shaped. 


He  fixed  thee  mid  this  dance 

Of  plastic  circumstance, 

This  Present,  thou,  forsooth,  wouldst  fain  arrest : 

Machinery  just  meant 

To  give  thy  soul  its  bent, 

Try  thee  and  turn  thee  forth,  sufficiently  impressed. 


So,  take  and  use  Thy  work : 

Amend  what  flaws  may  lurk, 

What  strain  o'  the  stuff,  what  warpings  past  the  aim ! 

My  times  be  in  Thy  hand  ! 

Perfect  the  cup  as  planned ! 

Let  age  approve  of  youth,  and  death  complete  the  same ! " 


CHAPTER  VI 

SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

IT  has  already  been  intimated  more  than  once 
that  morality  is  self-regard  as  well  as  regard  for 
others.  I  now  proceed  to  the  consideration  of  vir- 
tue in  the  two  aspects  of  self-realization  and  altru- 
ism. I  shall  try  to  indicate  the  place  of  self  in 
respect  to  the  good  and  the  right,  and  to  determine 
in  that  respect  the  mutual  relation  of  self  and  other 
persons. 

I 

The  opinion  that  morality  is  rooted  in  the  sym- 
pathetic feelings  alone  is  quite  generally  enter- 
tained by  both  ethical  and  evolutionary  philoso- 
phers. This  opinion  has  rendered  good  service  in 
the  discussion  of  moral  evolution.  For  a  time  it 
was  held  that  evolution  had  no  place  for  morality. 
As  struggle  for  existence  and  survival  of  the  fit- 
test, the  whole  process  was  characterized  as  selfish. 
Regard  for  the  good  of  others  was  reduced  to 
self-regard.  Cooperation  was  explained  as  an  ad- 
vantage in  self-defense.  Individuals  could  secure 
their  own  happiness  better  by  united  than  by  iso- 
lated or  antagonistic  action.  It  was  argued  earn- 
estly that  altruism  is  disguised  egoism.  Even  those 
acts  which  seem  to  show  utter  self-forgetfulness 
could  be  traced,  when  analyzed,  to  selfish  motives. 
Self-preservation  being  regarded  as  the  entire 


SYMPATHY  AND  SELF-REGARD        131 

philosophy  of  evolution,  morality  was  explained 
as  an  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 
This  is  only  what  might  have  been  expected. 
When  a  method  which  had  scarcely  been  noticed 
is  suddenly  discovered  to  be  widely  extensive,  it  is 
believed  to  be  more  extensive  than  it  is,  and  even 
to  be  universal.  But  after  a  time  necessary  quali- 
fications were  made.  It  was  seen  that  other  im- 
pulses are  as  constant  and  natural  as  the  impulse  of 
self-preservation.  It  was  first  admitted  and  was 
then  maintained  that  the  sympathetic  feelings  are 
constitutional  in  men  and  in  animals,  that  the  social 
affinities  are  instinctive,  that  they  are  as  immediate 
and  original  as  the  selfish  instincts.  Instances  of 
kindness  on  the  part  of  animals  to  an  injured  or 
sick  companion  were  adduced  as  evidence  of  sym- 
pathy. Then  it  was  noted  that  sympathy  is  not 
exceptional,  but  constant.  Maternity,  on  which 
the  preservation  of  every  species  depends,  is  the 
expression  of  disinterested  affection.  Reproduc- 
tion, that  most  distinctive  power  of  life,  is  anything 
but  self -regarding.  The  gregariousness  of  animals, 
the  society  of  human  tribes,  are  forms  of  sympa- 
thetic attraction.  These  feelings  are  so  essential  to 
existence  that  the  wonder  is  they  were  neglected  in 
theories  of  the  origin  and  development  of  life,  or, 
if  not  overlooked,  that  they  were  thought  to  be 
secondary  feelings  derived  from  the  primary  self- 
regarding  instincts.  The  admission  that  sympathy 
is  constitutional  and  original  opened  a  door  both 
for  the  moralist  and  the  evolutionist.  They  ex- 
claimed with  one  voice  that  evolution  is  not  hostile 
to  morality.  The  evolutionist  was  rather  glad  to 


132     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

find  that  so  uncompromising  a  reality  as  virtue  is 
not  a  mere  device  or  utility,  but  is  in  the  very 
nature  of  man  and  even  of  the  inferior  animals,  and 
also  to  perceive  that  he  might  now  hope  to  escape 
the  ignorant  and  prejudiced  criticism  of  ethical 
writers.  The  moralist  was  relieved  to  find  that  he 
need  no  longer  batter  his  head  against  the  stubborn 
facts  of  evolution,  now  that  part  of  the  wall  was 
taken  down  and  a  large  territory  of  native  instincts 
surrendered  to  his  exclusive  cultivation.  Nature, 
which  had  seemed  to  be  only  talon  and  tooth,  is 
now  a  type  of  the  family,  of  home,  and  of  love. 
The  birds,  building  their  nests,  brooding  over  and 
feeding  their  young,  symbolize  goodness.  Have 
not  the  hen,  gathering  her  chickens  under  her  wing, 
and  the  eagle,  fluttering  over  her  eaglets,  furnished 
the  most  beautiful  illustrations  of  the  divine  love  ? 
We  were  sure,  said  the  moralists,  that  nature  could 
not  be  in  opposition  to  morality.  Sympathy  is, 
and  always  has  been,  as  basal  as  selfishness.  Sym- 
pathy subdues  selfishness  and  thus  man  attains 
virtue.  Mr.  Huxley,  approaching  morality  from 
the  scientific  side,  finds  in  sympathy,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  power  with  which  to  transcend  the  cos- 
mic process  of  struggle  for  existence  and  survival 
of  the  fittest.  Professor  Henry  Drummond,  ap- 
proaching evolution  from  the  ethical  side,  traces, 
along  the  lines  of  sympathy,  the  evolution  of  the 
mother,  of  the  father,  of  the  husband,  on  the  as- 
sumption that  regard  for  others  is  the  ladder  on 
which  man  ascends.1  Now,  while  we  appreciate  the 
truth  and  importance  of  these  views  and  heartily 

1  The  Ascent  of  Man. 


SYMPATHY  AND  SELF-REGARD'       133 

agree  that  the  social  feelings  are  essential  in  moral- 
ity and  constitutional  in  human  nature,  we  are 
not  satisfied  to  leave  out  of  the  account  that  other 
half  of  the  process  and  progress  of  life  which  con- 
sists in  self-assertion.  When  evolution,  after  hav- 
ing refused  to  give  anything,  finally  consented  to 
surrender  sympathy  to  ethics,  we  took  the  half -loaf 
gratefully  rather  than  starve.  But  man  owes  his 
progress  in  large  part  to  the  self -regarding  and  self- 
asserting  feelings.  This  method  has  been  as  power- 
ful and  as  constant  as  the  social  method.  Man  is 
allied  as  closely  to  animals  on  the  self-regarding 
side  as  on  the  sympathetic  side.  The  one  method 
seems  as  normal  and  necessary  as  the  other,  as  man 
makes  his  way  along  the  upward  path.  Is  it  to 
be  presumed  that  self-assertion  has  no  significance 
for  morality,  that  so  large  a  section  of  conduct  is 
non-moral  ?  Is  it  to  be  presumed  that  self-regard 
is  opposed  to  virtue,  that  it  must  be  subdued  and 
eradicated  by  regard  for  others,  that  so  important 
a  portion  of  life  is  immoral  ?  And  is  it  therefore 
to  be  presumed  that  morality  is  possible  only  by  an 
inner  conflict  of  the  sympathetic  with  the  self-re- 
garding man  ?  Well,  if  virtue  is  simply  and  solely 
regard  for  others  and  service  of  others,  that  is,  pure 
altruism,  its  root  may  be  found  in  the  social  feelings. 
But  in  that  case,  self-regard  must  be  explained  as  a 
prolonged  and  unpleasant  preliminary,  or  as  a  per- 
sistent hindrance  and  stubborn  obstacle  to  morality, 
and  in  either  case  the  explanation  is  unsatisfactory. 
The  truth  is  that  self-realization  is  as  moral  as 
altruism.  Nearly  all  text-books  of  ethics,  in  the 
analysis  of  man  as  he  now  is,  put  the  person  him- 


134     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

self  first,  in  the  enumeration  of  virtues.  But  when 
the  account  with  evolution  is  made  up,  the  advan- 
tage which  may  be  found  in  almost  every  system  is 
abandoned  by  ignoring  or  condemning  self-preser- 
vation and  self-realization.  I  do  not  profess  ability 
to  bring  all  the  acts  of  man  within  the  lines  of 
moral  progress.  Rivalry  and  strife  in  the  earlier 
and  also  in  the  later  history  of  man  are  not  easily 
explained  from  the  moral  point  of  view.  Every 
one  must  confess  partial  ignorance.  It  must  be 
concluded,  also,  that  there  has  been  perversion  and 
reversion,  as  there  manifestly  is  in  the  present  stage 
of  progress.  Nevertheless,  I  am  very  sure  that  the 
self-regarding  feelings,  although  they  have  led  to 
strife  arid  struggle,  are  as  elementary  and  funda- 
mental for  ethics  as  they  are  for  evolution.  I 
believe  that  in  the  large  correspondence  of  self- 
preservation,  which  is  the  important  word  of  evo- 
lution, with  self-realization,  which  is  one  of  the 
two  important  words  of  ethics,  we  may  perceive 
the  harmony  of  morality  and  evolution. 

II 

Every  one  is  an  object  to  himself,  —  an  object 
of  effort  and  an  object  of  thought.  It  is  not 
merely  by  a  roundabout,  refined,  accommodated 
reflection  that  one  objectifies  himself,  but  it  is  a 
primitive,  natural,  and  necessary  perception.  The 
Self,  the  Ego,  the  I,  as  distinguished  from  what 
is  other  than  self,  is  the  beginning  of  knowledge. 
And  it  is  objective  knowledge  before  it  is  subjec- 
tive knowledge.  Every  child  knows  himself  first 
as  an  object  in  the  third  person.  He  speaks  of 


SELF  135 

himself  by  the  name  others  give  him  ;  "  baby  hurt," 
"baby  cry."  Children  use  "me,"  the  objective, 
before  they  use  "  I,"  as  the  subject  of  their  sen- 
tences. A  savage  thinks  in  the  same  way.  He 
speaks  of  himself  in  the  third  person,  usually  by 
the  name  which  has  been  given  him.  He  thinks 
of  himself  as  others  think  of  him.  This  is  the 
more  concrete,  pictorial,  descriptive,  and  therefore 
the  more  primitive  mode  of  thought.  At  length, 
as  language  was  able  to  express  general  concepts, 
a  single  word  was  employed,  instead  of  the  sev- 
eral and  particular  names  of  individuals,  to  desig- 
nate the  person  as  his  own  object,  the  word  "  self." 
The  earlier  and  the  common  use  of  the  word  is 
objective.  Self  and  not  another  is  in  view.  It  is 
the  exact  and  complete  identification  of  an  indi- 
vidual as  his  own  object.  It  is  still  compounded 
only  in  the  objective  form,  himself,  themselves, 
not  heself ,  they  selves ;  or  in  the  oblique  cases  to 
indicate  that  which  pertains  to  the  person  as  an 
object.  Even  when  it  is  put  alongside  the  subject 
in  the  nominative,  as  I  myself,  he  himself,  they 
themselves,  the  bbjective  form  is  retained,  and  the 
purpose  is  to  mark  sharply  the  individuals  in  their 
separateness  and  independence  and  responsibility, 
as  distinguished  from  all  others.  When  the  word 
is  compounded  with  words  of  action  or  result,  it 
signifies  the  person  as  an  object  acted  upon,  —  as 
self -accusation,  self -approval,  self-command,  self- 
love,  self-made.  "We  could  not  get  on  without  the 
word  "  self,"  which  means  the  person  objectified  to 
his  own  mind  as  he  is  objectified  to  the  minds  of 
others.  One  may  be  very  much  mistaken  about 


136     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

himself,  even  about  his  personal  appearance,  so 
that,  even  if  he  recognizes  his  own  photograph,  he 
finds  it  a  disappointment,  or,  more  rarely,  an 
agreeable  surprise.  Few  can  take  their  own  meas- 
ure even  so  as  to  see  themselves  as  others  see 
them.  The  maxim,  "  Know  thyself,"  is  a  hard  one. 
Nevertheless,  every  one  holds  before  his  mind 
some  kind  of  a  self,  true  or  false,  which  he  as  con- 
tinually makes  an  object  of  effort.  He  flatters  it 
or  rebukes  it,  pampers  it  or  castigates  it,  inflates 
it  to-day  and  punctures  it  to-morrow.  He  is  re- 
minded by  others  of  his  duty  to  this  object.  He 
has  often  been  told,  when  a  child,  that  he  ought 
to  be  ashamed  of  himself,  as  if  he  were  two  chil- 
dren. In  a  fit  of  disgust  he  feels  like  kicking 
himself,  as  if  he  had  two  bodies.  He  talks  about 
improving  himself  and  enjoying  himself.  If  the 
reader  should  take  the  pains  to  glance  back  over 
this  paragraph  he  would  see  that  the  attempt  to 
describe  a  person  as  his  own  object  is  possible 
only  by  constant  use  of  the  word  to  be  explained. 
Self  is  the  only  word  by  which  self  can  be  denoted. 
No  other  word  can  take  its  own  unique  place.  It 
speaks  for  itself.  The  distinction  of  subject  and 
object  has  been  ingeniously  marked  in  a  recent 
article  in  an  ethical  journal,  and  the  difference 
between  self-love  and  selfishness  designated  by  the 
new  words,  "  I-ishness  "  and  "  me-ishness,"  which 
make  the  contrast  clear,  but  can  hardly  claim  to 
have  enriched  the  English  language.1 

The  conception  of  self  as  an  object  is  more  than 
recognition  of  the  actual  self.     It  is  also  recogni- 

1  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  April,  1895,  pp.  273-295. 


SELF  137 

tion  of  the  ideal  self.  There  are  really  three 
selves ;  the  subjective  self,  the  objective  self,  and 
the  ideal  self.  Others  distinguish  these  three 
selves.  Those  who  are  interested  in  a  boy  form 
an  ideal  of  him  even  when  he  is  little.  They 
wonder  what  he  will  become.  They  notice  his 
tastes,  capacities,  intelligence,  powers  of  imagina- 
tion, and  predict  his  career.  They  skip  over  the 
twenty  intervening  years,  and  picture  the  man 
that  will  be  or  may  be.  Very  early,  every  one  has 
some  ideal  of  himself.  It  may  be  mistaken,  in- 
adequate, fanciful,  impossible.  But  it  is  perceived 
and  pursued.  A  child  lives  in  a  world  of  imagina- 
tion, sees  himself  in  some  other  character,  plays 
that  he  is  a  soldier,  a  sailor,  a  knight,  a  pirate,  a 
king.  He  lives  it  all  out,  as  if  he  really  were 
that  other  person.  As  he  grows  older  he  brings 
his  ideal  into  shape  somewhere  within  the  limits 
of  possibility.  He  is  very  decided  as  to  what  he 
will  be,  a  carpenter,  an  engineer,  an  architect,  a 
merchant,  a  doctor,  an  orator ;  first  an  ideal  of 
what  he  can  do  with  his  hands,  later  an  ideal  of 
what  he  can  do  with  his  brains.  He  sees  him- 
self beforehand  as  he  will  be  in  his  occupation. 
Ambition  sees  the  ideal  self.  One  who  has  politi- 
cal ambition  imagines  himself  governor,  congress- 
man, president.  He  imagines  what  he  will  do, 
what  power  he  will  have,  how  he  will  be  honored 
in  the  position  he  covets.  If  he  is  a  vain  person 
and  values  the  external  trappings  of  office,  he 
may  some  day  actually  be  caught  posing  before  a 
mirror,  and,  if  he  should  confess  the  truth,  he 
would  admit  that,  for  the  moment,  he  was  governor 


138     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

of  the  State,  delivering  his  inaugural  address. 
But  every  one  stands  before  a  magic  glass,  which, 
as  he  peers  into  it,  reflects  a  person  somewhat  like 
the  one  who  stands  before  it,  yet  different,  with 
attainments,  qualities,  dignities,  of  which  he  deems 
himself  capable,  or  which  he  at  least  desires.  As 
a  convex  mirror  gives  a  distorted  image,  yet  which 
is  reflected  from  the  beholder,  so  the  magic  mir- 
ror of  imagination  gives  an  ennobled,  enlarged, 
more  refined  image  of  the  ideal  which  the  actual 
may  become. 

in 

It  follows  therefore  that  self-love  is  intelligible 
and  real.  The  conception  of  self-love  may  perhaps 
be  derived  from  the  conception  of  love  to  others, 
although  it  is  a  question  whether  desires  for  our 
own  good  are  determined  by  that  which  we  regard 
as  good  for  others,  or  desires  for  the  good  of  others 
are  determined  by  what  we  regard  as  good  for  our- 
selves. But,  as  we  have  or  think  we  have  a  clear 
idea  of  love  for  others,  we  may  take  that  idea  and 
observe  that  it  applies  equally  and  almost  exactly 
to  self-love.  Love  for  others  is  the  desire  and  the 
duty  to  do  that  which  is  for  their  good.  It  is  not 
merely  the  feeling  of  delight  in  being  with  them 
and  contemplating  them.  While  it  is  a  liking,  a 
sympathetic  feeling,  a  joy  in  companionship,  it  is 
at  the  same  time  a  desire  to  serve  them,  to  promote 
their  happiness,  to  do  something  for  them.  Love 
seeks  the  true  good  of  the  person  loved.  It  will 
not  minister  in  an  unworthy  way  to  afford  a  tem- 
porary pleasure.  It  will  not  approve  nor  tolerate 
that  which  is  wrong.  It  will  not  encourage  the 


SELF-LOVE  139 

coarse,  base  passions  of  the  one  loved.  It  condemns 
impurity,  falseness,  selfishness.  A  parent,  we  say, 
does  not  really  love  his  child  if  he  tolerates  the  self- 
indulgence  and  does  not  correct  or  punish  the  faults 
of  the  child.  Faithful  are  the  wounds  of  a  friend. 
Love  discriminates.  It  admires  only  that  which  is 
worthy  of  admiration.  It  cannot  consent  to,  much 
less  approve,  anything  unworthy  of  the  loved  one. 
The  more  love  the  more  condemnation  of  that  which 
is  unlovely.  What  has  been  said  of  the  divine  love 
is  true  of  human  love  :  — 

"  The  very  wrath  from  pity  grew, 
From  love  of  men  the  hate  of  wrong." 

Love  has  a  high  ideal  of  the  person  loved,  and  is 
devoted  to  the  attainment  of  that  ideal.  Love 
seeks  righteousness,  and  is  satisfied  with  nothing 
less  and  nothing  other  than  that. 

Should  not  one  be  seeking  the  same  things  for 
himself  that  he  seeks  for  others  ?  Should  he  not 
have  the  same  ideal  for  himself  ?  Is  not  the  good- 
ness he  would  promote  in  a  friend  the  very  good- 
ness he  should  be  striving  to  promote  in  his  own 
character  ?  If  I  love  another,  I  seek  his  perfection. 
But  I  should  seek  my  own  perfection.  Therefore 
I  should  love  myself.  In  fact,  the  very  best  way 
to  promote  the  goodness  of  another  is  to  cultivate 
my  own  goodness.  To  be  of  the  right  character 
gives  the  power  and  the  only  power  of  loving  and 
serving  others.  Example  is  the  best  service  love  can 
render.  If  one  is  seeking  the  wrong  things  for  him- 
self, he  cannot  be  seeking  the  right  things  for  his 
friend,  except  as  he  disapproves  his  own  wrongness, 


140     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

and  is  a  warning  to  his  friend.  Now  we  understand 
self-love.  The  representation  of  love  as  including 
self  is  by  no  means  a  far-fetched  and  circuitous  way 
of  thinking.  In  the  complete  summary  of  moral  law, 
a  summary  which  is  almost  universally  accepted, 
two  great  principles  are  laid  down,  one  of  which 
gives  as  much  importance  to  self-love  as  to  love  for 
others,  and  even  makes  self-love  the  rule  and  type 
of  love  to  others.  "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor 
as  thyself,"  is  the  second  of  two  great  command- 
ments on  which  hang  all  the  moral  precepts  of 
lawgivers  and  prophets.  The  comparison  has  re- 
spect, not  to  quantity  but  to  quality.  It  does  not 
mean  that  one  is  to  love  his  neighbor  as  much  as 
he  loves  himself,  that  he  is  to  give  just  as  much 
time,  thought,  care,  service,  to  his  neighbor  as  he 
gives  to  himself,  in  as  equal  division  as  possible. 
It  means  that  one  is  to  love  his  neighbor  in  the 
same  way  that  he  loves  himself,  in  the  same  man- 
ner, after  the  same  fashion,  with  the  same  objects  in 
view,  like  as  he  loves  himself.  It  is  not  the  "  as  "  of 
degree  but  the  "  as  "  of  kind.  As  thou  lovest  thyself 
so  shalt  thou  love  thy  neighbor.  The  soul's  goods 
one  seeks  for  himself  are  the  soul's  goods  he  should 
seek  for  his  neighbor.  Therefore  one  must  love 
himself  aright  in  order  to  love  his  neighbor  aright. 
According  to  this  comprehensive  precept,  self-love 
is  not  derived  from  love  to  others,  but  love  to 
others  gets  its  pattern  and  therefore  its  measure 
from  love  to  self.  This  is  as  distinct  a  declaration 
of  self-love  as  could  possibly  be  made,  and  certainly 
on  the  best  authority.  The  somewhat  similar  pre- 
cept which  is  found  both  in  Christian  and  in  Con- 


SELF-REALIZATION  141 

fucian  ethics,  —  to  do  unto  others  as  you  would 
that  they  should  do  unto  you,  —  indicates  the  right 
every  one  has  that  others  should  seek  his  good,  as 
well  as  his  duty  to  seek  their  good,  and  so  objectifies 
self  as  needing  love  and  service.  If  one  is  entitled 
to  the  efforts  of  others  for  his  good,  he  certainly  is 
required  to  serve  himself  as  he  would  have  others 
serve  him  and  as  he  ought  to  serve  them. 

IV 

But  how  about  the  virtue  of  self-sacrifice  and  self- 
denial  ?  Does  not  self-love  conflict  with  them  ?  I 
think  not,  but,  on  the  contrary,  regard  them  as  the 
best  expressions  of  self-love.  Self-sacrifice  is  not 
self-effacement,  self -obliteration,  self -debasement. 
One  may,  for  the  sake  of  another,  sacrifice  out- 
ward things,  goods,  time,  pleasures,  comforts,  repu- 
tation. He  may  sacrifice  possessions  and  enjoy- 
ments which  in  themselves  are  legitimate,  and  so 
may  practice  self-denial.  But  he  may  not  sacrifice 
character,  the  goods  of  the  soul,  truth,  honor, 
purity,  nobleness.  That  such  sacrifice  may  not  be 
made  is  finely  illustrated  in  the  reply  of  Isabel 
to  Angelo  the  judge,  in  "  Measure  for  Measure." 
She  refuses  to  sacrifice  her  purity  to  save  her 
brother's  life  :  — 

Isabel.  —  That  is,  were  I  under  the  terms  of  death, 
Th'  impression  of  keen  whips  I  'd  wear  as  rubies, 
And  strip  myself  to  death,  as  to  a  bed 
That  longing  I  've  been  sick  for,  ere  I  'd  yield 
My  body  up  to  shame. 

Angelo.  —  Then  must 

Your  brother  die.    .» 

Isabel.  —  And  't  were  a  cheaper  way. 

Better  it  were,  a  brother  died  at  once, 


142     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

Than  that  a  sister,  by  redeeming  him, 
Should  die  for  ever. l 

The  worth  of  the  true  self  cannot  be  denied  nor 
renounced.  The  loss  of  it  would  be  the  loss  of 
power  to  promote  another's  true  good.  Self-sacri- 
fice is  not  the  denying  but  the  giving  of  self.  It 
is  the  devotement  of  self  itself,  rather  than  of  some 
outward  thing  into  which  the  giver  does  not  put 
himself.  A  sacrifice  is  an  offering  of  that  which 
has  value.  It  is  the  consecration  of  friendship, 
counsel,  inspiration,  sympathy,  the  gifts  of  charac- 
ter. The  value  of  the  service  is  measured  by  the 
moral  value  of  the  person  who  gives  himself  with- 
out stint.  Every  teacher  must  first  gain  the  know- 
ledge he  would  impart.  He  must  realize  himself 
intellectually  in  order  to  teach  others.  Any  self- 
denial  involved  is  simply  giving  his  time  to  the 
two-fold  work  of  self-realization  and  self-imparta- 
tion.  The  new  charity  has  laid  hold  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  self -giving.  It  shares  the  life  of  those  who 
need  help.  It  does  not  extend  a  gift  at  arm's- 
length,  but  comes  in  person  to  give  wisdom,  sym- 
pathy, guidance,  respect,  companionship,  to  give 
self.  It  is  self-impartation.  The  self-impartation 
has  value  only  if  there  is  self-realization,  only  if 
there  is  self-love,  seeking  the  highest  good  of  self. 
One  who  is  not  a  lover  of  himself  according  to  the 
highest  value,  is  incapable  and  worthless  for  any 
service  to  others.  At  the  most  he  can  only  make 
some  heedless  gift  of  money  to  relieve  the  bodily 
wants  of  the  poor,  and  even  then,  if  he  does  not 
put  some  wise  thought  into  it,  some  of  the  judi- 
1  Measure  for  Measure,  act  ii.,  so.  4. 


SELF-REALIZATION  143 

ciousness  which  is  a  personal  thing,  he  will  do 
more  harm  than  good.  Self-denial  is  either  denial 
of  the  lower  self,  of  appetite,  greed,  or  passion,  in 
order  that  there  may  be  realization  of  the  true  and 
higher  self,  or  it  is  relinquishment  of  certain  pur- 
suits which  might  yield  pleasure  or  profit,  in  order 
to  use  one's  self  at  a  larger  advantage  for  the  ser- 
vice of  others,  in  which  he  will  at  the  same  time 
gain  the  best  and  finest  self-culture.  After  it  had 
been  said  of  the  Hebrew  priests  that  when  they 
came  to  the  altar  it  was  necessary  they  should 
have  somewhat  to  offer,  it  is  observed  of  him  who 
was  greater  than  all  the  priests  that  he  offered 
himself,  nothing  less  than  himself,  in  all  the  wealth 
of  his  sympathy.  That  was  the  unspeakable,  the 
incomparable  gift. 

That  the  culture  of  the  person  himself  is  the 
very  essence  of  morality  is  evident  from  all  that 
has  been  presented  concerning  the  moral  ideal, 
which  is  one's  own  personal  ideal  of  worth,  and  on 
which  all  moral  laws,  all  rights,  duty,  obligation, 
are  based.  It  was  seen  that  the  person  is  an  end 
in  himself,  never  a  means  to  some  other  end ;  that 
one  is  to  serve  others,  because  they,  like  himself, 
are  values  of  absolute  worth;  that  morality  is  in- 
separable from  character ;  and  that  the  object  —  or, 
it  might  better  be  said,  the  nature  —  of  morality  is 
the  perfection  of  character.  It  is  impossible,  then, 
to  limit  virtue  to  regard  for  others,  to  find  in  good- 
ness only  an  expression  of  the  sympathetic  feelings, 
to  reduce  morality  to  altruism.  It  may,  indeed  be 
necessary  to  emphasize  service  to  others  as  against 
the  selfishness  which  grasps  from  others  to  gratify 


144     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

the  lower  desires.  But  the  good  of  others  cannot 
be  interfered  with  by  the  realization  of  one's  own 
worth.  It  is  evident,  then,  it  is  self-evident,  that 
there  is  as  close  and  vital  a  relation  between 
morality  and  the  self-regarding  feelings  as  there  is 
between  morality  and  the  sympathetic  feelings.  It 
no  more  follows,  because  some  of  the  forms  of  self- 
assertion  are  unethical,  that  self-assertion  itself 
has  no  relation  to  virtue,  than  it  follows,  because 
some  of  the  forms  of  sympathy  are  immoral,  that 
sympathy  has  no  relation  to  virtue.  The  signifi- 
cance of  the  truth  which  has  been  gained  in  re- 
spect to  the  self -regarding  feelings  will  be  employed 
in  the  next  chapter  on  the  relation  of  ethics  and 
evolution. 

Before  considering  altruism,  attention  is  called 
to  a  word  which  has  been  frequently  used  in  the 
preceding  pages,  the  word  "  self-realization."  It  is 
a  good  term,  for  several  reasons.  It  indicates  the 
morality  of  the  person  himself.  It  implies  that 
character  is  the  end  in  view.  It  implies  that  the 
character  to  be  attained  is  the  normal  man,  the 
true  self,  according  to  the  type  or  ideal  of  his  own 
constitution.  It  suggests  that  the  character  is  to 
be  attained  progressively  by  a  process  of  realiza- 
tion. It  signifies  self-perfection.  The  complete, 
symmetrical,  ideal  character  is  the  self  to  be  real- 
ized. The  word  is  therefore  preferable  to  "  ego- 
ism," which  is  too  suggestive  of  egotism,  and  which 
is  not  suggestive  at  all  of  a  process  of  development. 
It  is  obviously  a  better  word  than  "selfishness," 
which  stands  for  pursuit  of  the  lower  gratifications, 
and  also  for  indifference  to  the  welfare  of  others. 


SELF-REALIZATION  145 

The  characterization  of  the  self-regarding  instincts 
as  selfish,  in  contrast  with  the  sympathetic  instincts, 
is  unfortunate,  for  it  is  prejudicial  to  the  self- 
regarding  feelings  before  they  are  supposed  to 
have  any  moral  quality  whatever.  Self-realization, 
and  not  egoism  or  selfishness,  is  the  side  of  moral- 
ity which  pertains  to  self. 

The  cultivation  of  self  according  to  the  ideal 
proceeds  on  one  side  without  reference  to  others. 
When  one  gets  away  from  men  into  the  solitude 
of  nature,  and  has  the  freshening  and  purifying 
influences  which  come  from  the  beauty  of  the 
world,  he  has  a  repose  and  joy  and  strength  which 
cannot  be  gained  from  human  companionships. 
Wordsworth  is  the  poet  of  nature's  ministration, 
and  Stevenson,  I  think,  is  her  best  interpreter  in 
prose.  His  stories  abound  with  delicious  sugges- 
tions of  the  pure  delights  of  nature,  such  as  the 
farmer's  good-night  to  Prince  Otto :  "  See,  sir," 
and  here  he  opened  a  door  and  ushered  Otto  into  a 
little  whitewashed  sleeping-room,  "  here  you  are 
in  port.  It  is  small,  but  it  is  airy,  and  the  sheets 
are  clean  and  kept  in  lavender.  The  window,  too, 
looks  out  above  the  river,  and  there  's  no  music 
like  a  little  river's.  It  plays  the  same  tune  (and 
that 's  the  favorite)  over  and  over  again,  and  yet 
does  not  weary  of  it  like  men  fiddlers.  It  takes 
the  mind  out-of-doors  ;  and  though  we  should  be 
grateful  for  good  houses,  there  is,  after  all,  no 
house  like  God's  out-of-doors.  And  lastly,  sir,  it 
quiets  a  man  down  like  saying  his  prayers."  A 
friend  tells  me  of  a  German  scholar  who  went 
away  to  live  for  a  time  in  a  small,  remote  village, 


146     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

far  from  the  rush  of  cities  and  the  bustling  activi- 
ties of  politics  and  the  new  philanthrophy,  just  for 
a  time  to  be  and  not  to  do.  We  are  told  that  there 
should  be  returns  of  various  kinds  to  that  which 
is  old,  in  philosophy,  in  art,  in  music,  in  religion. 
A  return  which  needs  to  be  made  from  the  very 
activities  of  benevolence,  and  from  the  plans  and 
works  which  are  to  make  the  world  better,  is  just 
the  return  into  self,  into  an  interior  life  of  quiet, 
of  meditation,  of  communion  with  nature  and  with 
God,  which  gives  the  strength  of  repose  and  the  re- 
pose of  strength.  But  we  digress  too  far,  perhaps, 
from  the  path  we  are  following. 


As  we  turn  to  altruism,  from  self  to  others,  the 
path  seems  easier.  The  occasions  of  duty  are 
furnished  in  relation  to  children,  parents,  brothers, 
sisters,  friends,  citizens,  the  sick,  the  poor,  the 
ignorant,  the  oppressed.  The  demands  are  per- 
petual and  pressing.  Life  is  absorbed  in  the  cares 
and  services  which  are  thus  imposed.  The  good 
man  has  no  time  to  think  of  himself  in  his  devotion 
to  others.  Duty  seems  to  be  no  more  and  no  less 
than  that  which  one  owes  to  those  about  him.  If 
it  should  be  intimated  that  duty  to  others  is  a  less 
simple  conception  than  duty  to  self,  we  should  be 
surprised  and  incredulous.  Yet  a  plausible  argu- 
ment could  be  made  to  show  that  my  own  good  is 
a  more  immediate  object  than  the  good  of  another, 
and  that  it  is  not  so  easy  as  it  seems  to  demon- 
strate the  right  of  some  other  person  to  my  services. 
We  have  already  noticed  that  the  Utilitarians  were 


ALTRUISM  147 

challenged  to  show  how  the  happiness  of  another 
is  as  obligatory  on  every  one  as  his  own  happiness, 
and  that  they  were  somewhat  at  a  loss  for  an  an- 
swer. The  fact  that  there  could  be  such  a  discus- 
sion proves  at  least  that  the  obligation  of  altruism 
is  no  more  obvious  and  immediate  than  the  obliga- 
tion of  self-realization.  But  there  is  no  occasion 
to  debate  the  point,  for  it  is  now  agreed  that  the 
sympathetic  feelings  are  as  original  and  constitu- 
tional as  the  self-regarding  feelings.  The  simple 
fact  is  that  man  is  a  person  in  society,  and  that 
he  cannot  be  thought  of  apart  from  the  reciprocal 
relations  of  the  social  organism.  The  feelings  of 
affection  are  spontaneous,  and  mutual  services  are 
indispensable.  I  am  dependent  on  others  and 
others  are  dependent  on  me.  Humanity  is  incon- 
ceivable under  any  other  conditions.  No  person 
can  be  started  in  life  without  the  conscious  coopera- 
tion of  others,  and  there  can  be  no  newcomers  after 
us  unless  we  invite  their  appearance.  Altruism  is 
laid  down  in  the  nature  of  man  and  even  of  ani- 
mals. The  foot  cannot  say  to  the  hand,  the  child 
cannot  say  to  the  parent,  the  friend  cannot  say  to 
the  friend  :  "  I  have  no  need  of  thee  and  thou  hast 
no  need  of  me."  Nor  do  these  necessities  of  re- 
ciprocity proceed,  even  on  the  physical  ranges,  in 
unconsciousness.  Reproduction,  nurture,  educa- 
tion, depend  upon  preference  and  intelligent  choice. 
Much  more  do  the  mutual  services  of  society, 
economic,  political,  benevolent,  require  deliberate 
purpose.  It  is  a  strange  contention  of  Mr.  Kidd's 
that  the  efforts  of  individuals  are  selfish,  com- 
petitive, greedy,  and  that  altruism  is  a  race  func- 


148     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

tion  of  which  individuals  are  not  conscious,  and 
which  they  cannot  bring  under  rational  justifica- 
tion. It  could  more  reasonably  be  argued  that 
actions  for  the  good  of  others  in  the  family  and  the 
State  engage  conscious  and  concentrated  attention, 
and  that  actions  for  self  are  unreasoned  and  almost 
unconscious.  But,  whether  self -regard  ing  or  altru- 
istic actions  are  more  distinct  to  consciousness,  it 
is  entirely  certain  that  duties  to  others  constitute 
a  large  portion  of  moral  conduct.  This  is  so  ob- 
vious that  illustration  is  unnecessary. 

VI 

There  are,  however,  two  aspects  of  altruistic 
action  which  are  worthy  of  notice,  because  they 
show  that  altruism  is  only  the  promotion  of  self- 
realization  in  others.  They  are  the  receptive  and 
the  reflex  aspects  of  duty  to  others. 

The  receptive  aspect  is  often  overlooked.  But 
it  is  as  obligatory  to  receive  as  to  impart  good. 
Two  persons  are  concerned  in  every  altruistic  act, 
the  giver  and  the  receiver.  To  the  completeness 
and  the  value  of  such  an  act,  receptiveness  is  es- 
sential. There  is  as  much  virtue  in  right  receiving 
as  in  right  conferring.  Giving  is  for  the  good 
of  another  person,  and  the  good  is  not  achieved 
unless  there  is  a  fitting  acceptance  of  it.  Instruc- 
tion, for  example,  is  not  instruction  unless  there  is 
teachableness.  There  must  be  the  capacity  and 
the  disposition  to  learn.  There  is  no  virtue  in 
rebuke  if  it  is  not  deserved,  and  no  efficacy  if  it  is 
not  heeded.  If  I  would  render  service  to  another, 
I  must  ascertain  his  need  and  suit  the  service  to 


ffr 


ALTRUISM  RECEPTIVE  AND  REFLEX    149 

the  need.  Otherwise  there  is  good  only  in  inten- 
tion, and  not  in  effect.  This  comes  around  to  the 
duty  of  self-realization  on  the  part  of  the  one  to 
whom  service  is  proffered.  My  altruistic  action  is 
for  the  purpose,  and  the  sole  purpose,  of  helping  him 
realize  his  own  good.  So,  conversely,  if  altruistic 
action  is  right,  I  must  allow  and  even  require  it 
from  others.  If  I  need  what  others  can  give,  it  is 
as  much  my  duty  to  receive  as  their  duty  to  give. 
It  is  wrong  not  to  imitate  a  good  example.  It  is 
false  pride  to  refuse  needed  help.  Ingratitude  is 
base.  Indeed,  right  reception  is  the  more  difficult, 
and  therefore  in  many  cases  the  better  part  of 
virtue.  There  is  consciousness  of  power  in  giving, 
but  consciousness  of  weakness  in  receiving,  and 
the  exercise  of  power  is  more  agreeable  than  the 
admission  of  weakness.  He  who  confers  benefits 
must  be  careful  not  to  assume  an  air  of  superiority. 
Benefactors  have  to  be  wary.  It  may  be  more 
blessed  to  give  than  to  receive,  but  it  is  less  diffi- 
cult. It  is  indeed  a  mark  of  greatness  to  receive 
gracefully  and  gratefully.  Appreciation,  respon- 
siveness, admiration,  veneration,  indicate  breadth 
of  character.  Courtesy  is  responsive.  Its  stock 
of  phrases  is  best  supplied  with  expressions  of 
thankfulness  and  appreciation.  It  lets  others  con- 
fer favors.  It  depreciates  its  own  acts  and  appre- 
ciates the  acts  of  others.  Mr.  Spencer  reduces 
this  to  an  absurdity  by  suggesting  that  true  altru- 
ism consists  in  receiving.  His  argument  is,  that 
altruistic  action  is  pleasurable,  that  to  give  others 
that  pleasure  we  should  afford  them  the  opportu- 
nity of  doing  favors  to  us,  and  should  forego  the 


150     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

pleasure  ourselves.  Consequently  two  altruistic 
persons  will  engage  in  friendly  competition,  not  to 
serve  but  to  be  served.  One  will  try  to  anticipate 
the  other  in  coming  under  obligation.  One  will 
create  artificial  wants  that  the  other  may  have  the 
pleasure  of  satisfying  them.  They  will  be  like  the 
two  friends  meeting  in  Piccadilly,  when  the  first 
says,  "  I  am  so  glad  to  see  you,"  and  the  other  re- 
plies, "  I  am  so  glad  that  you  are  glad,"  to  which  the 
first  responds,  "  I  am  so  glad  that  you  are  glad  that 
I  am  glad,"  and  so,  logically,  they  never  get  away 
from  each  other.  The  obvious  truth  of  altruism 
is  that  its  object  is  the  realization  of  personal 
worth,  in  which  one  may  help  another,  that  there 
is  therefore  virtue  in  receiving  as  well  as  in  giv- 
ing, and  that  no  one  can  realize  his  own  worth 
apart  from  others.  Altruism  is  extended  self- 
realization,  inasmuch  as  it  seeks  the  same  objects 
for  another  as  for  self.  The  virtue  of  altruism 
consists,  not  in  its  contrast  with  self-realization, 
but  in  its  contrast  with  selfishness.  The  selfish 
man  is  not  willing  to  share  with  another  those 
possessions  which  are  reduced  by  giving,  and 
which  are  usually  gained  by  depriving  others  of 
them.  If  one  is  altruistic  he  seeks  for  himself 
goods  which  are  increased  by  imparting  or  com- 
mending them  to  others.  When  material  posses- 
sions are  thought  to  constitute  the  chief  good, 
there  is  envy  and  rivalry,  because  they  cannot  be 
shared  without  being  diminished.  Miss  Wedg- 
wood remarks  on  "  the  important  fact  that,  so  far 
as  human  beings  dwell  within  the  realm  of  sense, 
they  are  to  a  certain  extent  necessarily  rivals,  and 


ALTRUISM  RECEPTIVE  AND  REFLEX    151 

quotes  from  the  "  Purgatorio  "  the  saying  of  Yirgil 
to  Dante  concerning  envy,  which  arises 

"  Because  men  set  their  wishes  upon  that 
Wherein  companionship  is  one  with  loss."  * 

But  all  that  is  intellectual,  a3sthetic,  and  moral  is 
a  common  possession,  which  is  not  impoverished 
by  giving  nor  enriched  by  withholding.  When  a 
higher  good  is  enjoyed,  one  is  impelled  to  share  it 
with  others.  When  one  perceives  the  beauty  of 
sunset  clouds,  of  a  planet's  soft  light  in  the  even- 
ing sky,  of  a  distant  mountain  peak,  his  first  im- 
pulse is  to  call  another  to  see  it.  When  the 
scholar  discovers  a  fact  or  a  truth,  he  is  possessed 
with  a  desire  to  communicate  it.  When  one  has 
a  revelation  of  a  type  of  character,  of  a  freedom 
of  faith,  of  a  discipline  from  trouble,  he  must  pro- 
claim it  as  good  news.  Every  revelation  is  a  gos- 
pel. It  is  truth  to  be  proclaimed  with  enthusiasm. 
There  is  the  gospel  of  reform,  the  gospel  of  art, 
the  gospel  of  education,  of  socialism,  of  science, 
and  even  of  recreation.  Every  one  who  is  illumi- 
nated, who  has  vision  of  the  true  good,  is  a  propa- 
gandist. Altruism  is  rooted  in  the  knowledge, 
possession,  and  enjoyment  of  the  higher  values  of 
character.  It  is  rooted  in  self-realization.  Each 
individual  is  but  one  among  a  multitude.  But  his 
worth  is  absolute,  and  stands  in  equilibrium  of 
value  with  that  of  all  others,  as  a  slender  column 
of  water  stands  at  the  same  level  with  the  reser- 
voir and  balances  it. 

The  reflex  influence  of  altruism  is  commonly 
observed.     Devotion  to  the  good  of  others  pro- 
l  The  Moral  Ideal,  p.  292. 


152     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

motes  the  purity,  refinement,  and  strength  of  one's 
own  character.  The  reason  is  obvious.  He  is 
seeking  the  very  objects  for  another  which  are  his 
own  objects.  They  become  so  distinct  and  valu- 
able when  they  are  desired  for  others  that  they 
are  more  his  own  objects  than  ever.  As  the  surest 
way  to  know  a  subject  is  to  teach  it,  so  the  sur- 
est way  to  realize  goodness  is  to  teach  it,  persuade 
to  it,  and  impart  it.  The  tendency  of  promoting 
the  good  of  others  is  to  eliminate  from  one's  own 
character  whatever  is  foreign  to  the  ideal.  If  one 
allows  in  himself  anything  contrary  to  the  good, 
he  defeats  the  object  of  his  service  for  another, 
and  is,  indeed,  so  far  forth  incapable  of  service. 
Self-love  and  love  of  others  react  upon  each  other. 
To  have  one  is  necessarily  to  have  the  other. 

I  have  dwelt  upon  the  receptive  and  reflex  as- 
pects of  altruism  in  order  to  show  that  there  can 
be  no  virtue  in  which  self  is  left  out  of  the  ac- 
count. The  sympathetic  feelings  cannot  be  sepa- 
rated from  the  self-regarding  feelings  and  made  the 
sole  basis  of  virtue.  Personality  is  always  in  soci- 
ety, and  is  therefore  altruistic.  Society  produces 
better  personalities,  and  therefore  there  is  cooper- 
ation for  the  good  of  persons.  Realization  of 
character  is  the  object  each  has  for  himself  and 
for  others.  The  religion  which  is  most  altruistic, 
which  makes  ministration  its  law,  and  which  teaches 
that  greatness  is  for  service,  is  the  religion  which 
makes  equally  important  the  salvation,  that  is,  the 
perfection,  of  the  individual,  who,  by  reason  of  his 
self-realization,  enters  into  that  kingdom  which  is 
the  true  society. 


THE  MUTUAL  RELATION  153 

VII 

If  the  positions  taken  are  correct,  there  is  little 
to  be  added  on  the  debate  concerning  egoism  and 
altruism.  Mr.  Spencer  attempted  to  show  that  all 
action  for  others  has  a  relation  to  self,  that  ser- 
vice for  others  is  often  to  one's  own  advantage,  and 
that  such  service  gives  pleasurable  feeling  to  the 
one  who  renders  it  as  well  as  to  the  one  who  re- 
ceives it.  He  showed  that  the  man  who  takes  care 
of  his  health,  and  has  an  unfailing  flow  of  spirits, 
can  do  more  for  others  than  the  man  who  neglects 
his  health  and  is  peevish  or  despondent,  and  that 
therefore  there  is  no  such  thing  as  pure  and  unde- 
filed  altruism.  He  assumed  that  there  must  be 
utter  unconsciousness  of  self  and  entire  disregard 
of  one's  own  interests  in  action  which  is  altruistic, 
and  that,  as  this  can  never  be  the  case,  there  is  no 
such  a  thing  as  unalloyed  altruism.  But  the  as- 
sumption is  wrong.  Some  actions  which  are  for 
the  benefit  of  others  may  be  prompted  by  purely 
selfish  motives.  One  who  does  what  he  can  to 
keep  his  neighbor  in  health,  but  only  that  he  him- 
self may  not  contract  an  infectious  disease,  is  alto- 
gether selfish.  But  other  acts  have  direct  regard 
to  the  good  of  a  neighbor.  If  one  keeps  himself 
in  health  so  that  he  may  be  able  to  support  his 
family,  if  he  amuses  himself  so  that  he  may  be 
fresh  and  strong  for  the  work  on  which  others  are 
dependent,  his  care  of  himself  is  not  selfish  but 
altruistic.  There  is  no  opposition  between  self- 
regard  and  regard  for  others.  Each  makes  the 
other  possible.  The  altruism  which  reduces  self 


154     SELF-REALIZATION  AND  ALTRUISM 

to  zero  is  an  act  without  an  actor.  It  is  some- 
thing out  of  nothing.  It  is  a  verb  without  a  noun. 
It  is  a  nonentity  exercising  power.  Very  nearly 
all  that  Mr.  Spencer  says  is  true,  because  self-cul- 
ture is  the  power  of  service.  The  direction  of 
that  power  upon  another  for  his  good  is  altruism. 
Unless  one  does  make  the  most  of  himself,  he  is 
incompetent  for  good  to  others.  The  pleasure  I 
have  in  helping  another  does  not  reduce  the  virtue 
of  the  act,  but  enhances  it.  The  real  good  of 
another  ought  to  give  me  pleasure.  If  it  produces 
envy  or  any  unhappiness  in  me,  there  would  be 
no  virtue  in  my  promotion  of  it,  even  if,  with  such 
feelings,  I  could  promote  it  at  all.  Persons  are 
akin.  They  have  the  same  ideals,  and  are  seeking 
them  together.  They  can  help  each  other,  not  out 
of  the  emptiness,  but  only  out  of  the  fullness  of 
each.  Mr.  Spencer  started  out  and  ran  away  with 
the  ascetic,  morbid,  pallid  type  of  virtue,  and  had 
little  difficulty  in  showing  that  it  has  no  place  nor 
power  in  the  actual  world.  But  a  true,  healthy, 
pure,  noble  egoism  is  the  necessary  condition  of 
altruism.  The  more  of  such  self-realization  there 
is,  the  more  genuine  and  valuable  is  service  for 
others  in  that  regard  for  their  good  which  is  the 
true  altruism.  We  are  members  one  of  another. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ETHICS    AND   EVOLUTION 

IN  the  first  chapter,  the  possible  relations  of 
evolution  and  ethics  were  indicated  in  a 'general 
way,  and  in  anticipation  of  the  discussion  which 
was  to  follow.  It  was  pointed  out  that  the  relation 
might  be  regarded  as  antagonistic,  as  independent, 
as  identical,  or  as  harmonious.  It  was  stated  that 
the  essential  methods  of  evolution  would  be  found 
to  be  in  harmony  with  the  fundamental  principles 
of  ethics.  In  the  intervening  chapters  the  ele- 
ments of  morality  have  been  considered,  in  order  to 
gain  materials  for  the  comparison  by  which  har- 
mony is  established.  It  has  been  found  that  an 
ideal  of  the  worth  or  perfection  of  persons  in  so- 
ciety constitutes  morality ;  that  this  ideal  is  oblig- 
atory in  law  or  right ;  that  it  is  realized  in  love, 
which  is  self-love  and  love  of  others  ;  that  it  is 
rooted  therefore  in  the  self-regarding  and  the  sym- 
pathetic feelings,  which  issue  in  self-realization 
and  altruism.  Emphasis  has  been  laid  on  self- 
regard,  self-assertion,  self-love  and  self-realization 
as  against  theories  of  a  purely  sympathetic  and 
altruistic  morality.  It  has  been  intimated  that  the 
self-realization  which  is,  to  say  the  least,  a  whole 
hemisphere  of  morality,  is  closely  allied  to  the  self- 
preservation  which  is  fundamental  in  evolution, 
and  that  harmony  may  therefore  be  looked  for  at 


156  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

the  very  point  where  antagonism  had  been  as- 
sumed. I  now  proceed  to  indicate  more  definitely 
the  parallel  lines  of  ethics  and  evolution  in  respect 
to  the  end  attained,  the  method  of  attaining  it, 
and  the  values  of  the  self-regarding  and  sympa- 
thetic feelings.  The  principal  difficulty  in  estab- 
lishing the  harmony  arises  from  the  struggle  which 
accompanies  the  development  of  all  life,  animal 
and  human.  This  difficulty  may  not  be  entirely 
removed.  But  if  it  is  seen  to  be  the  incident 
rather  than  the  law  of  progress,  and  the  incident  of 
an  essential  element  of  morality,  the  difficulty  will 
be  greatly  reduced.  Under  any  theory,  a  serious 
problem  is  presented  in  view  of  strife,  waste,  and 
pain.  But  if  all  that  pertains  to  self-regard  is 
excluded  from  morality,  the  problem  is  more  per- 
plexing than  it  is  if  self-regard  is  included.  And 
if  self-preservation  becoming  self-realization  tends 
to  eliminate  strife  and  suffering,  and  thus  to  correct 
its  own  defects,  the  problem  will  have  a  sufficiently 
satisfactory  solution.  I  shall  first  consider  the 
end  attained,  together  with  the  method  of  attain- 
ing it,  and  afterwards  consider  the  impulses  of  self- 
regard  and  sympathy. 

I 

In  the  comprehensive  view  there  is  a  principle 
which  is  common  to  ethics  and  evolution.  When 
the  entire  movement  is  observed  it  is  defined  for 
both  in  the  same  way,  namely,  as  an  ideal  progres- 
sively realized. 

This  is  the  very  nature  of  morality.  It  is  that 
which  ought  to  be.  The  individual  seeking  his 


THE  COMMON  PRINCIPLE  157 

own  worth  or  perfection,  or  even  happiness,  sees 
an  ideal  which  he  ought  to  realize,  and  which,  if  he 
is  moral,  he  is  trying  to  realize.  The  advance  of 
society  is  towards  an  ideal.  Dissatisfaction  with 
existing  conditions,  proposed  reforms,  improvement 
in  every  sphere,  the  industrial,  the  political,  the 
educational,  the  aesthetic,  are  the  recognition  and 
realization  of  an  ideal.  A  philosophy  of  history  is 
possible  because  progress  towards  an  ideal  can  be 
traced.  Inventions,  explorations,  laws,  govern- 
ments, revolutions,  art,  science,  philosophy,  are 
interpreted  as  stages  of  progress.  The  functions 
of  the  several  nations  in  the  advance  of  civiliza- 
tion are  perceived.  It  is  seen  that  there  has  been, 
not  stagnation  and  repetition,  but  regular,  related, 
and  intelligible  progress.  The  movement  has  not 
always  been  in  a  straight  line.  It  has  been  like 
the  rotary  movement  of  a  storm,  the  centre  trav- 
eling due  east  but  the  wind  blowing  from  all 
directions  on  the  edges,  or  like  the  ascending  spiral 
which  seems  to  return  upon  itself  in  the  compari- 
son of  days  or  years,  but  moves  upwards  as  seen  in 
the  progress  of  centuries  and  generations.  The 
historian  is  not  a  mere  annalist.  He  is  an  interpre- 
ter of  events  and  tendencies.  He  sees  the  ideals 
which  arose  before  the  minds  of  a  people  and  the 
process  by  which  the  ideals  were  realized.  The 
stages  of  progress  are  marked  along  the  centuries 
in  historical  succession.  They  are  seen  simulta- 
neously in  the  contrasted  conditions  of  civilized 
and  savage  peoples  at  the  present  time,  as  a  moun- 
tain clothed  with  verdure  at  the  base  and  covered 
with  snow  at  the  summit  exhibits  vertically  in  its 


158  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

few  thousand  feet  of  altitude  the  climates  and 
products  of  all  the  zones. 

The  belief  in  progress  is  deeply  rooted  and  well- 
nigh  universal.  It  is  said  that  charity-workers  in 
the  slums  of  London  find  that  the  poorest  live  in 
hope  of  better  conditions.  The  oppressed  expect 
deliverance.  The  slave  expects  freedom.  Al- 
though nearly  all  people  locate  the  golden  age  in 
the  past,  and  think  their  own  time  is  degenerate, 
yet  they  believe  that  there  will  be  leaders  and 
heroes  who  will  bring  back  the  golden  age.  Be- 
yond the  wilderness  lies  the  promised  land.  In 
the  darkest  hour  the  dawn  is  watched  for.  Hope 
repeats  the  proverb  that  it  is  darkest  just  before 
day. 

The  present  age  is  in  the  attitude  of  looking 
forward.  This  generation  stands  among  cross- 
lights,  with  hand  shading  the  eye,  peering  curiously 
or  anxiously  into  the  future.  We  seem  to  live  in 
the  thought  of  the  future  more  than  in  the  power 
of  the  present.  We  think  and  talk  of  that  which 
is  coming,  the  coming  method  of  business,  the  com- 
ing education,  the  coming  politics,  the  coming  art, 
the  coming  charity.  The  educator,  the  statesman, 
the  philanthropist,  the  artist,  sees  the  day  which 
is  dawning  and  lives  in  the  power  of  a  world  to 
come.  His  intellectual,  economic,  political,  artistic 
world  is  not  this  present  evil  world,  but  a  world 
he  sees  coming  and  which  by  his  efforts  he  will 
hasten.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  personal  and  so- 
cial morality  advance  towards  an  ideal  which  is 
more  or  less  distinctly  seen,  and  which  is  realized 
progressively. 


PROGRESSIVE  REALIZATION  159 


n 

Turning  now  to  evolution,  we  see  that  the  whole 
movement  may  be  comprehensively  regarded  as 
the  progressive  realization  of  ends  or  ideals.  This 
is  the  most  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  develop- 
ment of  physical  nature.  Whether  the  outcome, 
the  detailed  processes,  or  the  original  conditions 
of  the  universe  are  regarded,  evolution  signifies 
the  realization  of  ends. 

The  whole  outcome,  as  it  is  known  at  the  pres- 
ent time,  is  comprehended  as  a  development  of 
higher  from  lower  forms.  The  universe  of  suns 
and  planets  was  evolved  from  nebulous  or  ethe- 
real conditions,  and  has  passed  through  gaseous, 
igneous,  liquid  and  solid  stages,  until  the  earth 
and  perhaps  other  globes  became  habitable,  sus- 
taining animals  and  men.  A  writer  on  solar  and 
planetary  evolution  says  :  "  Everything  of  which 
we  have  any  knowledge  is  the  result  of  growth  or 
progress,  in  one  way  or  another  according  to  law. 
I  suppose  that  no  reasonable  person  who  is  ac- 
quainted with  the  facts  would  pretend  that  the 
earth  or  the  universe  is  any  less  the  result  of  a 
regular  process  of  development  than  a  tree."  So 
of  the  evolution  of  animal  life.  Differences  arise 
which  are  called  variations.  Some  of  them  are 
preserved  and  perpetuated  because  they  give  ad- 
vantage to  the  animals  which  possess  them.  Thus 
varieties  and  species  appear,  the  new  being  supe- 
rior to  the  old.  The  general  law  is  the  law  of  the 
progress  of  the  whole,  that  is,  as  stated  by  Le 
Conte,  "  the  general  fact  that,  although  there  is 


160  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

retrogression  and  reversion  in  parts,  the  whole 
system  steadily  advances  to  higher  functions  and 
wider  variety,  like  a  tree,  the  upward  and  spread- 
ing growth  of  which  as  a  whole  is  not  measured 
by  the  irregular  form,  or  deficient  development,  or 
retrogressive  metamorphosis  or  death  of  any  sub- 
ordinate branch  or  leaf."  There  may  be  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  how  this  took  place,  but  the 
result,  —  more  highly  organized  forms  descended 
from  less  highly  organized  forms,  —  cannot  be  suc- 
cessfully questioned.  So,  again,  of  the  evolution 
of  man  in  society.  It  means  progress.  If  all  men 
remained  in  or  reverted  to  a  savage  state,  there 
would  be  no  movement  that  could  be  called  evolu- 
tion. But  the  progress  of  the  race,  which  is  not 
yet  ended,  is  even  more  confidently  affirmed  by 
evolutionary  than  by  ethical  philosophers.  The 
outcome,  then,  is  seen  to  be  a  result  which  all 
forces  and  forms  have  tended  to  realize.  The 
forces  and  forms  can  be  understood  only  in  view 
of  the  results. 

Again,  when  any  particular  law  of  evolution  is 
perceived,  the  law  of  definite  variation,  the  law  of 
sexual  selection,  the  law  of  heredity,  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  avoid  the  use  of  terms  which  signify 
the  adjustment  of  means  to  ends.  Mr.  Spencer's 
definition  of  life  is  precisely  that :  "  the  continuous 
adjustment  of  internal  relations  to  external  rela- 
tions." It  has  been  remarked  that  adjustment  is 
as  full  of  teleology  as  an  egg  is  full  of  meat. 
Haeckel  speaks  of  the  internal  formative  tendency 
by  which  heredity  strives  to  keep  the  organic  form 
in  its  species.  A  tendency  is  that  which  tends  to 


PROGRESSIVE  REALIZATION  161 

a  certain  result.  Striving  to  keep  a  form  within 
certain  lines  is  the  adjustment  of  means  to  ends. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  merely  in  occasional  phrases 
expressing  purpose,  and  which  are  employed  for 
convenience  to  indicate  cause  and  effect,  but  in  the 
thought  of  life  as  organism  rather  than  mech- 
anism, and  developing  by  definite  variation  and 
selection,  that  we  find  the  assumption  of  pur- 
pose. Vital  forms  tend  to  higher  organization, 
to  better  adjustment  with  environment,  to  greater 
intelligence,  to  the  psychical  and  moral  powers  of 
man.  Every  law  and  method  makes  for  progress. 
Progress  can  mean  only  the  realization  of  ends. 
Otherwise  the  changes  of  nature  would  be  only  a 
kaleidoscope.  l 

If  the  outcome  and  the  process,  then  also  the 
original  conditions  of  the  universe  are  intelligible 
only  in  view  of  the  ends  to  be  realized.  The  end 
or  ideal  was  implicit  in  the  beginning.  The  origi- 
nal condition  is  assumed  by  some  evolutionists  to 
have  been  a  homogeneous  mass.  Mr.  Spencer  calls 
it  an  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity.  Another 
writer  calls  it  a  lifeless,  chaotic  mass.  Another 
calls  it  primal  chaos.  Still  another  describes  it 
as  the  primitive  nebulosity.  The  supposition  is 
that  it  was  all  alike,  one  uniform  stuff,  which  had 
existed  without  change,  no  one  knows  how  long. 
How,  then,  did  change  begin  ?  How  came  the 
indefinite  mass  to  take  on  different  and  definite 
forms?  It  is  represented  that  at  a  given  time  a 
movement  began,  that  there  was  a  stir,  a  breaking 

1  See  lecture  of  J.  W.  Chadwick  in  Evolution,  a  series  of  papers 
read  before  the  Brooklyn  Ethical  Association,  p.  329. 


162  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

up,  different  kinds  of  chemical  elements,  separa- 
tion of  the  mass  into  suns  and  planets.  The  most 
herculean  task  Mr.  Spencer  ever  attempted  is  his 
effort  to  introduce  change  into  the  eternal,  change- 
less homogeneousness.  He  strives  by  the  momen- 
tum of  huge  masses  of  words  to  set  the  primeval 
mass  in  motion.  "  All  finite  powers  of  the  homo- 
geneous," he  says,  "  all  forms  of  it  which  we  can 
know  or  conceive,  must  inevitably  lapse  into  heter- 
ogeneity. In  three  several  ways  does  the  persist- 
ence of  force  necessitate  this.  Setting  external 
agencies  aside,  each  unit  of  a  homogeneous  whole 
must  be  differently  affected  from  any  of  the  rest 
by  the  action  of  the  rest  on  it.  The  resultant  force 
exercised  by  the  aggregate  on  each  unit,  being  in 
no  two  cases  alike  both  in  amount  and  direction, 
and  usually  not  in  either,  any  incident  force,  even 
if  uniform  in  amount  and  direction,  cannot  produce 
like  effects  on  the  units.  And  the  various  posi- 
tions of  the  parts  in  relation  to  any  incident  force 
preventing  them  from  receiving  them  in  uniform 
amounts  and  directions,  a  further  difference  in  the 
effects  wrought  on  them  is  inevitably  produced." l 
If  this  chaos  of  words  has  any  meaning,  it  certainly 
means  that  the  homogeneousness  was  never  homo- 
geneous, for  it  had  separate  units,  and  no  two  of 
the  units  were  in  precisely  the  same  condition.  To 
introduce  differences  he  assumes  that  differences 
already  existed.  There  must  either  have  been  the 
action  of  a  force  from  outside,  or  there  must  have 
been  some  potency  resident  in  the  homogeneous 
mass,  some  activities  which  had  been  there  all  the 

1  First  Principles,  p.  429. 


PROGRESSIVE  REALIZATION  163 

time.  If  there  was  a  force  from  without,  it  must 
have  been  a  purposive  force,  for  it  marked  out  a 
path  in  which  the  chaotic  mass  must  move.  If 
there  were  potencies  within,  the  primitive  nebu- 
losity had  internal  forces  and  qualities  which  de- 
termined the  course  it  should  take,  and  so  it  was 
not  an  incoherent  homogeneity,  after  all.  One 
who  could  have  been  stationed  at  a  point  of  time 
when  there  was  nothing  but  diffused  nebula,  and 
could  have  understood  the  potencies  and  forces 
resident  in  the  primordial  atoms,  would  have  been 
able  to  comprehend  the  next  or  any  succeeding 
change  only  by  perceiving  the  ends  which  those 
forces  would  progressively  realize.  If  science  said 
that  there  is  only  ceaseless  flux  and  reflux,  the  case 
would  be  altogether  different.  Science  does  say 
law  and  order,  and  not  only  that,  but  it  says  also 
progress,  more  highly  organized  existences,  human 
reason  and  conscience.  If  there  were  only  cease- 
less flux  and  reflux,  there  would  be  no  knowledge 
of  it,  for  there  would  be  no  minds  to  observe 
it,  unless  they  already  existed  independent  of 
the  universe.  The  intelligent  observer  is  the  out- 
come of  the  universe  he  observes,  and  must  have 
been  implicit  in  it  as  intelligence  from  the  begin- 
ning. 

These  assumptions  concerning  the  original  state 
have  been  noticed,  not  to  prove  that  the  universe 
was  created  by  God,  but  to  show  that  the  begin- 
nings of  evolution  under  whatever  conditions  (and 
no  antecedent  conditions  of  the  universe  when  it 
was  absolutely  changeless  can  be  conceived)  were 
beginnings  in  a  line  of  progress,  beginnings  which 


164  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

involved  ends,  and  which  can  be  accounted  for- 
only  as  intelligent  purpose  realizing  itself.1 

Thus,  however  the  world  may  be  regarded,  — 
whether  in  its  latest,  in  its  earliest,  or  in  any  inter- 
mediate condition,  —  it  is  intelligible  at  all  only 
as  it  is  seen  to  be  an  evolution  in  the  progressive 
realization  of  ends  or  ideals.  If  intelligence  and 
purpose  are  in  it  at  any  point,  they  are  in  it  at 
every  point.  The  large  correspondence,  then,  of 
evolution  and  ethics  is  found  in  the  fact  that 
each  is  the  progressive  realization  of  an  ideal.  In 
this  view,  it  may  be  admitted  that  ethics  is  one 
phase  of  evolution. 

in 

The  harmony  of  ethics  and  evolution  is  found 
not  only  in  the  whole  movement,  but  more  particu- 
larly in  respect  to  the  self -regarding  and  the  sym- 
pathetic feelings.  It  is  not  claimed  that  the  feel- 
ings of  either  kind  are  precisely  the  same  in  men 
and  in  animals.  Too  much,  I  think,  has  been 
assumed  both  as  to  the  moral  value  and  the  corre- 
spondence even  of  the  social  instincts.  But  the 
sympathetic  feelings  do  work  in  the  same  way,  to 
a  degree,  wherever  they  are  found,  especially  in 
reproduction,  the  care  of  young,  and  the  gregari- 
ousness  of  animal  and  human  societies.  Almost 
all  writers  on  ethics,  without  any  demur,  regard 
the  social  feelings  as  essential  to  virtue,  and  dis- 
cover relations  or  at  least  analogies  of  morality 
in  the  social  instincts  of  animals.  It  is  obvious, 

1  See  the  acute  analysis  made  by  Prof.  James  Iverach  in 
Christianity  and  Evolution,  ch.  1. 


MORALITY  AND  SYMPATHY  165 

however,  that  sympathy  of  itself  has  no  moral 
value,  not  even  in  man.  It  may  be  immoral. 
There  is  such  a  thing  as  mistaken  kindness.  Un- 
willingness to  hurt  the  feelings  of  a  friend  may 
lead  to  the  toleration  of  faults.  Pity  may  shield 
wrong-doers  from  deserved  punishment,  and  clamor 
for  their  release.  It  would  open  all  prison  doors 
indiscriminately  and  let  the  captives  go  free. 
Spoiled  children  are  the  victims  of  indulgent  kind- 
ness. The  hero  of  a  popular  novel,  who  believed 
he  was  a  poet,  persisted  in  his  silly  scribblings, 
and  eventually  suffered  bitter  disappointment  be- 
cause a  friendly  clergyman  lacked  the  courage  to 
disillusionize  him.  The  clergyman  fancied  he 
could  atone  for  the  harm  he  had  done  by  preach- 
ing a  sermon  which  was  severe  on  himself,  from 
the  text,  "The  tender  mercies  of  the  wicked 
are  cruel."  The  exercise  of  pity  is  sometimes 
a  purely  selfish  gratification.  There  are  some 
whose  greatest  happiness  is  to  weep  with  those  that 
weep.  As  experienced  and  successful  comforters 
they  are  aware  of  their  own  importance.  They 
are  instantly  on  the  spot  when  a  neighbor  is  ill, 
and  brush  all  others  aside,  because  they  know  best 
how  to  smooth  a  pillow,  or  soften  the  light,  or 
interpret  symptoms.  They  are  great  at  funerals, 
believing  that  it  is  better  to  go  to  the  house  of 
mourning  than  to  the  house  of  feasting.  Pity  is 
their  strong  point.  They  take  a  melancholy  plea- 
sure in  the  sufferings  of  others.  From  profes- 
sional sympathizers  we  all  may  pray  to  be  de- 
livered. A  frequent  complaint  of  those  who  are 
truly  kind  to  the  poor  is  the  harm  done  by  visitors 


166  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

whose  motive  is  the  exercise  of  a  dilettante  virtue. 
It  is  more  difficult  to  rejoice  with  those  that  do 
rejoice  than  to  weep  with  those  that  weep,  for 
good  fortune  awakens  envy,  but,  as  has  been 
shrewdly  said,  the  misfortunes  of  our  dearest 
friends  give  us  secret  pleasure.  While  there  can 
be  no  real  kindness  to  others  without  sympathy, 
feelings  of  sympathy  have,  in  themselves,  no 
moral  quality.  With  animals,  also,  regard  for 
others  terminates  early.  As  soon  as  the  young 
one  can  take  care  of  itself,  the  mother  cares  for 
it  no  longer.  Eeproduction  and  care  of  offspring 
are  little  more  than  instincts  planted  in  the  physi- 
cal nature  and  needs  of  animals.  Some  animals 
show  more  attachment  for  human  beings  than 
for  their  own  offspring.  Domesticated  creatures 
sometimes  neglect  their  young  to  be  in  the  com- 
pany of  their  masters.  It  cannot  be  known,  how- 
ever, to  what  extent  human  society  has  modified 
the  canine  and  feline  nature.  When,  therefore, 
morality  is  associated  with  the  social  and  sympa- 
thetic feelings,  it  is  not  to  be  identified  with  them, 
but  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  right  direction  of 
those  feelings.  It  is  only  in  this  sense  that  I 
claim  a  relation  and  find  a  harmony  on  that  side. 
As  strong  a  case  could  be  made  out  for  the  perver- 
sion of  the  sympathetic  as  for  the  perversion  of 
the  self -regard  ing  feelings.  And,  if  it  is  correct  to 
find  the  materials,  or  at  least  the  conditions  and 
associations,  of  morality  in  the  other-regarding  im- 
pulses, it  is  equally  correct  to  find  the  materials, 
conditions,  or  associations  of  morality  in  the  self- 
regarding  impulses. 


SELF-ASSERTION  AND  STRUGGLE     167 

IV 

Passing,  then,  to  self-assertion,  we  find  in  it, 
all  the  way  through  sentient  life,  a  correspond- 
ence to,  a  necessary  condition  of,  morality.  We 
also  find  in  it,  as  we  do  in  sympathy,  perver- 
sion and  degeneration.  From  the  perversion  pro- 
ceeds much  of  the  waste,  loss,  and  destruction 
which  are  contrary  to  virtue,  just  as  great  injury 
proceeds  from  misdirected  sympathy. 

In  the  inorganic  realm,  moral  conditions  and 
analogies  do  not  exist.  There  are  no  feelings, 
impulses,  preferences,  pleasures,  or  pains.  It  is 
only  by  accommodation  that  conformity  to  law 
is  characterized  as  obedience.  Disobedience  is 
impossible. 

On  the  lowest  plane  of  life  there  are  no  self- 
regarding  and  social  feelings.  Plants  are  uncon- 
scious. They  do  not  enjoy  or  suffer.  Stamens, 
pistils,  pollen,  seeds,  roots,  branches,  do  their 
work  without  any  thought  or  sensation  of  which 
plants  are  conscious.  There  are  some,  indeed, 
who  attribute  feeling  to  plants  and  trees,  but 
they  do  so  poetically,  projecting  the  feeling  of  the 
lover  of  beauty  into  the  crushed  flower  or  the 
felled  oak.  We  may  be  fond  of  flowers,  but 
there  is  no  evidence  that  they  are  fond  of  us  or  of 
each  other.  There  is,  therefore,  no  problem  con- 
cerning the  waste  and  destruction  of  plants.  Of 
a  hundred  blossoms,  only  one  survives  and  ma- 
tures. But  the  ninety-nine  falling  to  the  ground 
fertilize  the  soil  and  enable  the  survivor  to 
ripen.  Enough  come  to  maturity  to  continue  re- 


168  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

production.  Animals  which  derive  their  suste- 
nance from  plants  are  not  cruel  in  such  daily 
destruction  of  life.  Cattle  browsing  on  the  hill- 
side are  noticed  as  a  pleasing  feature  in  the 
landscape.  Even  those  persons  who  object  to 
the  use  of  animals  as  food,  and  regard  beef-eat- 
ing men  as  little  better  than  cannibals,  make  no 
objection  to  that  destruction  of  life  which  pro- 
vides vegetables  and  bread  for  the  table. 

There  is  no  approach  to  moral  considerations 
until  the  animal  world  is  entered  and  the  suffer- 
ing incident  to  evolution  is  considered.  I  cannot, 
however,  discover  any  moral  problem  in  that 
realm  of  life.  Animals  have  an  instinct  of  self- 
preservation.  There  must  be  exertion  in  order 
to  live.  The  animal  must  eat  and  drink,  and 
must  find  something  to  eat  and  drink.  It  must 
roam  from  place  to  place  in  search  of  food.  This 
is  the  principal  occupation  of  animals.  During 
the  period  of  gestation  the  male  animal  some- 
times brings  food  to  the  female,  and  after  the 
young  are  born  food  is  put  in  their  mouths 
until  they  are  able  to  find  it  themselves.  But 
very  early  they  must  become  self-supporting. 
If  it  were  not  so,  each  animal  would  have  to 
gather  food  for  some  other,  and  some  other  for 
him,  —  a  circuitous  way  of  securing  the  same 
result  as  by  self-exertion.  Life  is  a  good.  Full- 
ness of  life  is  a  good.  It  therefore  must  be 
sought  after,  preserved,  and  enriched  by  the 
efforts  of  every  creature  that  has  life.  The 
waste  and  destruction  which  are  incident  to  the 
self-preservation  of  animals  are  not  to  be  regarded 


SELF-ASSERTION  AND  STRUGGLE     169 

as  having  anything  to  do  with  morality.  It  is 
supposed  that  pain  and  death  are  quite  different 
to  animals  and  to  men.  There  is  no  fear  of 
death,  no  painful  apprehension  of  it,  but  only 
the  momentary  pang.  It  is  possible  that  the 
beasts  of  prey  exercise  something  like  an  hyp- 
notic influence  over  their  victims,  if  we  may 
judge  from  the  quietness  of  the  victim  and  from 
the  sensations  of  explorers  and  keepers  who  have 
been  rescued  at  the  last  instant  from  the  lion's 
paw.  Animals  prey  upon  each  other,  but  com- 
mit no  wrong,  as  carnivorous  man  commits  no 
wrong  in  killing  animals  for  food.  There  is  no 
morality  about  it,  or,  if  there  is  any,  a  plausible 
argument  might  be  made  to  show  that  it  would 
be  immoral  for  the  noble  lion  not  to  slay  and 
eat  inferior  animals.  An  ancient  writer  said 
that  the  young  lions  roar  after  their  prey  and 
seek  their  food  from  God.  The  carnivorous 
animals,  which  have  their  place  in  nature,  are 
provided  for  in  nature's  storehouse.  If  there 
are  lions  there  must  be  lambs.  The  lion  is  the 
final  cause  of  the  lamb.  The  beasts  which  are 
devoured  have  had  their  life  also,  with  its  satis- 
factions, and  may  thank  the  lion  for  a  compara- 
tively painless  death.  It  is  supposed  that  there  is 
but  little  wanton  destruction,  little  killing  for  the 
sake  of  killing.  To  this  there  are  some  exceptions, 
as  with  terriers,  which  will  kill  any  number  of  rats 
let  out  of  a  cage.  But  terriers  have  enjoyed  the 
advantage  of  several  centuries  of  human  civiliza- 
tion. It  is  not  the  death  of  animals,  but  only  their 
premature  death,  that  raises  any  question  concern- 


170  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

ing"  waste  and  loss.     All  animals  are  mortal  and 

o 

must  die  sooner  or  later.  The  death  of  animals 
which  are  food  for  other  animals  is  not  premature, 
provided  enough  survive  for  the  continuance  of  the 
species  by  reproduction.  Unless  Nature  has  made 
a  mistake  in  producing  any  but  herbivorous  ani- 
mals, there  is  no  waste,  except  in  the  case  of  those 
creatures  which  die  by  reason  of  unfavorable  con- 
ditions, that  is,  which  starve  to  death  prematurely. 
And,  although  there  are  no  statistics,  it  may  be 
believed  that  the  amount  of  such  waste  is  not 
enormous.  Nature  is  economical  and  makes  some 
thrifty  use  of  the  unfit  who  do  not  survive. 

There  are  natural  limits  on  reproduction,  which 
should  not  be  overlooked.  Too  large  a  figure  has 
been  given  for  the  proportion  of  non-survivors.  A 
million  to  one  is  a  wild  guess.  The  geometrical 
ratio  of  increase  is  incorrect.  If  a  cat  has  four 
kittens,  and  those  in  turn  sixteen,  and  the  sixteen 
sixty-four,  and  so  on,  the  original  cat  might,  in  her 
lifetime  of  ten  years,  have  1,864,120  lineal  descend- 
ants. But  that  is  on  the  supposition  that  all  are 
females.  If  half  are  males  the  progeny  shrinks  to 
8,144  in  the  ten  years,  and  even  then  all  must 
intermarry.  Some  might  be  sterile,  or  give  birth 
to  only  one  or  two  kittens,  in  which  case  there 
would  be  a  loss  of  numbers.  As  matter  of  fact, 
there  is  no  such  close  interbreeding.  Males  may 
predominate  in  one  family  and  come  over  into 
another  family  for  mates.  Lines  converge.  Num- 
bers increase  slowly  or  not  at  all.  As  with  men, 
so  with  animals,  —  the  species  enlarges  at  a  mod- 
erate rate.  The  ratio  of  increase  is  not  geometri- 


SELF-ASSERTION  AND  STRUGGLE     171 

cal,  and  scarcely  arithmetical.  We  say,  to  be  sure, 
that  certain  animals  multiply  rapidly,  but  it  would 
be  more  nearly  exact  to  speak  of  additions  and 
subtractions.  In  childhood,  one  is  puzzled  by  the 
great  number  of  ancestors,  as  much  as  by  the  pos- 
sible number  of  descendants.  He  has  two  parents, 
four  grandparents,  eight  great-grandparents,  as  he 
may  have  two  children,  four  grandchildren,  and  so 
on.  He  seems  to  be  like  the  central  point  in  an 
hour-glass,  or  like  a  strait  between  two  seas  which 
widen  out  behind  and  before.  But  he  learns  that 
other  children  have  the  same  great-grandparents, 
that  there  have  been  intermarriages,  and  that,  after 
all,  the  generations  run  on  parallel  lines,  that  the 
lines  spread  a  little  in  some  countries  and  periods, 
and  narrow  a  little  in  other  countries  and  periods. 
It  is  like  a  wall  covered  with  paper  in  diamond 
pattern.  The  lines  diverge  and  converge,  yet  the 
figures  are  parallel.  As  to  reproduction  and  in- 
crease of  population,  men  and  animals  are  under 
the  same  laws.  The  comparatively  stationary  num- 
ber of  each  species  is  laid  down  as  a  general  fact 
of  evolution.  There  is  a  normal  proportion,  which 
is  quickly  made  good  if  there  has  been  reduction 
by  exceptional  causes,  but  which  does  not  materi- 
ally increase. 

This  leads  to  the  most  important  consideration 
of  all,  namely,  that  self-preservation  is  of  the  spe- 
cies rather  than  the  individual.  It  is  not  the  case 
that  the  individual  struggles  alone  against  all  com- 
petitors. Competition  for  subsistence  is  between 
groups.  There  is  union  for  self-defence.  There 
are  warnings  against  danger.  There  is  coopera- 


172  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

tion  in  many  respects.  Internal  cohesion  dimin- 
ishes the  strife  between  individuals,  and  therefore 
diminishes  destruction  both  from  within  the  group 
and  from  without.  There  is  not  an  indiscriminate 
struggle  for  existence,  with  survival  of  only  the 
fittest  individuals,  but  a  cooperative  life  which 
reduces  loss  in  proportion  to  the  extent  of  the 
group. 

There  are  other  limitations  on  indefinite  increase 
of  life  which  can  only  be  mentioned ;  such  as  the 
demarcation  of  species  by  intersterility  and  the 
limits  of  sexual  selection  within  the  species.  Vari- 
ations which  give  individuals  advantage  are  no 
longer  held  to  be  indefinite.  Few  variations  per- 
sist, the  tendency  to  reversion  is  so  strong.  The 
centripetal  are  stronger  than  the  centrifugal  forces. 
It  is  not  necessary  for  our  present  purpose  to  con- 
sider all  phases  of  evolution,  but  only  those  which 
pertain  to  the  struggle  for  existence  with  its  waste 
and  destruction.  The  conclusion  is  that  life  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  good,  that  the  effort  to  have  full- 
ness of  life  is  not  immoral  but  is  moral,  if  indeed 
any  moral  quality  or  analogy  can  be  found  in  it, 
that  the  rejection  and  premature  destruction  is  not 
enormous  as  compared  with  the  survivals,  and  that 
reproduction  and  cooperation  are  as  potent  as  self- 
regard.  On  the  whole,  the  conditions  under  which 
the  self-preservation  of  the  individual  and  the  spe- 
cies is  possible  must  be  a  good,  or  there  could  be 
no  progress.  The  value  of  the  life  of  animals  is 
worth  more  than  the  incident  of  loss.  If  the  loss 
were  enormously  greater  than  the  gain,  there  would 
be  retrogression  and  final  cessation  of  life.  I  have 


PERVERSION  INCIDENTAL  173 

dwelt  upon  the  waste  of  animal  life,  because  it  has 
been  identified  with  the  waste  of  human  life  in 
discussions  of  evolution,  and  has  been  made  a  rea- 
son for  putting  ethics  and  evolution  in  antagonism. 


A  relation  of  ethics  to  evolution  exists  only  in 
human  impulses,  sentiments,  and  actions.  All 
that  comes  over  from  animal  life  is  self-regard 
and  sympathy.  These  values  have  a  correspond- 
ence to  similar  sentiments  in  man.  From  them 
the  moral  powers  of  man  may  have  been  derived. 
But  they  have  moral  quality  only  when  directed 
to  self-realization  in  the  worth  of  persons  in  so- 
ciety. 

But  the  self-regard  of  man  is  accompanied  by 
strife,  competition,  waste,  oppression,  and  injustice. 
In  this  respect  the  process  of  his  evolution  is  like 
that  of  animals.  What,  now,  shall  be  concluded 
concerning  the  human  struggle  for  existence  ?  It 
is  obvious  that  with  man,  as  with  animals,  exist- 
ence is  a  good.  What  is  called  the  instinct  of 
self-preservation  is  enough  to  prove  it.  If  it  is 
necessary  it  is  right  to  preserve  life  and  to  have 
the  satisfactions  of  life.  The  effort  required  is 
itself  an  element  of  the  life.  The  effort  to  obtain 
food  gives  appetite  for  it.  Physical  health  and 
strength  are  dependent  on  physical  exertion.  Skill, 
foresight,  intelligence  are  developed  by  self-sup- 
port. The  difficulty  of  sustaining  and  satisfying 
life  develops  the  strong  and  sagacious  man.  It  is 
the  duty  of  every  able-bodied  man  to  take  care  of 
himself.  If  he  is  taken  care  of  by  others,  they 


174  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

must  be  able  to  take  care  of  themselves  and  to 
have  some  surplus  for  the  weak  dependent.  Self- 
support  is  a  primary  good  in  any  stage  of  civiliza- 
tion. This  is  the  truth  of  Professor  W.  G.  Sum- 
ner's  contention  that  the  first  business  and  duty  of 
every  man  is  to  take  care  of  himself.1  The  wisest 
philanthropists  maintain  that  every  healthy  per- 
son should  be  self-supporting,  even  if  altruism 
seems  thereby  to  be  reduced.  Only  the  defective 
and  children  are  to  be  provided  for  by  others. 
While  combined  efforts  are  required  to  provide 
physical  subsistence  and  comfort,  yet  each  should 
bear  his  proportionate  share  in  producing  what  is 
needed.  The  strongest  are  those  who  make  their 
own  way.  When  nature  does  nearly  all  for  man, 
as  in  tropical  climates,  he  is  inferior.  When  na- 
ture is  somewhat  rugged  and  inhospitable,  he  is 
superior.  The  chief  danger  of  socialistic  schemes 
of  industry  and  production  is  the  lack  of  incen- 
tive to  personal  exertion.  The  struggle  for  exist- 
ence is  a  good.  The  existence  is  a  good,  and  the 
struggle  is  a  good.  Man's  mastery  of  nature  at 
the  cost  of  effort  is  for  his  advantage  and  presents 
no  moral  problem.  It  is  only  when,  in  gaining 
subsistence  from  nature,  man  comes  into  conflict 
with  man,  and  inflicts  injury  or  destroys  life,  that 
moral  considerations  appear.  This  conflict  arises 
necessarily  only  if  population  increases  more  rap- 
idly than  the  means  of  subsistence.  I  shall  not 
discuss  the  Malthusian  theory  that  population  in- 
creases in  a  geometrical  ratio  and  subsistence  only 
in  an  arithmetical  ratio,  and  that,  were  it  not  for 

1  What  Social  Classes  owe  to  each  other,  p.  113. 


PERVERSION  INCIDENTAL  175 

famines,  wars,  vice,  and  crime,  within  a  century 
the  globe  could  not  sustain  its  population.  There 
are  various  conditions  which  limit  the  increase  of 
population,  and,  as  wars,  vices  and  crimes  dimin- 
ish, there  is  a  lower  rate  of  increase.  In  civilized 
countries,  the  number  of  children  in  a  family  is 
not  greater,  as  a  rule,  than  can  be  properly  reared 
and  educated.  The  reduction  in  number  may  be 
carried  too  far,  either  from  an  artifical  standard 
of  luxury,  or  from  unwillingness  to  sacrifice  social 
enjoyment  to  the  bearing  and  rearing  of  children. 
But,  on  the  whole,  what  is  true  of  the  animal 
orders  is  true  of  the  human  species,  namely,  a  sta- 
tionary or  slowly  increasing  number,  determined 
by  adjustment  to  environment.  This  is  the  rule  on 
all  planes  of  life  which  are  above  the  savage  plane. 
And  savages  do  not  usually  wage  wars  of  extermi- 
nation or  decimation  because  there  is  lack  of  sub- 
sistence, but  by  reason  of  ancient  feuds  and  love  of 
conquest.  It  is  very  much  to  be  doubted  whether 
strife  and  destruction  are  necessary  on  account  of 
insufficient  subsistence.  If  they  are  inevitable  on 
the  lower  savage  plane,  they  are  not  immoral.  If 
they  are  not  inevitable,  but  are  due  to  abnormal 
self-regard  and  misdirected  regard  for  the  social 
group,  they  are  obviously  a  perversion,  which  is  to 
be  estimated  in  view  of  that  moral  education  which 
proceeds  partly  by  experience  of  the  evils  suffered, 
and  which  constitutes  progress.  I  do  not  deny 
that  the  pressure  of  numbers  on  subsistence  may 
be  severe.  But  the  savage  learns  that  there  is 
scarcity  only  at  certain  seasons  of  the  year,  and 
lays  by  him  in  store  from  the  season  of  abundance. 


'U1I71RSI1 


176  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

By  the  exercise  of  forethought  he  passes  from  hunt- 
ing to  grazing,  and  from  grazing  to  agriculture 
and  manufactures  and  commerce.  He  exchanges 
products  with  the  tribes  he  had  been  trying  to 
destroy.  He  passes  from  war  to  work,  and  thus 
makes  the  first  great  advance  towards  civilization. 
Pressure  on  subsistence  also  stimulates  inventive- 
ness, according  to  the  law  that  necessity  is  the 
mother  of  invention.  Thus  the  fecundity  of  na- 
ture is  increased  a  hundred-fold,  until  over-pro- 
duction becomes  a  worse  economic  evil  than  over- 
population. It  is  a  singular  commentary  on  the 
prediction  of  Malthus  that  at  the  present  time,  to 
which  he  looked  forward  with  gloomy  forebodings 
in  the  prospect  of  multiplied  consumers,  the  serious 
economic  problem  is  the  restriction  of  production 
rather  than  the  restriction  of  population. 

The  conflict  of  man  with  man  is,  in  the  main,  a 
perversion.  The  sympathetic  and  humane  senti- 
ments rebel  against  it,  at  least  within  the  limits 
of  a  social  group.  The  social  group  enlarges  by 
confederations,  by  defensive  alliances,  by  natural 
boundaries  of  territory,  by  the  rise  and  growth  of 
nations,  until  the  sentiment  of  humaneness  finds 
its  correspondence  in  the  entire  extent  of  actual 
humanity.  The  conflicts  of  man  with  man  have, 
however,  developed  power.  Not  seldom  even  the 
vanquished  have  gained  by  defeat,  and  the  victors 
have  assimilated  the  intelligence,  vigor,  and  civi- 
lization of  the  people  whom  they  have  defeated  in 
war,  and  in  whose  territory  they  have  settled. 
Such  was  the  case  when  the  Goths  invaded  Italy, 
and  when  the  Normans  conquered  the  Saxons. 


THE  HIGHER    VALUES  177 

The  war  between  Japan  and  China  has  made  both 
nations  stronger,  and  advanced  both  towards  the 
rank  of  great  powers  of  the  first  class.  The  con- 
clusions reached  at  this  point  are  two  :  that  there 
has  been  thus  far  sufficient  subsistence  for  the  pop- 
ulation of  the  globe  if  foresight,  industry,  and  in- 
ventiveness are  exercised ;  and  that  man's  conflict 
with  his  fellow-man  is  moral  perversion,  dimly  or 
clearly  recognized  as  such,  but  which  nevertheless 
has  been  attended  with  some  advantage  in  devel- 
oped power,  and  in  the  mingling  of  races  to  form 
the  most  vigorous  nations.  It  need  not  be  added 
that  wars  which  have  turned  on  moral  issues  may 
have  sufficient  justification,  —  wars  against  injus- 
tice, oppression  and  slavery,  wars  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  a  nation. 

VI 

The  tendency  of  man's  self-seeking  in  society  is 
to  desire  those  values  which  are  higher  than  the 
material.  He  sees  that  what  he  gains  by  taking 
from  others  is  on  the  lower  plane.  He  perceives 
the  value  of  the  higher,  only,  it  may  be,  by  having 
the  lower  and  finding  it  is  not  enough.  Possibly 
he  must  have  this  experience  in  order  to  value  the 
higher.  He  at  least  sees  that,  by  grasping  vio- 
lently or  deceitfully  from  others,  he  impairs  or  de- 
stroys the  sources  from  which  he  draws,  and  also 
the  sources,  in  companionship,  of  his  deeper  satis- 
factions. If  his  hand  is  against  every  man,  soon 
every  man's  hand  will  be  against  him.  The  higher 
goods  are  valued.  Thus  society,  even  while  the 
majority  are  intent  on  physical  and  material  grati- 
fication, is  dissatisfied,  and  condemns  the  pursuit 


178  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

of  wealth  in  comparison  with  knowledge,  truth, 
culture,  the  home,  the  State.  Some  such  advance 
is  made.  If  it  is  not  made,  there  is  no  progress 
in  civilization.  But  the  advance  is  not  the  substi- 
tution of  altruism  for  selfishness.  It  is  substitu- 
tion of  the  higher  for  the  lower  self-realization.  It 
is  probable  that  the  perception  of  the  higher  is 
never  wholly  absent.  The  interest  of  savages  in 
nature  and  their  interpretation  of  it,  their  rude 
artistic  designs,  their  religious  practices,  the  sacred- 
ness  of  hospitality,  the  veneration  of  chiefs  and  of 
ancestors,  are  proof  enough  that  their  thoughts  are 
not  exclusively  occupied  with  feasting. 

So  much  of  waste  and  premature  death  as  occurs 
belongs  to  the  lower  stages  of  savagery,  while  life 
is  not  yet  valued.  It  is  in  part  perversion,  which 
the  savage  knows  to  be  wrong,  and  which  he  learns 
to  condemn  and  avoid.  The  value  of  life,  in  the 
group  to  which  he  belongs,  is  perceived.  The  life 
of  one  of  his  own  family  or  tribe  is  worth  as  much  as 
his  own.  A  rude  justice  is  meted  out  to  those  who 
slay  any  of  their  own  tribe.  Refuge  is  provided 
for  one  who  by  accident  has  killed  another.  The 
whole  kin  is  held  responsible  for  death  inflicted  or 
suffered.  Rights  of  property  and  of  the  family 
are  defended.  Distinctions  of  right  and  wrong 
become  more  clear.  The  wrong  is  that  which  is 
injurious  to  persons,  that  which,  by  the  analogies 
of  evolution,  may  be  regarded  as  reversion  or  per- 
version. The  circle  of  those  who  may  not  be  in- 
jured widens  as  tribes  unite  in  the  nation,  and 
finally  extends  to  mankind.  Whatever  amount  of 
destruction  there  may  be  in  the  lower  conditions 


THE  HIGHER   VALUES  179 

of  society,  the  tendency  is  away  from  it  as  civili- 
zation advances.  The  inferior  and  weak  are  pre- 
served and  protected.  Even  when  civilized  na- 
tions declare  war,  they  do  so  reluctantly,  they  pro- 
fess to  desire  peace,  and  find  it  necessary  to  show 
sufficient  justification.  There  is  increasing  regard 
for  the  higher  values  of  industrial  prosperity,  of 
good  and  honest  government,  of  the  family,  of 
knowledge,  culture,  art,  letters,  and  character ; 
values  which  are  attained  by  cooperation  rather 
than  by  competition.  I  should  think  no  one  can 
doubt  that  the  tendency  is  to  the  reduction  and 
cessation  of  waste,  destruction,  and  oppression. 

A  distressing  picture  can  indeed  be  drawn  of 
the  evils  which  proceed  from  greed  of  gain,  from 
unbridled  competition,  from  selfish  ambition,  from 
intemperance  and  lust ;  evils  which  infest  domes- 
tic, economic,  and  political  life.  But  also  a  pic- 
ture can  be  drawn  which  shows  enormous  improve- 
ment in  the  condition  of  laborers,  in  the  better 
government  of  civilized  countries,  in  the  education 
of  the  masses,  in  the  spirit  of  philanthropy  which 
knows  neither  national  nor  social  limits,  and  above 
all  in  the  loud  and  insistent  protest  against  the 
evils  from  which  society  suffers.  A  few  years  ago 
Mr.  Spencer  and  Sir  Frederic  Harrison  attempted 
to  paint  the  two  pictures.  Mr.  Harrison  had  de- 
rided Mr.  Spencer's  religion,  which  is  the  worship 
of  the  Great  Unknowable.  He  suggested  that  for 
such  an  object  of  worship  some  algebraic  symbol 
for  an  unknown  quantity  might  as  well  be  em- 
ployed, for  example,  xn.  He  contended  that  hu- 
manity is  the  only  proper  object  of  service  and 


180  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

reverence  ;  the  Grand  Eire,  of  Comte.  He  de- 
picted in  glowing  colors  the  beauty,  nobleness, 
and  greatness  of  humanity.  Mr.  Spencer  retorted 
with  a  representation  of  actual  humanity  in  such 
a  country  as  England,  with  its  crime,  greed,  lust, 
suffering,  beggary,  injustice,  and  derided  a  reli- 
gion which  has  no  better  object  than  weak,  selfish, 
coarse,  and  wicked  humanity.  Mr.  Harrison's  pic- 
ture was  an  idealization.  Mr.  Spencer's  picture 
was  a  horrid  caricature.  Both  were  wrong  and 
both  were  right.  But  there  is  hope  for  society  so 
long  as  it  can  produce  men  who  protest  so  vigo- 
rously as  Mr.  Spencer  protests.  The  power  to 
perceive  that  wickedness  and  misery  are  bad  is 
a  power  for  deliverance.  Evil  does  not  fully  tri- 
umph till  it  is  approved  and  praised  and  flattered. 
In  his  rational  moods,  Mr.  Spencer  allows  no  one 
to  surpass  him  in  the  advantageous  comparison 
of  civilized  with  savage  life.  When  he  came  to 
himself  he  tried  to  suppress  his  part  of  the  con- 
troversy with  Mr.  Harrison. 

There  is,  then,  an  ideal  humanity  towards 
which  actual  humanity  is,  and  has  long  been,  tend- 
ing. There  is  moral  progress  which  conserves  and 
enriches  the  life  even  of  the  weak  and  inferior. 
The  number  of  individuals  who  seek  the  higher 
good  increases.  Some  individuals  may  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  good  itself  to  promote  base  and 
selfish  ends,  may  take  advantage  of  security  of 
property  and  safety  of  person  to  carry  out  illegiti- 
mate schemes.  Here  is  the  truth  of  Mr.  Kidd's 
representations  of  selfishness.  But  it  is  not  con- 
scious individuals  against  unconscious  society.  It 


THE  TWO-FOLD  RELATION  181 

is  some  individuals  in  contrast  with  other  individ- 
uals. In  the  last  analysis  there  is  the  individual 
himself  preferring  the  higher  to  the  lower  good. 

VII 

I  have  granted,  or  rather,  have  accepted,  all 
that  evolution  claims,  so  far  as  I  understand  it. 
Self-preservation  with  its  struggle  and  survival, 
and  the  preservation  of  species  through  reproduc- 
tion and  cohesion,  furnish  the  only  possible  rela- 
tion to  the  moral  nature  and  progress  of  man. 
The  waste  and  destruction  of  animal  life  are  the 
incidents  of  a  real  good,  and,  however  extensive 
they  may  be,  involve  no  moral  considerations.  At 
the  most,  the  self-regard  and  the  sympathy  of  ani- 
mals are  no  more  than  analogies  or  precedent  con- 
ditions of  the  morality  of  man.  Man  is  another 
kind  of  creature.  His  distinction  is  found  in  his 
recognition  of  the  relative  worth  of  the  higher  and 
lower  goods  of  persons.  Morality  appears  when 
man  appears.  It  is  a  variation  which  amounts  to 
an  essential  differentiation.  Man  can  compare 
and  choose  moral  values.  And  he  does  not  first 
preserve  and  develop  himself  by  simple  self-regard, 
which  is  afterwards  succeeded  by  social  depend- 
ence and  services.  He  is  not  first  selfish  as  a 
non-moral  or  an  immoral  being,  and  then  made 
moral  by  the  altruism  which  subdues  selfishness. 
Both  self-regard  and  regard  for  others  are  operant 
from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  life,  and,  for 
that  matter,  are  concurrently  operant  in  animals 
as  well  as  in  men. 

In  the  case  of   mankind,  there  is,  throughout, 


182  ETHICS  AND  EVOLUTION 

the  lower  self  and  the  higher  self,  the  lower  society 
and  the  higher  society.  Even  when  all  are  chiefly 
intent  on  the  lower  goods,  there  is  cooperation  as 
well  as  selfishness.  The  progress  of  individuals 
consists  in  the  realization  of  the  higher  rather 
than  of  the  lower  self.  The  progress  of  society  is 
the  same  thing,  for  society  is  simply  and  only  the 
persons  who  compose  it.  Man's  perversion  is  the 
supremacy  of  the  lower,  which  is  selfishness.  Con- 
cerning this  I  shall  have  something  to  say  in  the 
chapter  on  personal  degeneration.  Man's  salva- 
tion is  the  supremacy  of  the  higher,  in  which  is 
his  self-realization,  his  self-perfection.  Concerning 
this  I  shall  have  something  to  say  in  the  chapters 
on  personal  and  social  regeneration.  The  Chris- 
tian doctrines  of  sin  and  regeneration  designate 
important  facts  pertaining  to  the  moral  condition 
of  man.  The  doctrine  of  sin  has  a  counterpart  in 
reversion,  which  is  always  implied  in  the  selection 
and  survival  of  evolution,  —  the  selection  which 
involves  rejection,  the  survival  of  the  fittest  which 
involves  at  least  the  existence  of  that  which  is  un- 
fit. The  doctrine  of  regeneration  has  a  counter- 
part in  the  survival  of  the  strong  and  the  progress 
of  the  race.  On  any  theory,  the  waste,  failure, 
and  loss  of  life  presents  a  difficult  problem,  a  pro- 
blem which  is  insoluble,  except  as  it  is  found  that 
there  is  progress  on  the  whole.  On  any  theory 
also,  the  existence  of  sin,  with  its  disease,  suffer- 
ing, and  cruelty,  presents  a  difficult  problem,  a 
problem  which  is  insoluble,  except  as  it  is  found 
that  there  is  power  of  recovery  and  moral  health 
for  the  individual  and  power  of  moral  progress  for 


THE  TWO-FOLD  RELATION  183 

society.  Both  evolution  and  ethics  admit  perver- 
sion and  reversion.  Both  find  that,  in  spite  of 
failure  and  loss,  men  in  society  move  along  an  up- 
ward path.  In  view  of  the  large  correspondences 
which  have  been  recognized,  it  may  be  confidently 
maintained  that  ethics  is  not  opposed  to  evolution 
in  any  sort  of  antagonism,  nor  insulated  from  it  in 
any  sort  of  independence,  nor  identified  with  it  as 
if  man  had  no  distinctive  character,  but  is  harmo- 
nious with  it  through  man's  realization  of  the  good 
in  that  freedom  which  is  perfect  obedience  to  per- 
fect law. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

MORALITY    AND    RELIGION 

MORALITY  may  properly  enough  be  regarded  as 
the  outcome  of  a  prolonged  process.  If  it  is  so 
regarded,  the  process  is  seen  to  issue  in  a  self- 
conscious,  intelligent  being  who  comprehends  the 
universe  in  its  laws  and  development,  a  being  who 
has  ideals  which  are  obligatory,  a  being  who  is 
related  to  other  beings  like  himself  in  reciprocity 
of  rights  and  duties.  Either  the  variations  which 
appeared  at  points  of  advance  were  new  movements 
introduced  from  some  source  other  than  the  uni- 
verse, or  all  the  differentiations,  physical,  psychi- 
cal, and  moral,  were  present  potentially  within  the 
universe.  In  either  case,  the  universe  now  contains 
man,  such  as  he  is  in  bodily,  intellectual,  and 
moral  constitution,  and  in  organic  relation  with  his 
fellow-men.  This  outcome  of  the  process  implies 
the  purpose  inherent  in  the  process.  Evolution, 
culminating  in  man,  in  rational,  moral,  social  man, 
is  not  a  blind  and  purposeless,  but  an  intelli- 
gent and  purposive  process.  The  outcome  cannot 
otherwise  be  understood.  That  which  is  implicit 
all  along,  in  the  lowest  as  in  the  highest  stages, 
becomes  explicit  to  reflection  as  the  purpose  which 
finds  its  highest  realization  in  man.  In  other 
words,  the  universe  with  all  that  is  in  it  implies 
God.  A  divine  element  is  in  all  the  evolution 


REASON  IN  THE  UNIVERSE     185 

which,  on  the  earth,  issues  in  humanity.  There- 
fore morality  has  a  relation  to  religion.  This  rela- 
tion is  involved  in  the  very  existence  of  morality 
as  the  completion  of  an  ascending  evolution,  and 
is  direct  in  the  close  connection  which  has  always 
obtained  between  practical  morality  and  religious 
belief.  We  pass  therefore  to  the  consideration 
of  this  relation.  Several  lines  will  be  followed, 
although  all  of  them,  the  implicit  and  the  explicit, 
converge  into  one  line  and  arrive  at  one  conclu- 
sion. 

I 

The  evidence  of  purpose  in  the  universe  must 
first  be  considered.  It  is  seen  that  the  entire 
process  of  evolution,  up  to  and  including  man,  is 
the  realized  purpose  of  reason.  There  is  thought 
in  the  universe,  which  we  did  not  put  into  it,  but 
which  we  find  in  it.  That  which  our  thought  per- 
ceives and  understands  is  itself  thought.  There  is 
correspondence  of  mind  with  mind.  Over  fixed 
points  already  in  line,  prediction  sights  along 
the  range  of  law  and  foresees  the  coming  event. 
Mathematical  laws  worked  out  in  intellectual  soli- 
tude are  traced  objectively  in  the  orbits  of  the 
planets.  The  moment  of  an  eclipse  is  foretold. 
The  discovery  of  a  planet  is  prophesied.  The 
world  is  understandable.  That  which  is  intelligi- 
ble has  intelligence  in  it.  The  theory  has  been 
advanced  that  our  thought  is  merely  the  inner  side 
of  things  in  necessary  correspondence  with  the  im- 
pressions made  from  without,  like  the  inverse  and 
obverse  sides  of  an  embossed  plate.  But,  if  thought 
is  the  concave  side  of  the  convex  universe,  the 


186  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

concave  is  intelligence  and  so  the  convex  must  be 
intelligence.  Man  did  not  create  either  side  of 
the  shield.  Man  himself  is  part  of  the  universe, 
the  highest  part,  and  he  is  intelligent,  hence  the 
whole  must  be  intelligence.  I  will  not  traverse 
the  theories  of  subjective  creating  its  own  objective, 
of  appearance  and  reality,  of  things  as  they  seem 
and  things  in  themselves,  of  phenomenon  and  nou- 
menon.  It  is  enough  to  say  that  every  argument 
against  the  trustworthiness  of  thought  assumes  the 
validity  of  the  argument.  The  doubter  assumes 
some  intellectual  premises  which  cannot  be  doubted. 
Otherwise  he  could  not  argue  at  all.  And  every 
argument  against  the  reality  of  an  intelligible 
universe  assumes  the  existence  of  something  which 
occasions  thought.  The  proof  that  reality  is  dif- 
ferent from  appearance  assumes  that  there  is  the 
appearance  which  is  perceived  and  discussed.  The 
appearance  is  real,  is  not  the  thinker's  creation,  and 
is  the  appearance  of  law,  order,  thought,  intelli- 
gence. If  man  is  indeed  a  product  into  which  the 
forces  of  the  universe  have  entered,  if  he  cannot 
be  separated  from  the  whole  process,  then  there 
must  have  been  intelligence  all  the  way  through. 
The  longer,  more  continuous,  and  more  intimately 
related  the  process  is  believed  to  be,  the  greater, 
not  the  less,  reason  there  is  for  finding  thought  in 
it.  If  the  primordial  atoms  contained  all,  they 
must  have  been  highly  endowed  atoms.  What  is 
taken  out  of  atoms  —  chemical,  organic,  human 
potencies  —  has  to  be  put  into  them  beforehand. 
Materialists,  who  claim  that  matter  alone  is  the 
potency  of  all  that  is,  have  been  obliged  to  charge 


REASON  IN  THE  UNIVERSE     187 

the  atoms  more  and  more  highly  and  variously. 
Dr.  Mar-tineau,  in  his  address  on  Eeligion  and 
Materialism,  signalizes  this  increased  investiture 
of  original  elements  :  "  But  surely  you  must  ob- 
serve how  this  '  Matter  '  of  yours  alters  its  style 
with  every  change  of  service  :  starting  as  a  beggar, 
with  scarce  a  rag  of  '  property '  to  cover  its  bones, 
it  turns  up  as  a  Prince,  when  larger  undertakings 
are  wanted,  loaded  with  investments,  and  within 
an  inch  of  a  plenipotentiary.  .  .  .  You  deposit  at 
your  bank  a  round  sum  ere  you  start ;  and,  draw- 
ing on  it  piecemeal  at  every  pause,  complete  your 
grand  tour  without  a  debt.  .  .  .  Such  extremely 
clever  Matter  —  Matter  that  is  up  to  everything, 
even  to  writing  '  Hamlet,'  and  finding  out  its  own 
evolution,  and  substituting  a  molecular  plebiscite 
for  a  divine  monarchy  of  the  world,  may  fairly  be 
regarded  as  a  little  too  modest  in  its  disclaimer  of 
the  attributes  of  Mind."  A  tree  comes  from  a 
seed,  but  there  must  be  that  mysterious  potential- 
ity, a  tree-seed,  to  start  with.  A  wooden  peg, 
whittled  into  exact  resemblance  to  a  seed,  would 
rot  in  the  ground. 

If  the  existence,  much  more  the  progressive  evo- 
lution of  the  universe  signifies  thought."  Progress 
means  purpose.  Advance  from  lower  and  simpler 
to  higher  and  more  complicated  organisms,  from 
inanimate  to  animate,  from  instinct  to  self -con- 
sciousness and  choice,  from  brute  to  man,  from 
cave-dweller  to  city-builder,  from  barbarism  to 
culture,  is  purposive  advance  in  the  adaptation  of 
means  to  end.  Plan  means  intelligence.  Although 
design  in  itself  does  not  demonstrate  the  existence 


188  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

of  the  Absolute  and  Eternal  God,  it  does  find  the 
element  of  thought  coextensive  with  the  universe, 
in  which  no  part  is  separate  from  any  other  part. 
The  yellow  primrose  on  the  river's  brim  is  an  ex- 
pression of  the  cosmic  forces  of  heat,  light,  gravi- 
tation, chemical  affinity.  To  know  the  flower  in 
the  crannied  wall,  root  and  all,  and  all  in  all,  is  to 
know  God  and  man.  When  design  in  organism 
was  likened  to  human  design  shaping  materials 
already  given,  and  God  was  thought  of  as  an  ex- 
ternal artificer,  the  teleological  argument  was  not 
conclusive.  But  when  organism  takes  the  place 
of  mechanism,  when  design  is  found  in  the  very 
texture  of  things  —  the  whole  fabric  weaving  out 
a  pattern  in  the  roaring  loom  of  time  —  then  the 
thought  expressed  in  purpose  is  seen  to  be  as  ab- 
solute as  the  universe  itself,  to  the  origination  of 
which  imagination  cannot  go  back,  nor  to  its  ces- 
sation go  forwards. 

Force  itself,  ever  energizing,  is  of  God.  Force, 
which  is  ever  evolving  into  forms,  which  is  not 
mere  sequence,  but  power  and  life  throbbing  in 
every  atom,  in  every  wave  of  light  and  heat,  in 
magnetic  polarity,  is  known  to  us  by  the  power 
which  we  exert  and  direct,  and  so  we  conclude 
that  the  never-resting  and  undiininished  resident 
forces  of  nature  come  forth  from  the  eternal  Will 
directed  by  the  eternal  Reason. 

Science  cannot  crowd  religion  out.  It  cannot, 
indeed,  get  on  without  religion,  unless  it  confines 
itself  to  the  mere  classification  of  phenomena.  Its 
every  postulate,  of  cause  as  universal  and  neces- 
sary, of  primordial  atoms  with  potencies,  of  motion 


THE  MORAL   ORDER   OF  HISTORY      189 

imparted  to  inert  matter,  of  what  must  be  in  what 
is,  of  the  universal  in  the  particular,  of  progress 
from  lower  to  higher,  is  assumption  of  the  Absolute 
and  Eternal. 

It  is  not  even  true  that  science  and  religion  have 
distinct  provinces.  They  are  only  different  modes 
of  viewing  the  same  facts.  Nature  and  man  are 
the  province  of  both.  Science  knows  them  in 
themselves.  Eeligion  knows  God  in  and  through 
them.  Nor  does  science  pertain  to  intellect  and  re- 
ligion to  feeling.  Nature  awakens  feelings  of  won- 
der and  beauty.  There  is  no  emotionless  science. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  God  who  is  revered, 
worshiped,  and  loved  must  be  known  in  his  works 
and  ways,  that  religion  may  be  more  than  super- 
stition. An  unknown  God,  whom  men  ignorantly 
worship,  is  no  God  at  all.  Such  worshipers,  even 
on  Mars  Hill,  need  an  apostle  to  declare  the  true 
God  unto  them.  If,  now,  the  universe  signifies 
God,  that  which  is  highest  and  best  in  the  uni- 
verse, namely,  man,  with  his  reason,  his  moral 
ideals,  and  his  character,  must  be  closely  related 
to  the  God  he  has  discovered.  Morality  is  insep- 
arable from  religion.  Although  an  individual  may 
be  moral,  in  some  respects,  without  having  personal 
piety,  yet  even  so,  as  we  shall  see,  his  morality 
is  not  religionless.  We  proceed,  therefore,  to  the 
moral  customs  and  the  moral  nature  of  man  in  their 
relation  to  divine  purpose. 

II 

We  observe,  first,  that  there  is  a  moral  order  in 
history,  and  that  this  order  realizes  a  purpose 


190  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

which  lies  beneath  the  plans  of  individuals  and 
nations,  a  purpose,  therefore,  which  is  divine.  As 
the  course  of  history  is  followed,  it  is  seen  pro- 
ceeding on  moral  lines.  The  philosophy  of  history 
traces  intellectual  advancement  in  widening  know- 
ledge, especially  in  discovery  of  nature's  secrets,  by 
which  man  obtains  mastery  of  her  forces.  But 
knowledge  alone  is  not  progress.  To  travel  swiftly, 
to  communicate  at  a  distance  instantaneously,  to 
shape  iron,  to  weave  cloth,  to  produce  food  in 
abundance,  is  merely  to  have  tools.  These  may 
contribute  to,  but  do  not  constitute,  progress.  They 
may  impede  it,  by  ministering  to  luxurious,  effem- 
inate, and  vicious  tastes.  What  use  does  clever 
man  make  of  his  sharpened  tools  ?  What  does  he 
become  in  character?  The  story  of  witty  inven- 
tions is  a  superficial  philosophy  of  history.  Curi- 
osity asks  how  the  blocks  of  the  Pyramids  were 
raised  to  their  places.  Ingenuity  endeavors  to  re- 
produce the  lost  arts.  But  the  estimate  of  history 
is  directed  to  the  ancient  Egyptians  themselves, 
and,  in  view  of  slavery,  terrorism,  and  the  cheap- 
ness of  human  lives,  pronounces  on  their  civiliza- 
tion the  verdict  of  decadence.  Inner  decay  shows 
all  the  darker  against  the  splendid  monuments. 
Egyptian  art  embalmed  dead  civilization  and  mum- 
mies together,  exposing  to  later  times  the  arrested 
decay.  The  remains  of  old  Egypt  are  a  magnifi- 
cient  mausoleum.  When  Babylon  and  Nineveh 
were  in  their  glory  of  gorgeous  palaces  and  majes- 
tic temples,  were  circumvallated  in  mile  after  mile 
of  walls,  ramparts,  and  towers,  were  defended  by 
vast  armies  and  fed  by  a  million  slaves,  were  full 


THE  MORAL   ORDER   OF  HISTORY      191 

of  pomp,  were  the  envy  and  the  dread  of  the  sur- 
rounding nations,  the  Hebrew  prophet  foresaw 
their  downfall  and  cried,  "  Woe  to  Babylon,"  "  Woe 
to  Assyria."  He  saw  that  the  elements  of  decay 
were  fast  undermining  that  civilization  built  on 
oppression  and  vice,  and  that  it  was  crumbling 
to  the  ruin  of  inevitable  and  crushing  downfall. 
He  was  the  first  to  see  and  to  proclaim  that  the 
old  East  was  dead.  A  later  prophet  declared  of 
the  new  Babylon,  seated  on  her  seven  hills,  filling 
up  the  measure  of  her  iniquities,  that  she  is  dead 
while  she  liveth.  History  judges  ancient  civiliza- 
tions by  a  moral  standard.  When,  in  contrast,  in- 
stitutions, laws,  customs,  life,  deserve  favorable 
judgment,  it  is  because  men  are  equal  in  rights, 
obedient  to  law,  patriotic,  independent.  Perma- 
nent and  progressive  civilization  preserves  equity, 
maintains  justice,  promotes  freedom,  cultivates  in- 
telligence. It  has  the  moral  values.  When  pro- 
gress can  be  traced,  landmarks  are  recognized  in 
transition  out  of  slavery,  out  of  feudalism,  out  of 
autocracy,  oligarchy,  aristocracy,  towards  and  into 
democracy. 

The  moral  order,  as  observed  in  history,  is  a  divine 
order,  for  it  is  above  the  purpose  of  this  or  that 
individual,  above  the  purpose  of  any  single  genera- 
tion. It  is  a  common  saying  that  we  are  too  near 
to  understand  the  movement  of  our  own  times. 
We  surmise  it  in  part,  but  only  in  part.  Looking 
back  a  century  or  more,  we  see  the  peoples  emer- 
ging into  liberty.  The  change  is  distinct.  But  we 
also  see  that  few  at  the  time  knew  what  was  happen- 
ing, while  the  many  were  only  aware  of  vague  dis- 


192  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

content,  or  were  only  trying  to  throw  off  a  single 
form  of  injustice.  Sometimes  we  say  that  we  are 
in  the  midst  of  a  movement  which  in  later  times  will 
be  regarded  as  more  significant  than  any  of  the  po- 
litical and  social  changes  of  the  past.  But  we  must 
at  the  same  time  admit  that  we  can  make  no  clear 
forecast  of  the  actual  changes  which  will  occur. 
We  have  such  expectation  by  comparison  of  nine- 
teenth-century symptoms  with  eighteenth-century 
symptoms,  rather  than  by  unmistakable  interpre- 
tation of  the  signs  which  hang  in  our  sky.  A  pro- 
phet may  be  without  honor  in  his  own  country,  but 
in  his  own  time  he  has  more  honor  than  in  sub- 
sequent times.  The  most  astute  statesmen  have 
been  woefully  mistaken  in  their  forecast  of  political 
changes.  Their  predictions  have  been  falsified  in 
their  own  lifetime.  Mr.  Pearson,  in  "  National  Life 
and  Character,"  a  book  which  he  calls  a  Forecast, 
has  brought  together  several  striking  instances  of 
false  prophecy.  He  speaks  of  Burke's  prediction, 
in  1793,  that  France  would  be  partitioned,  like 
Poland,  among  a  confederacy  of  hostile  powers ; 
of  Canning's  expectation  that  the  South  American 
colonies  would  grow  up  as  the  United  States  had 
grown ;  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington's  remark  in  1832 
that  "  few  people  will  be  sanguine  enough  to  imag- 
ine that  we  shall  ever  again  be  as  prosperous  as  we 
have  been ;  "  of  the  opinion  generally  entertained 
in  England  that  the  Southern  Confederacy  would 
become  an  independent  American  nation.  Mr. 
Pearson,  after  mentioning  several  prophecies  that 
have  been  verified,  —  as  Lord  Chesterfield's  and 
Goldsmith's,  thirty  years  before  the  event,  of  the 


THE  MORAL   ORDER   OF  HISTORY      193 

French  Revolution ;  De  Tocqueville's,  also  thirty 
years  before  the  civil  war  in  this  country,  that  the 
Southern  States  were  the  one  part  of  the  Ameri- 
can Union  in  which  disruption  was  likely  to  be  at- 
tempted ;  and  Alexander  Hamilton's,  that  London 
and  New  York  would  become  the  chief  commercial 
emporia  of  the  world,  —  suggests  that  correct  pro- 
phecies have  pointed  to  remote,  incorrect  prophe- 
cies to  near  events,  and  concludes  that  the  power  of 
divination  concerns  itself  with  general  laws  which 
are  not  controlled  by  legislation,  and  which  are 
more  easily  recognized,  rather  than  with  the  practi- 
cal and  conflicting  interests  of  the  present.  A  re- 
cent instance  of  mistaken  prediction  is  found  in 
the  general  expectation  that,  after  the  first  skir- 
mishes, China  would  crush  Japan.  There  may  be 
a  manifest  destiny  of  nations,  but  it  is  more  mani- 
fest in  retrospect  than  in  prospect.  Progress,  then, 
is  made.  On  the  long  ranges  of  history  it  can  be 
clearly  discerned.  As  we  peer  into  the  future  it 
can  only  be  surmised.  There  is  a  purpose  which 
takes  up  our  efforts  into  it.  It  is  best  understood 
as  a  divine  purpose  partly  disclosed,  partly  con- 
cealed. The  master-builder  knows  better  than  the 
workmen  know  the  plan  of  the  edifice  they  are 
erecting.  But  as  it  rises  under  their  hands,  imagina- 
tion can  anticipate  the  completed  structure.  The 
progress  of  the  world,  be  it  dimly  seen  or  clearly 
seen,  is  in  the  line  of  the  moral  order  of  society.  It 
is  this  divine  ordering  of  progress  upon  which  Mr. 
Kidd  has  fastened.  That  ordering  is  larger  than 
our  plans  and  efforts.  It  is  not  fully  understood 
by  us,  as  the  soldier  does  not  fully  understand  the 


194  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

plan  of  battle.  But  it  is  not,  as  he  mistakenly 
argues,  against  our  reason.  It  is  rather  the  high- 
est reason.  There  is  some  recognition  of  it  in  the 
lowest  conditions  of  society,  as  the  universality  of 
religion  and  superstition  shows.  As  men  grow  in 
understanding  they  recognize  it  more  clearly  and 
cooperate  with  it  more  effectually.  It  is  the  irra- 
tional, the  ignorant  man,  not  the  rational  man, 
who  fails  to  perceive  the  increasing  purpose  which 
through  the  ages  runs. 

Paulsen  bases  his  philosophy  upon  growths  of 
knowledge,  law,  society,  according  to  a  unitary 
process  which  individuals  perceive  and  in  a  meas- 
ure consciously  cooperate  with,  but  which  they  do 
not  create.  "  A  nation,"  he  says,  "  does  not  design 
its  life  and  then  complete  it  according  to  a  plan ; 
its  life  is  gradually  unfolded,  unknown  to  the  peo- 
ple themselves.  The  retrospective  historian  is  the 
first  to  see  unity  and  harmony  in  it."  So  of  scien- 
tific knowledge.  He  says  that  "  sciences  were  not 
invented  and  developed  according  to  plan  ;  they 
grew.  Mythological  cosmology  is  their  original 
germinal  form,  the  first  rough  outline  of  a  unitary 
world-view.  From  it  philosophy  developed,  and 
from  philosophy  the  separate  sciences  gradually 
grew  like  so  many  different  branches  of  a  com- 
mon stock.  The  entire  unitary  evolution  was  not 
thought  out  by  a  human  intellect  and  designed,  as 
a  builder  designs  the  work  which  is  executed  by  a 
thousand  hands,  in  the  course  of  so  many  decades. 
The  germ  of  knowledge  unfolded  itself  by  a  kind 
of  inner  necessity ;  not  without  the  aid  of  individ- 
ual reason,  it  is  true,  but  yet  in  such  a  way  that  no 


THE  IDEAL   ORDER   OF  HUMANITY  .  195 

one  commanded  a  view  of  the  whole  and  the  entire 
course  of  the  development."  :  The  rational  man 
says  of  great  national  and  social  movements  of 
progress  what  he  says  of  his  own  life :  — 

"  There 's  a  divinity  that  shapes  our  ends, 
Rough-hew  them  how  we  will." 

History,  disclosing  an  order,  a  plan,  an  evolu- 
tion, above  the  plans  of  this  or  that  person,  and 
above  the  combined  purposes  of  short-lived  men, 
implies,  not,  as  some  strangely  insist,  the  absence 
of  God,  but  rather  his  constant  presence  and  work- 
ing, even  until  now. 

in 

Morality  still  more  conclusively  signifies  religion 
when  we  turn  from  the  actual  order  of  the  world 
to  the  ideal  order  of  the  world.  There  is  deep- 
rooted  belief  in  the  triumph  of  the  good.  The 
conviction  that  duty  must  be  done  at  all  hazards  is 
the  conviction  that  right  will  conquer  wrong,  what- 
ever present  appearances  may  be.  There  have 
been  men  who  have  given  up  religious  belief,  yet 
have  clung  to  duty  even  at  the  cost  of  life.  The 
sacred  and  absolute  obligation  of  right  has  been 
the  anchor  of  their  souls.  They  have  believed 
that  death  ends  the  existence  of  the  individual,  and 
yet  —  yes,  and  therefore  —  have  followed  unswerv- 
ingly in  the  path  of  duty.  They  sacrifice  profit, 
pleasure,  popularity,  health,  life,  for  the  sake  of 
duty.  They  swim  against  the  current  till  they  are 
drowned  and  the  waves  close  over  them.  What  is 

1  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  pp.  203,  206. 


196  .  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

this  imperative  of  duty  which  may  not  be  disobeyed 
even  when  there  is  no  belief  in  God  or  immortal- 
ity? It  is  indestructible  faith  in  the  ultimate 
triumph  of  righteousness.  The  wrong  is  the  false, 
the  absurd,  the  deceptive,  the  weak,  the  perish- 
able. In  the  end  it  must  succumb.  The  right  is 
the  true,  and  the  truth  is  mighty  and  will  prevail. 
But  again  the  question  presses,  Whence  comes  this 
undying  faith  in  the  triumph  of  the  good  ?  Is  it 
created  by  the  actual  observed  order  of  the  world  ? 
The  dominance  of  the  right  may  indeed  be  per- 
ceived as  the  pages  of  history  are  turned.  But 
so  firm  a  conviction  of  the  conquering  power  of 
goodness  is  not  gained  by  a  survey  of  the  rise  and 
fall  of  nations.  Evil  is  strong.  Evil  is  prosper- 
ous. Suffering,  cruelty,  injustice,  caprice,  stain 
every  page  of  the  age-long  record.  The  pessimist 
marshals  multudinous  facts  in  support  of  his  phi- 
losophy, if  it  may  be  called  a  philosophy,  of  moral 
chaos.  Experience  can  confirm  but  cannot  create 
faith.  Morever,  this  faith  was  controlling  when 
as  yet  history  was  unwritten,  when  the  righteous 
man  was  ignorant  of  the  world  back  of  him  and 
around  him,  when  he  knew  only  the  two  generations 
which  preceded  him,  and  when  the  overhanging 
mountains  and  the  seashore  were  the  boundaries 
of  his  universe.  Yet  then,  the  good  man,  standing 
alone  in  the  midst  of  a  crooked  and  perverse  gen- 
eration, was  steadfast  in  his  righteousness.  The 
actual  order  oppressed  him  with  a  problem.  He 
was  perplexed  by  the  prosperity  of  the  wicked  and 
the  sufferings  of  the  righteous.  Heathen  writers 
struggled  with  the  problem.  The  writers  of  the 


THE  IDEAL   ORDER   OF  HUMANITY     197 

Bible  struggled  with  it.  The  books  of  Job  and 
Ecclesiastes  and  some  of  the  Psalms  are  pathetic 
in  striving  to  pierce  the  gloom.  But  belief  in  the 
triumph  of  the  good  always  emerges  unshaken  in 
confidence.  Faith  fastens  on  some  explanation. 
It  believes  there  will  be  a  future  rectification, 
either  in  this  world  or  in  the  next,  and  that  retri- 
bution awaits  the  wicked.  The  explanation  may  be 
illogical.  Skepticism  may  sneeringly  ask  how  from 
the  failure  of  retribution  in  the  world  we  know,  it 
can  be  inferred  that  retribution  will  come  in  the 
world  we  do  not  know.  But  this  or  any  other  par- 
ticular explanation  is  an  expression  of  the  unquench- 
able faith  which  must  have  some  expression.  Exact 
retribution  in  the  future  may  be  a  crude  solution 
of  the  problem.  But  the  demand  for  a  solution  is 
the  faith  itself,  confident  that  some  way  or  other 
the  right  will  prevail.  Therefore  faith  in  the  right 
has  not  been  determined  by  majorities.  One  voice 
raised  in  protest  against  wrong  is  mightier  than  the 
multitude  following  evil.  The  voice  crying  in  the 
wilderness  prepares  the  way  of  the  Lord.  Luther 
against  the  church,  Athanasius  against  the  world, 
right  against  wrong,  truth  against  falsehood,  are 
mightier  than  their  foes.  "  Now  there  was  found 
in  it  a  poor  wise  man,  and  he  by  his  wisdom  de- 
livered the  city ;  yet  no  man  remembered  that  same 
poor  man."  Prophet  or  reformer  is  the  entering 
wedge  which  splits  the  mass  asunder.  Elijah,  fan- 
cying himself  alone  in  loyalty  to  Jehovah,  was  told 
to  go  back  into  the  evil  world  he  had  deserted 
before  he  was  assured  that  there  were  seven  thou- 
sand as  loyal  as  he.  Abraham  should  not  have 


198  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

stopped  praying  till  he  was  sure  there  was  not  so 
much  as  one  righteous  man  in  Sodom.  The  drama 
idealizes  life.  It  must  portray  the  triumph  of  the 
good,  and  depict  the  folly  and  failure  of  the  bad. 
It  may  seem  untrue  to  actual  life.  But  the  specta- 
tors demand  the  exposure  and  overthrow  of  lago, 
of  Shylock,  of  Macbeth.  Right  ought  to  triumph. 
The  drama  is  the  faith  of  men  projected  before 
their  eyes  in  situations  and  characters  created  by 
genius.  The  Old  Testament  Scriptures  are  dra- 
matic as  well  as  historical  writings.  Characters  are 
selected.  The  significance  of  events  is  pointed  out. 
Uneventful  years  are  passed  over.  Wickedness 
is  defeated.  Righteousness  triumphs.  The  career 
of  Abraham  could  be  easily  dramatized,  and  the 
story  of  Joseph,  and  the  Exodus  out  of  Egypt,  and 
the  experience  of  Job  (who  was  perhaps  an  imagi- 
nary character),  and  the  narrative  of  Elijah,  Ahab, 
and  Jezebel.  These  personages  and  events  have 
in  fact  furnished  materials  for  the  great  dramatic 
oratorios.  Drama  and  religious  history  assume 
that  a  divine  purpose  is  realized  in  the  moral  order 
of  society,  that  the  good  which  ought  to  prevail 
will  prevail.  In  the  narrow  compass  of  a  few 
pages  or  a  few  selected  scenes,  the  meaning  of  life 
is  interpreted  in  an  epitome  of  years  or  even  cen- 
turies. Faith  in  the  triumph  of  righteousness  de- 
manding such  solution  of  the  problem  of  life  is 
faith  in  the  righteous  purpose  of  God.  This  de- 
mand, —  what  is  it  but  faith  in  the  power  not  our- 
selves which  makes  for  righteousness  ? 

But  yet  again  the  question  presses,  How  do  we 
know  that  the  ideal  order  is  anything  other  than 


THE  IDEAL   ORDER   OF  HUMANITY    199 

our  own  wishes,  hopes,  or  fancies  ?  Is  it  not 
mere  illusion  ?  What  reason  have  we  to  believe 
that  the  ideal,  the  perfect  ideal,  will  ever  be  real- 
ized ?  Does  not  the  very  contrast  of  the  ideal  with 
the  actual  show  that  it  is  a  dream  ? 

There  are  two  answers  to  these  questions.  One 
of  the  answers  is  given  by  another  question :  How 
is  it  that,  having  only  the  actual,  we  perceive  the 
ideal  ?  and  perceive  it  as  better  than  the  actual  ? 
Is  it  not  from  the  very  nature  of  the  right  as  ex- 
perienced ?  Is  it  not  because  the  actual  does  pre- 
sent a  problem  just  on  account  of  the  presence  and 
power  of  evil?  The  ideal  state  of  righteousness 
and  love  would  present  no  problem.  We  know,  by 
the  very  perplexity  which  evil  occasions,  that  right 
is  in  itself  superior  to  wrong,  that  it  is  the  sworn  an- 
tagonist of  wrong,  and  is  destined  to  prevail.  We 
see  that  evil  is  nothing  in  and  of  itself.  It  is  only 
negation  of  the  good.  It  is  only  that  which  dis- 
places the  good.  It  is  preventive,  privative,  par- 
asitic. It  has  no  productive  power,  but  only  de- 
stroying power.  It  is  the  bad  use  of  a  good  thing. 
It  converts  means  of  goodness  into  ultimate  ends. 
If  The  gratifications  of  sense,  which  are  right  when 
subordinate,  are  wrong  when  supreme.  The  attain- 
ments of  intellect,  which  are  right  when  subservient 
to  character  and  duty,  are  wrong  when  they  are 
made  the  end,  or  are  subservient  to  covetousness, 
injustice,  and  oppression.  /  Mephistopheles,  Satan, 
Ahriman  are  cunning,  clever,  alert.  The  devil  is 
an  impersonation  of  one  who  is  all  brains  and  no 
heart.  Evil  reverses  right  proportion.  When  the 
hyperbole  of  poetry,  —  evil,  be  thou  my  good,  — 


200  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

is  translated  into  prose,  it  is  inverted  into  its  oppo- 
site, —  good,  be  thou  my  evil.  That  which  depends 
on  the  good  for  its  very  existence,  as  disease  feeds 
on  the  vitality  it  invades,  which  is  wrong  only  be- 
cause it  is  the  act  of  a  moral  being  constituted  for 
righteousness,  shows  the  ideal  by  contrast.  The 
ideal  is  seen  in  the  absence  of  perversion,  contra- 
diction, and  abnormity.  The  ideal  is  not  a  dream. 
It  is  the  right  righting  itself,  setting  itself  free 
from  reversions  and  perversions.  The  ideal  is  the 
normal.  It  is  not  the  contrast  and  opposition  of 
the  actual.  It  is  the  normal  recovering  itself  by 
eliminating  the  abnormal. 

The  other  answer  runs  deeper,  and  is  indeed  the 
ground  of  the  first  answer.  The  answer  is,  that 
the  ideal  moral  order  is  not  an  ideal  of  our  own 
creation,  but  is  the  divine  idea  of  the  good,  re- 
vealed to  us  in  our  constitution,  our  convictions, 
and  our  very  consciousness,  confirmed  to  us  in  the 
experience  of  good  with  its  sanctions  and  of  evil 
with  its  penalties,  and  reflected  with  increasing 
clearness  in  the  moral  progress  and  civilization  of 
mankind.  This  is  the  truth  of  Matthew  Arnold's 
impersonal  and  attenuated  philosophy  of  religion  ; 
the  Power  not  ourselves  that  makes  for  Righteous- 
ness. The  constitution  of  man  and  the  constitution 
of  society  are  moral.  The  self-realization  of  man 
and  the  self-realization  of  society  are  on  the  lines 
of  righteousness.  The  divine  purpose  which  is  ful- 
filled in  the  universe  will  be  fulfilled  in  the  high- 
est product  of  the  universe,  in  man,  the  moral  and 
social  being.  The  moral  ideals  of  man  are  not  his 
own  creation  any  more  than  his  moral  and  social 


THE  IDEAL   ORDER   OF  HUMANITY    201 

constitution,  in  which  those  ideals  are  implicit,  is 
his  own  creation.  ^Belief  in  the  triumph  of  good- 
ness is  not  a  dream  which  might  as  well  have  been 
some  other  fancy,  but  is  just  nature  asserting  itself ; 
that  intellectual  and  moral  nature  which  knows 
God  as  reason  and  righteousness,  fulfilling  his  eter- 
nal purpose  of  truth  and  goodness  in  man,  the 
work  of  his  hands.  Absolute  devotion  to  duty  is 
belief  in  the  certain  triumph  of  the  good  ;  and  that 
belief,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  is  faith  in  God, 
the  righteous  and  true.  Faith  in  repose  rests  in 
profound  security  on  the  foundation,  and  says 
meditatively:  "It  is  he  that  hath  made  us,  and 
not  we  ourselves ;  we  are  his  people,  and  the  sheep 
of  his  pasture.  .  .  .  For  the  Lord  is  good ;  his 
mercy  is  everlasting ;  and  his  truth  endureth  to  all 
generations."  Faith,  well-nigh  overwhelmed  with 
trouble,  is  able  to  ejaculate,  "  Though  he  slay  me, 
yet  will  I  trust  in  him."  Faith,  tempted  to  impa- 
tience by  the  power  of  evil,  cannot  repress  the  in- 
quiry, "  How  long,  O  Lord  ?  "  But  the  faith  is 
deeper  than  the  impatience,  for  the  whole  question 
is,  "  How  long,  O  Lord,  holy  and  true  ?  "  and  it 
never  for  a  moment  imagines  that  the  saints  on 
earth  will  give  over  their  sainthood  because  they 
are  not  avenged.  And,  as  to  the  actual  moral 
order  and  progress  of  the  world,  it  is  nearer  the 
truth  to  say  that  faith  in  the  purpose  of  God  sees 
that  purpose  developing  in  time  than  to  say  that 
observed  progress  creates  faith  in  ultimate  tri- 
umph. The  exact  truth  is  that  faith  and  fact  cor- 
respond, that  faith  interprets  fact  because  it  has 
the  right  perspective,  and  that  fact  confirms  faith. 


202  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

Pfleiderer,  tracing  this  correspondence,  says: 
"  When  we  thus  look  with  the  eye  of  the  faith 
which  is  based  on  God  into  the  historical  world, 
we  also  find  infallibly  in  it,  notwithstanding  all  its 
evils  and  painful  disharmonies  in  detail,  the  traces 
of  the  ruling  of  that  governing  righteousness  and 
wisdom,  which  so  direct  the  course  of  things  that, 
in  spite  of  all  the  wrong  in  individual  things,  right 
nevertheless  comes  in  the  whole  of  humanity  to  an 
ever  firmer  and  purer  existence.  All  the  resist- 
ance which  the  realization  of  the  good  finds  every- 
where in  detail  cannot  hinder  us  from  recognizing 
its  victorious  progress  in  the  whole  of  the  world's 
history ;  and  the  very  fact  that  it  constantly  as- 
serts itself  only  in  conflict  with  the  resisting  will  of 
individuals  —  nay  more,  that  this  very  resistance 
contributes  as  a  spur  and  stimulus  to  the  ever 
richer  and  more  powerful  development  of  the  moral 
idea  —  enables  us  to  recognize  the  more  distinctly 
the  revelation  of  the  divine  will  as  the  ground  and 
law  of  the  moral  process  of  humanity." 1 

IV 

The  relation  of  morality  to  religion  is  found  in 
the  individual  as  well  as  in  society.  The  impera- 
tive of  duty  is  laid  on  every  one.  It  is  not  self- 
imposed  nor  socially  imposed.  The  authoritative 
law  is  neither  enacted  nor  repealed  by  human  con- 
vention. It  is  sometimes  expressed  in  the  custom- 
ary, but  sometimes  defies  the  customary.  It  is 
binding  on  every  individual.  The  imperative  of 
obligation  is  a  law  of  his  constitution.  Conscience 

1  Philosophy  and  Development  of  Religion,  vol.  i.,  pp.  179,  180. 


MORAL  LAW  UNIVERSAL  203 

is  not  a  property  which  one  can  do  as  he  likes 
with.  A  child  defined  it  in  those  very  terms, 
as  "  something  inside  that  we  cannot  do  what 
we  like  with."  Dr.  Dorner  says,  "  It  is  not  man 
that  possesses  conscience  so  much  as  conscience 
that  possesses  man."  The  imperative  of  duty  as 
denned  in  the  chapter  on  the  Right  is  the  obliga- 
tion to  realize  the  Ideal.  The  ideal  is  the  normal 
constitution  of  man,  in  the  proportion  and  perfec- 
tion of  his  powers.  This  ideal  is  God's  idea  of 
man.  If  the  universe  in  its  existence  and  evolu- 
tion is  a  revelation  of  the  thought  and  purpose  of 
God,  then  the  ideal  of  man,  which  carries  obliga- 
tion, is  the  idea  of  God  presented  as  moral  law. 
This  is  the  familiar  moral  argument  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  and  need  not  be  developed.  The 
argument  is  confirmed  by  the  consequences  of 
obedience  and  disobedience.  The  satisfaction,  the 
health,  the  growth,  which  attend  obedience,  the 
unrest,  disturbance,  disease,  suffering,  which  at- 
tend disobedience,  reenforce  the  truth  that  man  is 
made  for  righteousness,  that  the  law  is  given  by 
God,  in  whom  physically,  intellectually,  and  morally 
we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our  being. 


The  universality  of  moral  law  is  an  evidence 
that  it  is  divine.  All  men  are  under  the  same  law. 
It  is  not  different  for  different  persons.  If  honor 
is  nobler  than  fraud  in  me,  so  it  is  in  others.  Try 
as  we  may,  we  cannot  reverse  the  order  of  higher 
and  lower  for  any  man.  There  is  an  invariable 
constitution  of  humanity.  The  ideal  of  worth  is 


204  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

not  individual:  it  is  human.  "The  supposition 
of  subjective  morals  is  no  less  absurd  than  the 
supposition  of  subjective  mathematics,"  says  Mar- 
tineau.  The  moral  law  is  the  truth  of  reason.  It 
corresponds  to  the  reason  and  worth  of  man  as 
man.  As  there  are  not  different  kinds  of  reason 
for  different  men,  there  are  not  different  kinds  of 
morality  for  different  men.  A  science  of  ethics  is 
possible  because  the  principles  of  morality,  like 
the  laws  of  mathematics,  are  the  same  everywhere 
and  for  all  minds.  John  Stuart  Mill  put  feeling 
into  mathematics  when  he  affirmed  that  he  would 
go  to  hell  rather  than  believe  that  goodness  is 
not  the  same  in  God  as  in  man,  and  began  his 
argument  by  denying  that  two  and  two  make  five 
for  any  minds  in  any  part  of  the  universe.  It  is 
as  impossible  to  conceive  that  falsehood  promotes 
the  worth  of  any  intelligence  in  any  part  of  the 
universe. 

The  absolute,  indefeasible  worth  of  every  man, 
which  every  other  is  bound  to  respect  and  promote, 
creates  society.  It  is  the  ground  of  sympathy.  It 
is  the  possibility  of  service.  It  unifies  society. 
The  worth  of  individuals  is  not  mutually  exclusive, 
but  is  reciprocal.  This  moral  unification  of  all 
men  may  be  regarded  as  the  divine  constitution  of 
society,  and  is  valued  by  some  writers  as  the  most 
conclusive  evidence  of  the  divine  thought  embodied 
in  humanity.1 

1  Outlines  of  Social  Theology.  By  William  DeWitt  Hyde, 
President  of  Bowdoin  College.  —  Morality  and  Religion:  being  the 
Kerr  Lectures  for  1893-94.  By  Rev.  James  Kidd. 


THE  RIGHTEOUSNESS  OF  GOD        205 


VI 

One  step  further  may  now  be  taken.  The  ideal, 
recognized  as  obligatory  by  all  men  but  not  per- 
fectly attained  by  any,  implies  the  existence  of 
perfect  righteousness  in  God,  who  made  man  for 
righteousness.  It  cannot  be  argued  that  the  real- 
ization of  the  moral  ideal  is  imperative  on  us,  but 
does  not  necessarily  belong  to  the  very  nature  of 
God  who  lays  the  law  on  us  ;  that  he  has  com- 
manded and  sanctioned  morality  for  us  as  that 
which  fulfills  the  intention  of  our  being,  but  that 
he  may  be  a  non-moral  being,  just  the  unknowable 
Power  energizing  in  all  existence.  This  would 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  goodness  is  not  rational 
but  arbitrary.  Good  and  bad  would  be  merely  in 
the  sphere  of  the  world,  and  not  in  the  being  who 
expresses  himself  in  his  world.  Goodness  would 
rest  on  might,  not  on  right.  This  would  end  in 
denying  reason  to  God.  Right  is  to  us  the  high- 
est reason.  In  the  right  we  read  God's  thought. 
But  if  his  thought  does  not  express  his  character, 
does  not  reveal  himself,  we  are  deceived  in  sup- 
posing that  we  know  God  in  the  ideals  of  goodness. 
That  which  is  the  highest  truth  of  reason  to  us, 
and  is  known  as  that  which  ought  to  be,  must  be 
reason  and  reality  in  God.  As  an  idea  of  the  di- 
vine mind,  it  is  an  idea  of  that  which  ought  to  be ; 
hence,  in  him  who  reveals  his  thought  to  us,  the 
idea  must  be  reality. 

Neither  is  it  to  be  held  that  morality  has  a 
merely  potential  existence  in  God,  and  that  it 
comes  to  reality  only  when  the  universe  is  devel- 


206  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

oped  to  its  highest  point  in  man.  For  then  some- 
thing would  be  lacking  to  the  perfectness  of  God. 
He  must  wait  to  perfect  himself  till  man  appears 
to  complete  that  which  was  wanting.  The  creation 
does  indeed  wait,  groaning  within  itself,  for  the 
revealing  of  the  sons  of  God,  but  God,  the  source 
and  ground  of  the  creation,  does  not  wait  for  time 
and  man  before  he  becomes  actual  and  perfect 
righteousness.  The  universe  becomes  ;  God  is. 

Neither  has  the  law  of  right  an  existence  inde- 
pendent of  God,  as  a  law  according  to  which  he 
created  man.  There  are  no  laws  of  any  kind  ex- 
isting in  their  own  independence.  Laws  are  the 
constitution  of  things.  Moral  laws  are  the  consti- 
tution of  character.  The  perfect  law  is  but  the 
mode,  the  generalization  of  conduct  and  charac- 
ter. God  does  not  find  laws  first  and  make  things 
conform  to  them  afterwards.  Then  law  is  the  Ab- 
solute, and  God  is  a  Demiurge,  shaping  materials 
according  to  eternal  laws.  Neither  does  he  make 
laws  by  his  power,  in  an  arbitrary  fashion.  He  is 
the  eternal  truth,  the  eternal  goodness ;  and  laws 
express  his  reason  and  character. 

The  will  of  God  is  not,  as  bare  will,  the  ground 
and  authority  of  right.  When  we  say,  "  It  is  right 
because  God  wills  it,"  we  say  what  is  true,  but  have 
reached  the  approximate,  not  the  final  reason  of 
right.  It  is  because  we  know  God  is  perfect  good- 
ness and  love  that  we  obey  his  commands.  It  is 
his  will  because  it  is  right,  and  it  is  right  because 
God  is  the  God  of  righteousness  ;  precisely  as  a 
child  says,  "  It  is  right  because  father  told  me  to  do 
it."  The  child  believes  that  his  father  is  good  and 


MORALITY   WITHOUT  RELIGION       207 

loving,  and  will  require  only  that  which  is  best  for 
the  child.  "The  mere  good  pleasure  of  God  "is 
as  mischievous  a  phrase  as  theologizing  man  ever 
coined  to  misrepresent  God.  It  .means  that  he 
might  just  as  well  have  done  otherwise.  It  means 
that  we  cannot  know  anything  in  God  or  anything 
in  men  which  led  him  to  elect  some  rather  than 
others  to  eternal  life.  It  means  that  God  is  merely 
power  which  goes  crashing  through  the  world. 

God  is  himself  the  perfect  one,  and  in  the  ideals 
he  sets  before  us,  with  requirement  of  them,  he 
reveals  his  own  character.  Dorner  says :  "  If 
morality  at  first  is  not  perfect  in  fact  in  the  world, 
so  much  the  more  must  it  be  such  in  God.  .  .  . 
In  God  morality  has  an  aboriginal  existence ;  it 
has  a  place  where  the  actual  is  eternally  perfect, 
and  therefore  it  can  become  for  the  world  obliga- 
tion and  law.  .  .  .  The  good  does  not  float  and  flit 
around  in  the  universe  without  a  vehicle  or  real 
substratum,  but,  eternally  rooted  in  God,  it  seeks 
to  spread  out  and  become  fruitful  in  the  world  also 
by  means  of  a  process  of  growth." 1 

Above  all,  the  good  is  self-imparting.  Love  is 
its  law.  It  is  from  a  Being  of  goodness  that  the 
world  has  sprung,  a  world  in  which  moral  beings 
exist  and  come  to  their  perfection  in  goodness  and 
love.  Such  impartation  shows  that  God  is  the  per- 
fect goodness  in  living  reality. 

VII 

But  is  there  not  genuine  morality  without  reli- 
gion ?     Are  there  not  upright,  conscientious,  and 
1  Christian  Ethics,  pp.  64,  65. 


208  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

philanthropic  men  who  are  agnostic  as  to  God  and 
immortality  ?  I  have  already  indicated  that  devo- 
tion to  duty  implies  faith  in  the  triumph  of  the 
good,  and  so  in  a  divine  order  of  society.  But  this 
implicit  faith  may  not  be  conscious  faith.  Men 
whose  morality  cannot  be  doubted  expressly  dis- 
claim religious  beliefs.  They  are  unreligious  mor- 
alists. Is  not  morality,  then,  independent  of  reli- 
gion ?  May  it  not  exist  without  religious  basis  or 
sanction?  In  answer  to  these  questions  several 
considerations  arise. 

To  those  who  practice  only  a  conventional  and 
reputable  morality  the  questions  do  not  pertain. 
Men  who  boast  that  they  do  not  cheat  and  do  not 
tell  lies,  who  reduce  their  goodness  to  a  safe  mini- 
mum and  ask  defiantly,  "  What  need  is  there  of 
more,  what  need  is  there  of  religion,  what  lack  I 
yet? "are  not  the  men  of  whom  we  are  thinking. 
Theirs  is  not  the  genuine  morality  of  disposition, 
motive,  love  of  right  for  right's  sake.  It  is  a 
purely  selfish  morality.  Safety  and  success  are 
its  only  objects.  We  are  thinking  of  those  to 
whom  duty  is  sacred  and  paramount. 

It  must  first  be  observed  that  they  are  not  en- 
tirely free  from  religious  influences.  They  have 
been  reared  in  Christian  homes,  have  lived  in  a 
religious  community  under  the  shadow  of  churches, 
have  been  familiar  with  the  Bible,  have  derived 
their  ideas  of  goodness  from  Christian  standards. 
The  individual  who  relinquishes  religion  still  lives 
in  a  community  whose  common  spirit  affects  the 
spirit  of  each  individual.  These  isolated  cases  do 
not,  then,  present  an  example  of  morality  insulated 


MORALITY   WITHOUT  RELIGION       209 

from  religious  influences  and  standards.  To  em- 
ploy a  homely  illustration,  one  house  may  safely 
dispense  with  lightning-rods  if  all  the  other  houses 
of  the  village  are  provided  with  them.  To  obtain 
a  specimen  of  un  religious  morality  it  is  necessary 
to  imagine  the  absence  of  religious  faith  from  the 
whole  community  for  several  generations.  There 
never  has  been  such  a  community,  so  it  is  impos- 
sible to  know  what  morality  would  be  without 
religion.  The  standard  might  be  lowered  to  the 
useful.  The  sacredness  of  obligation  might  be 
reduced.  With  no  reverence  for  the  holy  will  of 
God,  with  no  thought  of  men  as  the  children  of 
one  good  and  loving  Father,  with  no  belief  in  the 
immortal  worth  of  the  soul,  with  no  faith  in  God's 
righteous  purpose  assuring  the  triumph  of  the 
good,  with  no  knowledge  of  the  example  of  Jesus, 
morality  might  be  in  danger  of  contraction  into 
utilities  of  comfort.  So  far  as  history  bears  testi- 
mony on  this  point,  it  shows  that  periods  of  skepti- 
cism and  atheism  have  been  periods  of  immorality. 
Kevivals  of  morality  which  have  followed  such  peri- 
ods have  been  revivals  of  religious  faith,  under  the 
leadership  of  reformers  who  have  had  invincible 
faith  in  God,  have  threatened  divine  judgment  on 
wickedness,  and  have  proclaimed  God's  holy  law. 

It  should  be  remembered  also  that  the  discarded 
religion  has  often  been  dogmas  and  forms  rather 
than  true  religion  ;  dogmas  of  unethical  and  exter- 
nal salvation,  of  arbitrary  decrees,  of  favoritism, 
and  the  like ;  forms  of  ecclesiasticism  and  of  ritual, 
empty  of  religious  meaning.  Against  these  the 
religionless  moralist,  as  he  styles  himself,  is  pro- 


210  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

testing  in  the  name  of  true  religion,  for  he  believes 
in  goodness  as  the  only  salvation,  in  righteousness 
rather  than  formalities,  and  in  the  triumph  of 
goodness  and  righteousness  in  the  world. 

But  if  the  case  really  is  that  belief  even  in  a  good 
God  is  given  up,  and  that  man  is  not  regarded  as 
having  absolute  and  eternal  worth,  but  as  a  higher 
animal  destined  like  the  lower  animals  to  perish,  it 
will  almost  inevitably  follow  that  the  philanthropic 
side  of  goodness  will  be  narrowed.  One  who  sees 
men  not  merely  as  they  are  in  their  selfishness,  mal- 
ice and  ingratitude,  but  in  their  possibilities  as  chil- 
dren of  God  whom  God  loves,  and  destined  for  im- 
mortality, is  not  disheartened  by  the  badness,  the 
hardness,  the  impurity  he  sees.  But  one  who  sees 
only  the  reality  becomes  discouraged.  His  enthu- 
siasm cools.  He  becomes  pessimistic.  He  may 
still  for  himself  adhere  tenaciously  to  duty.  But 
he  is  likely  to  isolate  himself  in  his  righteousness. 
His  strength  may  defy  the  world  and  all  its  evil 
customs  ;  but  he  lacks  the  faith  which  overcomes 
the  world.  He  is  not  himself  overcome  of  evil ; 
but  he  does  not  overcome  evil  with  good.  This 
tendency  is  finely  described  by  Pfleiderer  :  "  It  is 
undoubtedly  possible  that  even  where  the  wings  of 
philanthropic  enthusiasm  have  been  broken  by  rough 
contact  with  reality,  the  feeling  of  duty  may  still 
remain  strong  enough  to  determine  permanently 
the  moral  guidance  of  life.  Experience  shows  us 
not  seldom  such  stoical  characters,  who,  without 
loving  men,  and  even  with  expressed  contempt  of 
them,  yet  keep  firm  and  unmoved  to  duty  for  the 
sake  of  duty.  Undisturbed  by  the  success  or  fail- 


MORALITY  WITHOUT  RELIGION       211 

ure  of  their  actions,  they  hold  fast  to  what  they 
know  to  be  right  as  that  which  is  commanded  by 
their  reason.  They  respect  the  law  of  their  reason, 
because  they  must  otherwise  lose  respect  for  them- 
selves. Such  virtue  we  must  always  regard  as  es- 
timable ;  we  may  well  admire  its  power  of  defying 
the  world,  but  we  will  hardly  trust  its  power  to 
overcome  the  world.  The  very  hardness  which  it 
uses  to  protect  and  steel  itself  against  the  world, 
slays  those  tenderer  feelings  which  biad  man  to  the 
world  and  open  to  him  the  entrance  to  the  hearts 
of  his  fellow-men.  The  rough  severity  of  this 
virtue  does  not  exercise  a  warming  and  attract- 
ing, but  a  repelling  and  chilling,  influence  upon  its 
surroundings ;  it  isolates  the  moral  person  from 
society,  and  thereby  cuts  off  his  moral  influence 
upon  it;  and  the  feeling  of  this  isolation  engenders 
but  too  easily  a  pessimistic  bitterness  and  proud 
haughtiness  towards  the  despised  crowd."  * 

Wordsworth  had  the  religionless  moralist  in 
mind  as  one  of  those  who  visited  a  poet's  grave  :  — 

"  A  moralist  perchance  appears ; 

Led,  Heaven  knows  how  !  to  this  poor  sod  : 
And  he  has  neither  eyes  nor  ears  ; 
Himself  his  world,  and  his  own  God ; 

"  One  to  whose  smooth-rubbed  soul  can  cling 

Nor  form,  nor  feeling-,  great  or  small ; 
A  reasoning-,  self-sufficing  thing, 
An  intellectual  All-in-all!  " 

While  there  may  be  morality  which  has  no 
conscious  religious  motive,  yet  the  best  type  of 
morality  is  consciously  religious.  I  believe  that  all 

1  Philosophy  and  Development  of  Religion,  vol.  i.,  pp.  62,  63. 


212  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

i  sincere  moral  action  is  of  divine  origination,  for 
God  made  man  moral  in  perception,  capability, 
and  obligation,  and  established  the  social  relations 
of  rights  and  duties.  But  without  faith  in  God, 
morality  is  limited  and  defective.  Faith  in  God, 
who  is  perfect  goodness,  filial  trust  in  him  as 
Father  and  love  of  men  as  children  of  one  Father, 
produces  the  purest  character,  the  best  self-culture, 
the  most  hopeful  and  usually  the  most  effective 
service  of  others.  It  produces  the  saint  and  the 
reformer.  Both  have  faith  in  God.  Both  are 
idealists.  The  reformer  sees  the  better  order  of 
society  in  contrast  with  the  actual  order.  He  en- 
ters into  God's  thought,  and  labors  with  undaunted 
faith  for  social  regeneration.  The  saint  sees  the 
better  character  for  himself.  He  also  enters  into 
God's  thought  and  labors  with  serene  faith  for 
personal  regeneration.  Yet  both  are  striving  after 
the  same  thing.  The  reformer  desires  better  per- 
sons in  society,  and  is  himself  becoming  a  better 
person,  is  becoming  a  saint,  a  holy,  whole,  healthy, 
complete  character.  The  saint  cannot  become  per- 
fect in  isolation.  As  he  realizes  the  standard  of 
worth,  he  desires  it  for  others  and  is  impelled  to 
impart  it  to  others.  The  reformer  becomes  a 
saint.  The  saint  becomes  a  reformer.  They  only 
stand  in  different  points  of  view.  Without  the 
inspiration  of  faith,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether 
either  of  these  types  appears. 

VIII 

It  has  been  remarked  above  that  there  has  never 
been  a  community  for  several  generations  irreli- 


HISTORICALLY  TOGETHER  213 

gious,  that  periods  of  unbelief  have  been  periods 
of  immorality,  and  have  soon  been  followed  by 
revival  of  religion  which  has  also  been  the  revival 
of  morality,  a  revival  which  has  been  happily  com- 
pared to  the  reappearance  of  verdure  on  burnt  land. 
This  fact,  that  religion  and  morality  are  always 
found  together,  is  most  significant  for  their  essen- 
tial relation.  In  the  earliest  times,  social  and  legal 
usages  rested  on  religion.  The  family,  worship- 
ing the  same  house-gods,  is  probably  the  first  reli- 
gious community.  Paternal  authority  was  based 
on  the  priesthood  of  the  father,  who  performed  the 
religious  rites.  Property  was  hereditary,  because 
the  continuous  family  worshiped  the  same  house- 
divinity.  This  was  the  unifying  bond  of  the  fam- 
ily, and  strengthened  mutual  obligations  of  service 
and  love.  Piety  first  meant  reverence  for  the  fa- 
ther. The  hero  of  Virgil's  .SDneid  is  always  called 
plus  jffineas,  on  account  of  his  devotion  to  his 
father.  So  the  city  was  a  community  having  the 
same  deities  and  sacrifices.  Kings  were  priests. 
Keligion  regulated  peace  and  war,  courts  of  justice, 
festivals  and  games.  Laws  were  believed  to  have 
been  revealed.  Even  savage  tribes  are  united  into 
a  society  for  protection  and  mutual  service  under 
a  "  totem,"  or  divinity.  In  modern  times  religion 
is  regarded  as  the  conservator  of  morality,  and  the 
State  either  supports  directly,  or  recognizes  and 
protects  churches  and  worship. 
/Religion  and  morality  have  reacted  on  each 
other.  When  religion  has  hardened  into  formal- 
ism and  the  arbitrary  authority  of  priests,  while 
morality  has  widened  in  the  relations  of  business, 


214  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

of  government,  and  of  society,  a  certain  independ- 
ence and  even  antagonism  has  resulted.  But 
sooner  or  later,  the  broader  morality  has  demanded 
a  reform  of  religion,  to  make  it  humane.  Jesus 
exposed  the  emptiness  of  Pharisaism  by  showing 
its  immorality,  and  restored  the  true  religion, 
which  is  humanitarian.  He  told  the  formalists, 
who  nhide  the  Sabbath  an  end  in  itself  rather  than 
a  means  for  the  good  of  man,  and  who  held  aloof 
from  publicans  and  sinners,  to  go  and  learn  the 
meaning  of  the  ancient  prophet's  message  :  "  Thus 
saith  the  Lord ;  I  desire  mercy,  and  not  sacrifice." 
That  is  what  God  says,  and  always  has  said.  Man 
says :  "  Offer  sacrifices,  perform  ablutions,  fast  oft, 
pay  tithes."  God  says :  "  I  desire  mercy ; "  "  Thou 
shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."  When  the 
prophet  thundered,  "  Thus  saith  the  Lord,"  he  did 
not  mean  that  God  had  spoken  audibly  such  and 
such  words  in  his  ear.  He  meant :  man  says  this 
and  that,  says  penance,  fasting,  class-contempt, 
race-contempt,  robbery,  and  even  murder ;  but  God 
says:  mercy,  truth,  righteousness,  charity,  obedi- 
ence, reverence  ;  thus  saith  the  Lord.  To-day  we 
hear  much  of  social  Christianity.  Nowhere  is  there 
keener  criticism  on  those  who  seek  only  their  own 
salvation  than  in  the  Christian  pulpit  and  press. 
The  gospel  of  to-day  is  the  gospel  of  the  kingdom. 
It  is  seen  that  belief  in  the  fatherhood  of  God 
means  belief  in  the  brotherhood  of  man.  This  res- 
toration of  religion  to  its  humaneness  is  perhaps 
due,  in  part,  to  assertion  of  rights  in  society,  to  the 
socialistic  spirit,  and  to  the  waning  influence  of 
the  church  over  certain  classes  who  regard  it  as  an 


RELIGION  INSPIRES  MORALITY       215 

exclusive  and  other-world  institution.     Thus  mo- 
rality and  religion  act  and  react  on  each  other. 

IX 

(Religion  is  not  only  implied  in  morality,  but  is 
the  inspiration  of  morality.)  Failure  to  realize  the 
moral  ideal  creates  the  need  of  religion  to  bring 
moral  law  to  effect.  Power  to  attain  the  good 
does  not  correspond  to  the  knowledge  of  it  and  the 
recognized  obligation  of  it.  There  is  not  merely 
the  failure  to  realize  in  early  stages  what  is  possi- 
ble only  in  later  stages.  There  is  failure  at  any 
given  stage  to  realize  what  is  appropriate  to  that 
stage.  This  is  universal  testimony.  Men  know 
more  than  they  practice.  Macaulay,  in  homely 
contrast,  says  :  "  For  our  own  part,  if  we  are  forced 
to  make  our  choice  between  the  first  shoemaker 
and  the  author  of  the  three  books  on  Anger,  we 
pronounce  for  the  shoemaker.  It  may  be  worse 
to  be  angry  than  to  be  wet.  But  shoes  have  kept 
millions  from  being  wet,  and  we  doubt  whether 
Seneca  ever  kept  anybody  from  being  angry."  Is 
iff  not,  indeed,  Seneca  who  is  reported  to  have  said, 
"  Ah,  if  some  one  would  but  stretch  out  a  hand  ! " 
Paul  called  himself  a  wretched  man  as  he  ex- 
claimed, "The  good  that  I  would,  I  do  not,  and 
the  evil  that  I  would  not,  I  do."  Transgression, 
failure,  degeneration  have  reduced  moral  power. 
Christianity  assumes  knowledge  of  right  and 
wrong.  It  claims  no  distinction  in  that  respect. 
What  it  does  is  to  bring  the  love  and  truth  of  God 
to  sinful  man  under  the  great  transforming  power 
of  self-sacrifice  in  Jesus  Christ.  "  I  came  not 


216  MORALITY  AND  RELIGION 

to  condemn  the  world,"  said  Jesus  (it  was  con- 
demned, self-condemned,  already),  "  but  to  save 
the  world."  With  a  tone  of  triumph  some  have 
said  that  the  moral  precepts  of  Christianity  can  be 
matched  in  other  codes  and  religions,  as  if  Chris- 
tianity was  thereby  proved  to  have  no  transcendent 
claim.  But  that  is  to  miss  the  meaning  of  the 
gospel,  which  takes  it  for  granted  that  men  know 
the  right.  Christianity  gives  moral  power  rather 
than  moral  knowledge.  By  its  lofty  ideal  it  does, 
indeed,  reveal  man  to  himself,  but  its  object  is  to 
restore  man  to  his  true  self.  Christ  is  the  power 
of  God  as  well  as  the  wisdom  of  God.  In  the 
chapters  on  personal  and  social  regeneration  I 
endeavor  to  elucidate  this  characteristic  of  Chris- 
tianity. 

x 

Morality  implies  immortality.  Although  belief 
in  immortality  is  not  strictly  a  religious  belief, 
since  it  signifies  merely  the  continued  existence  of 
man,  yet  religion,  which  binds  man  to  God,  is  so 
identified  with  immortality,  that  the  belief  in  life 
after  death  belongs  with  the  relation  of  morality 
and  religion.  The  moral  ideal  is  an  ideal  of  per- 
fection. But  perfection  is  not  attained  in  this  life. 
The  conditions  are  not  satisfied  by  the  expectation 
of  perfection  in  some  remote  generation,  for  the 
individual  is  conscious  of  possibilities  of  comple- 
tion for  himself.  He  has  capabilities  of  knowledge, 
culture,  refinement,  purity,  which  threescore  years 
and  ten  cannot  satisfy.  Long  before  middle  life 
is  reached,  one  knows  that  he  must  relinquish  at- 
tainments which,  so  far  as  capacity  and  interest 


MORALITY  AND  IMMORTALITY        217 

are  concerned,  he  might  possess.  A  famous  Greek 
scholar  lamented  on  his  death-bed  that  he  had  not 
confined  himself  to  the  particle.  The  individual 
only  needs  time.  Undying  belief  in  the  triumph 
of  righteousness,  a  belief  grounded  in  faith  in  God, 
with  whom  man  works,  involves  the  continued  ex- 
istence of  men,  to  see  and  share  that  for  which 
they  have  labored.  The  moral  ideal,  which  is 
God's  thought  perceived  by  man,  means  the  eter- 
nal life  in  which  alone  ,  the  ideal  can  be  realized. 
Immortality  is  as  closely  related  to  morality  as  to 
religion. 

Summarily,  then,  morality  implies  and  depends 
on  religion.  The  moral  ideal,  complete  in  perfec- 
tion and  absolute  in  imperative,  is  the  idea  of  God 
for  humanity.  Seeing  the  ideal,  man  recognizes 
God's  thought  and  purpose.  The  idea  of  an  end, 
or  of  ends,  in  nature,  by  which  the  evolution  of 
nature  is  determined,  implies  a  thought  precedent, 
which  the  development  of  nature  is  realizing.  The 
perception  of  an  ideal  of  personality  and  society 
implies  a  thought  precedent,  which  the  develop- 
ment of  humanity  is  realizing.  The  philosophy  of 
history  is  recognition  of  a  divine  purpose.  God 
allows  us  to  see  the  end  that  we  may  with  intel- 
ligence and  hope  attain  it.  The  Bible  is  full  of 
such  disclosures  in  its  representations  of  the  king- 
dom of  God  and  of  heaven.  It  takes  up  the  an- 
cient call,  respice  finem.  Faith  sees  afar  off.  In 
God's  light  it  sees  light,  and  moves  on  confidently 
towards  the  goal  in  the  path  which  shineth  more 
and  more  unto  the  perfect  day. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   CHRISTIAN   IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

THE  question  is  sometimes  asked  whether  the 
term  "  Christian  Ethics  "  can  be  employed  with  pro- 
priety. It  is  said  that  there  cannot  be  different 
kinds  of  morality.  The  notion  that  it  varies  with 
place  and  time  is  abandoned.  The  faculties  of 
man  and  the  organism  of  society  determine  rights 
and  duties,  and  therefore  the  principles  and  the 
sanctions  of  morality  are  everywhere  and  always 
the  same.  If  the  ethics  of  Christianity  corresponds 
to  the  nature  of  man  in  society,  then  the  term 
"  Christian  ethics  "  is  tautological,  and  the  super- 
fluous adjective  may  as  well  be  dropped.  And  if 
the  ethics  of  Christianity  does  not  correspond  to 
the  nature  of  man  in  society,  then  the  system  is 
false  or  imperfect,  and  claims  attention  only  for 
purposes  of  criticism.  As  well  speak  of  Christian 
mathematics  or  Christian  logic  as  of  Christian 
ethics.  The  criticism  is  well  taken  as  against  the 
assumption  that  there  is  any  contradiction  between 
natural  and  Christian  ethics.  The  morality  of  the 
perfect  society  can  be  of  only  one  kind.  But  in 
two  respects  there  are  reasons  for  the  recognition 
of  Christian  ethics.  One  reason  is  that  morality 
is  an  evolution  which  has  had  historical  stages. 
Both  the  apprehension  and  the  practice  of  duty 
have  been  progressive.  There  have  accordingly 


CHRISTIAN   ETHICS  219 

been  successive  systems  of  ethics,  embodying  more 
or  less  truth.  Among  these  the  moral  precepts  of 
Christianity  have  an  historical  place.  As  there 
is  a  propriety  and  necessity  in  speaking  of  Grecian, 
Buddhistic,  or  Confucian  ethics,  which  are  well- 
defined  and  distinctive  systems,  there  is  equal 
propriety  in  speaking  of  Christian  ethics.  When 
these  systems  are  brought  into  comparison,  the  his- 
torical names  cannot  be  avoided.  The  other  rea- 
son for  the  use  of  the  term  is  that  morality  has  to 
do  with  ideals  as  well  as  with  phenomena,  and  that 
ideals  may  have  a  partial  or  a  complete  recognition. 
The  inquiry  concerning  any  system  pertains  to 
its  correspondence  with  the  ideal.  This  inquiry  is 
necessarily  made  concerning  the  ethics  of  Chris- 
tianity. The  conclusion  that  there  is  a  close  and 
complete  correspondence  with  the  true  ideal,  and 
the  universal  acceptance  of  that  conclusion,  would 
justify  the  identification  of  Christian  with  natu- 
ral ethics.  All  imperfect  systems  might  then  be 
disregarded,  except  as  having  historical,  or  rather, 
antiquarian  interest,  and  the  term  "  Christian 
ethics  "  would  be  considered  tautological.  But  at 
present,  only  those  who  are  certain  that  the  moral 
precepts  of  Jesus  are  absolute  and  universal  can 
dispense  with  or  criticise  the  designation  of  those 
teachings  as  Christian.  The  evolutionist,  even  the 
Christian  evolutionist,  is  the  last  one  to  object  to 
the  characterization.  The  same  criticism  could  be 
brought  with  as  much  and  as  little  force  against 
"  Christian  theology,"  or  even  "  the  Christian  re- 
ligion," on  the  ground  that  the  true  theology  and 
the  true  religion  are  Christian.  The  objection, 


220      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

then,  is,  on  the  one  hand,  hypercriticism,  but  on 
the  other  hand  a  tribute  to  the  loftiness  and  truth 
of  the  ethics  of  Christianity. 

The  comprehensive  treatment  of  the  evolution  of 
morality  would  include  examination  of  the  princi- 
pal systems  of  ethics  which  have  been  formulated 
and  have  had  extensive  influence,  especially  the 
Buddhistic,  the  Grecian,  and  the  Jewish.  But  the 
prolonged  account  which  would  be  necessary  would 
retard  rather  than  promote  the  progress  of  our  dis- 
cussion, and  I  shall  content  myself  with  such  inci- 
dental comparisons  as  the  consideration  of  Christian 
ethics  may  suggest.  We  proceed,  then,  to  note  the 
distinctive  characteristics  of  the  moral  precepts  and 
principles  of  Christianity. 


A  marked  distinction,  which  will  appear  at 
every  point,  and  which  is  often  noted  in  expressed 
contrast  with  the  Judaism  it  superseded,  is  the  dis- 
placement of  rules  by  principles.  In  place  of  a 
code  of  morals,  it  presents  a  philosophy  of  mo- 
rality. The  difference  is  like  that  between  a  photo- 
graph and  a  portrait,  which  are  indeed  pictures 
of  the  same  face,  yet  the  photograph  represents  a 
single  moment  and  the  portrait  represents  the  char- 
acteristic man  at  all  moments  ;  or  like  the  differ- 
ence between  learning  anything,  as  a  geometrical 
theorem  or  a  piece  of  music,  by  rote,  and  master- 
ing the  principles  of  mathematical  relations  or  of 
harmony  which  are  expressed  in  particular  propo- 
sitions or  compositions.  It  was  a  favorite  method 
of  Jesus  to  indicate  the  single  principle  from  which 


PERSONAL  AND  SOCIAL  221 

numerous  rules  proceed ;  such  as,  "  The  Sabbath 
was  made  for  man,"  and,  "  Thou  shalt  love  thy 
neighbor  as  thyself."  His  greatest  apostle  enu- 
merated specific  commandments  to  show  that  all  of 
them  fulfill  one  law,  a  law  which  implies  that  he 
who  loves  his  neighbor  will  work  him  no  ill,  and 
will  therefore  have  no  need  to  post  up  particular 
prohibitions.  As  compared  with  Judaism  there 
was  transition  from  legalism  to  principles.  A  sim- 
ilar contrast  could  be  made  in  respect  to  Buddhism 
with  its  acts,  virtues,  and  graces,  catalogued  in 
numbers  reaching  into  the  thirties  and  forties. 
Christianity  enjoins  many  of  the  same  duties,  but 
is  the  morality  of  reason  and  freedom  in  contrast 
with  the  morality  of  rules.  This  characteristic  ex- 
cellence of  Christian  ethics  gives  it  a  claim,  at 
the  outset,  to  be  considered  superior  to  all  other 
systems. 

II 

The  Christian  ideal,  like  every  other,  is  both 
personal  and  social.  It  presents  the  ideal  of  a 
person  and  the  ideal  of  a  society.  Unlike  every 
other,  however,  it  presents  the  two  in  right  propor- 
tion. In  other  systems  and  codes,  either  the  per- 
sonal or  the  social  has  preponderated  unduly. 
Previous  to  the  time  of  Jesus,  the  corporate  life 
dominated.  The  family,  the  kin,  the  clan,  the 
tribe,  the  State,  were  controlling.  At  some  subse- 
quent periods,  but  in  disregard  of  Christianity, 
there  has  been  within  Christendom  excessive  in- 
dividualism, as  in  the  French  Revolution,  when 
liberty  and  equality  left  less  than  one  third  to 
fraternity,  and  liberty  did  not  hesitate  to  defraud 


222      THE   CHRISTIAN  IDEAL — PERSONAL 

equality.  It  is  considered  an  abuse,  or  at  least  a 
misapprehension  of  Christianity,  for  the  Roman 
Catholic  branch  of  the  church  to  exalt  the  organi- 
zation above  the  individual.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  not  according  to  Christianity  for  the  Protest- 
ant branches  of  the  church  to  exalt  the  freedom 
and  final  salvation  of  the  individual  above  the  wel- 
fare of  society,  which  is  the  kingdom  coming  on 
earth.  But  the  ideal  of  Jesus  was  both  personal 
and  social,  and  was  both  in  perfect  harmony.  To 
revert  to  a  figure  already  employed,  the  Christian 
ideal  is  not  a  circle  with  the  individual  at  the 
centre,  nor  a  circle  with  society  at  the  centre,  but 
an  ellipse  swept  around  the  personal  and  social 
foci.  We  may,  however,  for  convenience  of  treat- 
ment, distinguish  the  two  phases  of  the  Christian 
ideal  and  consider  them  in  successive  chapters, 
but  remembering  always  that  there  is  no  separation 
in  fact. 

in 

In  the  personal  ideal  of  Christianity  the  first 
characteristic  to  be  noted  is  the  individualism  it- 
self. The  person  stands  forth,  not  to  be  subordi- 
nated to  any  grouping  of  community,  class,  or  race, 
but  having  his  own  intrinsic,  inalienable,  and  eter- 
nal worth.  This  absolute  value  of  the  individual 
is  expressed  in  religious  language  by  calling  him 
a  child  of  God.  He  is  more  than  a  product  of 
nature ;  he  is  more  than  a  member  of  the  species, 
although  'he  is  both.  He  is  a  son  of  God,  and 
therefore  is  not  the  sport  of  nature,  nor  the  tool 
of  other  men. 

On  the  negative  side  this  individualism  is  eman- 


INDIVIDUALISM  223 

cipation.  There  is  emancipation  from  those  na- 
tional barriers  which  give  adventitious  importance 
or  disadvantage,  from  slavery,  from  class  and  caste, 
from  inferior  privilege  of  sex.  Distinctions  be- 
tween Jew  and  Greek  sink  into  insignificance  in 
comparison  with  the  worth  of  the  soul.  Jews 
might  be  cast  off,  and  foreigners  from  any  land, 
east,  west,  north,  or  south,  might  sit  down  in  the 
kingdom  of  God.  The  slave  was  not  a  chattel, 
but  a  soul.  The  aristocracy  of  scribes  and  Phari- 
sees had,  as  such,  no  consideration  in  the  regard 
of  Jesus  above  the  ignoble  publicans.  His  regard 
for  woman,  even  for  debased  woman,  was  her  eman- 
cipation. Every  foreigner,  slave,  publican,  woman 
was  recovered  to  freedom  and  privilege  as  a  child 
of  God,  having  immortal  worth.  What  was  made 
real  by  the  teaching  and  action  of  Jesus  was  epit- 
omized by  Paul  in  his  famous  declaration  of  the 
independent  worth  of  souls :  "  There  is  neither 
Jew  nor  Greek,  there  is  neither  bond  nor  free, 
there  is  neither  male  nor  female,  for  ye  are  all  one 
in  Christ  Jesus ;  "  an  assertion  which  in  principle 
is  a  commonplace  now,  but  which  was  then  a  start- 
ling and  revolutionary  affirmation.  The  higher 
value  of  worth  swept  away  all  lower  and  artificial 
distinctions.  This  emancipation,  so  clearly  de- 
manded long  before  it  was  realized,  is  the  release 
of  the  individual  from  the  oppression  and  injus- 
tice imposed  by  the  corporate  life.  It  has  been 
secured  through  the  Christian  centuries  in  grow- 
ing freedom  of  belief,  thought,  and  speech,  as  well 
as  of  action.  Christian  individualism  doomed 
slavery,  doomed  caste,  doomed  the  subjection  of 


Of 


224      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — PERSONAL 

woman,  doomed  civil  and  religious  disabilities. 
Hegel  considers  the  widening  of  liberty  the  pro- 
gress of  history.  "  The  history  of  the  world,"  he 
says,  "  is  progress  in  the  consciousness  of  liberty." 
He  explains  his  meaning  by  saying  that  the  Orien- 
tals knew  one  man  was  free,  the  despot ;  the  Greeks 
knew  some  men  were  free,  namely,  the  Greeks, 
while  the  rest  of  mankind  were  slaves  or  barba- 
rians ;  but  that  we  know  all  men  are  free,  that 
man  as  man  is  free,  and  that  it  is  our  duty  to 
confer  freedom  on  every  circle  of  society.  This 
is  the  Christian  ideal  of  man.  The  liberty  we 
cherish  is  largely  due  to  Christ's  thought  and 
treatment  of  men,  and  to  the  universality  of  his 
religion.  The  Reformation,  in  its  doctrine  of 
personal  justification  by  faith  and  its  declaration 
of  freedom  from  the  domination  of  priesthood  and 
church,  was  a  reassertion  of  primitive  Christianity. 
Emancipation,  however,  is  only  a  release,  and  does 
not,  in  itself,  complete  the  personal  ideal.  Indeed, 
man  emancipated  all  the  more  needs  a  positive 
ideal.  To  relax  or  remove  the  external  authority 
of  the  community  makes  it  all  the  more  necessary 
to  provide  the  ideal  and  the  motive  power  of  his 
self-realization.  Christianity  sets  the  individual 
free  from  externalities  and  oppressions  that  he 
may  assert  himself  and  realize  his  true  character, 
or,  rather,  it  is  by  such  realization  only  that  he  can 
hope  to  be  emancipated  from  false  and  unjust  re- 
strictions. 

IV 

Positively,  then,  Christianity,  in  its  every  teach- 
ing, doctrine,  and  assumption,  asserts  the  worth  of 


THE  WORTH  OF  THE  PERSON    225 

the  individual.  What  a  call  was  that  to  the  an- 
cient world  :  "  What  shall  a  man  give  in  exchange 
for  his  soul,"  for  his  own  true  life  ?  A  soul  out- 
weighs the  world.  "  What  shall  it  profit  a  man  if 
he  gain  the  whole  world,  and  lose  his  own  soul  ?  " 
Moral  and  spiritual  laws  apply  to  all  individuals. 
No  exceptions  are  made.  "  Whosoever  "  designates 
every  man  and  woman  and  child.  "  Whosoever" 
goes  down  through  all  the  strata  of  society,  out 
among  all  the  nations,  up  to  all  the  mighty  and 
noble.  "  Whosoever  would  save  his  life  shall  lose 
it,  and  whosoever  loseth  his  life  shall  find  it."  It 
makes  no  difference  whether  he  is  a  master  or  a 
bondservant.  "Every  one  that  exalteth  himself 
shall  be  humbled,  and  he  that  humbleth  himself 
shall  be  exalted."  It  makes  no  difference  whether 
he  is  a  Pharisee  or  a  publican.  Every  one  can 
come  under  the  laws  of  moral  character.  Every 
one,  be  he  high  or  low,  must  come  under  those  laws. 
The  narratives  single  out  individuals  from  all 
classes  and  conditions  and  bring  them  separately 
before  Jesus.  He  addresses  to  each  of  them  his 
teaching  of  the  worth  of  the  soul  and  of  the  attain- 
ment of  its  worth.  Nicodemus  a  teacher,  Nathan- 
iel a  guileless  Israelite,  a  woman  of  despised  Sa- 
maria, a  rich  ruler,  Zaccheus  the  publican,  Simon 
the  Pharisee,  the  fallen  woman  who  had  entered 
Simon's  house,  a  restored  paralytic,  the  impetuous 
Peter,  are  drawn,  each  by  himself  alone,  into  con- 
versation with  Jesus.  The  teacher  shows  110  defer- 
ence to  rank  and  no  contempt  for  lowly  station,  but 
does  respect  every  person  for  his  own  worth,  and 
so  awakens  self-respect.  His  fondness  for  per- 


226      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

sonal  conversation  was  like  that  of  Socrates,  but 
the  Grecian  sage  seldom  talked  with  any  but  those 
of  his  own  station,  the  free  and  educated  youths 
of  Athens.  The  wonder  of  the  disciples  of  Jesus 
when  they  found  him  absorbed  in  conversation 
with  the  Samaritan  woman,  the  surprise  of  the 
Pharisees  that  he  sat  at  table  with  publicans,  were 
due  rather  to  the  national  and  social  separation  of 
those  persons  than  to  their  moral  debasement  or 
to  the  fear  of  contamination.  He  emphasized  the 
value  of  the  individual  in  three  parables,  which  are 
grouped  together  because  each  discriminates  one 
from  a  number.  One  sheep  out  of  a  hundred,  one 
coin  out  of  ten,  mean  that  the  individual  is  not 
lost  sight  of  in  the  multitude.  No  matter  how 
many  or  how  few  there  are,  each  has  his  own  value, 
and  if  lost  must  be  found.  One  son  out  of  two 
means  that  God  loves  a  man  as  much  as  if  he  had 
only  two  sons,  and  that  man  were  one  of  the  two. 
One  of  a  hundred,  one  of  ten,  one  of  two ;  it 
makes  no  difference.  Each  is  himself  in  his  own 
worth,  even  if  he  has  strayed  away,  or  is  poor, 
wretched,  and  wicked.  The  regard  of  Jesus  for 
every  individual  was  in  view  of  what  each  might  be. 
He  saw  the  ideal  in  the  actual,  and  saw  in  every 
person  the  possibility  of  the  ideal. 


The  ideal  of  personal  worth  was  clearly  pre- 
sented in  the  character  of  Jesus  himself.  He  not 
only  recognized  and  emphasized  the  worth  of  every 
individual,  but  set  forth  the  ideal  in  his  own  per- 
son. In  one  respect  there  is  nothing  distinctive 


THE  CHARACTER   OF  JESUS  227 

in  this.  Every  teacher  has  the  same  ideal  for  him- 
self that  he  sets  before  others.  But  every  other 
teacher  admits  that  he  has  not  attained  it.  Jesus 
embodied  every  precept  he  enunciated,  and  em- 
bodied it  perfectly.  He  was  not  one  who  was  strug- 
gling up  painfully  and  with  only  partial  success 
towards  an  ever-receding  ideal.  All  that  he  taught 
he  was,  and  all  that  he  was  he  taught.  The  mar- 
vel and  the  power  of  the  life  of  Jesus  is  his  perfec- 
tion, the  ideal  made  real.  He  did  not  say,  "  I  seek 
the  truth  and  the  life,"  but,  "  I  am  the  truth  and 
the  life."  Here  is  the  first  and  chiefest  distinction 
of  the  personal  ideal  of  Christian  ethics.  The  ideal 
was  realized  in  the  person  who  gave  it  to  the  world. 
No  act,  or  word,  or  thought,  or  motive  conflicted 
with  his  own  perfection.  His  holiness  was  objecti- 
fied as  obedience  to  the  will  of  his  Father,  who  is 
holy.  That  good  and  loving  will  he  never  tra- 
versed and  never  questioned.  He  knew  that  he 
was  in  complete  harmony  with  his  Father's  will. 
His  fidelity  was  constant  and  complete.  Here  is 
the  significance  of  his  temptation.  No  easy  success, 
no  personal  satisfaction,  no  suffering,  no  martyr- 
dom, could  swerve  him  from  holiness  of  character 
and  obedience  to  his  Father's  will.  Others  have 
had  a  measure  of  faithfulness,  but  in  him  it  was 
perfect  and  entire,  wanting  nothing.  His  perfec- 
tion has  been  described  in  various  ways,  all  of 
which  show  the  symmetry  of  his  character.  Ap- 
parent opposites  are  united;  compassion  and  in- 
dignation, gentleness  and  strength,  freedom  and 
obedience,  contemplation  and  action,  repose  and 
energy,  calmness  and  zeal,  sorrow  and  joy.  All 


228      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL — PERSONAL 

his  character  went  into  each  quality.  There  was 
always  appropriateness  of  act  and  word  to  the  occa- 
sion. No  virtue  was  in  excess  or  disproportion. 
No  good  trait  slid  off  into  its  counterfeits.  The 
delicate  balance  was  never  disturbed.  Criticisms 
have  indeed  been  pointed  at  some  fancied  lack  or 
excess  in  the  character  of  Jesus,  but  have  not  been 
regarded  as  well  taken.  If  he  was  angry  it  is  seen 
that  his  anger  was  justifiable,  and  was  more  virtu- 
ous than  an  easy  toleration.  If  he  was  compassion- 
ate to  notorious  sinners,  it  is  seen  that  it  was  a 
reclaiming  compassion,  and  that  the  pity  of  purity 
is  holier  than  the  condemnation  of  contempt.  The 
powerlessness  of  criticism  to  discover  flaws  in  the 
symmetry  and  harmony  of  Jesus'  character  has 
given  certainty  to  the  agreeing  opinion  that  he  is 
the  greatest  of  the  holy  and  the  holiest  of  the  great. 
The  ideal  is  set  forth  in  a  real  person.  It  is  not 
all  or  partly  in  theory ;  it  is  not  all  or  partly  in 
the  future  as  a  hope ;  it  has  been  embodied,  incar- 
nated in  an  actual  personality.  An  ideal  character 
is  indeed  perceived  without  the  knowledge  of  Jesus. 
Its  qualities  are  suggested  by  various  individuals, 
and  are  combined  in  an  imaginary  character,  as  we 
have  already  seen.  It  is  known  that  the  ideal  is  of 
a  person,  of  a  person  in  society,  is  of  absolute  worth 
as  an  end,  not  a  means,  is  the  union  of  worth  and 
happiness,  and  that  the  ideal  is  partly  realized.  I 
suppose  we  could  not  construct  any  kind  of  an 
ideal  if  there  were  no  virtue  realized  in  life.  But 
the  ideal  is  incomplete.  It  lacks  content.  In 
the  life  of  Christ  all  the  conditions  are  realized  in 
his  complete,  symmetrical,  and  perfect  character. 


THE  LAW  OF  LOVE  229 

When  we  put  the  best  ideal  we  can  form  by  the 
side  of  the  historical  Jesus,  its  every  truthful 
feature  is  reproduced  in  him.  Yet  he,  the  actual 
person,  transcends  it.  In  fact,  the  ideals  we  can 
frame  are  derived  in  large  part  from  him.  We 
become  aware  of  this  derivation  when  we  place  the 
ideals  of  previous  times,  and  of  peoples  who  have 
been  ignorant  of  Jesus,  beside  his  character.  Then 
we  are  struck  by  omissions  and  defects  of  teaching, 
and  still  more  impressed  by  the  inferiority,  im- 
perfection, and  one-sidedness  of  the  teachers  them- 
selves. 

VI 

Although  the  ideal  is  personal,  it  is  not  an  ideal 
of  the  person  in  isolation.  The  perfection  of  the 
individual  is  found  in  right  relation  to  others. 
The  law  of  love  dominates  the  person.  It  domi- 
nated Jesus.  The  ideal  he  presents  is  of  a  person 
who  loves  others  according  to  their  need.  Their 
need  is  measured  by  their  worth.  The  service  of 
love  is  determined,  not  by  affinities,  or  standing, 
or  reputation,  but  by  need  and  worth.  It  is  not 
enough  to  do  good  to  those  who  do  good  to  us. 
We  should  do  good  to  those  who  need  what  we  can 
impart.  Self-impartation  is  a  characteristic  of  the 
ideal  character.  Jesus  was  so  characterized  in  the 
highest  degree.  He  expressed  it  as  a  law  of  life 
in  the  words,  "  The  Son  of  man  came,  not  to  be 
ministered  unto,  but  to  minister."  There  had  been 
some  perception  of  this  law  in  Judaism.  The  pre- 
cept, "  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself," 
was  to  be  found  in  the  books  of  Moses.  But  the  ap- 
plication had  been  restricted  chiefly  to  the  nation. 


230     THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

The  parable  of  the  good  Samaritan  gave  a  new 
definition  of  neighborhood.  The  law  obtained  in 
the  family  amongst  all  nations,  but  mutual  services 
were  determined  and  limited  by  incomplete  ideals 
of  character.  Here  and  there,  among  the  ancients, 
an  individual  perceived  the  law,  and  on  occasions 
practised  it,  but  usually  under  local  or  class  restric- 
tions, and  according  to  defective  standards.  Jesus 
made  it  a  central  and  controlling  law  of  his  own 
life,  and  of  all  true  life.  He  poured  out  the  wealth 
of  his  character  in  a  ministration  which  was  not 
the  emptying  but  the  impartation  of  self.  What- 
ever greatness  one  has  is  the  measure,  not  of  exac- 
tion, but  of  service.  He  who  is  great  should  serve, 
because  he  who  is  great  can  serve.  And  greatness 
is  attained  by  service.  One  becomes  greater  him- 
self by  serving  others  according  to  their  need  and 
worth.  "  Whosoever  would  become  great  among 
you,  shall  be  your  minister."  A  great  moral  nature 
puts  itself  into  the  pain  and  distress  which  selfish- 
ness brings  upon  others,  and  finds  its  own  peace  and 
power  in  such  sympathy.  Something  like  this  is 
the  open  secret  of  Christ's  life.  He  realized  the 
law  of  sacrifice  perfectly,  and  taught  it  as  plainly 
as  it  could  be  taught  in  the  paradoxes  of  the  Beati- 
tudes, in  the  inculcation  of  meekness,  non-resist- 
ance, and  forgiveness  of  injuries.  He  thus  reversed 
customary  standards,  and  said  that  he  did.  Those 
maxims  which  some  declare  impracticable,  such  as, 
"  If  any  man  take  away  thy  coat  let  him  have  thy 
cloke  also ; "  "  Whosoever  smiteth  thee  on  thy 
right  cheek  turn  to  him  the  other  also,"  mean 
disregard  of  the  moralities  of  self-protection  and 


THE  LAW  OF  LOVE  231 

of  exact  justice  under  the  higher  law  of  serving 
men  according  to  their  need.  "  Ke verse  all  that," 
he  seems  to  say,  and  to  say  it  with  the  emphasis  of 
hyperbole,  "  and  do  good  to  the  evil  and  the  un- 
thankful. Lose  your  life  and  you  will  save  it. 
Do  not  protect  yourself,  and  avenge  yourself,  and 
profit  yourself ;  do  not  save  your  life  by  sparing 
it  in  avoidance  of  burdens  and  pains,  but  give  it 
lavishly  away  in  the  service  and  sympathy  which 
others  need."  This  is  the  strain  that  runs  through 
the  teaching  of  Jesus.  The  teaching  is  understood 
in  the  light  of  his  life.  Some  of  it  would  be  unin- 
telligible if  we  did  not  know  the  sacrificial  life  of 
Jesus  in  its  power  and  beauty.  The  life  was  the 
light  of  men.  Socrates  said  that  men  lack  know- 
ledge only,  that  if  their  ignorance  is  dispelled  they 
will  live  aright.  But  light  proceeds  from  life,  not 
life  from  light,  unless,  at  least,  light  is  reflected 
from  a  life.  Because  the  perfect  character  imparts 
itself  at  c0st  of  suffering,  the  cross  is  the  best 
symbol  or  that  which  Jesus  personified.  The  cross 
is  complete  self-giving.  The  service  of  others  ac- 
cording to  their  need,  in  teaching,  in  sympathy,  in 
self-impartation,  is  realized  only  in  society  and 
brings  into  view  the  social  ideal,  but  it  is  an  essen- 
tial element  in  the  personal  ideal  of  perfection. 

The  personal  ideal  according  to  Christianity  in- 
cludes happiness.  Jesus  chose  a  word  suggestive 
of  internal  rather  than  external  sources  of  happi- 
ness, the  word  "  blessedness."  The  child  of  God  is 
blessed.  He  alone  is  blessed.  He  may  suffer,  but 
beneath  the  suffering  is  a  deep  joy.  Jesus  prom- 
ised peace  to  his  disciples,  and  described  it  by 


232      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — PERSONAL 

reference  to  himself,  "  My  peace  give  I  unto  you." 
He  combined  in  himself  both  the  elements  of  good- 
ness, perfection  and  happiness.  By  example  and 
precept  he  presented  the  personal  ideal  which  com- 
bines them,  and  presented  it  in  such  ways  that  men 
could  adopt  it. 

Such  is  the  ideal  of  character  given  to  the  world 
in  the  life  and  teachings  of  Jesus.  It  is  an  ideal 
as  distinctive  as  Stoic  endurance  or  Hebrew  obe- 
dience to  law.  It  is  not  an  ideal  of  self-renuncia- 
tion alone,  but  of  self-renunciation  of  the  lower  in 
order  to  self-realization  in  the  higher  values  of  life. 
It  was  dimly  perceived  in  Buddhistic  asceticism, 
which,  however,  was  negative  as  deprivation.  It 
was  clearly  recognized  and  nobly  lived  by  Jesus  in 
that  self-denial  which  loses  itself  in  finding  another. 
The  child  of  God,  who,  as  such,  has  absolute 
worth,  is  the  brother  of  every  other  child  of  God, 
and  seeks  the  other's  worth,  as  he  does  his  own,  by 
the  sacrifice  of  self-impartation.  In  seeking  an- 
other's worth  he  best  secures  his  own.  It  is  the 
true  principle  of  morality,  and  so  was  destined  to 
supersede  all  ascetic,  legal,  and  negative  types  of 
morality,  while  it  includes  all  their  truth. 

VII 

This  ideal  of  goodness  contained  implicitly  what 
is  explicitly  and  repeatedly  taught  by  Jesus.  The 
child  of  God  having  absolute  worth  has  eternal  life. 
Jesus  did  not  attempt  to  prove  immortality.  He 
assumed  and  constantly  declared  it.  If  man  is  in 
union  with  God  he  can  never  die.  To  believe  in 
Christ  is  to  be  in  such  union,  for  it  is  to  have  the 


ETERNAL  LIFE  233 

ideal  character  which  is  in  harmony  with  the  char- 
acter and  therefore  with  the  will  of  God.  The 
only  approach  to  an  argument  is  the  reply  Jesus 
made  to  the  question  of  the  Sadducees,  who  did  not 
believe  in  personal  immortality.  The  word  Moses 
heard  from  the  burning  bush  is  enough  :  "  I  am  the 
God  of  Abraham,  and  of  Isaac,  and  of  Jacob." 
The  patriarchs  were  in  personal  union  with  God 
and  had  their  life  in  him.  A  union  which  is  moral 
and  spiritual  cannot  be  destroyed  by  physical  dis- 
solution. Such  a  union  implies  that  man  is  not 
merely  a  link  in  the  chain  of  physical  nature,  but 
has  reason  by  which  he  knows  God,  the  absolute 
reason,  and  is  a  spirit  made  in  the  image  of  God, 
who  is  a  spirit.  As  reason  and  spirit  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  man,  even  if  perverse  and  unreal- 
ized morally,  can  cease  to  exist  with  the  death  of 
the  body.  But  he  who  realizes  his  character  as  a 
child  of  God,  in  knowledge  of  his  Father's  will  and 
in  obedience  to  it,  has  eternal  life,  for  he  cannot 
be  plucked  out  of  the  Father's  hand.  Moral  and 
spiritual  union  with  God  is  not  temporary,  but 
eternal.  The  God  of  Abraham,  of  Isaac,  and  of 
Jacob  is  the  God  of  persons.  A  person  is  not  a  ma- 
terial phenomenon.  He  knows  God  and  is  known 
of  him.  He  loves  God  and  is  loved  by  him.  He 
has  satisfaction  in  God  and  God  has  satisfaction 
in  him.  God  is  not  the  God  of  the  dead,  but  of 
the  living.  The  persons  he  loves  are  not  creatures 
who  appear  and  disappear,  who  pass  into  nothing- 
ness, who  die,  of  whom  he  is  bereaved,  but  persons 
who  live,  who,  as  his  children,  have  absolute  and 
undying  worth.  All  arguments  for  immortality 


234     THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

are  eventually  reduced  to  this  one  argument  of 
kinship  with  God.  The  argument  that  man  in  his 
knowledge  of  before  and  after,  of  the  relation  of 
separate  phenomena,  of  cause  and  of  final  cause, 
is  a  being  who  transcends  physical  nature,  means 
that  man  has  reason  corresponding  to  the  reason 
which  makes  things  the  expression  of  thought, 
which  makes  the  world  a  cosmos  and  not  a  chaos, 
and  which  is  God  the  supreme  Reason.  The  argu- 
ment from  man's  moral  nature,  from  his  sense  of 
obligation,  from  the  ideal  of  perfection  which  de- 
cades of  earthly  life  cannot  complete,  means  a 
moral  nature  derived  from  and  akin  to  the  absolute 
holiness  of  God.  The  argument  from  the  moral 
order  of  the  world  means  the  personal  participation 
of  those  who  perceive  and  desire  it,  and  not  merely 
the  participation  of  a  future  generation  which  in 
its  turn  will  pass  away,  because  it  is  a  divine  order 
realized  in,  as  well  as  through,  the  persons  who 
consciously  promote  it.  This  moral  order,  as  we 
shall  see  later,  is  the  kingdom  of  God,  which  is  of 
the  present  as  well  as  of  the  future,  which  every 
child  of  God  enters,  and  in  which  he  ever  remains. 
All  the  reasons,  I  say,  that  we  have  for  believing 
in  immortality,  are  based  on  the  kinship  of  man 
with  God.  God  the  person  and  man  the  person  in 
relation  as  persons  —  that  is  all  of  it.  God  and 
Abraham  know  each  other  ;  therefore  Abraham  is 
immortal.  Dr.  Dorner  puts  it  concisely  and  con- 
clusively in  the  heading  of  a  chapter  :  "  Destined 
for  religion,  man  is  destined  for  immortality.'* 
This  is  fundamental  and  indispensable  for  ethics. 
It  signifies  the  absoluteness  of  morality.  It  signi* 


ETERNAL  LIFE  235 

fies  that  the  ideal  of  perfection  is  not  illusory,  but 
that  it  is  to  be  realized.  It  signifies  the  value  of 
the  individual  in  and  of  himself  as  a  distinct  and 
separate  person,  as  a  soul  having  eternal  life,  and 
not  merely  as  an  infinitesimal  unit,  merged  and  sub- 
merged in  a  great  impersonal  social  organism. 

Christianity,  then,  by  its  doctrine  of  eternal  life, 
is  the  true  ethics,  for  it  recognizes  the  absolute 
worth  of  personality.  This,  which  has  been  made  a 
reproach  against  Christianity,  is  really  its  strength 
and  glory.  Practicality  says  that  the  gospel  in  seek- 
ing the  future  salvation  of  the  individual  neglects  his 
present  welfare  and  neglects  the  welfare  of  society. 
But  the  gospel  by  procuring  the  everlasting  salva- 
tion of  the  individual  best  advances  his  welfare 
and  the  social  well-being,  for  it  thus  declares  the 
worth,  the  absolute  worth  of  every  individual. 
Absolute  worth  is  the  very  core  of  the  doctrine  of 
eternal  life.  Even  when  the  representations  of  a 
future  life  are  physical  rather  than  spiritual,  and 
when  salvation  is  thought  of  chiefly  as  rescue  from 
remote  dangers,  yet  the  belief  that  man  is  immor- 
tal is  made  distinct,  and  this  is  belief  in  his  imper- 
ishable worth.  To  take  time  as  the  measure  of 
salvation,  so  that  unending  duration  is  the  princi- 
pal thing,  is,  to  be  sure,  to  estimate  salvation  im- 
properly. But  even  so  there  is  recognition  of  the 
absolute  undying  worth  of  the  soul.  To  picture 
heaven  as  consisting  in  desirable  outward  condi- 
tions is,  undoubtedly,  to  take  a  low  view  of  man's 
destiny.  But  it  is  not  forgotten  that,  in  some 
sense,  worth  of  character  is  the  indispensable  con- 
dition of  gaining  heaven.  Besides,  whatever  may 


236      THE   CHRISTIAN  IDEAL— PERSONAL 

have  been  true  in  the  past,  salvation  is  now  almost 
invariably  represented  as  a  spiritual  character 
which,  outlasts  death  rather  than  as  a  state  of 
material  delights.  The  Christian  does  not  look 
forward  to  a  Mohammedan  heaven.  Dante's  rep- 
resentations of  the  life  beyond  are  permanent  in 
literature  because  they  match  outward  conditions 
with  inner  character.  The  point  to  be  made  is  that 
Christianity  raises  the  estimate  of  man's  needs  far 
above  his  outward  circumstances  and  his  mere  hap- 
piness. It  makes  man  realize  that  he  is  not  the 
creature  of  a  day,  but  has  a  life  which  is  immortal. 
It  tells  man  that  he  has  a  soul.  Although  that 
word  "  soul  "  is  often  used  vaguely,  it  is  well  that 
it  has  not  been  relinquished,  for  it  is  always  un- 
derstood, even  by  the  illiterate,  to  mean  that  man 
has  spiritual  and  immortal  worth.  The  philoso- 
pher Lotze  found  no  better  word  to  employ  as  an 
exact  designation  of  the  rational  and  spiritual  fac- 
ulties of  man.  At  the  very  first,  when  the  op- 
pressed slave  was  pointed  to  the  future  freedom  of 
heaven,  the  effect  was  more  than  the  removal  of 
discontent.  The  worth  of  the  slave  as  a  man  with 
a  soul  was  emphasized,  a  soul  for  which  Christ 
died,  and  which  would  attain  immortality.  This 
belief  in  the  immortal  worth  of  every  human  being 
was  the  principal  cause  which  reduced  infanticide, 
abortion,  and  suicide  in  the  early  centuries  of  the 
Christian  era.  The  belief  that  those  who  died 
unbaptized  were  exposed  to  eternal  damnation 
invested  infanticide  with  peculiar  horror.  But  re- 
gard for  the  sanctity  of  human  life  is  due  in  large 
part  to  the  Christian  belief  in  immortality.  Mr. 


THE  IDEAL  PERFECT  AND  FINAL      237 

Lecky  says :  "  This  minute  and  scrupulous  care 
for  human  life  and  human  virtue  in  the  humblest 
forms,  in  the  slave,  the  gladiator,  the  savage,  or 
the  infant,  was  indeed  wholly  foreign  to  the  genius 
of  Paganism.  It  was  produced  by  the  Christian 
doctrine  of  the  inestimable  value  of  each  immortal 
soul.  It  is  the  distinguishing  and  transcendent 
characteristic  of  every  society  into  which  the  spirit 
of  Christianity  has  passed."  l  The  gospel  has  al- 
ways made  men  feel  their  superiority,  as  persons 
who  are  children  of  God  and  heirs  of  immortality, 
to  the  accidental  circumstances  of  the  present  life, 
so  that,  at  times,  they  have  had  supreme  and  ex- 
cessive disregard  for  the  relations  of  society.  But 
at  all  events,  Christianity,  by  its  doctrine  of  ever- 
lasting life,  brings  the  worth  and  perfection  of  man 
to  their  highest  conception,  and  so  places  ethics  on 
the  true  basis.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  Chris- 
tianity is  strengthened  by  the  tendency  of  its 
preachers  to  leave  out  of  view  eternal  destiny,  and 
to  magnify  the  importance  of  the  present.  Men 
can  best  be  made  mindful  of  their  moral  and  spir- 
itual worth  by  frequent  thought  of  the  immortality 
which  Christ  lighted  up. 

VIII 

The  Christian  ideal  of  personal  character  ia 
therefore  to  be  regarded  as  perfect  in  kind  and 
not  to  be  superseded  by  another  type.  Legal 
morality  is  a  type  which  produces  some  virtues. 
Ascetic  morality  is  a  type  which  suppresses  some 
vices.  But  the  Christian  type  of  love  to  God  and 

1  History  of  European  Morals,  vol.  ii.,  p.  34. 


238      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

love  to  man  is  the  perfect  and  final  type.  Ideals 
of  goodness  may  be  compared  with  forms  of  gov- 
ernment. There  is  the  despotic  form,  which  is 
absolute  monarchy,  which  has  a  certain  strength 
of  security  while  it  lasts,  but  which  gives  little 
freedom  to  the  individual.  There  is  the  form 
which  combines  monarchy  with  parliamentary  rule, 
which  has  its  advantages,  but  which  is  in  a  state 
of  constant  transition  through  continual  reduction 
of  royal  power.  There  is  the  republican  form,  in 
which  the  people  elect  all  their  rulers,  a  form 
which  is  exposed  to  the  dangers  of  shifting  popu- 
lar opinion,  yet  which  is  in  principle  the  perfect 
and  final  form.  In  the  comparison  we  say  that 
self-government  is  the  perfect  form  and  that  it 
will  not  be  superseded  by  a  better  form,  nor  re- 
vert to  any  of  the  other  forms.  It  will  correct  its 
own  errors.  A  similar  conclusion  is  reached  in 
respect  to  types  of  civilization,  of  education,  and 
of  art.  The  Christian  character  is,  in  kind,  the 
perfect  type.  It  supersedes  all  others  but  can  be 
superseded  by  none  because  it  seeks  to  realize  the 
perfect  ideal  through  the  principle  of  love. 

IX 

A  characteristic  equally  significant  with  perfec- 
tion of  type  is  the  present  possession  of  this  kind 
of  character.  Complete  realization  lies  in  the 
future,  but  the  type  itself,  in  the  principle  and 
power  of  it,  is  already  actual.  Because  the  type 
now  exists  its  complete  attainment  is  to  be  ex- 
pected. I  regard  this  as  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant considerations  for  Christian  ethics,  as  well  as 


firm* 

%^(r  «*  ^ 

A  PRESENT  REALITY  239 

one  of  the  most  unique  features  of  the  Christian 
religion.     It  explains  and  combines  the  statements 
of  Scripture  that  man  is  to  be  saved  in  the  future 
and  yet  is  saved  in  the  present ;  that  he  will  have 
and  that  he  now  has  eternal  life.     By  supreme 
choice  one  goes  over  from  other  types  of  virtue,  as 
well  as  from  immorality,  to  the  Christian  type  of 
love.     He  abandons  the  legalism  of  rules  for  the 
freedom  and  spontaneity  of  love,  as  was  the  case 
when  the  Jew  became  a  Christian.     He  abandons 
the  repressions  of   asceticism  for  the  life  of  self- 
sacrificing  service,  which,  in  the  absorbing  pursuit 
of  the  higher,  leaves  no  room  nor  interest  for  the 
lower,  on  the  principle  that  he  who  walks  in  the 
Spirit  does  not  fulfill  the  lusts  of  the  flesh,  a  prin- 
ciple expressed  in  Dr.  Chalmers's  famous  sermon 
on  The  Expulsive  Power  of  a  New  Affection.    This 
type,  which  in  kind  is  perfect,  is  in  possession  and 
is  controlling  as  soon  as  it  is  intelligently  preferred 
and  freely  adopted.     It  is  the  working  principle 
from  the  outset.     The   character  exists  and  per- 
petually reproduces  itself  in  nearer  approximation 
to  the  standard.     This  is  precisely  the  truth  of 
self-realization.     Self  realizes  self.     There  must 
be  the  true  self  in  type  and  choice  in  order  that 
there  may  be  the  true  self  in  perfect  degree.     The 
Christian,  finally  produced,  untarnished  and  sym- 
metrical, is  the  Christian  continually  reproduced. 
There  must  be  the  Christian  to  begin  with  that 
there  may  be  the  Christian  to  end  with.    The  kind 
of  life  must  be  incipient  in  order  that  there  may 
be  that  kind  of  life  complete  and  beautiful.     All 
the  result,  the  advantage,  the  privilege  are  con- 


240      THE   CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

tained  in  the  initial  choice  which  constitutes  the 
new  character.  This  fact  finds  repeated  expres- 
sion in  the  New  Testament.  One  who  receives 
Christ  is  as  truly  a  child  of  God  the  instant  he 
turns  from  a  self-centred  to  a  God-centred  life, 
as  he  is  when  he  attains  the  glory  of  heaven  and 
is  clad  in  white  robes  before  the  throne  of  God. 
There  is  now  no  condemnation.  Now  are  we  the 
sons  of  God.  The  believer  has  eternal  life  now. 
He  has  passed  from  death  unto  life.  Eternal  life 
is  not  of  the  future  only,  but  also  of  the  present. 
It  is  future  because  it  is  present.  By  faith  which 
ventures  out  on  Christ,  there  is  a  new  status  which 
involves  all  that  will  be  progressively  evolved. 
Paul  puts  it  in  bold  and  sweeping  statement : 
"  If  any  man  be  in  Christ,  he  is  a  new  creation  ; 
old  things  are  passed  away,  behold,  all  things  afe 
become  new."  The  selfish  and  lower  life  is  old 
because  it  is  full  of  the  elements  of  decay.  The 
life  of  faith  and  love  is  new  because  it  has  the 
power  of  recuperation,  of  growth,  of  progress. 
Salvation  is  therefore  represented,  sometimes  as 
future,  sometimes  as  present.  "  Now  is  our  salva- 
tion nearer  than  when  we  believed,"  that  is,  the 
complete  salvation  of  the  future.  "  Work  out  your 
own  salvation,"  that  is,  you  have  salvation  already ; 
now,  work  it  out  to  its  issues.  The  writer  did  not 
mean  that  by  working  tremendously  salvation  will 
finally  be  grasped,  but,  let  the  possessed  salvation 
energize  and  work  till  its  appropriate  transforma- 
tions and  fruitage  are  complete. 

This  radical  and  instantaneous  change  of  char- 
acter is  sometimes  made  a  reproach  against  Chris- 


A  PRESENT  REALITY  241 

tianity,  but  is  really  one  of  its  most  important  and 
profound  principles.  The  criticism  is  made  that 
the  gospel  encourages  men  with  false  hopes ;  that 
it  attributes  to  a  word,  a  choice,  an  assent,  an  emo- 
tion, salvation  and  the  approval  of  God;  that  it 
leads  men  who  are  still  impure  and  imperfect  to 
regard  themselves  as  holy  before  they  have  had 
and  without  having  the  discipline  which  is  the  in- 
dispensable condition  of  right  character.  Salva- 
tion by  faith,  it  is  said,  cannot  take  the  place  of 
salvation  by  character.  The  effect  of  such  teach- 
ing is  to  make  men  indifferent  to  moral  conduct, 
since  salvation  is  not  by  works,  but  by  faith. 
When  the  condition  of  eternal  life  is  condensed 
into  the  words,  "  only  believe,"  there  is  danger  of 
immoral  indulgence  and  excess,  a  danger  which  has 
too  often  been  realized.  Any  principle  is  liable  to 
abuse,  and  the  principle  of  salvation  by  repentance 
has  not  escaped.  But  it  is  a  true  principle.  Faith 
puts  life  under  the  law  of  love  to  God  and  love  to 
man.  One  who  is  in  that  life  is  free  from  con- 
demnation. He  is  justified.  He  is  treated  as  if 
he  were  righteous.  He  has  the  privileges  of  a  son 
of  God.  Those  privileges  are  not  independent  of 
character,  but  are  conditioned  on  it.  He  is  new- 
privileged  because  he  is  new-charactered.  If  men 
deceive  themselves  with  the  counterfeits  of  faith, 
with  professions,  assents,  emotions,  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  genuine  faith  is  not  a  radical  transforma- 
tion of  character  and  the  pledge  of  its  perfection. 
The  counterfeits  are  a  tribute  to  the  reality  and 
potency  of  that  faith  which  renews  a  man,  which 
new-characters  him. 


242      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — PERSONAL 

The  fact  that  the  future  is  in  the  present  has 
abundant  illustration  in  inventions  and  discoveries. 
Edison  experiments  with  some  bits  of  carbon  and 
electrified  wires  till  he  can  scarcely  see  the  little 
threads  on  which  he  is  working.  If  a  certain  re- 
sult is  gained,  it  is  seen  at  once  that  old  methods 
of  lighting  and  communication  must  give  way  to 
new  methods.  The  invention  is  instantly  worth 
thousands  of  dollars  before  any  useful  application 
of  it  has  actually  been  made.  In  such  cases,  a 
power  is  discovered  which  is  seen  to  be  capable  of 
producing  important  results,  and  it  is  spoken  of  as 
if  it  had  already  produced  them.  As  soon  as  the 
art  of  printing  was  invented,  when  as  yet  no  books 
had  been  published,  it  might  have  been  foretold 
that  education  would  become  general,  that  all  parts 
of  the  globe  would  be  brought  into  communica- 
tion, that  the  Bible  would  be  an  open  book  and  the 
masses  would  be  emancipated  from  the  power  of 
the  priesthood.  A  volume  which  issued  from  the 
first  press  seems  to  us  ill-favored  enough  with  its 
coarse  paper  and  clumsy  letters,  but  on  the  title- 
page  might  have  been  printed,  education,  culture, 
political  and  religious  freedom.  Starting-points, 
epochs,  are  the  points  of  chief  importance.  An 
intellectual  awakening  occurs.  The  youth  who  had 
been  frivolous,  fond  of  sports,  a  pleasure-seeker, 
all  at  once,  by  some  book  casually  read,  or  under 
the  inspiration  of  a  teacher,  is  aroused  mentally, 
and  finds  himself  in  a  new  world.  His  intellec- 
tual character  is  changed  and  he  is  already  a 
scholar  before  actual  attainments  have  been  made. 
When,  in  time  of  war,  one  enlists  in  the  army, 


A  PRESENT  REALITY  243 

he  is  a  soldier,  he  is  honored  for  his  patriotism, 
and  has  a  new  character,  which,  under  discipline, 
will  make  him  a  soldier  indeed.  The  character  of 
faith  and  love  is  a  present  reality  having  potency 
and  promise.  Future  results  are  seen  in  the  pres- 
ent, and  are  regarded  as  already  attained.  There- 
fore there  is  joy  in  the  presence  of  the  angels  of 
God  over  one  sinner  that  repenteth.  To  be  sure, 
from  heaven's  point  of  view,  he  is  still  a  sorry  ob- 
ject. The  hour  may  be  far  away  before  he  attains 
perfection.  But  he  is  a  changed  man,  a  new  man. 
It  mattered  not  to  the  father  that  the  prodigal  son 
was  in  rags,  gaunt,  dirty,  forlorn.  He  had  turned 
about  and  come  home  to  his  father  because  he  had 
come  to  himself. 

It  is,  then,  one  of  the  commanding  ideas  of 
Christianity  that  he  who  is  in  Christ  is  a  new  sort 
of  man.  The  writers  of  the  New  Testament  never 
lost  the  surprise  of  it.  A  man  is  not  bound  by  the 
chains  of  past  habit,  but  is  set  free  at  a  stroke.  It 
is  not  implied  that  nothing  remains  to  be  done  ; 
but  faith  is  a  principle  which  works,  which  works 
by  love,  and  is  ever  at  work  until  the  actual  man 
becomes  the  ideal  man.  The  power  of  Christianity 
resides  in  no  small  degree  in  this  creation  of  the 
new  type  here  and  now.  It  has  power  because  it 
is  true  to  nature.  It  is  like  those  differentiations 
which  appear  instantaneously  and  which  produce 
new  types.  The  power  and  truth  of  this  idea 
would  be  still  more  clearly  seen,  if  comparison 
should  be  made  with  the  long  and  tedious  pro- 
cess of  the  ascetic  righteousness  of  Buddhism,  with 
the  passive  endurance  and  unnatural  calm  of  Stoi- 


244      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  PERSONAL 

cisra,  or  with  the  legal  prohibitions  and  require- 
ments of  Judaism,  a  comparison  which  needs  only 
to  be  suggested. 

x 

Another  characteristic  of  the  personal  ideal  of 
Christian  ethics  remains  to  be  noticed.  It  proceeds 
from  the  individual  to  society  rather  than  from 
society  to  the  individual.  The  individual  is  the 
starting  point.  The  individual  is  the  goal  or  end. 
Christianity  deals  directly  with  individuals  rather 
than  with  institutions  and  tendencies.  It  saves 
souls  first  and  creates  institutions  afterwards  and 
consequently.  It  singles  out  individuals  one  by 
one,  and  does  not  deal  with  them  in  the  mass.  It 
addresses  each  one  in  the  second  person  and  singu- 
lar number.  Christ  tasted  death  for  every  man. 
An  apostle  saysj  "  Christ  loved  me  and  gave  him- 
self for  me."  Jesus  turns  thought  away  almost  se- 
verely from  others,  saying,  "  What  is  that  to  thee  ? 
follow  thou  me."  Institutions  are  expressly  de- 
clared to  be  for  individuals,  and  individuals  not  to 
be  for  institutions.  "  The  Sabbath  was  made  for 
man  and  not  man  for  the  Sabbath."  This  method 
is  practically  reversed  by  some  theories  of  the  nat- 
ural development  of  society,  which  expect  improve- 
ment though  tendencies  and  movements,  the  spirit 
of  the  age,  the  Ze.it-  Geist,  an  intellectual  and  moral 
atmosphere.  A  slowly  improving  social  condition 
is  to  be  the  result,  and  the  individual  is  but  a 
means  to  this  magnificent  end.  He  is  in  the  midst 
of  a  slow  advance  of  which  his  own  generation  will 
witness  only  one  stadium.  One  who  is  moving  on  a 
swift  river  looks  forward  to  his  destination  which 


FROM  PERSON  TO  SOCIETY  245 

he  in  his  own  person  will  reach ;  but  if  he  is  far  up 
on  a  glacier  the  movement  is  so  slow  that  personally 
he  will  get  nowhere.  His  chief  concern,  therefore, 
is  to  make  his  hut  comfortable  and  his  stock  of 
provisions  ample  during  his  lifetime  on  this  frozen 
and  nearly  stationary  river.  Christianity  secures 
the  temporal  and  eternal  worth  of  the  individual. 
It  undertakes  to  reach  him  and  does  reach  him  at 
every  stage  of  social  progress  and  in  any  state  of 
civilization,  or  even  of  barbarism  and  savagery. 
It  does  not  wait  for  him  to  be  raised  up  by  general 
influences  of  intelligence  and  culture  to  a  higher 
level,  and  then  upon  that  rising  tide  of  progress  to 
act  merely  as  steersman  of  his  boat  to  its  destina- 
tion, avoiding  collisions  with  other  crafts,  which, 
like  his  own,  are  borne  along  by  great,  silent,  irre- 
sistible currents.  Every  ship  freighted  with  the 
hopes  and  capabilities  of  a  human  personality 
can  spread  its  sails  to  the  winds  of  heaven  and  re- 
sist or  traverse  the  currents  of  customary  tendency. 
Christianity  finds  the  individual  in  any  land,  in 
Africa,  Japan,  England,  and  renovates  him  so  that 
a  new  type  of  character,  yet  everywhere  essentially 
the  same,  appears  the  world  over.  One  century  need 
not  wait  for  another  which  will  be  more  advan- 
tageous. Paul  did  not  require  the  conditions  of 
the  nineteenth  or  the  twenty-ninth  century  in  order 
to  reach  men  with  his  gospel,  nor  did  he  believe  that 
the  world  must  wait  one  or  two  thousand  years  be- 
fore any  appreciable  results  in  moral  progress 
would  be  visible.  The  church  and  kingdom  of 
Christ  were  dear  to  him,  nor  did  he  overlook  the 
mutual  relations  of  members  of  the  kingdom,  but 


246      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — PERSONAL 

in  the  new  life  of  individuals  the  kingdom  had  al- 
ready come,  for  the  eternal  worth  of  persons  was 
realized  through  their  faith  and  love.  The  preach- 
ing of  the  gospel  is  with  power  because  it  is  direct 
to  individuals,  appealing  to  conscience  and  aspira- 
tion. Even  in  unrefined  forms  it  has  this  power. 
One  who  visits  a  congregation  of  working-people 
may  be  offended  by  the  homespun  illustrations  and 
slang  expressions  of  the  preacher.  It  may  seem 
as  if  religion  is  cheapened  or  caricatured.  And 
yet  the  earnest  speaker  may  have  possession  of,  or 
rather  be  possessed  by,  a  lofty  ideal  of  life  which 
can  be  made  intelligible  and  impressive  to  such 
listeners,  and  in  response  to  which  many  of  them 
can  be  brought  not  only  to  rectitude,  but  to  the 
gentleness  and  holiness  of  Christian  life.  The 
pulpit  becomes  ineffective  when  it  discusses  Chris- 
tianity in  some  general  way,  even  if  it  be  with  forci- 
ble argument,  telling  illustration,  and  choice  diction. 
The  living  gospel,  in  all  ages  and  conditions  of  the 
world,  addresses  the  individual  with  sanctions  of 
divine  authority,  and  thus,  not  waiting  for  the  slow 
movements  of  social  progress,  raises  him  at  once 
above  the  level  of  existing  custom. 

Such  is  the  personal  ideal  of  Christian  ethics. 
It  is  not  an  ideal  of  the  person  in  separation  from 
society,  for  his  character  is  formed  partly  in  social 
relations.  But  it  is  an  ideal  which,  exalts  person- 
ality. It  has  always  signified  the  absolute  worth 
of  the  individual,  as  having  eternal  life.  It  is  pre- 
sented perfectly  in  the  character  of  Jesus.  Its 
central  principle  is  love,  which  seeks  the  worth  of 
every  soul  through  service,  and,  if  need  be,  through 


FROM  PERSON  TO  SOCIETY  247 

suffering.  It  is,  in  type,  the  perfect  ideal,  not  to 
be  superseded,  and  it  is  an  ideal  which,  in  kind 
and  power,  is  the  existing  character.  It  corre- 
sponds with  the  essential  elements  of  the  moral 
ideal  which  have  been  indicated  in  an  earlier  chap- 
ter, and  yet  transcends  them.  The  admission  must 
doubtless  be  made  that  that  ideal  was  derived  in 
part  from  the  Christian  ideal.  But  the  elements 
which  are  found  in  the  ethics  of  those  who  had  no 
knowledge  of  Jesus,  as  Aristotle  and  the  Stoic 
philosophers,  are  reproduced  in  the  precepts  of 
Jesus,  and  also  are  surpassed. 

The  person,  however,  is  a  person  in  society,  and 
is  always  so  regarded  by  Jesus.  The  Christian 
ideal,  accordingly,  is  social  as  well  as  personal,  and 
in  the  next  chapter  the  social  point  of  view  is 
taken,  that  the  ideal  of  Christianity  may  be  recog- 
nized as  perfect  and  final. 


CHAPTER  X 
THE  CHRISTIAN   IDEAL  —  SOCIAL 

THE  social  ideal,  according  to  Christianity,  is, 
as  already  observed,  in  true  proportion  with  the 
personal  ideal.  In  this  chapter  I  consider  only 
the  characteristics  of  the  social  ideal  which  are 
peculiar  to  Christianity,  and  especially  as  they 
appear  in  the  teachings  of  Jesus,  leaving  to  the 
chapters  on  social  regeneration  the  application  of 
the  Christian  ideal  to  actual  society.  These  char- 
acteristics are  so  familiar  that  it  is  not  necessary 
to  develop  them  at  any  length. 


The  social  ideal  was  usually  set  forth  by  Jesus 
under  the  figure  of  a  kingdom,  which  he  called  the 
kingdom  of  God,  and  the  kingdom  of  heaven.  In 
the  three  narratives  known  as  the  Synoptic  Gospels, 
attributed  to  Matthew,  Mark,  and  Luke,  the  simile 
is  frequently  employed  in  beatitudes,  parables,  and 
didactic  teaching,  and  appears  in  the  prayer  he 
taught  his  disciples.  In  the  Fourth  Gospel,  attri- 
buted to  John,  there  is  less  of  the  kingdom  and 
more  of  the  personal  life,  but  the  representation  of 
the  renovated  society  as  a  kingdom  is  not  wanting. 
Nicodemus  is  told  that  one  must  be  born  again  to 
enter  into  the  kingdom  of  God.  In  answer  to  the 
question  of  Pilate  Jesus  spoke  of  his  kingdom,  and 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD  249 

of  himself  as  king.  The  inscription  which  Pilate 
caused  to  be  placed  upon  the  cross  shows  that 
Jesus  had  been  constantly  proclaiming  the  king- 
dom he  expected  to  establish.  In  the  other  books 
of  the  New  Testament,  the  church  on  earth  and  in 
heaven  is  the  usual  designation  of  the  renovated 
society,  although  the  kingdom  is  occasionally  men- 
tioned, and  Christ  is  called  a  king.  The  social 
ideal,  under  the  figures  of  kingdom  and  church,  is 
prominent  and  important  in  the  teachings  of  Jesus 
and  his  apostles. 

It  may  be  noticed  at  this  point  as  well  as  any- 
where that  this  conception  of  a  kingdom  is  thought 
by  some  at  the  present  time  to  be  the  fundamental 
and  dominant  truth  of  Christianity.  They  main- 
tain that  the  gospel  of  Jesus  is  no  less  and  no  more 
than  the  gospel  of  the  kingdom.  Professor  Julius 
Kaftan,  of  the  University  of  Berlin,  holds  that  the 
chief  good,  which  is  the  object  alike  of  ethics  and 
religion,  is  the  kingdom  of  God,  and  that  every 
line  of  the  gospel  must  be  read  in  the  light  of  that 
truth.  This,  in  fact,  is  the  central  principle  of  the 
influential  Ritschlian  school  of  German  theology, 
of  which  Professor  Kaftan  is  the  ablest  represent- 
ative. A  coterie  of  clergymen  in  the  Western 
States  of  this  country  hold  and  promulgate,  with 
some  slight  qualifications,  the  same  philosophy 
of  Christianity  as  the  kingdom  of  God.  These, 
and  many  others,  consider  this  philosophy  to  be  a 
revival  of  primitive  Christianity,  and  especially  a 
return  to  the  teachings  of  Jesus.  The  pulpit,  pro- 
claiming to-day  with  strong  emphasis  the  gospel  of 
society,  makes  large  use  of  the  figure  of  the  king- 


250       THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL— SOCIAL 

dom.  Occasionally,  this  claim  that  the  kingdom 
of  God  furnishes  the  comprehensive  and  exhaustive 
philosophy  of  Christianity  is  challenged.  The 
Reverend  James  Kidd  (not  the  author  of  "  Social 
Evolution")  maintains  in  his  published  lectures 
that,  in  the  New  Testament,  the  family,  even  more 
than  the  kingdom,  is  a  characteristic  representa- 
tion of  the  redeemed  society.1  I  presume  that 
the  writers  and  teachers  referred  to  would  make 
no  objection,  since  both  family  and  kingdom  are 
figures  which  represent  social  relations.  The 
family  suggests  relations  of  affection  in  the  father- 
hood of  God  and  the  brotherhood  of  men.  The 
kingdom  suggests  righteousness  in  obedience  to  the 
divine  government  of  society.  It  might  be  urged 
with  considerable  force  that  the  family  furnishes 
the  better  analogy,  inasmuch  as  it  is  coeval  with 
society,  while  the  rule  of  kings  is  a  mode  of  gov- 
ernment which  did  not  always  exist,  which  is  not 
now  universal,  and  which  may  entirely  disappear. 

For  my  own  part,  I  think  this  idea  of  the  king- 
dom is  just  at  present  being  overworked,  especially 
in  the  claim  that  it  is  practically  exhaustive  of  the 
truth  of  the  gospel.  Such  emphasis  of  an  import- 
ant truth  illustrates  the  common  tendency  to  swing 
from  one  extreme  to  the  opposite  extreme.  This 
is  a  reaction,  and  a  rather  violent  reaction,  from 
the  excessive  individualism  of  personal  salvation, 
just  as  the  Reformation,  with  its  doctrine  of  just- 
ification by  faith,  a  doctrine  which  isolated  the 
individual  and  brought  him  in  his  own  solitary 
person  alone  before  God,  was  a  reaction  from  the 

1  Morality  and  Religion:  being  the  Kerr  Lectures  for  1893-94. 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD  251 

corporate  authority  of  the  church.  Now,  while 
society  and  the  individual  are  inseparable,  society 
is  only  individuals  in  relation.  The  advance  of 
society  exalts  and  develops  personality.  Society  is 
not  the  end,  but  the  persons  who  compose  society 
are  the  end.  I  have  said  more  than  once  that  the 
human  curve  is  an  ellipse  swept  around  the  two 
foci,  society  and  the  individual.  But  centring  the 
chief  good  in  society,  or  the  kingdom,  to  which 
the  individual  is  subordinate,  converts  the  path  of 
humanity  (if  the  mathematical  symbolism  may  be 
pursued)  into  an  hyperbola,  which  comes  from  no- 
where and  terminates  in  infinity,  which  is  a  grand 
and  magnificent  curve,  but  lacks  definiteness  and 
completion.  The  revival  and  over-emphasis  of  the 
idea  of  the  kingdom  is  partly  due,  no  doubt,  to  the 
socialistic  theories  which  have  captivated  so  many 
minds.  It  is  an  attempt  to  solve,  by  means  of  a 
simile,  all  the  economic,  social,  and  political  prob- 
lems which  perplex  us.  This  revival,  however,  by 
impressing  the  truth  that  the  gospel  means  more 
than  the  future  salvation  of  the  individual,  may  be 
of  service  in  recovering  one  of  the  two  great  values 
of  Christianity.  The  recovery  of  neglected  truth 
is  usually  accomplished  by  over-valuation  of  it. 
Necessary  modifications  are  sure  to  be  made  in 
due  time.  Perhaps  those  who  magnify  the  idea  of 
the  kingdom  would  deny  that  they  minimize  the 
idea  of  personal  salvation.  My  criticism,  indeed, 
is  directed  to  overemphasis  of  the  kingdom.  Kaf- 
tan  cannot  avoid  recognition  of  a  purely  personal 
element  in  the  chief  good.  He  says :  '  Besides 
subordination  of  one's  own  well-being  to  the  well- 


252      THE   CHRISTIAN  IDEAL— SOCIAL 

being  of  others,  or  say,  of  the  community,  that 
everywhere  evokes  moral  approbation,  it  is  also 
true  that  yielding,  at  least  in  some  ways,  to  the 
sensuous  impulse  of  the  moment,  is  everywhere 
censured.' l  Therefore  inward  mastery  of  our  sen- 
suous impulses  is  an  element  of  morality.  This 
inward  mastery  is  certainly  personal  rather  than 
social.  But,  at  all  events,  Jesus  did  present  a  so- 
cial ideal.  He  presented  it  in  right  proportion  to 
the  personal  ideal.  He  presented  it  often  under 
the  figures  of  the  kingdom  of  God  and  the  king- 
dom of  heaven.  The  characteristics  of  this  ideal 
now  come  under  consideration.  That  which  has 
been  indicated  in  the  previous  chapter  concerning 
the  personal  ideal  presented  and  exemplified  by 
Jesus  may  be  expected  to  preserve  the  right  pro- 
portion of  social  and  personal  value. 

ii 

The  idea  of  the  kingdom  is  the  idea  of  an  organ- 
ization of  society  having  certain  characteristics  and 
objects.  The  idea  was  not  original  with  Jesus. 
He  took  it  up  from  Jewish  thought,  to  which  it 
was  a  cherished  expectation.  Professor  C.  H.  Toy 
says  of  it :  "  The  conception  of  the  kingdom  of  God 
is  a  marked  characteristic  of  Jewish  religious 
thought, — perhaps  its  most  distinctive  peculiarity. 
It  is  the  idea  of  a  social  organization  in  which 
the  divine  and  human  shall  be  perfectly  blended, 
the  social  ideal  being  complete  conformity  to  the 
divine  will  and  complete  interpenetration  by  the 

1  The  Truth  of  the  Christian  Religion,  translated  by  George 
Ferries,  B.  D.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  351. 


FULFILLMENT  253 

divine  guiding  and  moulding  presence.  .  .  .  Else- 
where the  main  stress  had  been  laid  on  conquest, 
government,  literature,  philosophy,  or  art ;  and  the 
theocratic  idea,  the  feeling  of  the  direct  and  com- 
plete dependence  of  the  community  on  God,  when 
it  has  been  recognized,  has  played  a  secondary 
role.  It  is  only  in  a  few  cases  that  the  attempt  to 
embody  it  in  a  historical  form  has  been  at  all  suc- 
cessful ;  and  among  these  it  is  to  the  Hebrew  the- 
ocracy that  the  first  rank  in  precision  and  practical 
efficacy  must  be  assigned."  l  The  theocracy,  how- 
ever, was  national.  Only  with  application  to  Israel 
could  it  be  said,  "  They  shall  be  to  me  a  people  and 
I  will  be  to  them  a  God."  The  kingdom,  although 
thus  limited,  was  thought  of,  by  some  at  least,  as  a 
spiritual  kingdom.  Not  only  would  there  be  boun- 
tiful harvests  with  rich  increase  of  wine  and  oil,  but 
there  would  be  equity,  righteousness,  peace,  and 
justice  to  the  needy  and  him  that  hath  no  helper. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  kingdom  was  not  merely 
a  human  society  held  together  by  common  interests 
and  mutual  services,  but  was  a  kingdom  in  the 
true  sense,  the  union  of  the  members  consisting  in 
allegiance  to  one  and  the  same  King,  whose  will 
was  personal  law  to  every  Israelite.  Their  union 
lay,  not  in  themselves,  but  in  God,  whose  servants 
and  subjects  they  were.  Here  already  was  a  con- 
ception of  the  kingdom,  different  from  that  of  a 
social  organism  as  an  end  in  itself,  complete  and 
self-inclosed.  The  members  were  united  to  each 
other  because  they  were  united  to  the  same  God, 
because  they  offered  the  same  worship  and  obeyed 
1  Judaism  and  Christianity,  p.  303. 


254       THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — SOCIAL 

the  same  divine  law.  The  prophets  were  not  with- 
out the  belief  that  other  nations  might  share  the 
privileges  of  the  kingdom  of  God.  The  popular 
conception,  however,  was  of  a  national  kingdom. 
The  popular  conception,  also,  was  material  and 
political  rather  than  spiritual. 

Jesus  took  up  this  familiar  idea  and  spiritual- 
ized it.  The  external  form  and  limit  dropped 
away.  The  kingdom  was  to  be  universal,  not  na- 
tional ;  spiritual,  not  political.  Yes,  he  said,  the 
kingdom  of  God  is  coming  indeed,  but  not  with 
pomp  and  observation.  The  haughty  Pharisee, 
who  fancied  he  would  have  a  high  place  in  the 
kingdom,  had  not  even  entered  it ;  indeed,  he  did 
not  even  see  it,  although  it  was  amongst  and  within 
the  men  who  were  all  about  him.  He  was  blind. 
Although  he  had  two  eyes,  he  had  no  vision  of  the 
kingdom  which  was  already  established.  Yet  any 
one  who  became  as  a  little  child  was  of  and  in  the 
kingdom.  That  frequent  declaration,  "  The  king- 
dom of  heaven  is  at  hand,"  means  that  the  kingdom 
so  long  expected  has  come  at  last.  But  it  is  not 
in  any  place,  as  when  men  say,  "  Lo  here  and  lo 
there,"  — out  in  the  desert  away  from  the  haunts 
of  men,  nor  in  the  city  where  men  do  congregate, 
nor  even  in  the  sacred  city,  whither  the  tribes  go 
up.  The  kingdom  of  God  is  within  you  and  among 
you.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  Jesus  did  not 
introduce  the  idea  of  the  kingdom  as  something 
new,  nor  in  order  to  present  a  social  in  place  of  an 
individualistic  ideal.  He  took  a  familiar  concep- 
tion which  had  become  empty,  and  filled  it  with 
moral  and  spiritual  reality.  He  did  not  set  up  so- 


THE  KINGDOM  UNIVERSAL  255 

ciety  against  individualism.  There  was  no  need  of 
that,  for  the  corporate  life  was  already  of  more  im- 
portance than  the  individual.  He  taught  that  the 
kingdom  is  a  society  of  holy  individuals,  that  men 
and  women  must  be  persons  of  a  certain  character 
in  order  to  see  the  kingdom  at  all.  But  we  are 
anticipating  the  explicit  teaching  of  Jesus  concern- 
ing the  nature  of  the  kingdom  which  he  intro- 
duced. 

in 

A  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the  kingdom 
is  its  extent.  It  is  not  limited  by  country  or  na- 
tion. Its  terminal  lines  are  not  drawn  anywhere 
inside  humanity  so  that  any  class  or  people  is  ex- 
cluded. It  is  coextensive  with  humanity  in  all 
lands  and  all  generations.  It  is  a  universal  king- 
dom. This  is  a  characteristic  of  the  highest  im- 
portance. Even  the  most  highly  civilized  peoples 
drew  a  line  which  coincided  with  the  nation,  or  at 
the  very  widest  included  only  those  nations  which 
were  confederated.  Every  restriction  of  extent 
falls  away  from  the  kingdom  of  God.  Man  as  man 
is  the  subject  of  the  kingdom.  As  Kaftan  says  : 
"  A  further  extension  of  the  circle  is  impossible ; 
the  terminal  point  is  unconditionally  arrived  at."  l 
Declarations  of  universality  were  deeply  impressed 
on  the  memory  of  the  disciples,  and  by  them  re- 
peated, such  as :  "  And  they  shall  come  from  the 
east  and  from  the  west,  and  from  the  north,  and 
from  the  south,  and  shall  sit  down  in  the  king- 
dom of  God  ;"  "  The  publicans  and  harlots  go  into 
the  kingdom  of  God  before  you ; "  "Go  ye  and 
1  The  Truth  of  the  Christian  Beligion,  vol.  ii.,  p.  368. 


256       THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — SOCIAL 

make  disciples  of  the  nations  ;  "  "  The  field  is  the 
world."  His  frequent  designation  of  himself  as 
the  Son  of  Man,  rather  than  the  son  of  Abraham, 
or  the  son  of  David,  implied  the  universality  of 
his  kingdom ;  a  kingdom  of  man,  of  humanity. 

IV 

The  social  ideal  of  Christianity  is  as  intensive 
in  character  as  it  is  extensive  in  range.  Its  depth 
corresponds  to  its  breadth.  It  is  not  an  empty 
ideal.  A  favorite  thought  is  fulfillment.  It  is 
filled  full.  It  fulfills,  or  fills  full,  the  partial  ideals 
of  law  and  prophecy.  The  content  which  fills  the 
ideal  is  righteousness.  "  Seek  ye  first,"  said  Jesus, 
"  the  kingdom  of  God  and  his  righteousness."  It  is 
not  material  good,  except  as  that  is  a  condition  of 
moral  and  spiritual  good.  Material  goods  amount 
only  to  food,  drink,  clothing,  and  shelter.  Such 
goods  the  nations  of  the  world  seek  after.  God 
knows  that  men  have  need  of  such  things.  A  man 
starving  and  freezing  is  on  the  way  to  death,  and 
cannot  even  think  of  higher  good.  But  health 
and  physical  comfort  are  not  character  any  more 
than  they  are  culture.  A  scholar  must  have  food 
and  clothing ;  but  they  are  not  knowledge.  The 
righteous  man  in  the  righteous  society  must  have 
physical  sustenance ;  but  it  is  not  character.  All 
grades  of  human  value  are  attained  in  the  ideal 
of  the  kingdom  of  God ;  for  the  individual,  satis- 
faction of  body,  mind,  and  spirit ;  for  society,  the 
values  of  family,  friendship,  the  State,  the  Church. 
The  complete  good  of  the  kingdom  is  realized 
under  the  law  of  love  ;  true  self-love,  which  seeks 


THE  FORMS  OF  RIGHTEOUSNESS       257 

the  good  of  holy  character,  and  true  love  of  others, 
which  seeks  their  worth  and  perfection. 

The  righteousness  which  fulfills  the  ideal  of  a 
kingdom  of  persons  having  the  true  character  was 
explained  by  Jesus  in  its  three  forms,  which  are 
contrasted  with  their  counterfeits.  Righteousness 
is  of  three  kinds,  or  may  be  regarded  from  three 
points  of  view ;  almsgiving,  wjiich  expresses  rela- 
tion to  others,  prayer,  which  expresses  relation  to 
God,  and  fasting,  which  expresses  one's  relation  to 
himself. 

Almsgiving  and  all  service  for  others  is  to  have 
sole  reference  to  their  good.  Self-forgetfulness  is 
to  be  so  complete  that  the  left  hand  is  not  to  know 
what  the  right  hand  is  doing.  The  counterfeit  is 
a  service  which  is  rendered  ostentatiously,  with 
flourish  of  trumpets,  to  elicit  admiration. 

Prayer  is  between  the  soul  and  God  alone,  in 
secrecy,  with  the  door  of  the  closet  shut  on  the 
world,  in  communion  with  the  perfect  holiness  and 
love.  True  prayer  brings  one  into  communication 
with  the  source  of  goodness.  The  child  communes 
with  the  Father,  breathes  his  name  with  hallowed, 
loving  reverence,  contemplates  his  kingdom  and 
desires  its  coming,  depends  on  him  for  bread  and 
the  supply  of  all  recurring  wants,  asks  that  faults 
and  sins  may  be  forgiven,  and  that  temptation 
henceforth  may  lose  its  power.  In  prayer  he  re- 
ceives light  and  life  and  love.  The  counterfeit  is 
prayer  which  has  no  motive  but  to  gain  the  rep- 
utation of  piety,  which  is  loud-spoken  at  street 
corners,  and  so  is  not  prayer  at  all,  but  pure 
hypocrisy. 


258      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL —  SOCIAL 

Fasting  is  self-culture.  Negatively,  it  is  absti- 
nence from  all  that  hinders  holiness,  and  therefore, 
it  may  be,  from  excess  or  richness  of  food  which 
makes  the  body  dull  and  gross,  and  also  from  im- 
pure thoughts,  from  foolish  and  malicious  conver- 
sation, from  greed  of  gain,  from  selfish  ambitions. 
As  self-culture  proceeds  in  part  by  severe,  heroic 
disciplines,  fasting  symbolizes  the  method.  These 
disciplines,  however,  always  have  in  view  the  true 
character  to  be  cultivated.  The  counterfeit  is  that 
abstinence  which  advertises  itself  in  studied  negli- 
gence of  the  person,  in  ostentatious  practice  of  an 
artificial  regimen  of  food,  in  observance  of  days  and 
seasons,  when  suspension  of  social  entertainment 
is  made  a  fashion.  It  is  as  if  one  should  say  :  "  I 
am  unholy  and  need  purifying ;  behold  my  superior 
goodness  in  subjecting  myself  to  the  needed  pro- 
cesses of  cleansing."  The  true  fasting  is  in  secret. 
It  is  an  affair  of  one's  own.  It  is  between  him- 
self and  God.  He  must  determine  for  himself  the 
points  at  which  he  needs  repression,  and  not  adapt 
his  fasting  to  popular  fashion.  It  may  very  well 
be,  as  we  are  creatures  of  periodicity,  that  a  sea- 
son of  fasting  should  be  observed.  But  in  that 
season  every  one  should  prescribe  his  own  methods 
of  self-culture,  going  about  it  with  cheerfulness 
(anoint  thy  head  and  wash  thy  face),  and,  if  need 
be,  protracting  it  beyond  the  customary  season. 

Righteousness,  in  all  its  forms,  is  the  righteous- 
ness of  God.  To  be  righteous  is  to  be  holy,  like 
God,  impartial  in  love,  like  God,  who  sendeth  rain 
on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust.  It  is  to  be  like 
Christ,  whose  life  was  in  God  and  who  perfectly 


THE  FORMS  OF  RIGHTEOUSNESS      259 

obeyed  the  will  of  God.  Nothing  less  than  the 
divine,  absolute  righteousness  can  satisfy  man 
and  society.  "  Our  souls  are  restless,"  exclaimed 
Augustine,  "  and  can  find  no  rest  until  they  rest  in 
thee."  Our  souls  can  be  filled  only  with  the  full- 
ness of  God.  When  the  tide  is  out,  the  bays  and 
inlets  and  creeks  are  empty  and  forlorn.  The 
great  ships  stick  fast  in  the  mud.  No  human 
power  can  fill  the  thousand  empty  indentures  of 
the  coast.  But  the  swelling,  rising  tide  of  the 
ocean  creeps  in  over  the  flats,  covers  their  ugliness, 
rises  higher  and  yet  higher,  lifts  the  ships  from 
the  bottom,  till  the  billows  come  bowing  over  the 
surface,  and  the  ships  sail  away  to  their  destina- 
tions. The  gulfs  and  inlets  are  filled,  as  they  can 
only  be  filled,  with  all  the  fullness  of  the  ocean. 
We  may  be  filled  with  all  the  fullness  of  God,  with 
his  love,  which  in  breadth  and  length  and  depth 
and  height  passes  the  reach  of  finite  measurements 
and  fathomings. 

Jesus  illustrated  by  parables  the  universal  ex- 
tent and  the  intensive  perfection  of  the  kingdom. 
The  seed  is  sown  in  all  hearts,  in  the  shallow,  the 
hard,  the  thorny,  the  fruitful ;  and  the  field  is  the 
world.  The  righteousness  of  the  kingdom  pene- 
trates intensively,  like  leaven  in  flour,  till  the 
whole  mass  is  leavened.  The  value  of  the  charac- 
ter of  righteous  love  is  of  absolute  preciousness, 
like  the  pearl  of  greatest  price,  for  which  all 
lower  values  are  exchanged. 

The  kingdom  of  God,  then,  is  the  true  social 
ideal,  because  it  is  moral  rather  than  national  or 
political,  and  so  is  as  universal  as  humanity ; 


260       THE   CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — SOCIAL 

because  it  is  realized  in  character  rather  than  in 
circumstance  ;  because  all  its  members  are  ruled 
by  the  law  of  love  in  reciprocity  of  service  accord- 
ing to  need  and  worth;  and  because  it  has  the 
righteousness  of  God,  which  Jesus  exemplified  in 
glad  and  perfect  obedience  to  his  Father's  will. 


It  follows  that  the  kingdom  is  a  society  of  re- 
lated personalities,  in  which,  as  in  every  organism, 
each  member  is  at  the  same  time  means  and  end. 
The  object  in  view  is  better  personalities  in  a  bet- 
ter society.  If  individuality  is  reduced  till  all  are 
alike,  society  is  reduced  at  the  same  time.  There 
is  no  society  in  a  community  of  Shakers,  but  only 
an  aggregation  of  people  who  dress  alike  and 
pursue  the  same  undeviating,  mechanical  routine. 
The  word,  community,  suggests  a  dead  level,  share 
and  share  alike,  all  in  common.  Numbers  are  as 
good  as  names,  as,  to  the  management  of  a  great 
hotel,  guests  are  known  by  the  numbers  of  their 
rooms.  The  word,  society,  suggests  the  person. 
Socius  is  a  companion,  and  companionship  means 
distinct  personalities,  alike  in  difference.  One  of 
the  best  descriptions  of  society  to  be  found  in  lit- 
erature is  Paul's  comparison  of  the  church  to  the 
bodily  organism.  Unity  is  possible  only  through 
differences.  Each  individual  has  his  own  peculiar 
gifts.  The  various  members  are  not  mutually  ex- 
clusive, but  reciprocally  helpful.  It  would  be  folly 
for  one  to  wish  to  be  another,  as  for  the  eye  to 
wish  to  be  the  ear.  If  all  were  seeing,  where  were 
the  hearing  ?  The  whole  body  depends  on  each 


RELATED  PERSONALITIES  261 

organ.  Each  organ  depends  on  the  whole  body 
for  the  exercise  of  its  own  function.  So  the  church 
is  a  true  organism,  for  every  member  is  at  the 
same  time  the  means  and  the  end  of  the  whole.  It 
is  an  organism  of  the  highest  order,  for  the  highest 
organisms  are  most  diversely  articulated  and  most 
distinct  in  variety  of  functions.  Paul's  use  of  the 
analogy  is  his  emphatic  injunction  to  every  Chris- 
tian to  be  just  as  individual  as  he  can,  to  cultivate 
to  the  utmost  his  own  peculiar  gifts,  and  least  of 
all  to  try  to  become  like  somebody  else.  This  is 
in  accordance  with  the  progress  of  society,  as  was 
observed  in  the  second  chapter.  The  advance  of 
society  is  the  increasing  liberty  and  power  of  the 
individual,  and  therefore  a  more  various  and  richer 
life  for  all,  in  reciprocity. 

The  likeness  of  society  and  of  the  kingdom  of 
God  to  an  organism  does  not,  however,  obtain  in 
all  respects.  We  must  not  ride  a  parable  on  all 
fours.  The  analogy  fails  in  respect  to  self-con- 
sciousness and  choice.  The  separate  members  of 
an  organism  have  no  separate  consciousness.  There 
is  only  one  central  consciousness,  that  of  the  organ- 
ism. Society  as  a  whole  has  no  consciousness  and 
choice,  for  these  are  found  only  in  the  several  indi- 
viduals who  constitute  society.  It  is  a  collection 
of  distributed  consciousnesses,  because  each  is  a 
person.  Some  tendencies  of  modern  thought  are 
clearly  due  to  overworking  the  analogy  of  organic 
life.  They  attribute  to  humanity  as  a  whole  a 
central  consciousness  and  will  which  transcends 
individuals,  whose  action  is  therefore  determined 
necessarily  by  the  social  or  national  will.  For  con- 


262       THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — SOCIAL 

venience  and  impression  the  personification  of  na- 
tions, societies,  and  the  church,  is  permissible.  But 
when  such  personification  is  made  the  basis  of  a 
social  philosophy  and  even  of  a  religion,  such  as 
Cornte's  Grand  Etre,  and  Kidd's  altruistic  con- 
sciousness which  is  purely  corporate,  it  is  open  to 
serious  criticism.  The  truth  of  such  representa- 
tions is  the  recognition  of  a  divine  purpose  working 
out  in  history,  the  will  of  God  turning  the  hearts 
of  men.  But  this  is  through  the  intelligent  choices 
of  men  who  recognize  in  part  the  divine  truth  and 
right.  Paul  put  the  will  of  Christ  into  the  church 
as  its  central  consciousness.  The  difference  between 
society  and  a  physical  organism  is  quite  as  impor- 
tant as  the  resemblance.  Man  is  distinguished  by 
his  personal  consciousness  and  power  of  intelligent 
choice.  The  reciprocities  of  society  he  enters  into, 
for  the  most  part,  consciously  and  willingly.  I 
have  dwelt  in  criticism  on  the  analogy  of  society  to 
the  body,  because  the  undue  subordination  of  the 
individual  which  marks  some  social  philosophies  is 
an  overworking  of  this  analogy. 

The  Christian  ideal  of  the  kingdom  preserves 
and  promotes  personality.  It  is  simply  a  kingdom 
or  society  of  related  personalities,  each  of  whom  is 
distinct  in  his  own  value,  like  the  lost  sheep,  the 
lost  coin,  and  the  lost  son.  Therefore,  as  already 
observed,  social  institutions  and  religious  observ- 
ances are  represented,  never  as  ends  in  themselves, 
but  always  as  means  for  perfecting  persons.  The 
tendency  to  exalt  institutions  and  organizations 
was  rebuked  once  and  for  all  in  the  teaching  of 
Jesus  concerning  the  Sabbath.  It  was  on  the  very 


RELATED  PERSONALITIES  263 

occasion  when  he  was  accused  of  desecrating  the 
Sabbath  that  he  declared  he  was  working  as  God 
works,  for  the  good  of  man  :  "  My  Father  worketh 
even  until  now,  and  I  work."  Jesus  went  straight 
through  the  form  and  venerableness  of  institutions 
to  their  uses  for  persons.  He  was  always  teaching 
that  the  kingdom  comes  in  the  hearts  and  lives  of 
individuals ;  that  to  have  better  society  there  must 
be  better  persons.  The  illusion  that  improvement 
lies  first  in  outward  conditions,  circumstances,  and 
institutions,  is  not  yet  dispelled.  Jesus  taught 
that  there  must  be  the  man  in  the  circumstance ; 
righteousness  first,  the  other  things  afterwards. 
This  dependence  of  the  outward  on  the  inward  is 
well  expressed  by  Bishop  Martensen  :  "  God  de- 
sires not  merely  outward  action  :  he  desires  first 
of  all  to  have  regenerate  men,  prepared  for  every 
good  work.  All  human  deeds  and  efforts,  all  inci- 
dents and  vicissitudes  in  the  life  of  the  individual, 
all  national  revolutions,  are  in  their  ultimate  sig- 
nificance only  means  —  stuff  and  material  through 
which  and  out  of  which  human  personalities  may 
construct,  mould,  and  prepare  their  intellectual  and 
spiritual  frame,  their  imperishable  possession  — 
means  not  merely  for  the  individual,  but  the  ripen- 
ing of  humanity  for  this  future  kingdom.  Human 
orders  of  society — the  Family,  the  State,  nay,  even 
the  Church  in  its  earthly  constitution  —  are  only 
temporary  forms,  which  must  be  broken  down 
when  perfection  arrives."  * 

1  Christian  Ethics,  p.  139. 


264      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — SOCIAL 

VI 

It  is  a  marked  characteristic  of  the  social  ideal 
of  Christianity  that  the  kingdom  of  God  is  already 
established.  It  is  now  and  here.  "  The  kingdom 
of  God,"  said  Jesus,  "  is  among  you."  It  is  in  de- 
cided contrast  with  the  expectation  of  the  prophets 
of  Israel  who  always  pointed  to  the  future.  John 
the  Baptist  was  a  forerunner,  who  prepared  the 
way  for  the  coming  Messiah.  But  Jesus  taught 
that  the  new  life  of  faith  and  obedience  is  life  in 
the  kingdom,  and  not  life  in  preparation  for  a  king- 
dom which  will  come  by  and  by.  "  The  Christian 
conception  of  life,"  remarks  Dr.  Newman  Smyth, 
"  and  its  supreme  good,  rests  on  this  fundamental 
fact  which  Jesus  announced,  that  the  kingdom  of 
God  is  not  something  wholly  future,  or  remote  from 
our  present  participation  in  it,  but  it  is  a  real 
power  and  an  actual  reign  of  God  already  begun 
on  earth,  —  a  kingdom  of  heaven  into  which  we 
may  now  enter,  and  which  offers  through  citizen- 
ship in  it  some  immediate  possession  of  the  highest 
good  and  present  part  in  the  eternal  life."  l 

The  kingdom  is  present  because  the  new  type 
of  life  now  exists.  The  type  is  perfect.  Life  is 
brought  under  the  perfect  law  of  love.  It  is  a  real 
value  and  power,  although  it  is  not  yet  completely 
realized.  There  are  new  men,  new  creations  in 
Christ  Jesus,  men  who  have  put  on  Christ.  Eter- 
nal life  is  not  merely  a  life  of  the  future  which  will 
nojb  end,  eternal  in  duration.  It  is  a  present  life 
known  by  the  experience  of  it  to  be  of  a  kind  which 

1  Christian  Ethics,  p.  98. 


THE  KINGDOM  ESTABLISHED         265 

cannot  perish  or  decay.  Every  one  who  has  a  life 
like  Christ's  hath  passed  from  death  unto  life 
already.  The  elements  of  death  and  decay  are  no 
longer  working.  The  society  composed  of  such 
characters  is  therefore  a  society  established  and 
extending  in  the  earth. 

The  present  reality  of  the  kingdom  explains  the 
certainty  with  which  Jesus  spoke.  He  spoke  of 
what  is.  His  own  life  and  power  he  knew.  He 
saw  the  same  kind  of  life  in  others.  When  the 
seventy  returned  with  enthusiastic  report  of  the 
power  they  had  exerted  in  the  name  of  Jesus,  he 
rejoiced  in  spirit.  In  those  beginnings  he  saw 
that  the  kingdom  of  God  had  come  among  men, 
and  in  confident  anticipation  foresaw  its  full  tri- 
umph. "  I  beheld  Satan  fallen  as  lightning  from 
heaven."  The  calm  certainty  of  Jesus  as  of  one 
who  saw  the  reality  has  been  compared  to  the  quiet 
and  reasoned  confidence  of  positive  science.  Asso- 
ciating his  disciples  with  himself,  he  said :  "  We 
speak  that  we  do  know,  and  testify  that  we  have 
seen;"  and  again  :  "  If  I  bear  witness  of  myself 
my  witness  is  true."  Jesus  gave  evidence  of  that 
which  he  witnessed.  The  early  preachers  called 
themselves  witnesses.  So  many  of  them  bore  tes- 
timony by  suffering  death  that  the  word,  witness, 
came  to  mean,  martyr.  To  trace  the  derivation 
of  our  English  word,  martyr,  to  the  Greek  word 
for  witness,  is  to  go  back  to  the  reality  of  the 
life  in  Christ  and  to  the  kingdom  of  God  as  they 
stood  forth  clear  and  unquestioned  to  early  be- 
lievers ;  a  reality  they  could  not  doubt,  a  value 
they  could  not  relinquish,  even  to  save  their  lives. 


266      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  — SOCIAL 

VII 

The  kingdom  of  God  is  both  real  and  ideal.  As 
already  existing,  it  carries  within  itself  the  pro- 
phecy of  consummation.  The  seed  is  in  the  ground, 
and  therefore  the  mustard-tree  will  spread  out  its 
branches,  where  the  birds  may  build  their  nests. 
The  ideal  is  in  the  real.  The  kingdom  as  real  is 
the  kingdom  of  God.  The  kingdom  as  ideal  is  the 
kingdom  of  heaven.  I  do  not  mean  that  this  dis- 
tinction is  always  intended  when  the  two  terms 
are  used,  but  that  there  is  such  difference  of  signi- 
fication. The  kingdom  of  heaven  is  evidently  the 
ideal  state  of  perfection.  The  kingdom  of  heaven 
existing  on  earth  is  the  ideal  becoming  real.  The 
law  of  heaven  is  the  law  of  earth  and  will  so  work 
in  the  midst  of  evils  as  to  create  a  new  earth, 
wherein  dwelleth  righteousness.  But  it  is  the  king- 
dom of  God,  who  reveals  himself  in  Christ,  whose 
law  of  love  is  known,  accepted,  and  realized,  whose 
children  men  already  are.  "  Now  are  we  the  sons 
of  God."  "  If  children,  then  heirs  ;  heirs  of  God, 
and  joint-heirs  with  Christ ;  if  so  be  that  we  suffer 
with  him,  that  we  may  be  also  glorified  together." 
Since  there  is  now  the  kingdom  of  God,  there 
must  be  in  the  future  the  kingdom  of  heaven. 
We  can  pray,  Thy  kingdom  come,  because  we  can 
also  pray,  Thy  will  be  done  in  earth  as  it  is  in 
heaven. 

A  significant  utterance  of  Jesus  unites  the  real 
and  the  ideal.  He  was  talking  with  an  obscure 
and  despised  woman  concerning  the  kingdom, 
which  would  not  have  a  local  centre,  in  a  moun- 


REAL  AND  IDEAL  267 

tain  of  Samaria,  nor  even  in  Jerusalem,  but  would 
be  composed  of  spiritual  worshipers,  wherever  they 
might  be,  and  he  said  concerning  it :  "The  hour 
cometh  and  now  is."  The  woman  had  asked  a 
question  to  change  the  subject,  which  had  become 
embarrassing.  Her  casual  inquiry  was  the  occa- 
sion of  a  prediction  respecting  the  coming  religion, 
in  the  time  when  there  should  be  true  worshipers 
everywhere,  worshiping  the  Father  in  spirit  and  in 
truth,  a  prediction  which  Jesus  made  with  the 
utmost  confidence :  "  Woman,  believe  me."  The 
prediction  was  as  bold  as  it  was  confident.  In  view 
of  the  world  as  it  then  was,  the  Jews  with  their 
formalism,  the  Greeks  and  Romans  with  their 
idolatry  of  sensuous  worship  and  their  skepticism, 
his  own  disciples  gone  to  the  village  yonder  to  get 
food,  expecting  a  kingdom  of  external  show  with 
good  places  for  them,  —  nothing  could  seem  more 
improbable  than  the  prevalence  of  spiritual  wor- 
ship. It  was  even  less  probable  than  if  we,  look- 
ing on  Africa,  China,  India,  should  say,  the  hour 
cometh  when  in  those  darkened  lands  the  people 
will  be  true  worshipers  of  the  Father.  A  remote 
future  that,  we  admit,  and  so  a  more  remote  future 
which  Jesus  predicted.  It  was  an  ideal ;  all  ideal. 
But  he  said,  as  if  correcting  himself  for  pointing 
to  a  far-away  time,  "  The  hour  cometh,  and  now  is." 
The  new  era  has  already  been  ushered  in.  In  one 
aspect,  although  the  hour  is  coming,  it  is  far  away. 
In  another  aspect,  that  hour  has  already  struck. 
It  was  a  new  hour  in  the  world's  history  when 
Jesus  came.  A  new  power  had  been  introduced. 
A  new  cause  was  working.  And  although  the  large 


268       THE   CHRISTIAN  IDEAL —SOCIAL 

results  lay  in  the  future,  the  cause,  the  power  was 
already  in  the  life  of  darkened,  sinning,  erring  hu- 
manity. He  meant  more  than  that  here  and  there 
already  true  worshipers  could  be  found.  That  had 
always  been  the  case,  as  when,  in  the  time  of  Elijah, 
there  were  seven  thousand  who  had  not  bowed 
the  knee  to  Baal.  He  meant  that  a  new  day  had 
dawned.  The  light,  which  lighteth  every  man,  had 
come  into  the  world  and  broken  on  the  darkness. 
When  we  say  of  important  results,  "  It  is  only  a 
question  of  time,"  "The  time  is  coming,"  it  is  be- 
cause a  method  or  principle  has  been  introduced 
and  only  needs  time  to  work.  Whenever  we  can 
see  that  the  hour  is  coming  we  can  also  see,  and  it 
is  because  we  can  see,  that  the  hour  now  is. 

The  future  lies  in  the  present  when  a  new  force 
enters  in.  When  upon  our  earth,  life,  whether  or 
not  previously  present  in  potency,  appeared  at 
some  favored  spot,  in  the  midst  of  rock  and  ice,  or 
when  darkness  was  on  the  face  of  the  deep,  it  could 
have  been  said, '  The  hour  cometh  when  in  place  of 
this  desolation  there  shall  appear  verdure,  flowers, 
forests,  bird,  and  beast.'  Such  an  hour  cometh  be- 
cause it  now  is,  because  life  is  here.  When  man 
appeared,  a  child  of  the  forest  or  the  plain,  not  so 
much  better  than  animals  and  weaker  than  some 
of  them,  it  could  have  been  said, '  The  hour  cometh 
when  there  shall  be  cities,  ships,  armies,  slaves, 
kings,  railroads,  telegraphs,  books,  philosophy, 
science,  art,  religion.'  Such  an  hour  cometh  be- 
cause it  now  is.  Man  is  here.  Such  wonders  he  * 
will  achieve,  such  he  will  become.  Never  before, 
but  now,  humanity's  hour  is  come.  When  Jesus 


REAL  AND  IDEAL  269 

appeared,  it  could  have  been  said, '  The  hour  cometh 
when  there  will  be  no  slaves,  no  armies,  no  idols, 
no  burdensome  and  wearisome  rituals,  no  injustice, 
no  oppression,  but  when  there  will  be  peace  and 
good-will  among  men,  when  men  will  live  as  chil- 
dren of  one  Father  whom  they  worship  in  spirit  and 
in  truth,  and  as  brothers  and  friends  of  each  other.' 
The  hour  cometh  because  Jesus  is  here,  and  so  the 
hour  now  is.  At  each  of  these  three  epochs,  —  the 
appearance  of  life,  the  appearance  of  man,  the  ap- 
pearance of  Jesus  Christ,  —  the  old  world  became  a 
new  world  ;  and  while  ages  were  needed  for  the  face 
of  the  earth  and  the  face  of  society  to  be  trans- 
formed, it  was  only  a  question  of  time,  and  it  might 
have  been  said  with  equal  truth,  either,  the  hour 
cometh,  or,  the  hour  now  is.  A  new  hour  strikes 
when  the  old  order  changeth.  Before  results  be- 
come visible,  the  far-sighted  seer  says  that  the  hour 
cometh,  —  that  the  next  century,  the  next  genera- 
tion, the  next  decade,  will  witness  great  changes. 
But  the  hour  cometh  because  it  now  is.  He  fore- 
sees because  he  sees.  The  seer  is  he  who  sees. 
Foresight  of  the  future  is  insight  of  the  present. 
When  every  one  is  saying  that  we  live  in  a  period 
of  transition,  social,  political,  theological,  and  that 
in  the  future  there  will  have  been  radical  trans- 
formations, it  is  because  the  change  has  already 
begun,  because  the  hour  now  is. 

The  social  ideal  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  or  the 
kingdom  of  heaven,  is  spoken  of  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment either  as  real  in  the  present  or  as  ideal  in  the 
future,  because  it  is  both.  The  kingdom  has  come, 
is  coming,  is  to  come.  The  kingdom  of  God  is 


270      THE  CHRISTIAN  IDEAL  —  SOCIAL 

amongst  you,  said  Jesus ;  yet  when  ye  pray,  say, 
Thy  kingdom  come.  The  nature  of  the  kingdom 
will  not  change,  but  it  will  keep  coming  in  new 
epochs  till  the  kingdom  of  God  becomes  indeed  the 
kingdom  of  heaven.  How  fine,  broad,  and  true  is 
the  imagery  of  the  vision  seen  on  Patmos :  "  And 
I  John  saw  the  holy  city,  new  Jerusalem,  coming 
down  from  God  out  of  heaven  prepared  as  a  bride 
adorned  for  her  husband."  How  profound  as  well 
as  poetic  is  the  union  of  ideal  and  real  in  the 
figure  employed  by  the  apostle  to  the  Gentiles  : 
"  Jerusalem  which  is  above  is  free,  which  is  the 
mother  of  us  all."  The  ideal  is  social.  The 
heavenly  city  is  a  society.  The  individual  does 
not  depart  into  a  solitary  life,  like  a  ship  sailing 
away  on  the  lonely  ocean,  but  enters  the  throbbing 
life  of  a  city.  He  goes  from  that  real  and  living 
society  which  is  the  kingdom  of  God  here  to  that 
pure  and  holy  society  which  is  the  kingdom  of 
heaven  there.  The  two  societies  are  one.  Jeru- 
salem above  is  the  mother  of  us  all.  The  earthly 
Jerusalem  is  the  type  and  prophecy  of  the  heavenly 
Jerusalem.  The  real  assuring  the  ideal  is  repre- 
sented with  beautiful  suggestiveness  by  Dr.  Mar- 
tineau  :  "  Beyond  and  yet  within  the  moral  empire 
that  covers  the  broad  level  of  the  common  world 
there  is  the  promise  of  a  state  unrealized,  or  of  a 
transfer  to  a  new  and  unsuspected  centre ;  behind 
Rome  there  is  Jerusalem ;  and  within  Jerusalem 
an  upper  chamber  whence  voices  already  escape 
that  neutralize  the  barriers  of  race  and  tongue,  and 
are  not  silenced  by  the  look  of  the  impossible."  1 

1  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  vol.  ii.,  p.  375. 


CHAPTER   XI 

DEGENERATION 


A  POPULAR  book,  which  has  had  a  wide  circu- 
lation in  Europe  and  America,  undoubtedly  owes 
some  of  its  popularity  to  its  title,  "  Degeneration." 
Max  Nordau,  in  this  voluminous  work,  has  sub- 
jected to  criticism  the  manners,  dress,  amusements, 
economics,  politics,  music,  art,  poetry,  and  drama 
of  the  modern  world.  In  view  of  unhealthy,  un- 
wholesome, tawdry,  meretricious,  artificial,  osten- 
tatious, covetous,  sentimental,  hysterical,  erotic, 
corrupt,  cruel,  and  other  deplorable  tendencies  too 
numerous  to  mention,  he  emits  through  several 
hundred  pages  a  prolonged  wail,  which  deepens  at 
times  to  a  groan  and  rises  at  times  to  a  shriek. 
These  tendencies  he  considers  delirious  rather  than 
immoral,  and,  like  insanity,  indicative  of  degener- 
ation. He  does  not  deny  that  there  are  healthy 
as  well  as  unhealthy  tendencies,  but  does  affirm 
an  excessive  and  deplorable  abnormity,  especially 
in  art  and  literature.  That  such  a  book  is  widely 
read  is  very  significant.  Paulsen  says  that  a  time 
is  characterized  more  by  the  books  it  reads  than 
by  those  it  writes.  He  says  of  another  book  of 
Nordau's,  the  "  Conventional  Lies  of  Cultured 
Humanity: "  "  This  book  is  conspicuous  neither  for 


272  DEGENERATION 

its  contents  nor  form  ;  it  contains  nothing  but  the 
assurance  repeated  a  hundred  times  that  our  whole 
life  and  thought  is  a  lie.  But  this  very  circumstance 
will  puzzle  a  future  age  more  fortunate  than  our 
own,  let  us  hope ;  for  what  made  the  work  so  at- 
tractive ?  will  be  asked.  Did  it  really  express  the 
self -consciousness  of  its  age  ?  "  l 

There  is  a  strange,  yet  almost  irresistible  fas- 
cination in  realistic  delineations  of  the  bad.  The 
fascination  is  strange  because  the  facts  are  re- 
volting ;  it  is  irresistible  because  they  are  facts. 
Hawthorne's  two  greatest  works  are  occupied  with 
the  analysis  of  characters  affected  by  crime  and 
sin.  "  The  Scarlet  Letter  "  and  "  The  House  of  the 
Seven  Gables  "  are  histories  of  crime.  The  pure 
and  innocent  personages  of  the  stories  are  only  a 
background  of  light  to  project  in  sharp  outline  the 
dark  character  of  the  principal  figures.  The  most 
powerful  novels  of  Balzac  portray  realistically  incar- 
nations of  evil.  The  "  Paradise  Lost "  transcends 
the  "  Paradise  Regained "  in  power  and  interest. 
Dante's  "Inferno"  and  "  Purgatorio"  are  greater 
than  his  "  Paradiso."  The  drama  revolves  around 
the  conflict  of  good  with  evil.  Tragedy  is  concerned 
with  great  wrongs.  Even  Comedy  deals  with  the 
follies  and  mistakes  of  men.  Facts  which  are  so 
important  to  literature  cannot  be  inventions  of 
genius  nor  mere  incidents  of  life.  Literature  is  a 
human  interest.  It  portrays  the  sentiments,  emo- 
tions, passions,  struggles,  and  achievements  of  hu- 
manity. If  the  perversity  of  human  nature  were 
not  most  real  and  most  persistent,  that  perversity 
1  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  p.  67- 


DEGENERATION  AND  EVOLUTION     273 

could  not  fill  so  large  a  place  in  popular  and  in 
permanent  literary  products. 

II 

Thus  far  our  discussion  of  ethics  has  proceeded 
with  scarcely  any  reference  to  the  bad  element  in 
human  nature.  The  Good,  the  Right,  Self-Realiza- 
tion, Altruism,  the  Personal  and  Social  Ideals  of 
Christianity  have  been  characterized  without  notice 
of  failure,  mistake,  perversion,  and  degeneration, 
in  actual  life.  Goodness  has  been  exhibited.  Bad- 
ness has  been  ignored.  At  certain  points  perver- 
sion, for  a  moment,  came  into  view.  The  question 
whether  waste  and  destruction  are  immoral  de- 
manded an  answer.  Self-realization  had  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  selfishness.  The  Christian  ideal 
of  love  could  not  be  detached  from  the  sins  and 
sorrows  of  men  which  pressed  upon  the  heart  of 
Jesus  and  elicited  his  sympathy.  Still,  we  have 
been  studying  the  moral  rather  than  the  immoral, 
real  and  ideal  virtue  rather  than  transgressions. 
As  a  rule,  systems  of  ethics  do  not  consider  moral 
perversion,  perhaps  because  it  lies  out  of  the  range 
of  the  science  and  philosophy  of  ethics.  Theoreti- 
cal systems  are  occupied  with  the  nature  of  the 
chief  good,  the  grounds  of  obligation,  the  motives 
and  desires  which  determine  virtue,  and  with  criti- 
cism of  alternative  theories.  About  the  only  wrong- 
ness  recognized  is  the  wrongness  of  systems  which 
are  regarded  as  erroneous,  and  that  is  an  intel- 
lectual rather  than  a  moral  perversion.  There  is, 
however,  such  a  thing  as  transgression.  There  is 
disturbance  of  the  moral  order,  or  at  least  failure 


274  DEGENERATION 


to  realize  the\  ideal.  Literature  is  true  to  life  in 
this  respect.  Practical  morality  has  to  take  into 
account  the  actual  state  of  man  in  society,  as  well 
as  his  perceptions  and  endowments/ The  most 
effective  ethics  the  world  has  known  is  a  restora- 
tion as  well  as  a  realization.  It  is  a  corrective  of 
defect  as  well  as  a  perfect  ideal.  /Its  ideal  is  in 
vivid  contrast  with  the  actual. 

We  have  now  reached  the  point  at  which  transgres- 
sion and  degeneration  must  be  recognized.  If  they 
are  ignored  some  of  the  most  real  and  important 
conditions  of  human  progress  are  omitted.  Indeed, 
evolution,  even  before  it  reaches  man,  finds  rever- 
sion. Selection  implies  rejection.  Survival  of  the 
fittest  signifies  the  temporary  presence  of  the  unfit. 
Degeneration  is  a  stock  word  of  evolution.  There 
is,  then,  no  occasion  for  surprise,  if  reversion  and 
degeneration  appear  in  the  development  of  the 
human  species.  Their  absence  would  be  surprising. 
There  is  human  as  well  as  plant  and  animal  degen- 
eracy. Max  Nordau  borrowed  the  title  of  his  book 
from  evolution.  As  plants  and  animals  have  dis- 
eases which  are  abnormal  and  which  impair  or  de- 
stroy the  normal  type,  so  there  is  moral  disease 
which  invades  and  corrupts  the  ideal  character. 
Whether  avoidable  or  not  is  a  question  that  per- 
tains to  personality.  Whether  actual  or  not  is  a 
question  which  does  not  even  arise. 

That  which  is  morally  abnormal  may  with  pro- 
priety be  designated  as  degeneration,  not  only  be- 
cause degeneration  is  found  in  orders  below  the 
human,  but  also  because  it  keeps  in  view  the  type 
or  ideal  departed  from.  It  means  departure  from 


FACT  AND  EXTENT  275 

the  genus.  Degeneration  is  that  which  is  away 
from  the  genus.  There  is  thus  an  advantage  in 
employing  this  word  rather  than  sin,  vice,  and 
crime  (although  the  latter  terms  will  be  freely 
used),  for  it  always  implies  the  type,  the  norm,  the 
genus,  the  ideal,  and  implies  an  ideal  correspond- 
ing to  the  nature  of  man,  to  the  moral  genus  homo. 
There  is  advantage  in  the  word,  degeneration,  also, 
because  Christianity  implies  it  in  a  term  which  has 
passed  from  the  Scriptures  to  theology,  and  is  its 
exact  counterpart,  namely,  regeneration. 

in 

The  recognition  of  moral  evil  is  not  difficult. 
The  only  difficulty  is  to  know  where  to  begin. 
The  need  of  social  reforms  is  as  good  a  starting- 
point  as  any.  It  is  generally  assumed  that  society 
needs  reformation  in  various  relations,  and  society 
means  the  persons  who  compose  it.  Many  are 
expending  their  energy  on  industrial  reform.  They 
trace  nearly  all  existing  evils  to  selfish  competition 
which  creates  huge  monopolies  and  trusts,  and 
which  makes  the  laborer  the  last  rather  than  the 
first  partaker  of  the  fruits.  It  is  contended  that 
economic  conditions  should  be  changed  from  com- 
petition to  combination,  that  there  should  be  an 
equitable,  or  perhaps  an  equal  distribution  of 
wealth.  Poverty,  disease,  shortened  lives,  crime, 
intemperance,  ~and,  in  fact  nearly  all  evils  are 
traced  to  the  encroachment  of  profit  upon  wages. 
Others  are  devoted  to  the  reform  of  the  family. 
They  find  in  frequent  divorce,  in  hasty  and  ill  as- 
sorted marriages,  in  the  displacement  of  the  home 


276  DEGENERATION 

by  tenement  and  boarding-house,  in  the  prevalence 
of  licentiousness  which  is  fatal  to  domestic  purity 
and  a  preventive  of  marriage,  the  root  of  all  kinds 
of  evil.  Others,  still,  find  in  political  and  muni- 
cipal corruption  a  crying  evil.  These  are  wrongs, 
injustices,  and  perversions  which  infest  civilized 
•society.  Then,  there  are  down-trodden  races,  un- 
fortunate countries,  Armenian  massacres,  African 
slave-trade,  Indian  caste-system,  Chinese  stolidity 
and  superstition ;  everywhere  cruelty,  suffering, 
debasement,  vices  which  cannot  be  named,  wicked- 
ness which  cannot  be  described.  The  commanding 
interests  of  life  are  needed  readjustments,  purifica- 
tions, reform  of  morals,  customs,  and  manners. 
The  progress  which  is  needed  and  expected  is  the 
correction  of  wrongs.  It  is  not  merely  movement 
from  states  of  stagnation  and  inertia,  nor  merely 
expansion  of  the  good.  It  is  also,  and,  as  some 
think,  chiefly,  correction  of  the  bad.  The  theorist 
may  regard  evil  as  a  necessary  condition  of  good, 
but  will  not  deny  its  existence.  Theory  aside, 
every  one  knows  that  there  is  perversion  in  nearly 
all  human  relations. 

Furthermore,  the  case  is,  not  that  part  of  the 
world  is  entirely  right  and  part  entirely  wrong, 
but  that  every  one  fails  in  some  measure  to  prac- 
tice the  right  he  perceives  and  approves.  Even 
the  virtue  which  is  practiced  is  in  some  conflict, 
more  or  less  strenuous,  with  many  propensities  and 
habits.  This  is  so  common  that  virtue  has  been 
measured  by  its  difficulty.  Some  have  gone  so 
far  as  to  maintain,  and  with  the  authority  of  the 
philosopher  Kant,  that  a  perfectly  virtuous  action, 


FACT  AND  EXTENT  277 

motived  by  pure  and  unalloyed  regard  for  the 
moral  law,  has  never  been  performed.  According 
to  the  social  code  one  may  be  blameless,  and  may 
indignantly  resent  accusation.  But  the  social  code 
does  not  penetrate  to  motives.  It  requires  little 
more  than  security  against  dishonesty  and  untruth- 
fulness.  As  measured  by  such  a  code  one  may 
protest  his  innocence,  while  before  the  ideal  of 
righteousness  which  includes  motives  and  feelings 
he  pleads  guilty.  How  absurd,  it  is  said,  for  a 
thoroughly  upright  man  whom  every  one  respects, 
to  confess  in  prayer  that  he  is  a  miserable  sinner 
and  there  is  no  health  in  him.  Why,  if  he  should 
be  taken  at  his  word,  and  charged  with  any  par- 
ticular sin  of  theft  or  falsehood,  he  would  resent  it 
angrily.  But  there  is  no  inconsistency.  If  he 
should  be  charged  with  certain  wrong  motives  and 
feelings  he  would  admit  that  the  charge  is  true. 
Some  one  has  said  that  if  a  man  calls  himself 
faultless  in  the  deepest  sense  of  the  word,  and  the 
opinion  of  those  who  know  him  best  is  asked, 
they  blame  him  for  a  number  of  things,  but  above 
all  for  his  abominable  self-conceit  and  pride. 
When  Christians  set  themselves  up  as  perfection- 
ists and  aver  that  they  have  not  sinned  by  the 
space  of  a  year,  a  hundred  neighbors  vie  with  each 
other  in  criticism  of  blemishes  and  faults.  We 
assume  and  believe  that  every  one  has  some  moral 
taint,  that  the  best  men  are  not  free  from  faults. 
We  do  not  believe  that  all  men  are  totally  de- 
praved. Depravity  is  not  total.  If  it  were, 
men  would  be  as  bad  as  they  can  be.  But  de- 
pravity, which  is  crookedness,  deviation  from  the 


278  DEGENERATION 

straight  or  right  line,  is  universal,  for  no  one  is 
perfectly  conformed  to  the  ideal.  Huxley  says 
truly  :  "  The  majority  of  us,  I  apprehend,  profess 
neither  pessimism  nor  optimism.  We  hold  that 
the  world  is  neither  so  good,  nor  so  bad,  as  it 
conceivably  might  be ;  and  as  most  of  us  have 
reason,  now  and  again,  to  discover  that  it  can  be."  l 
No  effort  need  be  expended  in  showing  that  de- 
generation, in  some  degree,  and  with  its  accom- 
panying evils,  is  universal.  Interest  pertains  to 
the  nature  and  causes  of  it,  and  to  the  power  of 
recovery. 

IV 

What,  then,  is  degeneration  ?  It  is  that  which 
the  word  suggests  ;  the  absence  or  the  opposite  of 
virtue,  which  is  the  normal  character.  If  goodness 
is  supremacy  of  the  higher  over  the  lower  in  the 
proportionate  satisfaction  of  all  powers,  badness  is 
the  reverse  of  this  order,  is  the  satisfaction  of  the 
lower  to  the  neglect  of  the  higher.  This  is  the 
popular  idea  of  sin  ;  gratification  of  the  appetites 
and  passions  of  sense ;  the  sacrifice  of  truth  or 
honor  or  purity  in  order  to  enjoy  sensuous  pleas- 
ures and  to  gain  physical  good ;  estimate  of 
material  wealth  as  the  chief  good  because  it  minis- 
ters to  the  enjoyment  of  luxurious  and  sensual 
pleasures.  The  scholar  who  by  intemperance  is 
withdrawn  from  literary  activity  is  like  the  man 
who  in  base  self-indulgence  neglects  the  higher 
values  of  duty  and  character.  He  degenerates. 
He  falls  below  the  normal  type  of  worth.  The 
lowest  satisfactions  are  not  bad  in  themselves. 

1  Evolution  and  Ethics,  p.  30. 


ABNORMITY  279 

They  have  their  proper  and  necessary  place. 
They  are  bad  when  they  are  the  only  satisfactions ; 
when,  instead  of  being  subsidiary,  they  become 
supreme.  Degeneration  so  often  takes  the  form 
of  sensuous  gratification  that  some  philosophers 
and  theologians  have  held  that  this  is  the  source  of 
all  sin.  The  ascetic  discipline  has  usually  been  a 
practical  expression  of  this  theory.  It  has  claimed 
support  in  Paul's  contrast  between  the  carnal  and 
the  spiritual  man.  Quite  lately,  the  theory  has 
been  revived  under  the  supposed  sanction  of  evo- 
lution. It  is  held  that  man  has  not  yet  rid  him- 
self wholly  of  his  inheritance  of  animal  instincts, 
that  sin  is  just  the  animal  instincts  which  are  not 
yet  subdued  or  superseded  by  moral  and  spiritual 
development.  Huxley  says  :  "  For  his  successful 
progress,  as  far  as  the  savage  state,  man  has  been 
largely  indebted  to  those  qualities  which  he  shares 
with  the  ape  and  the  tiger.  .  .  .  But,  in  proportion 
as  men  have  passed  from  anarchy  to  social  organi- 
zation and  in  proportion  as  civilization  has  grown 
in  worth,  these  deeply  ingrained  serviceable  quali- 
ties have  become  defects.  After  the  manner  of 
successful  persons,  civilized  man  would  gladly 
kick  down  the  ladder  by  which  he  has  climbed. 
He  would  be  only  too  pleased  to  see  '  the  ape  and 
tiger  die.'  But  they  decline  to  suit  his  convenience ; 
and  the  unwelcome  intrusion  of  these  boon  com- 
panions of  his  hot  youth  into  the  ranged  existence 
of  civil  life  adds  pains  and  griefs,  innumerable 
and  immeasurably  great,  to  those  which  the  cosmic 
process  necessarily  brings  on  the  mere  animal.  In 
fact,  civilized  man  brands  all  these  ape  and  tiger 


280  DEGENERATION 

promptings  with  the  name  of  sins  ;  he  punishes 
many  of  the  acts  which  flow  from  them  as  crimes  ; 
and,  in  extreme  cases,  he  does  his  best  to  put  an 
end  to  the  survival  of  the  fittest  of  former  days  by 
axe  and  rope."  l 

Some  of  our  most  advanced  theologians  trace 
sin  to  the  vestiges  of  the  animal  remaining  in  the 
human  descendants.  The  theory  is  carried  to  its 
extreme  conclusion  in  the  doctrine  of  conditional 
immortality.  Those  who  develop  into  spiritual 
character  and  throw  off  the  animal  inheritance  will 
survive  death.  Those  who  are  controlled  by  the 
animal  desires  and  fail  to  attain  the  spiritual  char- 
acter will  perish,  like  the  animals.  Logically,  the 
theory  means  that  there  are  two  varieties  of  the 
human  species,  bestial  men  and  spiritual  men,  and, 
inasmuch  as  the  individual  can  pass  from  one 
state  to  the  other,  the  evolution  of  men  from  ani- 
mals was  not  completed  ages  ago,  with  no  survival 
of  intermediate  forms  (missing  links),  but  is  now 
going  on  before  our  eyes,  and  in  some  cases  very 
rapidly.  I  will  not  pause  to  measure  the  truth 
and  the  error  of  this  theory.  It  certainly  is  true 
that  many  sins  spring  from  physical  desires.  I 
cannot  but  think,  however,  that  some  injustice  is 
done  our  humble  ancestors  when  all  human  iniqui- 
ties are  fathered  upon  that  which  they  have  be- 
queathed to  us.  They  might  remind  us  that  we 
have  misused  our  inheritance,  that  it  is  only  be- 
cause we  have  higher  powers  that  there  is  any 
wrong  in  physical  gratification,  and  more  than  all, 
that  many  sins  are  not  physical  at  all.  It  is  so 

1  Evolution  and  Ethics,  p.  6. 


ABNORMITY  281 

evident  that  some  of  the  worst  sins,  such  as  revenge, 
pride,  falsehood,  selfish  ambition,  spring  from  de- 
sires which  are  not  sensuous,  that  a  broader  theory 
must  be  sought  for.  The  miser  is  an  ascetic.  He 
is  innocent  of  sensuous  sins.  He  exchanges  physi- 
cal for  spiritual  sin,  the  coarse  for  the  fine  per- 
version. A  narrow  ambition  keeps  the  body  un- 
der. Mephistopheles  cared  nothing  for  carnal 
pleasures.  His  was  the  evil  which  is  described  in 
Scripture  as  spiritual  wickedness  in  high  places. 
To  be  sure,  every  act  is  physical,  for  man  is  not  a 
disembodied  spirit,  but  also,  every  act  is  intellect- 
ual and  spiritual,  for  man  is  not  a  mere  animal. 

If  there  is  any  one  motive  of  wrong  which  ac- 
counts for  all  sins,  and  furnishes  a  comprehensive 
theory  of  perversion,  that  motive  is,  perhaps,  self- 
ishness. It  certainly  includes  many  sins.  It  is 
also  more  profound  than  the  former  theory,  for 
physical  gratification  is  wrong  only  when  it  is  self- 
ish. Selfishness  has  already  been  defined  as  the 
opposite  of  self-love.  Self-love  seeks  one's  own 
perfection  in  the  proportionate  satisfaction  of  all 
the  powers  according  to  the  ideal  of  the  good.  Self- 
ishness seeks  the  lower  satisfactions,  which,  when 
they  are  made  the  chief  ends,  are  unworthy  of  a 
man.  Physical  indulgences  are  included  in  selfish- 
ness but  are  not  its  only  forms.  It  is  also  in  con- 
trast with  love  of  others.  It  seeks  that  which 
cannot  be  shared  with  others,  seeks  that  wherein 
"  companionship  is  one  with  loss."  The  true  good 
is  that  which  can  be  shared.  Kaftan  gives  clear 
expression  to  this  in  his  definition  of  the  chief 
good,  already  cited.  He  says  that  well-being  is  a 


282  DEGENERATION 

preference  of  the  moral  goods  which  are  possessed 
by  men  in  common  above  those  of  the  individual. 
This  is  true.  A  good  which  is  not  increased  but 
is  reduced  by  sharing  it  is  a  lower  good.  In  fact, 
it  is  not  a  good  at  all.  Such  possessions  and  en- 
joyments are  spoken  of  as  goods  only  because  they 
are  so  regarded.  As  chief  ends  they  are  bad,  and 
debase  character.  The  selfish  man  may  company 
and  cooperate  with  others,  but  he  employs  others 
simply  as  means  to  his  own  ends.  He  would  make 
them  his  tools.  Some  degrading  pleasures  are 
social  of  necessity,  but  the  companion  in  sin  is  cast 
aside  when  he  or  she  can  no  longer  be  used.  It 
has  been  truly  said,  too  truly,  that  in  the  end  the 
libertine  destroys  the  victim  he  has  so  hotly  pur- 
sued. So  many  sins  consist  in  the  use  of  others  as 
tools  to  gain  lower  gratifications  that,  popularly, 
selfishness  is  rightly  considered  the  very  essence  of 
nearly  all  known  sins. 

When  worldliness  is  regarded  as  the  bad  ele- 
ment in  human  nature,  it  is  so  merely  as  the  object- 
ive form  of  selfishness.  Love  of  the  world,  so  far 
as  it  is  wrong,  is  love  of  those  things  in  the  world 
which  minister  to  the  lower  gratifications  of  sensu- 
ality, covetousness,  pride,  and  ambition.  It  need 
not,  therefore,  be  dwelt  upon. 

The  fact  is  that  a  philosophy  of  sin  is  extremely 
difficult  and  wellnigh  impossible  because  sin  is  ir- 
rational. It  is  against  reason  because  it  is  against 
nature.  It  is  contrary  to  the  truth.  That  which  is 
unreason  cannot  be  reasoned  about,  cannot  give  a 
reason  for  itself.  I  am  not  sure  but  that  this  is 
the  final  and  comprehensive  rationale  of  moral  de- 


ABNORMITY  283 

generation,  that  it  has  no  rationale,  that  it  must 
simply  be  regarded  as  the  false,  absurd,  and  irra- 
tional, as  man's  contradiction  of  himself.  It  is 
like  discords  in  music,  like  false  perspective  in  pic- 
tures, like  the  old  geocentric  astronomy.  It  is  dis- 
tortion, perversion,  contradiction,  absurdity.  There 
is  no  reason  why  a  man  should  sin,  for  sin  is  trans- 
gression of  the  laws  of  his  own  constitution.  In 
the  last  analysis,  he  sinneth  against  his  own  soid. 
According  to  the  withering  satire  of  the  Bible,  the 
sinner  is  a  fool.  He  is  irrational  and  absurd.  Sin 
is  a  blunder.  It  is  illusion  and  delusion.  It  is  a 
lie.  The  devil,  the  personification  of  evil,  is  the 
father  of  lies  from  the  beginning.  The  perverse 
man  pursues  the  evanescent,  the  fugitive,  the 
receding,  the  vanishing.  Sin  is  vanity.  Vanity 
literally  means  emptiness.  The  outstretched  hand 
grasps  nothingness.  As  it  is  seized,  it  vanishes. 
The  sinner  is  always  in  pursuit  of  a  vanishing 
quantity.  He  is  running  after  the  end  of  the  rain- 
bow. He  is  following  a  mirage  into  the  wilderness. 
The  nature  of  sin  does  not  lend  itself  to  a  philoso- 
phy, since  it  is  the  folly  of  self-contradiction.  But 
its  results  are  known.  Being  unreason,  it  must 
issue  in  failure  and  misery.  A  man  might  as  well 
set  himself  against  the  laws  of  nature,  or  defy 
the  laws  of  health,  with  expectation  of  peace  and 
safety,  as  to  set  himself  against  the  laws  of  right- 
eousness, which  are  absolute,  unchanging,  pitiless. 
Reason  recognizes  that  worth  of  character  which  is 
the  ideal,  normal  man.  Such  man  is.  This  is  his 
intention,  his  original,  his  type.  He  is  such  a  crea- 
ture. He  cannot  defy  himself  with  impunity.  It 


284  DEGENERATION 

is  because  sin  is  irrational  that  it  presents  an  insol- 
uble problem.  There  is  no  problem  of  the  good. 
The  good  is  the  reasonable.  "  What  is  true  to 
the  reason  is  law  to  the  will."  The  good  is  man's 
conformity  to  his  ideal.  Sin  can  give  no  reason 
for  itself.  It  cannot  answer  the  question,  why  ? 

Degeneration,  or  sin,  in  the  last  analysis  and  the 
deepest  consciousness  is  alienation  from  God.  The 
law  of  God  is  the  expression  of  supreme  and  abso- 
lute reason,  of  which  man's  reason  is  the  copy. 
The  law  is  the  expression  of  perfect  righteousness 
from  which  man's  righteousness  is  derived.  Con- 
science and  the  imperative  of  obligation  are  the 
voice  of  God,  for  they  respond  to  that  law  which 
man  did  not  create  and  cannot  annul,  which  he 
only  discovers  in  his  own  constitution,  which  is 
therefore  the  law  of  God.  Sin  is  transgression  of 
God's  law,  which  is  the  law  of  man's  perfection. 
In  consciousness,  therefore,  sin  is  unrest  and  dis- 
content. The  source  of  man's  moral  life,  as  of  his 
physical,  is  in  God.  Sin  is  self-sufficiency.  Sev- 
ered from  the  source  of  his  life,  man  is  restless 
and  unhappy. 

These  various  aspects  of  sin  which  have  been 
designated  as  preference  of  the  lower  to  the 
higher,  as  selfishness,  as  worldliness,  as  irrational- 
ity, and  as  self-sufficiency  in  separation  from  God, 
may  all  be  regarded  as  degeneration  from  the  type 
or  ideal,  for  the  ideal  is  preference  of  the  higher 
to  the  lower,  as  true  self-love  and  love  to  others, 
as  the  truth  of  reason,  as  the  divine  idea  of  man's 
constitution,  and  as  life  in  the  reason,  holiness, 
and  love  of  God,  in  whose  image  man  is  made. 


FREEDOM  285 

V 

The  possibility  of  moral  degeneration  is  found 
in  personality.  A  person  can  compare  values  and 
choose  between  them.  Alternatives  are  open. 
More  than  one  course  of  action  is  possible.  But 
man  does  not  have  absolute  freedom.  Some  objects 
are  completely  out  of  his  reach.  Some  things  he 
would  like  he  cannot  have.  Some  things  one 
man  can  have  another  cannot  have.  Some  things 
a  man  thinks  he  can  have  and  expects  to  have 
are  impossible  to  him.  A  grown  man  cannot  by 
taking  most  careful  thought  add  a  cubit  to  his 
stature.  The  additional  intellectual  cubit  is  as 
unattainable  as  is  the  coveted  physical  tallness. 
Some  men  make  themselves  ridiculous  in  the 
attempt  to  be  philosophers,  teachers,  musicians, 
poets,  inventors,  wits.  But  certain  alternatives 
are  presented  to  every  one.  There  is  a  limited 
freedom.  The  extreme  illustration  employed  by 
Dr.  Holmes,  which  likens  human  freedom  to  a 
drop  of  water  imprisoned  in  a  crystalline  sphere, 
leaves  some  mobility.  A  man  can  eat  one  kind 
of  food  rather  than  another.  He  can  sit  still  or 
walk.  He  can  be  silent  or  can  speak,  —  at  least, 
some  men  seem  to  have  that  power.  He  can  read 
a  book  rather  than  a  newspaper.  He  can  make 
a  true  or  a  false  representation.  He  can  be 
honest  or  can  cheat.  He  can  relieve  another's 
want  or  can  turn  away  contemptuous.  Theoreti-  j 
cally,  freedom  has  been  denied.  It  has  been 
maintained  that  power  of  choice  is  imaginary, 
that  the  course  actually  taken  is  the  only  course 


286  DEGENERATION 

that  could  have  been  taken.  But.  the  theory 
admits  and  assumes  that  all  men  believe  they 
have  the  power  of  choice,  that  they  always  have 
believed  it,  and  always  will  believe  it,  that  they 
act  as  if  they  were  free.  Necessitarians  admit 
that  they  themselves  are  conscious  of  having  this 
power  and  of  exercising  it  constantly,  that  they 
feel  responsibility,  have  regrets,  and  blame  or 
praise  others.  Human  nature  has  the  endowment 
of  consciousness  of  freedom.  Every  one  has  it. 
No  one  has  persuaded  himself  that  he  has  it.  On 
the  contrary  no  one  can  persuade  himself  out  of 
it.  Bushnell  cites  the  case  of  an  author  who  had 
written  a  book  to  prove  that  man  is  not  free,  and 
who,  in  reply  to  his  critics,  asseverated  vehe- 
mently that  their  telling  strictures  were  wicked. 
A  French  theologian,  Naville,  gives  a  similar  in- 
stance. Dr.  Holmes,  when  he  was  not  theorizing, 
directed  his  satire  mercilessly  against  certain  in- 
dividuals whose  actions  he  did  not  approve,  and 
did  not  exempt  one  of  the  governors  of  Massachu- 
setts from  the  outpourings  of  his  vials  of  witty 
wrath.  The  sense  of  freedom  within  certain 
limits  is  a  furnishing  of  human  nature.  It  is  a 
value,  a  power,  an  endowment  so  real  and  univer- 
sal, that  conditions  brought  over  from  the  non- 
human  realm  of  physical  nature  cannot  be  applied 
to  it.  Persons  are  distinctive.  They  are  on 
another  range.  They  are  not  out  of  connection 
with  physical  nature.  They  subdue  it  to  their 
uses.  But  self-determining  persons  are  a  different 
kind  of  power  from  the  necessitated  causes  and 
effects  of  chemical  and  mechanical  forces,  and  the 


FREEDOM  287 

difference  consists  largely  in  the  power  of  choos- 
ing among  alternatives,  a  power  which  implies 
reason  and  self-consciousness. 

I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  weigh  the  argu- 
ments for  and  against  the  limited  freedom  of  man. 
There  are  only  two  considerations  which  I  care 
to  present.  One  is,  that  the  universe  seems  to 
be  adapted  to  alternative  actions  of  men.  This 
has  been  conclusively  shown  by  Professor  William 
James  in  an  article  on  the  .Dilemma  of  Determin- 
ism, which  has  suggested  the  illustration  I  am 
about  to  employ.1  When  I  am  at  the  seashore,  I 
can  go  to  a  house  two  miles  away,  in  a  carriage,  or 
a  boat,  or  on  a  bicycle,  or  on  my  feet.  The  struc- 
ture of  the  universe  is  such  that  either  mode  of 
locomotion  fits  into  it.  After  I  have  driven,  the 
necessitarian,  or,  as  he  prefers  to  call  himself,  the 
determinist,  declares  that  it  would  have  been  im- 
possible to  walk.  But,  if  I  had  walked,  he  would 
say  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  drive.  Em- 
pirical observation  of  facts  could  find  no  impossi- 
bility in  either  mode  of  motion.  It  is  only  some 
preconceived  notion  of  cause  and  effect  in  the 
action  of  physical  forces  which  denies  me  the 
possibility  of  alternative  action.  But  this  neces- 
sity of  cause  and  effect  is  not  given  by  empirical 
observation  of  nature,  for  only  part  of  nature  has 
been  observed.  It  is  given  by  the  mind  which 
observes.  It  is  a  rational  inference  or  postulate. 
Yet  the  mind  which  puts  certain  laws  into  nature 
is  the  mind  which  is  conscious  of  the  power  of 
choice.  The  one  conviction  is  as  real  and  sure  as 
1  Unitarian  Review,  Sept.,  1884. 


288  DE GENERA  TION 

the  other.  In  fact,  the  notion  of  cause  producing 
effect  is  derived  from  the  human  will.  One 
exerts  power.  He  produces  effects.  He  is  a 
cause  as  truly  as  he  is  an  effect.  He  is  a  self- 
determining  cause.  Instead  of  interpreting  him- 
self in  the  terms  of  physical  nature,  he  interprets 
nature  in  terms  of  himself.  The  point  I  would 
make  is,  that  necessity  in  nature  is  a  mental  pos- 
tulate, and  that  power  of  alternative  action  is  a 
mental  postulate,  and  that  there  is  no  good  reason 
why  either  should  be  denied,  especially  as  nature 
makes  room,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  for  a  consider- 
able range  of  alternative  action  by  man,  and  even 
a  slight  range  of  alternative  action  by  animals. 
A  dog  seems  to  be,  and  perhaps  is,  undecided 
whether  to  follow  his  master  or  finish  his  bone, 
and  nature  accommodates  either  course.  Physical 
nature  has  its  mode  of  action.  Human  nature 
has  its  mode  of  action.  They  are  not  contradic- 
tory, but  they  are  not  identical. 

The  other  consideration  is  that  the  real  and  only 
difficulty  about  contingent  action  is  the  omni- 
potence and  omniscience  of  God.  It  is  not  easy 
to  see  how,  if  God  foreknows,  and  especially  if  he 
controls  all  events,  there  can  be  the  uncertainty 
which  exists  if  man  can  choose  one  course  rather 
than  another.  The  attempts  made  by  theologians 
and  philosophers  to  reconcile  human  freedom  with 
divine  sovereignty  have  not  been  crowned  with 
success.  God  has  been  compared  to  a  chessplayer, 
who  will  checkmate  his  opponent,  whatever  moves 
he  may  make.  The  Arminian  says  that  God  fore- 
Bees  without  compelling,  as  a  sagacious  man  clearly 


FREEDOM  289 

foresees  action  in  which  he  has  no  part.  Some 
have  held  that  God  delimits  himself,  vacates,  as  it 
were,  a  margin  of  the  field  to  man,  a  margin  with 
limits,  but  within  which,  whether  man  goes  right 
or  wrong,  he  will  subserve  the  purposes  of  God. 
Others  say  that  the  free  will  of  man  is  one  of  the 
causes  through  which  God  works.  But  these  ex- 
planations are  unsatisfactory,  for  they  deny  the 
very  thing  they  assume.  They  deny  complete 
knowledge  or  complete  power  to  God.  He  does 
not  know  every  course  man  may  take,  although  he 
knows  the  result.  He  does  not  control  every  act 
of  man,  although  he  foresees  the  result.  But  in- 
complete knowledge  is  not  omniscience,  and  partial 
power,  vacated  power,  is  not  omnipotence.  Yet  it 
is  because  God  is  omniscient  and  omnipotent  that 
the  possibility  of  human  freedom  calls  for  expla- 
nation. For  my  own  part,  I  have  long  ago  given 
up  the  expectation  of  harmonizing  these  two  con- 
ceptions. But  I  think  we  know  more  about  human 
freedom  than  we  know  about  omniscience  and 
omnipotence.  God  reveals  himself  in  his  works ; 
man  is  one  of  his  works  ;  and  man  cannot  rid  him- 
self of  the  consciousness  of  freedom  and  responsi- 
bility. I  accept  the  facts  as  I  find  them  and  do 
not  trouble  myself  to  adjust  them  to  my  meta- 
physical conceptions  of  God.  If  there  is  room  in 
God's  creation  for  man  the  person,  whose  greatness 
is  his  power  of  originating  action,  who  has  sense 
of  obligation  and  uncompromising  condemnation 
of  wrong,  who  is  at  the  head  of  creation  because 
he  has  conscience  and  reason,  there  certainly  is 
room  for  him  to  act  in  accordance  with  his  powers. 


290  DEGENERATION 

Nature  makes  room  for  him,  and  God  makes  room 
for  him.  One  who  does  not  believe  in  a  God  has 
no  trouble  about  freedom  on  the  score  of  omni- 
potence ;  and  as  nature  is  adapted  to  certain 
alternatives  of  human  action,  and  as  every  man  is 
conscious  of  power  to  choose,  there  seems  to  be  no 
reason  why  the  materialist  should  deny  that  power, 
since  facts  are  worth  more  to  him  than  d  priori 
notions. 

I  assume,  then,  a  degree  of  freedom  as  giving 
the  possibility  of  degeneration.  Some  forms  of 
degeneration  are  inevitable,  such  as  disease  of  the 
body,  which,  for  the  individual,  is  unavoidable, 
although  preventable  perhaps  by  combined  precau- 
tion. Such  degeneration  has  no  moral  character. 
It  is  not  sin.  One  does  not  blame  himself  for  it. 
But  there  is  a  degeneration  which  is  moral  because 
it  is  avoidable.  The  origin  of  it  is  found  in  man's 
power  of  alternative  action,  in  the  fact  that  he  can 
see  and  approve  the  better,  and  yet  may  follow 
the  worse. 

There  are  two  philosophies  of  evil ;  the  philoso- 
phy of  necessity  and  the  philosophy  of  liberty. 
Both  are  ancient  and  modern.  To  the  Greek,  evil 
resided  in  matter ;  disorder  was  there.  Accident, 
disease,  and  death  were  there.  The  gods  did  not 
create  matter.  They  found  it  as  it  was,  and  did 
the  best  they  could  with  it.  But  its  disorder  and 
evil  remained  in  some  degree.  Every  man  must 
suffer  more  or  less  from  the  dire  necessities  of 
the  world  and  of  the  flesh.  Evil  was  misfortune 
rather  than  fault.  There  really  was  no  sin.  The 
unavoidable  was  excusable.  Evil  was  the  shadow 


FREEDOM  291 

of  necessity.  To  the  Jew,  God  created  the  world. 
It  was  God's  world.  Nature  was  not  a  growth,  an 
evolution,  a  constant  flux.  It  originated  in  God 
and  was  governed  by  him.  Evil,  therefore,  was 
not  in  nature,  for  God  created  all.  In  the  boldness 
of  faith  one  prophet  declared  that  God  created 
the  darkness  and  the  light,  the  good  and  the  evil. 
Evil,  however,  could  not  come  from  God,  for  there 
is  no  evil  in  him.  Evil  is  from  man's  disobe- 
dience of  the  law  of  God.  Man  is  a  person  with 
liberty  of  choice.  He  chose  evil  rather  than  good. 
Evil  is  the  shadow  of  liberty.  The  contrast  of  the 
Greek  and  the  Hebrew  philosophy  is  admirably 
set  forth  by  Miss  Julia  Wedgwood  in  the  chap- 
ters on  The  Problem  of  Evil  and  The  Fall  of 
Man  in  "  The  Moral  Ideal."  A  single  quotation 
must  suffice :  "  The  belief  that  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  our  spiritual  nature  implies  the  possibility 
of  Evil,  was  a  natural  reaction  from  the  belief  that 
the  very  constitution  of  our  material  environment 
implies  the  existence  of  Evil.  We  see  how  Person- 
ality was  made  an  answer  to  the  unanswerable 
problem  only  when  we  see  how  the  very  opposite 
of  Personality  had  at  first  filled  the  place.  We 
understand  best  the  theory  that  finds  the  origin  of 
evil  in  a  choice  that  might  vary  at  any  moment 
when  we  compare  it  with  the  view  against  which 
it  was  a  recoil,  — that  Evil  was  a  definite  tangible 
reality,  a  thing  of  a  certain  fixed  compass  and 
amount,  which  might  be  shut  in  within  its  own 
limits,  and  disentangled  from  its  opposite,  but 
which  even  by  omnipotence  could  not  be  destroyed. 
There  can  be  no  reaction  more  inevitable  than  that 


292  DEGENERATION 

from  the  spirit  which  sees  in  matter  the  source  of 
Evil,  to  that  which  sees  the  source  of  Evil  in  hu- 
man choice.  It  was  a  natural  thing  to  see  Evil  as 
the  shadow  of  Liberty,  when  men  had  for  long 
seen  evil  as  the  shadow  of  Necessity."  l 

Even  the  Persian,  who  believed  that  man  could 
choose  between  right  and  wrong,  thought  that  there 
was  a  kingdom  of  Evil  ruled  over  by  Ahriman,  to 
whom  Ormuzd  was  opposed.  He  believed  that 
Ahriman  would  finally  be  overcome,  and  that  man 
could  cooperate  with  Ormuzd,  chiefly  by  industry 
reclaiming  the  earth  to  fruitf ulness. 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  the  philosophy  which 
denies  freedom  to  man  and  regards  evil  as  a  neces- 
sary incident  in  a  necessitated  evolution,  and  the 
philosophy  which  affirms  freedom  and  regards  evil 
as  a  perversion  of  liberty,  are  reproduced  under 
different  forms  in  the  modern  philosophies  of  ma- 
terialism and  personality.  A  reaction  has  set  in 
against  the  materialistic  philosophy.  Personality 
is  reasserting  itself.  Evil  is  seen  to  be-  the  shadow 
of  liberty,  not  the  shadow  of  necessity.  With 
this  revival  there  goes  a  profounder  and  more 
sombre  thought  of  sin,  but  with  it  also  a  more 
cheerful  hope  that  evil  may  be  reduced  and  event- 
ually removed  by  human  endeavor.  The  necessity 
of  the  material  world,  which  presses  hard  on  man, 
is  real  and  can  never  be  ignored.  But  personality 
and  liberty  are  real,  and  in  the  end  maintain  ascend- 
ancy in  theory,  as  they  always  have  in  fact. 

1  The  Moral  Ideal,  p.  332. 


MORAL  POWER  NOT  DESTROYED      293 


VI 

Degeneration  may  impair  without  destroying  the 
moral  powers,  as  disease  may  exist  without  pro- 
ducing death.  Observation  shows  every  degree  of 
degeneration.  Some  men  seem  to  have  no  vul- 
nerable point.  Other  men  seem  to  have  no  in- 
vulnerable moral  point.  Some  seem  to  have  no 
unhealthy  spot.  Others  seem  to  be  unsound 
throughout.  Between  these  extremes  are  individu- 
als combining  every  proportion  of  good  and  bad. 
It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  either  extreme 
actually  exists.  Popular  proverbs  express  this 
doubt.  "  Every  man  has  his  price."  "  To  err  is 
human."  The  best  men  have  at  least  the  defects 
of  their  virtues.  There  seems  to  be  a  lack  of 
humanness  in  one  who  has  no  faults  and  can  be 
assailed  by  no  temptations. 

"  They  say,  best  men  are  molded  out  of  faults, 
And  for  the  most,  become  much  more  the  better 
For  being  a  little  bad."  l 

On  the  other  hand,  the  worst  men  have  redeem- 
ing qualities.  Profligates  are  generous.  The  mur- 
derer loves  his  child.  The  fratricide  shudders  at 
the  thought  of  matricide.  Man  is  between  angel 
and  devil ;  all  the  way  between. 

But,  when  a  deeper  penetration  analyzes  charac- 
ter it  is  seen  that  a  quantitative  estimate  of  more 
or  less  is  superficial,  that  either  goodness  or  bad- 
ness is  masterful,  that  the  forces  of  health  are  ex- 
tending their  area  and  reducing  disease,  or  the 
forces  of  degeneration  are  invading  and  limiting 

1  Measure  for  Measure,  act  v.,  se.  i. 


294  DEGENERATION 

the  area  of  goodness.  There  is  either  pursuit  of 
the  ideal  of  self-love  and  love  to  others,  or  there 
is  selfishness  which  prefers  the  lower  to  the  higher 
good.  A  man  is  not  one  thing  to-day  and  another 
thing  to-morrow,  a  good  man  this  week  and  a  bad 
man  next  week.  Every  one  has  a  character  which 
is  strengthening  and  confirming  itself  continually. 
There  may  be  vacillations  and  inconsistencies. 
But  on  the  whole  a  man  is  what  he  is,  and  his  ac- 
tions correspond  to  his  character.  I  think  there 
is  really  no  dispute  about  this.  It  is  the  very  gos- 
pel of  the  determinist  (or  perhaps  I  should  say  his 
law,  for  it  is  not  good  news  to  most  of  us),  that 
character  determines  action  and  actions  continu- 
ally confirm  character.  It  is  the  very  philosophy 
of  the  theologian  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  char- 
acter, the  good  and  the  bad,  the  saint  and  the  sin- 
ner. There  is  no  denial  of  the  imperfections  of 
the  saint  nor  of  the  good  qualities  of  the  sinner. 
Concerning  one  sinner,  Jesus  said  that  he  lacked 
only  one  thing.  The  difference  between  the  theo- 
logian and  the  determinist  is  that  the  theologian 
believes  and  the  determinist  denies  that  the  sinner 
can  become  a  saint  by  one  decisive,  supreme  choice, 
which  is  a  radical  change  of  character.  The  deter- 
minist believes  that  a  man  may  by  his  own  efforts 
gradually  change  his  character  and  at  length  be 
of  quite  another  sort,  yet  by  so  infinitesimal  de- 
grees that  he  passes  over  the  line  imperceptibly, 
as  night  passes  into  day,  as  the  tide  creeps  over 
the  bar.  The  theologian  believes  that  a  man  may 
lay  hold  of  moral  forces,  of  the  ideal  presented  in 
Christ,  and  when  he  does  so  may  become  a  changed 


MORAL  POWER  NOT  DESTROYED      295 

character,  as  the  traveler  may  take  one  road  rather 
than  another,  as  he  may  come  out  of  a  cave  into 
the  broad  light,  as  he  may  turn  the  helm  of  his 
boat  and  sail  away  from  northern  seas  to  a  sunny 
clime.  Two  ships  may  be  side  by  side  and  for 
hours  within  sight  of  each  other,  but  sailing  in  op- 
posite directions.  I  shall  return  to  recovery  from 
degeneration  in  the  next  chapter. 

The  fact  that  the  worst  men  have  some  vestiges 
of  goodness  signifies  power  of  recovery.  Man  as 
sinful  in  whatever  degree  has  capability  of  good- 
ness, which  is  not  destroyed,  and  which  under  ap- 
propriate conditions  asserts  control.  Some  regard 
for  right  remains.  There  is  sense  of  obligation, 
conviction  of  right,  some  aspiration  towards  the 
ideal,  some  self-accusation,  some  conscious  discon- 
tent. Were  these  wanting,  were  there  no  know- 
ledge of  right  and  wrong,  man  would  cease  to  be  a 
moral  being.  He  might  be  miserable,  but  he  would 
not  be  man.  In  his  moral  perceptions  and  convic- 
tions is  the  power  of  recovery  to  his  ideal.  So 
long  as  men,  however  degenerate,  hear  the  call  to 
be  better  men,  they  have  the  power  to  be  better. 
They  may  not  be  able  of  themselves  to  change 
character,  but  they  may  be  able  to  attach  them- 
selves to  recuperative  moral  forces  and  persons,  as 
one  cannot  communicate  with  another  a  hundred 
miles  away,  but  can  do  so  by  availing  himself  of 
the  invisible  forces  of  nature.  There  have  always 
been  counter-agencies  to  degeneration.  Society  it- 
self, in  the  family,  in  government,  in  mutual  de- 
pendences, is  full  of  moral  values.  Good  men  are 
a  counter-check  on  bad  men.  Law,  art,  literature, 


296  DEGENERATION 

and  philosophy  have  objectified  the  ideal.  These 
are,  indeed,  human  creations,  but  creations  which 
combine  the  good  which  exists  in  many  persons. 
Individuals  as  they  now  are  in  society,  however 
bad  they  may  be,  have  capability  of  goodness. 
They  see  and  approve  the  good,  and  can  choose 
and  follow  it. 

The  theological  doctrine  of  the  Fall  of  man  is 
naturally  suggested  by  the  facts  we  have  been  con- 
sidering. The  doctrine  owes  more  to  Augustine 
and  Milton  than  to  the  Book  of  Genesis.  The 
Scriptural  truth  is  that  man  made  wrong  choices 
very  early,  say,  at  the  beginning,  and  that  those 
choices  brought  many  evils  upon  him.  He  was  in 
a  state  of  simplicity  and  innocence.  He  was  un- 
clothed and  after  a  time  wore  skins  of  animals. 
We  should  call  him  a  savage.  He  was  tempted  and 
did  wrong,  and  kept  on  going  wrong.  A  moral 
crisis  discovered  him  to  himself  as  a  moral  being. 
But  he  made  progress.  He  practiced  some  vir- 
tues. He  tilled  the  ground.  He  gained  knowledge. 
He  cultivated  simple  arts.  He  built  cities.  He 
formed  governments.  He  could  not  have  remained 
in  the  primitive,  characterless  state.  It  was  not 
intended  that  he  or  any  of  us  should  revert  to 
that  state.  He  became  a  creature  of  good  and 
bad  impulses.  At  times  he  yielded  to  the  lower 
and  became  very  bad  indeed.  At  times  he  at- 
tained goodness  and  made  considerable  progress. 
The  story  is  true  to  human  nature  and  human  his- 
tory. Every  one  comes  to  a  moral  crisis.  Almost 
every  one  first  seeks  satisfaction  in  the  lower.  But 
power  for  goodness  remains,  and  the  conditions 


MORAL  POWER  NOT  DESTROYED      297 

for  goodness  exist.  The  important  questions  are, 
not  how  bad  or  degenerate  men  became,  nor  how  far 
the  first  man  fell,  but  rather,  what  are  the  neces- 
sary and  actual  conditions  under  which  there  can 
be  recovery  from  degeneration  and  the  realization 
of  goodness  ? 


CHAPTER  XII 

PERSONAL    REGENERATION 

REGENERATION  is  a  word  which  has  recently  ob- 
tained rather  wide  currency  in  various  applications. 
The  phrases,  social  regeneration,  and,  municipal  re- 
generation, are  on  many  lips.  Even  the  regenera- 
tion of  art  and  the  regeneration  of  literature  are 
spoken  of.  As  a  designation  of  the  betterment  of 
conditions,  "  regeneration "  is  a  more  significant 
word  than  "  reform,"  possibly  because  it  suggests  a 
profound  and  thorough  transformation  rather  than 
a  superficial  and  specific  improvement.  Reform  is 
removal  of  an  abuse  or  excrescence.  Regeneration 
is  recovery  to  the  normal  type,  the  genus.  The 
word  has  come  over  from  Christianity.  It  is  found 
in  the  Christian  Scriptures.  It  has  survived  in 
theology.  It  has  always  held  a  place  in  the  lan- 
guage of  faith  and  experience.  So  vital  a  word 
could  not  perish,  even  when  it  was  made  to  carry 
the  burden  of  unreal  and  artificial  emotions.  It 
suggests  the  moral  and  spiritual  man  recovered  to 
himself.  It  means  restoration  of  the  genus.  In 
popular  and  in  Scriptural  language  regeneration 
is  a  birth,  a  new  birth.  The  two  words  are  syn- 
onymous. Birth  is  reproduction  of  a  species.  It  is 
vital,  not  mechanical.  As  physical  birth  is  the 
human  species  reproducing  itself  after  its  kind,  so 
moral  and  spiritual  birth  is  character  reproduced 


RECOVERY  299 

according  to  the  human  type.  Since  character  is 
by  one's  own  choice  rather  than  by  the  agency  of 
others,  the  new  birth,  the  regeneration,  follows  after 
the  natural  birth,  and  is  either  the  appropriation  of 
the  true  character,  or  a  recovery  to  it  from  ab- 
normal and  degenerate  character.  The  meaning 
of  regeneration  has  become  all  the  more  distinct 
now  that  its  precise  counterpart,  degeneration,  has 
come  into  popular  and  scientific  use.  Degenera- 
tion so  clearly  signifies  impairment  of  type  that 
regeneration  as  plainly  signifies  recovery  and  de- 
velopment according  to  the  type  or  genus.  The 
title  of  this  chapter  and  of  the  two  following  chap- 
ters has  the  advantage  of  Christian  usage  through 
the  centuries,  of  recent  popular  application  to  the 
improvement  of  society,  and  of  contrast  with  the 
term  employed  by  science  and  literature  to  desig- 
nate departure  from  the  normal  type,  the  word,  de- 
generation. In  this  chapter  we  consider  the  real- 
ization of  personal  character,  with  especial  regard 
to  Christian  regeneration,  and  in  the  two  succeed- 
ing chapters  some  of  the  forms  and  conditions  of 
social  regeneration. 


Although  personal  regeneration  is  the  positive 
realization  of  the  normal  type,  it  is  undoubtedly 
in  the  Christian  Scriptures  regarded  as  a  recovery 
from  the  abnormal  sinful  type.  All  men  are  sup- 
posed to  be  more  or  less  degenerate.  This  also  is 
common  opinion.  Along  with  physical  and  intel- 
lectual vigor,  along  with  advancement  in  arts, 
along  with  the  evolution  of  the  inonogamic  family 


300  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

and  of  the  institutions  of  government,  there  is  sensu- 
ousness,  vice,  selfishness,  sin.  The  individual  needs 
moral  regeneration.  As  a  perfectly  healthy  person 
is  the  exception,  so  a  perfectly  normal  character  is 
the  rare  exception,  even  if  it  exists  at  all.  Yet, 
although  Christianity  makes  this  assumption,  it 
represents  forgiveness  and  recovery  as  incidental, 
as  the  negative  side  of  regeneration.  Sin  is  an 
obstruction  to  be  removed,  a  formidable,  almost 
insurmountable  obstacle,  it  may  be,  but  still  only 
a  hindrance  and  denial  of  the  true  character. 
Deliverance  from  sin  and  its  consequences  is  not 
the  ultimate  object.  Redemption  is  from  sin,  it  is 
true,  but  that  is  not  all.  It  is  from  sin  unto  holi- 
ness. And  it  is  holiness  which  gives  recovery  from 
sin.  Theology  has  given  too  large  a  place  to  pen- 
alty and  guilt  as  related  to  the  law  of  God.  It 
has  represented  the  satisfaction  of  justice  and  the 
forgiveness  of  sins  as  the  principal  object  of  the 
revelation  of  God's  love  in  Christ.  Theology  has 
maintained  that  one  cannot  be  forgiven  on  his  re- 
pentance alone,  but  that  the  penalty  of  his  sin 
must  be  paid  off  by  some  equivalent.  The  effect 
of  these  theories,  which  I  shall  criticise  in  a  later 
chapter,  has  been,  to  say  the  least,  reversal  of  pro- 
portion. Personal  righteousness  and  the  kingdom 
of  God  are  the  primary  and  principal  objects.  In- 
cident to  these  is  deliverance  from  sin  and  its  con- 
sequences of  disease  and  degeneracy.  But  it  is  only 
by  choice  and  realization  of  the  good  that  sin  can 
cease  and  its  consequences  be  escaped.  To  convert 
the  sinner  into  a  saint  is  the  object  of  the  gospel. 
Becoming  a  saint  he  ceases  to  be  a  sinner.  There 


RECOVERY  301 

is  no  other  way  in  which  he  can  cease  to  be  a  sin- 
ner. If  he  chooses  to  be  a  child  of  God,  there 
are  no  old  accounts  hanging  over  him  which  must 
be  settled.  He  is  simply  forgiven  and  welcomed. 
Penalty  is  an  inherent  consequence  of  the  selfish, 
sinful,  degenerate  status.  It  can  be  remitted  and 
escaped  only  by  change  to  the  status  of  righteous- 
ness. It  is,  indeed,  so  wonderful  a  thing  that  one 
can  be  delivered  from  the  bondage  of  sin  that  at 
first  remission  of  sins  may  seem  to  be  the  whole 
of  it.  But  the  real  object  is  righteousness.  There 
is  no  condemnation,  it  is  true.  One  does  not  con- 
demn himself,  and  God  does  not  condemn  him. 
But  it  is  not  by  arrangement  external  to  himself. 
He  is  new-privileged  because  he  is  new-charactered. 
Guilt  is  an  estimate  of  character.  So  far  as  the 
past  is  concerned  it  never  is  removed.  If  one  is 
regenerated  when  he  is  thirty  years  old,  his  guilt 
when  he  was  twenty  remains  just  what  it  was. 
Looking  back,  he  disapproves  himself  even  more 
than  he  did  at  the  time.  He  was  the  guilty  one. 
Nothing  can  ever  change  that  fact.  But  that  is 
of  little  consequence  now.  One  should  not  think 
about  it.  God  does  not  reproach  him.  "Your 
sins  and  iniquities  will  I  remember  no  more ;  " 
that  is,  I  will  not  remind  you  of  them.  As  one 
who  has  reformed  sometimes  reverts  to  his  past 
wickedness  but  is  not  allowed  to  dwell  on  it  —  we 
will  not  talk  about  that  —  so  in  respect  to  the  old 
character  of  sin.  The  father  did  not  allow  the 
prodigal  to  complete  the  confessions  he  had  pre- 
pared to  make,  but  interrupted  him  and  dwelt  on 
the  fact  of  his  return  home.  Redemption,  like  re- 


302  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

generation,  says  to,  rather  than  from.  It  is  from 
sin  and  misery  because  it  is  to  right  uses.  The 
ordinary  is  the  Christian  meaning  of  redemption ; 
one  is  redeemed  or  recovered  to  his  uses. 

The  objective  point  of  the  gospel  is  regenera- 
tion of  character.  Its  initial  call  is  to  repentance. 
Repentance  (/xcrarota)  is  a  change  of  mind.  It  is 
not  merely  regret  for  the  past.  It  is  that  regret 
which  is  genuine  because  one  turns  from  sin  to 
righteousness.  Jesus  did  not  claim  that  the  neces- 
sity of  moral  regeneration  was  not  already  recog- 
nized. Indeed  he  was  surprised  that  Nicodemus 
did  not  perceive  the  need  of  being  born  again. 
"  Art  thou  the  teacher  of  Israel  and  understandest 
not  these  things  ?  "  This  was  an  earthly  thing,  a 
thing  of  earthly  knowledge,  for  which  no  revelation 
was  required.  Not  only  Jews,  but  other  peoples, 
knew  as  much  as  that.  It  was  not  a  Jew  who  said, 
"I  see  and  approve  the  better,  but  follow  the 
worse."  Jesus  saw  the  need  more  clearly  than 
others  saw  it.  He  saw  that  superficial  changes 
in  outward  conduct  and  custom  were  not  enough, 
that  political  changes,  such  as  deliverance  from  the 
Roman  yoke,  or  redistribution  of  property  ("  Who 
made  me  a  judge  or  a  divider  over  you  ?  ")  were 
not  enough.  He  brushed  away  false  expectations. 
He  traced  evils,  personal,  social,  political,  the  coming 
downfall  of  Jerusalem,  to  the  moral  corruption  of 
the  people.  There  must  be  the  changed  heart,  the 
new  birth,  the  new  man.  This  is  the  commonplace 
of  Christianity.  Professions  will  not  avail.  "  Lord, 
Lord,  have  we  not  in  thy  name  done  many  won- 
derful works  ?  "  Ceremonial  religion  is  unavailing. 


SELF-IMPARTATION  OF  JESUS         303 

"  Go  ye  and  learn  what  that  meaneth,  '  I  will  have 
mercy  and  not  sacrifice."  "  Ye  tithe  mint,  anise, 
and  cumin,  and  have  left  undone  the  weightier 
matters  of  the  law,  judgment,  mercy,  and  faith." 
There  must  be  right  motive,  a  right  spirit,  a  right 
heart,  right  character.  This  or  that  kind  of  food 
does  not  defile  a  man,  but  the  evil  thoughts  which 
proceed  out  of  the  heart,  these  defile  a  man.  Theo- 
logy has  obscured  the  simplicity  of  the  gospel,  when 
it  has  put  imputations  and  satisfactions  in  the  place 
of  renewed  character.  The  gospel  is  obscured 
when  one  imagines  that  he  may  go  on  in  his  selfish 
ways  and  be  saved  by  church,  sacrament,  profes- 
sions. The  strength  of  Unitarianism  has  been  due, 
not  so  much,  I  think,  to  a  simpler  speculative  con- 
ception of  God  than  that  of  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit, 
as  to  its  insistence  on  right  character.  The  con- 
trasted characters,  the  degenerate  and  the  regener- 
ate, are  often  put  side  by  side  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, the  old  man  of  deceitfulness  and  unright- 
eousness and  the  new  man  of  truth  and  holiness. 
Jesus  did  not  say  that  men  are  as  bad  as  they  can 
be.  He  said  that  all  men  are  sinners,  and  that  he 
came  to  call  sinners  to  repentance,  to  make  them 
free.  There  is  only  one  way  to  be  free,  he  said. 
The  truth  shall  make  you  free. 

II 

The  need  of  regeneration  is  generally  recognized. 
But  how  is  regeneration  to  be  accomplished  ? 
What  moral  power  is  equal  to  it  and  available  for 
it  ?  There  are  some  who  think  it  is  only  through 
the  life  and  sacrifice  of  Jesus  Christ  that  character 


304  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

can  change  the  centre  of  gravity  from  selfishness 
to  goodness.  I  should  not  care  to  assert  that. 
There  have  been  persons  who  lived  before  the 
time  of  Christ,  and  persons  since  his  time  who  had 
never  heard  of  him,  whose  life  was  right  in  aim 
and  to  a  large  extent  in  conduct.  Such  persons, 
in  contrast  with  their  contemporaries,  so  obviously 
present  the  character  of  goodness,  that  it  has  been 
maintained,  by  those  who  think  regeneration  is  pos- 
sible only  through  the  power  of  Christ,  that  they 
virtually  have  knowledge  of  him.  It  is  thought 
that  such  persons,  having  the  spirit  of  love,  have 
the  essential  Christ,  although  they  have  no  know- 
ledge of  the  historical  Jesus.  The  explanation 
evidently  labors.  Those  who  advance  it  are  in 
danger  of  forfeiting  their  own  assumption  of  the 
necessity  of  the  actual  life  and  sacrifice  of  Christ. 
But  the  theory  shows  that  there  is  real  goodness 
without  knowledge  of  the  historical  Jesus.  As  the 
ancient  world  and  the  world  outside  Christendom 
are  better  known,  the  number  of  good  men  is  found 
to  be  considerable ;  men  who  have  an  ideal  which 
in  some  respects  is  true,  and  who  in  a  measure 
realize  the  ideal.  I  content  myself  with  the  opin- 
ion, which  is  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  this  dis- 
cussion, that  Jesus  is  the  greatest  power  for  regen- 
eration, and  is  the  only  power  under  which  masses 
of  men  in  all  grades  of  culture  attain  the  character 
of  goodness.  If  he  has  that  power,  we  may  disre- 
gard other  influences,  which,  at  the  most,  are  capa- 
ble of  regenerating  only  a  few  exceptional  persons. 
The  power  of  Jesus  resides  in  his  own  character 
of  goodness.  That  character,  introduced  intohu- 


SELF-IMPARTATION  OF  JESUS         305 

inanity,  is  the  sufficient  power  for  all  needed  trans- 
formations. What  is  to  be  held  concerning  this 
perfect  person  who  appeared  in  the  fullness  of  time, 
vitally  and  organically  a  member  of  the  race,  yet 
the  creator  of  a  regenerate  humanity,  is  a  question 
which  is  reserved  for  the  chapter  on  Christianity 
and  Evolution.  We  are  now  concerned  with  the 
character  itself,  which  brings  moral  life  in  its 
wholeness  or  holiness  to  others.  And  I  assert  that 
the  power  was  himself.  His  life,  of  which  his 
teaching  was  one  expression,  and  not  his  teaching 
apart  from  his  life,  is  the  power  of  moral  life  and 
health  to  men.  It  is  the  uniqueness  of  Jesus  that 
he  realized  his  ideal.  He  is  the  only  moralist  who 
has  done  that.  There  are  those  who  deny  that 
Jesus  was  perfectly  good.  But  they  do  not  affirm 
that  any  other  has  been.  They  admit  that  Jesus 
stands  far  above  the  best  men.  There  is  no  other 
concerning  whom  the  question  even  arises  whether 
he  was  perfectly  good  or  not.  The  world's  judg- 
ment is  to  be  accepted.  He  was  the  complete 
realization  of  his  own  ideal.  Men  see  in  him  the 
true  humanity,  free  from  all  degeneration.  The 
character  of  Jesus  gives  knowledge  of  human  per- 
fection. Knowledge  of  the  ideal  is  the  first  condi- 
tion of  recovery  to  goodness.  What  man  should 
be  must  be  seen  in  contrast  with  what  he  is.  In 
the  character  of  Jesus  is  the  complete  and  final 
revelation  of  the  human  ideal.  He  furnishes  the 
standard  by  which  all  ethical  systems  are  measured 
and  judged.  Philanthropists  and  reformers  make 
it  their  task  to  apply  the  precepts  and  example  of 
Jesus  to  society  and  the  individual.  The  perfect 


306  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

type  which  he  presented  has  not  been  superseded, 
is  still  in  advance.  The  knowledge  of  true  good- 
ness is  still  gained  from  Jesus.  Many  transforma- 
tions are  needed  before  society  will  be  Christian. 
If  it  were  truly  Christian,  there  would  be  the  ideal 
state.  There  is  no  other  moralist  of  whom  that 
can  be  said.  One  would  be  laughed  at  if  he  should 
seriously  maintain  that  society  needs  to  become  Pla- 
tonic, or  Aristotelian,  or  Confucian,  or  Zoroastrian. 
But  the  Christian  ideal  for  society  and  the  indi- 
vidual is  still  in  advance.  Even  those  who  are 
outside  the  church  and  opposed  to  it  say  that  busi- 
ness, politics,  social  relations,  and  the  church  itself 
need  to  become  Christian.  The  ideal  which  Christ 
set  before  men  in  his  own  life  gives  knowledge  of 
the  goodness  which  all  men  should  seek  to  realize. 
The  presence  of  such  a  character,  seen  and  known 
of  men,  is  in  itself  a  power  for  righteousness. 
Certainly  there  can  be  no  true  righteousness  if  men 
do  not  know  what  it  is. 

At  this  point  there  is  a  very  common  mistake 
as  to  the  effect  of  unblemished  goodness  on  those 
who  see  it,  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  its  only 
effect  is  to  rebuke,  to  condemn,  to  discourage. 
Knowledge  of  the  perfect  character  of  Jesus  only 
increases  the  condemnation  of  sinful  and  imperfect 
men,  it  is  said.  But  Jesus  declared  that  he  came 
not  to  condemn  the  world,  but  to  save  the  world. 
Therefore,  it  is  thought,  his  power  to  recover 
men  from  sin  to  holiness  cannot  reside  merely  in 
the  revelation  of  his  own  sinless  and  holy  char- 
acter. It  is  very  true  that  goodness  by  its  very 
presence  rebukes  and  condemns  badness,  but  it  is 


. 

fgiiviB 

. 

SELF-IMPARTATION  OF  JESUS         307 

not  to  be  assumed  that  it  disheartens.  Even  the 
rebuke  carries  hope  of  regeneration.  For  him 
who  does  not  feel  rebuked  in  the  presence  of  holi- 
ness there  is  no  hope.  Indifferent  and  self-satis- 
fied, he  has  no  appreciation  nor  admiration  of 
goodness.  He  does  not  know  perfection  when  he 
sees  it.  But,  if  there  is  rebuke,  if  there  is  self- 
reproach  in  the  presence  of  holiness,  there  is  some 
stirring  of  moral  life.  Jesus  was  most  severe  on 
those  who  were  not  reproached  by  his  goodness, 
who  blindly  or  willfully  misapprehended  him,  who 
hated  him  with  murderous  hate,  who  said  he  was 
in  league  with  the  devil. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  perfection  only 
rebukes.  That  is  a  wrong  conception  of  goodness 
which  finds  in  it  nothing  but  condemnation.  It  is 
a  wrong  conception  of  the  character  of  Jesus.  It 
is  a  thought  of  negative  perfection  free  from 
faults,  clear  of  offense,  sinless,  temptationless. 
But  absence  of  sin  and  blemish  by  no  means 
exhausts  perfection.  The  holy  character  has,  in- 
deed, such  exemption  from  faults,  but  holiness  is 
wholeness,  health,  completeness,  fullness.  It  has 
the  active  as  well  as  the  passive  virtues.  It  could 
not  have  the  passive  unless  it  had  the  active. 
Jesus  is  known  to  be  perfect,  to  be  the  ideal,  by 
the  whole  of  his  life.  His  goodness  was  self-im- 
parting. The  self-impartation  of  sympathy  and 
love  was  the  very  genius  of  his  character.  The 
line  of  cleavage  between  holiness  and  selfishness 
divides  them  as  sharing  and  not  sharing.  It  is 
the  deepest  impulse  of  goodness  that  others  should 
be  good.  This  indeed  is  true  of  all  intrinsic 


308  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

values.  The  possessor  desires  to  share  them. 
They  gain  by  sharing.  Jesus  would  not  have 
been  perfect  if  he  had  had  no  impulse  of  self-im- 
partation.  The  reason,  indeed,  we  know  him  per- 
fect is  that  holiness  which  was  complete  measured 
the  self-giving  which  was  complete.  Without  this 
impulse  there  would  be  a  selfishness,  even  a  con- 
temptuousness,  in  holiness,  which  would  detract 
from  it.  Indeed,  it  would  not  be  holiness  at  all, 
for  holiness  is  love.  It  is  sympathetic.  It  is  a 
passion  for  goodness  in  others  as  well  as  in  self. 
It  values  the  worth  of  another  as  it  values  its 
own.  The  holy  man  sympathizes  with  those  who 
suffer.  He  sympathizes  more  deeply  with  those 
who  are  in  the  bondage  and  wretchedness  of  sin. 
He  seeks  out  sinners  to  save  them  to  themselves 
and  to  their  uses,  as  a  physician  with  skill  to  cure 
disease  finds  his  deepest  satisfaction  in  seeking 
out  the  unsightly  and  loathsome,  that  he  may 
restore  them  to  health.  One  and  another  must 
have  asked,  Why  does  Jesus  come  to  my  house, 
company  with  me,  talk  with  me,  when  he  knows 
he  will  incur  social  disgrace  and  will  be  exposed 
to  danger  ?  and  they  could  only  have  answered 
that  it  was  to  bring  them  into  his  way  of  living, 
to  save  them  from  their  sins.  He  sat  at  a  publi- 
can's table  in  order  that  the  publican  might  be- 
come an  honest  man.  He  was  kind  to  a  debased 
woman  that  she  might  return  to  virtue.  He  would 
have  them  estimate  themselves  not  as  others  esti- 
mated them,  but  as  he  estimated  them.  He  would 
recover  them  to  their  true  worth.  Goodness  in 
sympathy  is  constantly  self -imparting,  consciously 


SELF-IMPARTATION  OF  JESUS         309 

or  unconsciously.  Of  some  persons  it  is  said  that 
their  very  presence  is  a  benediction.  The  phrase, 
we  say,  is  outworn.  But  if  outworn,  it  must  have 
been  many  times  true.  A  visit  from  a  healthy, 
cheerful,  refined,  intelligent  friend  is  pretty  much 
the  salvation  of  a  family.  By  quick  yet  insensible 
degrees,  manners,  speech,  tones,  habits  accommo- 
date themselves  to  the  higher  standard.  From 
goodness  virtue  always  goes  forth.  True  courtesy 
never  overawes  with  superiority.  It  always  puts 
others  at  their  ease.  It  brings  out  what  is  best. 
A  great  man  does  not  make  others  feel  small.  He 
is  not  condescending.  He  is  sympathetic,  appre- 
ciative, encouraging.  Greatness  does  not  repel ; 
it  attracts.  It  does  not  discourage ;  it  inspires. 
Greatness  and  goodness  are  sympathetic,  self-im- 
parting. They  were  united  in  Jesus.  He  was 
the  best  great  man  and  the  greatest  good  man  in 
the  world.  His  perfection  was  a  rebuke,  indeed. 
But  it  was  love  going  out  in  sympathy  and  inspi- 
ration to  transform  men  into  its  own  likeness. 
When  a  disciple  saw  Jesus  employing  power  in 
the  service  of  kindness,  he  exclaimed,  "  Depart 
from  me,  for  I  am  a  sinful  man  ; "  but  at  the  same 
moment  clung  to  his  feet  and  would  not  let  him 
go.  Sympathy  attracts  while  it  rebukes.  The 
deeper  its  loving  rebuke,  the  mightier  its  attract- 
ing and  transforming  power.  A  sinless,  perfect 
man,  sympathizing  with  sinful,  imperfect  men, 
not  refusing  obloquy,  suffering,  and  death,  in  his 
consuming  desire  to  bring  them  to  themselves, 
could  not  pass  through  the  world  and  leave  it 
unchanged.  Great  moral  personalities,  with  im- 


310  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

perfections,  have  revolutionized  multitudes.  They 
have  inspired  faith,  and  men  who  have  faith  in 
somebody  are  better  men.  The  sacrifice  of  Jesus 
is  thought  to  be  the  power  of  regeneration.  The 
sacrifice  is  regarded  as  something  different  from 
the  character,  the  holiness,  the  example  of  Jesus, 
something  which  he  offered  to  God.  His  sacrifice 
was  indeed  offered  to  God  and  was  acceptable  to 
him.  But  it  was  an  expression  of  his  character, 
not  anything  other  and  different.  It  was  the 
giving  of  himself,  nothing  less  than  himself,  his 
whole  and  very  self,  for  men.  Suffering  and  death 
were  the  incidents  of  complete  self-giving.  He 
suffered  because  his  holiness  and  his  call  of  men 
to  a  righteous  and  loving  life  brought  him  into 
collision  with  those  whose  ways  of  goodness,  as 
well  as  of  badness,  he  condemned.  That  perfect 
character,  perfect  in  purity,  in  sympathy,  in  love, 
is  in  itself  the  power  of  regeneration. 

The  virtue  of  Jesus  is  reproductive  in  others 
who  will  personally  appropriate  it,  because  it  is  the 
virtue  of  self-sacrificing  love.  It  is  a  type  which 
does  not  discourage,  but  which  appeals  and  moves 
to  the  point  of  choice  and  adoption.  Sympathy 
kindles  sympathy,  kindles  response.  Nothing  in 
the  world  is  so  fitted  to  awaken  response  and  hope 
as  the  living  actual  Christ  under  the  burden  and 
sorrows  of  life  for  the  sake  of  men  whom  he  con- 
demned, pitied,  and  loved.  Such  a  life  is  not 
merely  ideal  and  pattern,  but  transforming  moral 
power.  "  Beholding,  as  in  a  glass,  the  glory  of 
the  Lord,  we  are  changed  into  the  same  image." 
Touched  and  transformed  by  him,  man  leaves  not 


THE  OBEDIENCE  OF  JESUS  311 

only  his  old  way  of  sin,  but  also  his  old  way  of 
virtue  under  prohibition  and  legalism.  He  has  a 
new  principle  of  righteousness  which  takes  up  all 
that  was  good  in  the  old,  fulfills  the  law  of  injunc- 
tions and  denials,  in  the  higher,  deeper  law  of 
loving  his  neighbor  as  himself.  Men  see  what  per- 
fection is,  and  reproduce  it,  as  one  light  is  lighted 
from  another.  Paul's  best  characterization  of  Jesus 
is,  that  he  is  a  life-giving  spirit.  The  analogies  of 
life  are  the  most  fitting  to  apply  to  the  power  of 
Jesus.  Life  was  a  favorite  word  of  his.  It  is  the 
simplest,  commonest,  greatest  word  of  Christianity. 
Life  is  reproductive.  The  life  of  Jesus  is  repro- 
duced in  men  who  are  Christ-like,  Christian.  How 
life  produces  and  quickens  life  is  a  mystery.  But 
reproduction  and  growth  are  the  most  real  of  all 
facts.  There  is  no  need  of  minimizing  the  regener- 
ating power  of  Jesus,  just  as  a  perfect  man,  when 
his  perfection  is  seen  to  be  self -imparting,  self-giv- 
ing, sacrificial.  If  there  were  only  the  record  of 
such  a  life,  I  think  it  would  have  some  such  power 
over  men  in  all  the  generations. 

in 

The  perfection  of  the  character  of  Jesus  con- 
sisted, to  his  own  consciousness,  in  obedience  to  the 
will  of  God  his  Father.  His  entire  life,  to  its  out- 
most circumference,  moved  within  the  circle  of  the 
thought,  will,  and  love  of  God.  He  had  nothing 
and  did  nothing  apart  from  God.  "  The  Son  can 
do  nothing  of  himself,  but  what  he  seeth  the  Father 
doing."  This  was  the  source  of  his  perfection.  He 
was  the  perfect  organ  of  the  will  of  God.  His 


312  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

object  was  to  bring  men  into  the  love  of  God,  to 
unite  them  to  the  Source  of  goodness  and  thus  to 
bring  them  into  character  and  life  like  his.  The 
power  of  Jesus  to  regenerate  character  was  his 
revelation  of  the  Fatherhood  of  God.  What  ailed 
men  was  that  they  were  away  from  God,  and  away 
from  him  not  so  much  intellectually  as  morally. 
They  had  set  up  false  gods,  a  distant  God,  a  hidden 
God,  an  angry  God,  a  God  to  be  propitiated  or 
cajoled  into  indulgence,  a  God  having  favorites. 
Jesus  would  have  men  understand  that  God  has  a 
heart,  and  that  his  own  life  was  bringing  the  life 
and  love  of  God  to  men.  He  actually  gave  the 
world  its  belief  in  the  Fatherhood  of  God.  It  is 
the  fact,  however  explained,  that  he  changed  the 
conception  of  God.  He  did  not  set  aside  existing 
conceptions,  for  part  of  the  truth  men  had  spelt 
out  from  the  volumes  of  nature  and  of  human  life ; 
but  he  revealed  the  complete  truth,  he  opened  the 
wholeness  of  the  truth.  This  he  did,  not  by  infer- 
ence of  philosophy,  nor  by  a  broad  view  of  history. 
Beliefs  gained  in  that  way  could  be  challenged  on 
the  same  grounds.  The  currents  of  history  do  not 
all  run  in  one  direction.  There  are  suffering, 
cruelty,  caprice,  as  well  as  prosperity  and  happi- 
ness. If  the  word  "  Father  "  crossed  the  lips  of 
some  prophet,  the  mysterious  facts  of  life  and  the 
conflicting  movements  of  history  destroyed  the 
incipient  hope  thus  trying  to  find  voice.  Jesus 
revealed  the  Fatherhood  of  God.  That  was  the 
revelation.  It  was  at  once  received  within  the 
circle  of  disciples,  and  from  them  it  went  forth 
into  the  world.  Turn  from  the  Old  to  the  New 


THE  OBEDIENCE  OF  JESUS  313 

Testament,  to  the  writings  of  men  who  had  been 
familiar  with  conceptions  of  the  righteousness  and 
majesty  of  God,  and  observe  the  frequency  with 
which  the  designation  of  God  as  Father  appears. 
Conspicuously  absent  from  the  Old,  it  is  on  almost 
every  page  of  the  New  Scriptures.  It  permeates 
the  new  faith  through  and  through.  Now,  only  one 
answer  can  be  given  to  the  question  how  the  belief 
in  God's  Fatherhood  was  created.  It  came  from 
Jesus,  and  it  was  from  the  life  even  more  than 
from  the  words  of  Jesus.  His  words  were  but  the 
expression  of  his  very  being  and  character  as 
the  Son  of  God.  There  was  the  mystery,  and  also 
the  beauty,  there  was  the  attractive,  almost  the 
compelling  power  of  the  life.  His  words,  his 
trust,  his  vision,  his  judgment  upon  wrong,  his  sym- 
pathy, his  character,  his  very  self,  revealed  the  life 
of  God  in  him.  His  consciousness  of  God  was  his 
deepest,  his  abiding  consciousness.  All  that  came 
to  the  surface  in  expression,  words  spoken,  deeds 
done,  endurance  of  indignities,  braving  of  igno- 
minious death,  all  welled  up  out  of  his  conscious- 
ness of  God  the  Father  living  in  him,  speaking  and 
working  through  him,  shining  out  in  the  relation 
of  Fatherhood  and  Sonship.  This  is  how  the 
belief  in  God's  Fatherhood  came  to  the  world.  He 
vitalized  it,  just  by  being  in  the  world  and  living 
out  that  life  of  unbroken  union  with  the  Father. 
Looking  abroad,  we  are  confused.  Looking  at 
him,  we  see  God  in  the  character  of  love.  The 
Fatherhood  of  God,  with  all  it  involves,  with  the 
faith  and  hope  it  inspires,  was  given  to  the  belief 
of  men  in  that  personality  whose  life  was  rooted 


314  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

in  God,  and  whose  teaching,  service,  suffering,  and 
triumph  expressed  the  very  character  of  God. 
Here  is  the  regenerating  power  of  Jesus.  The  life 
of  men,  their  moral  life  even  more  than  their  phy- 
sical and  intellectual  life,  is  in  God.  The  Divine 
character  was  brought  to  men  on  the  side  of  their 
apprehension  and  contact  and  inspiration  in  the 
human,  sympathizing,  suffering,  sinless  Son  of 
God.  "  He  that  hath  seen  me,"  Jesus  said,  "  hath 
seen  the  Father."  As  Jesus  is,  in  character,  so  God 
is.  All  this  has  implications  concerning  the  per- 
son of  Christ  which  need  not  now  be  considered. 
But  Jesus  did  make  men  believe  that  God  is  a 
good  and  loving  Father,  who  welcomes  them,  how- 
ever bad  they  may  have  been,  when  they  return 
to  him  with  penitence  and  trust,  as  little  chil- 
dren. Jesus  is  the  point  of  connection  between 
men  and  God.  The  divine  life  flashes  through 
him,  becomes  visible  in  his  perfect  humanity,  and 
thrills  into  the  life  of  men.  With  one  hand  he 
clasps  the  hand  of  man ;  with  the  other  he  clasps 
the  hand  of  God,  and  transmits  the  life  of  God  to 
man.  The  life  of  man  from  and  in  the  life  of  God 
is  the  true  religion.  It  is  also  and  therefore  the 
true  morality,  for  it  is  the  life  of  love  which  real- 
izes one's  own  perfection  and  imparts  that  perfec- 
tion to  others. 

IV 

Faith  is  the  condition  of  having  the  new  life 
after  the  type  of  Christ's  life,  of  being  new-char- 
actered, of  realizing  the  ideal.  Man  is  drawn  to 
Christ,  and,  forsaking  sin  in  his  heart,  he  receives, 
obeys,  imitates,  follows  him.  Man  sees  God  re- 


THE    EVER-LIVING    CHRIST  315 

vealed  in  Christ,  and,  receiving  Christ,  turns 
towards  God  thus  revealed,  turning  away  from  sin 
and  from  imperfect  forms  of  virtue  to  the  holiness 
of  a  child  of  God.  So  it  was  when  Jesus  was 
on  earth,  and  while  his  memory  was  still  fresh 
in  the  minds  of  those  who  had  companied  with 
him.  So  it  is  still.  As  God  was  then,  so  he  al- 
ways is.  Such  embodiment,  such  incarnation  of 
holy  character  which  revealed  because  it  had  its 
source  in  the  life  of  God,  was  not  a  temporary  in- 
cident in  the  world's  history.  It  was  not  a  power 
introduced  only  to  be  withdrawn  and  soon  to  be 
forgotten.  It  was  historical  manifestation  of  eter- 
nal reality.  Having  gained  lodgment  in  human 
thoughts  and  beliefs,  it  cannot  be  dislodged.  The 
power  of  God  once,  it  is  the  power  of  God  forever- 
more. 

"  One  accent  of  the  Holy  Ghost 
The  heedless  world  hath  never  lost."  1 

The  historical  Christ  is  the  ideal  Christ,  the 
spiritual  Christ,  the  ever-present,  ever-living  Christ. 
So  men  have  conceived  him.  Thus  they  have 
expressed  their  conviction  that  the  highest  moral 
potency  must  continue  to  energize  through  all 
changes  of  place  and  time,  and  through  the  same 
person,  the  same  character,  the  same  manifesta- 
tion. The  ever-present,  ever-living  Christ  is  not 
a  physical  presence  but  a  spiritual  power.  The 
Christ-revelation  once  is  the  Christ-revelation  al- 
ways. The  recorded  biography  keeps  the  image 
fresh.  God's  moral  power  in  love  and  Fatherhood 
is  conceived  in  the  same  form  and  responded  to  in 
1  Emerson's  Poems,  "  The  Problem." 


316  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

the  same  personal  character  now  as  of  old.  The 
mode  in  which  the  spirit  and  law  of  Jesus  are  ap- 
prehended is  of  less  consequence  than  some  sup- 
pose. It  is  of  comparatively  little  importance 
whether  he  is  thought  of  as  an  historical  personage 
of  the  past,  known  only  by  records,  or  as  a  present 
spiritual  power,  whether  as  example,  friend,  mas- 
ter, or  redeemer,  so  long  as  he  is  the  revelation  of 
God  and  the  inspiration  of  life.  Enough  that  he 
is  still  the  way,  the  truth,  and  the  life.  That  he 
is  such  to  millions  of  men  and  women,  that  they 
have  his  character,  that  they  trust  his  Father  and 
their  Father,  is  the  great  fact,  and  shows  that  his 
power  is  now  in  the  world,  at  issue  still  with  sin. 


Faith,  I  say,  is  the  condition  of  having  the  new 
life  which  is  after  the  pattern  of  Christ's  life,  the 
condition  of  being  new-charactered.  Faith,  how- 
ever described,  is  simply  receptiveness.  It  does 
not  create  nor  produce.  It  receives  and  responds. 
An  object  is  presented,  a  reality  already  existing, 
a  moral  magnitude  in  Jesus  Christ.  He  is  a  leader 
who  can  be  followed,  a  master  who  can  be  obeyed, 
a  friend  who  can  be  trusted,  an  example  who  can 
be  imitated.  Other  leaders,  masters,  friends,  ex- 
amples, may  not  warrant  implicit  faith,  but  we  can 
unhesitatingly  put  our  faith  in  Christ.  He  can  be 
depended  on.  He  can  be  trusted.  There  need  be 
no  uncertainty  in  receiving  and  following  him. 
"  The  words  that  I  speak  unto  you,  they  are  spirit 
and  they  are  life."  "  Heaven  and  earth  may  pass 
away,  but  my  words  shall  not  pass  away."  "  He 


FAITH  317 

that  followeth  me  shall  not  walk  in  darkness,  but 
shall  have  the  light  of  life." 

The  receptiveness  of  faith  is  like  all  knowledge 
of  truth  and  all  use  of  forces.  Man  does  not  create 
any  truth.  He  discovers  it,  receives  it.  Man  does 
not  add  a  particle  to  the  power  in  existence.  He 
adjusts  himself  to  it,  appropriates  it.  Faith,  how- 
ever, is  not  mere  passivity.  Faith  is  the  supreme 
energy  of  man  in  self -committal,  as  he  puts  himself 
under  the  law  and  spirit  of  Christ.  The  action 
of  man  in  receiving  and  responding  has  been  mini- 
mized almost  to  nothing,  because  the  faith  alone 
without  its  object  is  nothing,  as  if  man's  energy, 
because  it  is  unavailing  without  the  forces  of  nature, 
were  unessential,  whereas  those  forces  are  unavail- 
ing unless  man  understands  them  and  directs  them 
to  his  uses.  Intellectual  reception  is  not  passive. 
Instruction,  we  say,  has  only  to  be  received.  But, 
to  receive  it,  one  must  be  teachable,  attentive, 
alert.  One  has  only  to  receive  reproof,  but,  to 
receive  it,  he  must  be  humble  and  repentant.  To 
receive  Christ  by  faith,  one  must  make  himself 
over,  in  his  whole  purpose  and  energy,  to  the  law 
and  leading  of  Christ.  As  a  strong  personality 
dominates  another  intellectually,  inspiring  him 
with  the  zeal  of  knowledge,  or  influences  his  char- 
acter, so  Christ  dominates  his  followers  through 
the  faith  which  his  perfection  and  love  inspire. 

Faith  is  conscious  and  active  reception.  The 
response  of  a  seed  to  the  warmth  of  the  sun  is  real 
but  unconscious.  It  is  merely  vital  reaction  and 
correspondence.  Faith  which  receives  and  re- 
sponds to  moral  truth  is  conscious  in  almost  all 


318  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

respects.  Keceiving  Christ  one  sees  the  ideal,  the 
character,  the  person.  He  is  not  compelled  but 
attracted.  He  intelligently  chooses.  Thus  alone 
moral  results  are  secured,  in  freedom,  willingly, 
earnestly.  One  responds  with  all  his  moral  and 
intellectual  powers. 

Faith  increases.  There  is  finer  and  broader  ap- 
preciation of  Christ  and  so  increasing  receptive- 
ness.  Christ  unfolds  new  meaning,  beauty,  moral 
power.  The  Christ  of  childhood  is  the  babe,  the 
boy,  the  youth,  the  teacher,  the  friend.  The  Christ 
of  manhood  is  the  sympathizing,  self-sacrificing, 
suffering,  overcoming  Saviour.  He  takes  on  new 
forms.  He  appeals  to  faith  at  various  points  of 
need  and  aspiration.  The  way  it  seems  is  that 
duty  is  more  various,  that  there  are  more  needs  of 
the  world  to  be  satisfied  Christianly,  that  the  law 
of  Christ  can  be  applied  to  more  relations  and  con- 
ditions. He  is  always  in  advance,  leading  the  way 
however  high  it  may  go,  however  far  it  may  pro- 
ceed. He  is  never  passed  nor  surpassed.  The  per- 
ception of  this  is  the  increase  of  faith. 

Faith  is,  therefore,  the  principle  or  condition  of 
all  the  several  virtues,  because  it  adopts  that  type 
of  character  which  includes  them  all.  Faith  work- 
eth  by  love ;  works  out,  energizes  in  love,  which 
was  the  principle  of  Christ's  life  and  which  ful- 
fills the  law.  Faith  is  represented  by  one  of  the 
writers  of  the  New  Testament  as  developing  into 
all  the  virtues.  Add  to  your  faith,  virtue  ;  and  to 
virtue,  knowledge ;  and  to  knowledge,  temperance  ; 
and  so  on  through  the  list.  It  is  not,  however, 
addition,  as  if  one  virtue  were  completed  and  then 


CONFLICT   AND    RECIPROCITY         319 

another  added  to  it.  The  Greek  word  signifies 
development.  It  is  eTn^o/o^y^o-are,  and  suggests  the 
harmony  of  a  chorus.  In  faith  are  all  the  har- 
monious parts,  the  chorus  of  the  virtues.  Not  add, 
as  rendered  in  the  Received  Version,  nor  scarcely 
supply,  as  in  the  Revised  Version,  but  in  your  faith 
have  the  harmony  of  virtue  (manliness),  knowledge, 
temperance  (self-control),  patience,  godliness,  love. 
Faith  works,  energizes.  When  the  type  of  char- 
acter which  is  Christian  comes  into  existence,  it  is 
not  complete.  It  develops.  Life  means  growth. 
Outlying  areas  which  had  been  barren  are  re- 
claimed to  fruitful  ness,  like  a  field  which  had  run 
to  weeds  and  must  bear  successive  crops  in  rota- 
tion, to  become  fertile.  When  the  ground  is  first 
turned  up  and  sown  the  field  is  reclaimed,  but  the 
cultivation  of  each  season  increases  its  productive- 
ness. Growth  is  the  simple  and  significant  figure 
employed  in  the  Scriptures.  It  means  the  develop- 
ment, the  evolution  of  the  character  which  is  re- 
generated. 

VI 

What,  now,  is  the  method  of  realizing  the  per- 
sonal ideal  in  actual  life  ?  There  are  two  methods ; 
conflict  and  cooperation. 

In  almost  all,  if  not  in  all  cases,  there  is  con- 
flict. There  is  resistance  of  temptation  and  oppo- 
sition to  evil.  Few,  perhaps  none,  escape.  This 
method  is  so  common  and  so  continuous  that  some 
suppose  it  is  an  essential  condition  of  virtue,  and 
that  in  some  form  it  will  continue  forever.  It  is 
said  to  be  unthinkable  that  there  are  moral  choices 
without  the  thought,  and  in  a  degree  the  entice- 


320  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

ment,  of  evil.  However  that  may  be,  there  cer- 
tainly is  at  present,  while  character  is  immature, 
conflict  varying  with  different  persons  and  in  dif- 
ferent circumstances,  but  never  wholly  absent.  It 
takes  two  forms ;  resistance  of  temptation,  and 
antagonism  to  the  wrong  conduct  and  custom  of 
others. 

Resistance  of  temptation  is  one's  conflict  with 
himself.  It  is  an  inner  struggle.  It  is  due  to  the 
appeal  of  impulses  which  should  be  denied.  The 
physical  appetites  have  a  demand,  which,  in  its 
place  and  proportion,  is  legitimate.  The  demand 
becomes  a  temptation  when  it  craves  satisfaction 
in  disproportion  and  excess,  and  for  the  sake  of 
the  gratification.  To  yield  to  such  a  demand  is 
wrong,  for  it  is  degeneration  from  the  normal  type. 
This  could  be  followed  out  with  other  desires,  such 
as  covetousness  and  selfish  ambition.  These  de- 
sires have  become  strong  by  reason. of  a  false  esti- 
mate of  character.  The  process  of  overcoming  by 
conflict  is  the  recovery  of  the  man  to  his  normal  or 
ideal  state.  The  craving  for  a  stimulant,  for  ex- 
ample, significantly  called  unnatural,  disturbs  nor- 
mal conditions.  It  is  abnormal.  By  conflict  and 
struggle  the  craving  is  overcome.  The  unhealthy 
demand  ceases  by  enforced  abstinence.  Possi- 
bly, character  may  have  been  strengthened  by  the 
successful  struggle.  Now  the  abstainer  is  in  his 
normal  state.  The  sensuous  desires  are  easily  sub- 
ordinated by  the  nobler  desires,  unless  the  body  has 
become  diseased,  in  which  case  there  may  be  a  ter- 
rific struggle  even  when  resolution  is  supported  by 
correct  physical  regimen.  With  some  persons,  also, 


CONFLICT   AND    RECIPROCITY         321 

the  physical  passions  are  strong  and  clamorous,  so 
that  a  good  man  may  have  to  struggle  hard 
against  them.  But,  usually,  resistance  of  sensuous 
temptations  is  easy  to  a  good  man.  He  has  little 
trouble  in  making  the  physical  a  servant  of  the 
intellectual  and  moral.  The  desire  to  possess 
material  values  may  present  more  persistent  and 
insidious  temptation,  especially  when  they  are 
highly  esteemed  by  large  numbers  in  the  commu- 
nity. Selfish  ambition  may  give  more  trouble 
still.  It  is,  proverbially,  the  last  infirmity  of 
noble  minds.  Overcoming  temptation  restores  the 
man  to  himself,  in  true  proportion  of  passions, 
appetites,  and  desires,  according  to  the  ideal  of 
character  in  worth  or  perfection. 

The  necessity  of  inner  conflict  evidently  lies  in 
degeneration  which  is  not  instantly  corrected. 
But  conflict  is  not  essentially  and  always  neces- 
sary to  virtue.  Temptation  diminishes  as  one 
approaches  the  ideal  more  nearly.  The  more  vir- 
tue the  less  temptation.  Should  the  character  of 
virtue  become  symmetrical  in  all  respects,  there 
would  be  little  or  no  temptation.  The  more  a 
scholar  is  absorbed  in  his  work,  the  less  desire  he 
has  for  pleasures  and  indulgences  which  draw  him 
away  from  his  work.  He  is,  indeed,  impatient  of 
all  interruptions  and  interferences.  As  tempta- 
tions lose  their  power,  one  is  not  weaker  in  virtue 
but  stronger.  Conflict  and  struggle  are  simply 
curative.  As  one  becomes  healthy  physically  or 
morally  he  ceases  to  be  aware  of  temptation  to  ex- 
cess in  self-indulgence.  As  character  approaches 
the  normal  type  temptation  is  a  vanishing  quantity. 


322  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

This  is  the  correct  view  of  inner  struggle,  a  view 
clearly  expressed  in  Scripture  as  deadness  to  sin. 
The  Christian  becomes  dead  to  sin.  It  makes  no 
appeal,  elicits  no  response.  He  is  impervious  to 
it,  dead  to  it,  just  as  one  is  said  to  be  dead  to 
music,  dead  to  beauty,  dead  to  ambition.  They 
have  no  interest,  attraction,  or  even  meaning.  Al- 
most every  one  is  able  to  say  of  some  enticement 
which  once  was  strong,  That  is  no  temptation  to  me 
now,  I  am  dead  to  all  that.  Real  freedom  has  no 
conflicts.  It  is  not  merely  power  to  choose  be- 
tween right  and  wrong.  It  is  complete,  constant, 
glad,  unfettered  choice  and  realization  of  the 
right.  Character  conformed  to  the  ideal  in  right 
proportion  is  perfectly  free,  like  a  machine,  which 
when  it  moves  according  to  the  law  of  its  structure 
is  said  to  play  freely,  but  when  it  is  out  of  gear 
is  said  "to  labor.  Since  the  tendency  of  charac- 
ter strengthening  in  virtue  is  to  the  reduction  of 
temptation  and  struggle,  conflict  must  be  regarded 
as  a  temporary  method  of  realizing  the  ideal. 

The  other  form  of  conflict  is  opposition  to  the 
evil  of  the  world.  The  good  man  fights  against  it. 
Various  wrongs,  injustices,  vices,  and  crimes  he 
would  remove.  He  is  opposed  to  them,  he  rebukes 
them,  he  wage's  a  warfare  against  them.  The  re- 
former is  engaged  in  a  battle.  He  gains  victories 
and  suffers  defeats.  Opposition  to  evil  strengthens 
his  own  character  in  goodness,  though  that  result 
is  not  the  reformer's  object.  But  again  we  find, 
on  analysis,  that  the  tendency  is  to  cessation  of 
conflict.  The  evil  attacked  is  the  perversion  of 
other  persons  from  the  normal  character.  The 


CONFLICT  AND  RECIPROCITY         323 

good  man  who  is  condemning  and  opposing  evil  is 
endeavoring  to  recover  others  to  the  true  ideal, 
so  that  they  shall  not  degrade  themselves  by 
yielding  to  the  temptations  of  the  lower.  He 
would  have  them  become  like  himself.  He  would 
bring  as  many  as  possible  to  their  true  status.  As 
they  become  virtuous  there  will  be  less  evil  in  the 
world.  Enemies  will  be  converted  into  allies. 
Complete  victory  may  be  a  long  time  coining. 
The  struggle  may  continue  through  generations 
and  centuries.  But  in  the  new  earth  wherein 
dwelleth  righteousness  there  will  be  no  conflict 
with  evil.  All  will  be  regenerated.  All  will  be 
recovered  to  the  normal  type.  There  will  be  no 
inner  conflict  with  temptation  and  no  outer  con- 
flict with  evil.  It  cannot  be  held,  then,  that  con- 
flict is  a  necessary  method  of  realizing  goodness. 
For  a  time,  for  a  long  time,  it  is  necessary.  But 
a  society  wholly  recovered  to  the  normal,  ideal 
type  will  have  no  struggle  with  degeneration  and 
its  temptations. 

The  conjecture  that  in  the  perfect  society,  that 
is,  in  heaven,  there  will  be  some  form  of  conflict  is 
groundless,  although  harmless.  The  conjecture 
is  made  because  goodness,  at  present,  is  realized 
in  part  by  struggle  against  temptation  and  evil. 
The  surmise  has  to  assume  the  existence  of  evil  in 
the  universe  somewhere.  But  if  evil  is  reduced  till 
it  is  removed,  that  is,  if  degenerate  persons  who 
are  in  the  universe  become  regenerate,  there  will  be 
no  inner  conflict  and  no  outward  antagonism  with 
evil.  If  some  evil  is  persistent,  that  is,  if  some 
persons  are  incorrigible,  the  useless  conflict  would 


324  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

cease.  Nothing  would  remain  but  disapproval  of 
them.  If  the  incorrigible  should  perish,  as  some 
believe,  there  evidently  would  be  no  conflict. 

The  conjecture  becomes  still  more  attenuated  in 
the  fancy  that  there  may  always  be  conflict  among 
the  good.  It  is  surmised  that  the  saints  will  vie 
with  one  another  in  services  of  love,  and  in  honor 
will  prefer  one  another.  But  this  reduces  itself, 
logically,  to  the  absurdity  of  complete  inaction,  al- 
ready noticed.  Love  goes  out  in  service,  therefore 
each  would  give  the  other  opportunity  of  service, 
would  not  selfishly  prevent  it  by  rendering  service 
himself.  So  each  would  do  nothing,  in  order  that 
another  might  have  the  joy  of  serving  him.  There 
will  be  reciprocity  of  service  according  to  power 
and  need,  but  no  conflict,  no  emulous  anticipation 
or  abnegation.  The  most  that  can  be  expected  as 
continuance  of  conflict  or  struggle  is  the  active,  in- 
tense energizing  of  goodness.  Knowledge  is  gained 
by  effort,  and  is  increase  of  virtue.  Dr.  Newman 
Smyth  says :  "  Even  the  striving  of  a  pure  spirit 
with  God  for  more  knowledge  and  light,  although 
sinless  and  blessed,  would  be  of  the  nature  of  a  con- 
flict ;  Jacob's  wrestling  with  the  angel  of  the  Lord 
is  typical  of  all  moral  winning  of  blessing,  although 
only  in  a  sinful  being  need  there  be  left  the  mark 
of  the  conflict  on  the  hollow  of  the  thigh.  .  .  .  We 
may  well  imagine  that  in  a  matured  and  perfected 
moral  life  —  the  life  of  an  archangel  that  excels  in 
strength  —  the  glorified  spirit  shall  discover  ever 
new  and  higher  revelations  of  the  divine  which 
will  call  forth  all  the  energies  and  flame  of  its 
being  for  their  mastery."  l 

1  Christian  Ethics,  pp.  246,  246. 


CONFLICT  AND  RECIPROCITY         325 

This  is  very  beautiful  and  also,  no  doubt,  very 
true  ;  but  that  kind  of  energy  is  not  conflict,  unless 
there  is  some  vestige  of  laziness  to  be  overcome, 
and  which  no  archangel  can  be  supposed  to  have. 
The  energy  of  the  scholar  in  the  pursuit  of  know- 
ledge is  not  a  conflict  with  any  opposing  tendency. 
The  energy  of  an  archangel  is  the  energy  of  repose, 
of  perfect  tranquillity,  like  Goethe's  image  of  rest : 

"  'T  is  the  brook's  motion,  clear  without  strife, 
Fleeing  to  ocean  after  its  life." 

And  Jacob  was  not  an  archangel. 

We  conclude  that  conflict  is  one  method  of  real- 
izing the  ideal,  so  long  as  evil  is  in  the  world,  and 
so  long  as  the  normal  type  of  character  is  not  real- 
ized according  to  one's  capacity.  Afterwards  there 
will  be  growth  without  conflict.  Power  and  ca- 
pacity will  increase.  The  child  will  become  the 
man.  The  man  will  mature  and  broaden  forever. 
The  good  man  will  not  stop  growing.  In  that 
sense,  he  will  never  attain  absolute  perfection. 
But  he  may  cease  to  have  any  conflict  with  the 
temptation  to  go  wrong. 

The  other  method  of  realizing  the  ideal  is  the 
method  of  reciprocity,  the  method  of  giving  and 
receiving.  I  am  to  give  to  another  or  to  do  for 
another  what  he  needs  and  I  can  give.  I  am  to 
receive  from  another  what  I  need  and  he  can  sup- 
ply. In  an  imperfect  society,  goodness  consists 
more  largely  in  giving  than  in  receiving.  In  a 
perfect  society,  satisfaction  and  progress  are  se- 
cured by  equal  reciprocity.  This  is  well  suggested 
by  division  of  labor  according  to  special  functions. 


326  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

The  artist  does  for  others  what  they  cannot  do  for 
themselves,  and  devotes  himself  to  art.  So  of  the 
poet,  the  philosopher,  the  manufacturer,  the  arti- 
san. And  they  in  turn  are  served  by  the  others. 
One  cannot  produce  all  sources  of  his  own  satis- 
faction. But  he  can  appreciate  and  appropriate 
on  many  sides.  Those  who  adopt  the  law  of  mu- 
tual service  are,  in  the  present  imperfect  society, 
more  directly  engaged  in  giving  than  in  receiving. 
There  are  so  many  who  suffer  and  are  ignorant  and 
perverse,  that  the  good  man  is  under  the  law  of 
ministration,  at  the  cost  of  relinquishing  some  grat- 
ifications and  pursuits  which  are  legitimate.  But, 
even  so,  he  receives  in  many  ways.  Every  one 
needs  to  be  dependent  on  others,  and  to  be  aware 
of  it.  The  church  distinctly  provides  reciprocity, 
in  mutual  edification  and  fellowship,  as  hand,  eye, 
foot  are  mutually  dependent.  Even  in  respect  to 
material  goods,  there  must  be  cooperation.  No 
one  is  sufficient  to  himself.  On  the  higher  grades 
of  knowledge,  counsel,  example,  culture,  beauty, 
it  is  the  true  goodness,  as  it  is  the  true  greatness, 
to  receive  as  well  as  to  give.  As  the  Christian 
ideal  of  persons  in  society  is  more  largely  realized, 
reciprocity  will  become  the  prevailing  method  of 
virtue. 

Cooperation  increasing  and  resistance  to  temp- 
tation diminishing  because  temptation  loses  power, 
is  the  tendency.  There  will  be  more  reciprocity 
and  less  struggle  until  cooperation  becomes  the 
prevailing  method.  The  gradual  replacement  of 
conflict  by  reciprocity  is  not  the  replacement  of  ac- 
tivity by  inaction,  but  of  one  kind  of  activity  by 


CONFLICT  AND  RECIPROCITY          327 

another  and  a  higher.  In  discharging  the  func- 
tion which  is  most  congenial  to  each,  the  most  in- 
tense energy  is  exercised.  To  discover  and  inter- 
pret the  beauty  of  the  universe,  or  its  reason  and 
adaptations,  or  to  trace  the  philosophy  of  human 
history,  or  to  produce  the  harmonies  of  music,  are 
tasks  which  summon  the  most  profound  reflection, 
the  most  refined  appreciation  and  sympathy,  and 
the  most  tense  effort.  Such  activity  is  spontane- 
ous. Work  becomes  play.  Any  who  suppose  that 
absence  of  conflict  means  monotony,  may  see  in  the 
variety  of  interests,  tastes,  aptitudes,  talents,  in 
society,  and  may  see  in  the  corresponding  recipro- 
cities of  ministration,  that  conflict  against  the  ab- 
normal and  against  the  evil  which  comes  from  it  is 
a  lower  form  of  activity  which  will  finally  cease. 
Browning's  poem  "  Rephan "  wins  approval  be- 
cause Rephan  is  a  place  of  negative  conditions, 
where  there  is  no  evil,  no  defect,  no  excess,  a  state 
of  passive  and  monotonous  equilibrium.  The  ex- 
citement of  struggle  is  preferred.  The  Rephanite 
becomes  weary  of  his  planet,  and  is  sent  to  the 
Earth,— 

"  Thou  art  past  Rephan ;  thy  place  be  Earth." 

But  there  is  no  such  planet  as  Rephan.  Goodness 
is  not  inert  and  inane.  It  is  energetic.  It  is  full- 
ness, not  emptiness.  Representations  of  heaven 
too  often  contrast  it  with  earth  only  by  absence  of 
evils  and  struggles,  a  place  where  Sabbaths  have 
no  end.  The  thought  of  Jesus  returning  to  the 
glory  which  he  wished  his  disciples  to  behold,  is 
of  a  life  of  holiness  and  love  and  service.  Under 


328  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

other  conditions,  he   is  the  same   Jesus  there  as 
here. 

Different  persons  are  under  different  methods. 
Some  are  engaged  in  conflict.  Some  are  engaged 
in  cooperation.  It  has  been  said,  with  truth,  that 
it  is  -harder  for  some  men  to  be  decent  than  for 
other  men  to  be  saints.  As  life  goes  on  now,  it  is 
not  easy  to  decide  which  is  the  more  admirable 
character.  But  we  could  not  be  content  that  any 
one  should  always  be  struggling  in  conflict.  We 
are  content  that  all  should  forever  engage  in  the 
reciprocities  of  knowledge,  beauty,  and  love.  The 
character  whose  keynote  is  symmetry,  and  not  con- 
flict, has  been  called  idyllic.  The  keynote  is  peace  ; 
peace  with  self,  with  others,  and  with  God.  It  may 
have  been  gained  by  conflict  conquering  peace,  or 
there  may  have  been  only  such  conflict  as  may  be 
compared  to  the  pure  water  of  a  spring  bubbling 
up  through  white  sand  :  "  Endowed  at  birth  with 
a  temperament  that  turned  to  the  light  as  instinc- 
tively as  a  flower  turns  to  the  sun,  that  shrank 
from  the  touch  of  sin  as  from  the  defilement  of 
pitch,  that  knew  no  distinction  between  the  inter- 
ests of  self  and  of  others,  its  various  impulses  are 
so  finely  tempered  and  exquisitely  adjusted  to  each 
other  that  their  spontaneous  play  is  virtue,  without 
having  to  be  forced  into  becoming  it." 

VII 

It  may  be  added  that  the  method  of  realizing 
the  personal  ideal  is  the  positive  method.  Faults 
are  corrected  by  the  cultivation  of  virtues.  The 
new  pushes  out  the  old.  Direct  repression  Js._ 


THE  POSITIVE  METHOD  329 

re. The   leaves  of  an  oak   cling  to  the 

branches  until  late  in  the  spring,  when  other  trees 
are  green  with  foliage.  The  winds  and  storms  of 
winter  could  not  tear  them  off,  but  they  are  pushed 
off  by  the  propulsion  of  the  new  buds  at  the  base 
of  the  stem.  That  is  a  type  of  the  new  moral  life 
supplanting,  and  gently,  but  irresistibly,  pushing 
off  the  old.  The  lusts  of  the  flesh  are  subdued,  not 
by  severe  repression,  not  by  holding  them  down 
with  an  iron  hand,  not  by  scourgings  of  them  till 
they  bleed,  but  by  the  power  of  the  new  life. 
"  Walk  in  the  Spirit,  and  ye  shall  not  fulfill  the 
lusts  of  the  flesh."  The  discipline  of  asceticism 
is  a  dismal  failure.  Into  the  house  which  is  empty, 
swept,  and  garnished,  the  evil  spirits  return  with 
sevenfold  force.  The  strong  man  armed  keepeth 
his  palace  in  peace,  but  when  a  stronger  than  he 
comes  upon  him  he  is  overcome.  Eegeneration 
supplants  degeneration.  Paul  never  loses  the  joy 
of  the  new  life  of  faith  and  freedom,  nor  does  he 
ever  lose  the  surprise  of  it.  The  great  discovery 
was  then  and  still  is  a  perpetual  wonder,  ever  re- 
curring as  the  life  of  faith  springs  up  again  and 
again  in  those  who  receive  Christ. 

There  is  then  the  Christian  character,  which  is 
a  unique  type,  in  whatever  conditions  or  national- 
ities it  may  appear,  as  crystals  may  be  large  or 
small,  burnished  or  incrusted,  yet  all  cleave  at  the 
same  angles  and  respond  to  the  same  tests.  It  is 
a  type  superior  to  all  others  and  not  to  be  super- 
seded by  any  other,  since  it  has  the  elements  of 
absolute  worth.  In  any  individual  the  character 
may  be  only  imperfectly  realized,  but  the  ideal 


330  PERSONAL  REGENERATION 

which  is  perceived  and  embraced  is  the  perfect 
ideal.  In  kind,  in  principle,  in  type,  the  Chris- 
tian character  is  perfect  and  complete.  This  has 
been  the  verdict  of  every  age,  and  is  the  verdict 
of  our  own  age.  Disputes  over  doctrine,  creed, 
theory,  do  not  disturb  the  judgment  of  the  world 
respecting  the  Christian  character.  It  stands  out 
in  contrast  with  the  various  forms  of  selfishness 
which  successive  periods  have  produced.  It  is  an 
ideal  commanding  admiration  in  modern  as  in  an- 
cient times,  and  finding  fresh  embodiments  in  men 
and  women  of  faith,  of  independence,  and  of  self- 
sacrificing  love  in  every  generation.  Whether  it 
appears  under  Christian  nurture,  gradually  disen- 
gaging itself  from  that  which  is  foreign  to  it,  or 
bursts  out  with  suddenness,  almost  with  violence, 
throwing  off  chains  of  bondage,  it  is  the  new,  the 
living,  the  perfect  type  of  character.  It  is  inspired 
and  created  by  Christ.  If  any  man  be  in  Christ 
Jesus  he  is  a  new  creation.  So  it  was  at  the  out- 
set. He  was  the  source  of  the  new  life.  There 
were  various  explanations.  It  was  faith ;  it  was 
obedience  ;  it  was  imitation  ;  it  was  discipleship  ; 
it  was  sympathy  ;  it  was  consecration ;  but  no  mat- 
ter how  described,  it  was  some  sort  of  vital  relation 
with  Christ.  He  was  the  original  source  of  the 
life.  To  this  day  the  explanation  is  the  same. 
The  Christian  is  a  creation  of  Christ.  The  phrase 
of  explanation  matters  not.  Call  it  teaching,  in- 
fluence, or  example ;  call  it  sacrifice,  redemption, 
salvation,  regeneration  ;  enough  that  the  unique 
character  can  be  accounted  for  by  but  one  cause. 
And  this  new  life  is  a  life  of  sonship  with  God. 


THE  POSITIVE  METHOD  331 

Christ's  own  life  in  God  revealed  God  to  the 
world.  God  was  in  Christ,  disclosing  himself  in 
such  ways  that  the  life  of  son  ship,  with  its  faith, 
its  hope,  and  its  love,  replacing  the  old  life  (old 
because  full  of  the  elements  of  decay)  by  the  new 
life  (new  because  ever  fresh  and  strong),  was 
capable  of  production  and  reproduction  forever. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

SOCIAL  REGENERATION  —  ECONOMICS 

PERSONAL  regeneration  is  manifested  in  society, 
and  might  be  traced  to  its  social  results  in  the 
manifold  relations  of  men  to  one  another.  From 
these  relations  I  select  two  for  particular  notice, 
because  they  are  the  most  important  social  forms, 
because  they  show  progress  most  plainly,  and  be- 
cause at  present  they  are  among  the  principal 
subjects  of  discussion  and  conversation.  One  is 
economics,  and  the  other  is  social  institutions.  I 
devote  a  chapter  to  each,  taking  up  economic  pro- 
duction and  distribution  first. 


A  phrase  which  has  recently  obtained  currency 
calls  for  brief  remark.  This  phrase,  social  eco- 
nomics, although  frequently  used,  I  regard  as  loose 
and  inexact.  The  production  of  material  goods  is 
not  social.  The  producers  do,  indeed,  assemble 
under  the  same  roof  or  in  the  same  field.  But  the 
work  over  which  each  worker  bends  is  not  social. 
It  is  divisive.  Modern  industry  proceeds  by  divi- 
sion of  labor,  each  workman  taking  his  own  little 
part  and  passing  it  on  to  the  next.  Combination 
is  in  the  brain  of  the  inventor  who  contrives  a 
machine  which  in  its  many  parts  is  fed  by  many 
men,  or  in  the  brain  of  the  manager  who  appor- 


ECONOMICS  AND  ETHICS  333 

tions  out  the  work,  assigning  to  each  his  task. 
The  organization  of  laborers  into  unions  is  not 
necessary  to  the  performance  of  work,  but  is  in 
order  to  determine  the  amount  of  wage,  that  is, 
the  share  of  the  product  each  shall  claim,  to  fix  the 
number  of  working  hours,  to  prevent  injustice,  to 
provide  mutual  benefits,  and  so  on.  The  aggrega- 
tion of  laborers  gives  opportunity  for  association, 
but  work  itself  is  not  socializing.  However,  the 
relations  of  laborers  with  one  another  and  with 
employers  are  so  easily  facilitated  by  aggregation, 
and  the  sharing  of  products  has  so  much  to  do 
with  social  welfare,  that,  for  convenience,  indus- 
try and  economics  may  be  regarded  as  forms  of 
society,  although  in  themselves  they  are  purely 
material  and  actually  divisive.  And,  at  all  events, 
social  regeneration  is  closely  dependent  on  the 
conditions  and  products  of  industry. 

It  is  evident  that  economics  cannot  be  separated 
from  other  interests.  It  certainly  is  not  out  of  re- 
lation to  ethics.  There  may,  indeed,  be  necessary 
laws,  iron  laws  they  are  sometimes  called,  of  politi- 
cal economy.  The  observed  method  of  mechani- 
cal production,  the  transportation  of  products  from 
place  to  place,  the  function  of  money  as  facilitat- 
ing exchange  of  values,  the  proportion  of  profits 
and  wages,  are  governed  by  economic  laws  which 
are  independent  of  moral  conditions.  They  con- 
stitute a  mechanism,  like  the  structure  of  an 
engine.  Morality  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  flow 
of  gold  from  one  country  to  another,  nor  with  the 
price  of  cotton.  But  production  itself  is  deter- 
mined by  a  variety  of  social  and  moral  interests. 


334  ECONOMICS 

Wants  control  production.     There  are,  it  may  be, 
certain  necessary  wants,  such  as  food,  clothing,  and 
shelter,   which  must   be   supplied,   whatever  the 
moral   condition  of   society   may  be.      But   even 
those  wants  vary  greatly  in  different  civilizations. 
The  enormous  social  difference  between   the   no- 
madic life  of  hunting  and  the  settled  life  of  agri- 
culture is  simply  a  difference  of  food.     The  con- 
trast of  rude  skins  with  silk  and  broadcloth  is  only 
a  contrast  of  clothing.     From  log  hut  to  cottage, 
from  cottage  to  villa,  is  from  one  to  another  kind 
of  shelter.     Then  there  are  numerous  wants  besides 
the  so-called  necessaries  of   life.     Many  of   these 
are  moral  wants.     The  mode  of  production   and 
transportation,  and  the   equivalent   money  value, 
are  merely  the  method  of  making  and  getting  the 
thing.     But  wants  —  intellectual,  aBsthetic,  moral, 
religious  wants  —  occasion  production.    Economics 
tells  how  a  piano   is  made,  but  an  aesthetic  want 
calls  for  the  piano.     On  one  side  of  a  book  are 
printing-presses,  which  are  run  by  steam-engines, 
supplied  with  ink,  fed  by  paper,  directed  by  labor ; 
but  on  the  other  side  of  the  book  are  knowledge, 
culture,  education,  readers,  and   an   author.     An 
intellectual   want   sets   the   press   in   motion.     A 
church  is  planned  by  an  architect  who  has  a  com- 
mission, is  built  under  a  contract  by  paid  laborers, 
who  use  stone  and  iron  quarried  by  other  laborers 
and  brought  from  a  distance  by  ship  or  rail.    Every 
law  of  economics,  it  may  be,  plays  a  part.     But  a 
religious  want   makes   the   laws   active;  political 
economy  is  employed  by  belief  in  God  and  immor- 
tality.    Compare  the  wants  of  an  American  with 


MATERIAL   VALUES  335 

the  wants  of  an  Asiatic  workman,  to  see  that  do- 
mestic, intellectual,  moral,  political,  and  religious 
conditions  determine  the  time,  the  wage,  the 
quality,  the  skill,  and  the  value  of  labor.  Social 
regeneration,  then,  —  or,  if  the  term  is  preferred, 
social  progress,  —  is  in  close  relation  with  econom- 
ics, affecting  it  and  affected  by  it.  Social  progress 
has  a  material  side.  Labor,  wages,  and  wealth 
may  tend  either  to  the  degeneration  or  to  the  re- 
generation of  society.  What  we  are  to  consider  is 
not  a  theory  of  political  economy,  but  the  relation 
of  material  production  to  the  welfare  of  society. 
We  shall  see  that  there  are  three  relations  of  the 
material  to  social  welfare,  all  of  which  are  found 
either  in  practice  or  in  theory.  The  first  is  wrong, 
the  second  is  mistaken,  the  third,  I  think,  is  correct 
and  right. 

II 

The  first  relation  is  found  in  the  undue  exalta- 
tion of  the  material,  either  as  an  end  in  itself  by 
mere  possession,  or  as  supplying  material  wants 
and  desires.  This  exaltation  may  be  by  compul- 
sion or  by  choice.  It  is  by  compulsion  when  the 
entire  energy  of  life  is  necessarily  directed  to 
gaining  the  subsistence  which  is  needed  to  pre- 
serve life.  Poverty,  threatened  with  starvation, 
is  supreme  exaltation  of  the  material  by  compul- 
sion. Large  numbers  are  in  this  condition.  They 
have  all  they  can  do  to  keep  soul  and  body  to- 
gether. The  existence  of  a  considerable  number 
of  such  persons  is  a  source  of  degeneration.  It  is 
the  wrong  kind  of  life.  Two  opinions  about  it 
are  not  possible.  The  only  question  is,  How  may 


fUSIViRSITT) 


336  ECONOMICS 

they  be  raised  out  of  that  state  into  a  self-support 
which  will  enable  them  to  attain  the  higher  values 
of  life,  a  question  more  easily  asked  than  an- 
swered. 

The  supreme  exaltation  of  the  material  is  by 
choice  in  the  case  of  those  who  are  raised  above 
poverty  and  whose  aim  is  to  amass  wealth  for 
possession  or  to  expend  it  on  sensuous  and  selfish 
enjoyments.  The  supreme  valuation  is  placed  on 
wealth.  There  are  some,  there  are  many  persons, 
how  many  cannot  be  known,  who  appraise  life  at 
precisely  this  estimate.  The  strength  of  this  valu- 
ation is  seen  in  the  deference  paid  to  the  wealthy 
even  when  the  deference  can  bring  no  possible 
advantage,  in  the  facility  with  which  the  doors 
even  of  aristocratic  society  are  opened  to  the 
nouveaux  riches,  in  marriages  for  money,  in  the 
political  power  of  the  millionaire.  Exaltation  of 
the  material  is  not  confined  to  those  who  are  suc- 
cessful in  gaining  wealth,  but  is  found  with  every 
amount  of  actual  possession.  It  is  obviously  con- 
version of  means  into  ends.  It  is  as  obviously  a 
degenerating  and  vitiating  tendency  in  society. 

The  second  relation  of  material  to  social  values 
is  expressed  in  the  view  that  the  controlling  factor 
in  progress  is  material  welfare.  It  is  maintained 
that  economic  conditions  must  be  rectified  first 
and  that  moral  improvement  awaits  and  follows 
such  rectification.  This  is  the  view  of  nearly  all 
socialists.  They  do  not  regard  the  equalizing  or 
the  common  sharing  of  possessions  as  the  end. 
They  hold  that  division  of  products  in  proportion 
to  the  work  of  each  person  is  a  means  to  the 


MATERIAL   VALUES  337 

higher  ends  of  knowledge,  culture,  art,  domestic 
and  social  life.  But  they  insist  that  these  higher 
ends  cannot  be  gained  while  material  conditions 
are  unequal  and  unjust,  that,  although  the  few 
may  realize  the  higher  values,  the  many  cannot, 
and  that  even  the  few  amass  wealth  under  condi- 
tions so  unjust  that  their  own  character  is  vitiated 
and  sordid.  It  is  therefore  believed  that  effort 
should  be  mainly  directed  to  economic  reconstruc- 
tion, to  the  replacement  of  competition  by  combi- 
nation through  some  scheme  of  profit-sharing  or  of 
State-ownership  of  land  and  the  tools  of  produc- 
tion. They  maintain  that  when,  and  only  when, 
industrial  equalization  is  secured  can  the  masses 
have  the  leisure  and  the  means  for  enjoyment  of 
the  higher  values  of  culture,  art,  and  society.  All 
that  is  needed  for  material  comfort  can  be  pro- 
duced, it  is  thought,  with  half  the  labor  and  there- 
fore in  half  the  time  now  expended.  But  under 
existing  conditions,  in  which  the  masses  toil  from 
ten  to  sixteen  hours  a  day  to  gain  a  bare  subsist- 
ence, it  is  useless  to  expect  any  real  improvement. 
The  gospel  to  be  preached  is  therefore  an  eco- 
nomic gospel.  This  theory  is  advocated  by  Mr. 
John  Beattie  Crozier  in  his  interesting  volume  en- 
titled "  Civilization  and  Progress."  He  represents 
material  and  social  conditions  as  the  controlling 
factor  in  progress.  By  social  conditions  he  means 
political  rights  and  class  distinctions.  The  mate- 
rial, he  holds,  is  at  the  bottom  of  all.  Climate, 
soil,  population,  and  occupation  are  material  con- 
ditions which  give  rise  to  political  inequalities,  as 
between  the  chief  and  his  followers,  and,  through 


338  ECONOMICS 

the  subjugation  of  tribes,  to  the  hierarchy  of 
emperors,  kings,  nobles,  burgesses,  menials,  and 
slaves.  These  political  inequalities  give  rise  in 
turn  to  social  distinctions  of  high  and  low  born,  of 
educated  and  illiterate,  of  refined  and  vulgar.  And 
out  of  these  social  inequalities  arise  those  moral 
inequalities  of  rights,  privileges,  duties,  and  obli- 
gations which  it  is  the  object  of  civilization  to 
remove.  As  customary  morality  is  a  result  of 
these  conditions,  there  must  be  equalization  of  the 
material,  political,  and  social  conditions,  beginning 
with  the  material  and  working  upwards,  in  order 
that  there  may  be  higher  morality.  He  says: 
"  On  the  one  hand,  there  are  those  who  think  that 
civilization  is  to  be  best  advanced  by  primarily 
addressing  the  hearts  and  imaginations  of  men,  by 
appeals  to  their  consciences,  and  exhortations  to 
duty  and  self-sacrifice,  or,  in  a  word,  by  the 
preaching  of  morality;  on  the  other  hand  are 
those  who  believe  that  it  is  to  be  best  advanced  ~by 
ameliorating  the,  material  and  social  conditions 
of  men,  in  the  belief  that,  out  of  the  improved 
conditions,  the  higher  morality  will  arise  of  itself. 
Speaking  broadly,  we  may  say  that  the  Church 
represents  the  view  that  civilization  is  to  be  best 
advanced  by  the  preaching  of  duty  and  morality ; 
the  State,  the  view  that  it  is  to  be  best  advanced 
by  improvement  in  men's  material  and  social  con- 
ditions." 1  To  the  latter  of  these  views  he  gives 
his  own  firm  adhesion.  He  contends  that  moral- 
ity does  not  produce  improvements  all  the  way 
down,  but  that  material,  political,  and  social 
1  Civilization  and  Progress,  p.  378. 


MATERIAL   VALUES  339 

equalization  produces  morality.  His  philosophy 
of  civilization  reverses  a  familiar  saying,  to  make 
it  run,  Seek  ye  first  all  these  things,  and  the 
kingdom  of  God  and  his  righteousness  shall  be 
added  unto  you. 

The  third  view  of  the  relation  of  material  and 
moral  is  that  they  are  mutually  dependent.  The 
material  is  one  factor  of  progress,  but  it  is  not  the 
only  factor,  and  is  not  an  independent  factor.  If 
material  conditions  are  wrong,  they  cannot  be 
made  right  all  by  themselves,  but  only  as  other 
conditions  are  also  made  right.  When  economic 
conditions  are  manifestly  wrong,  efforts  may  need 
to  be  directed  earnestly  to  their  rectification.  But 
the  terms,  right,  and  wrong,  are  moral  terms 
used  in  view  of  injustice  and  of  exclusion  from  the 
higher  uses  of  life  by  poverty.  Economics  has  not 
developed  independently.  As  already  said,  wants 
determine  production,  and  wants  are  political,  so- 
cial, intellectual,  moral,  and  religious ;  which  is 
the  same  thing  as  saying  that  man,  every  man,  is  a 
physical,  intellectual,  social,  moral,  and  religious 
being.  His  physical  needs  are  what  they  are  be- 
cause he  is  more  than  an  animal.  All  the  factors 
work  together,  and  always  have  worked  together. 
An  ideal  is  before  men,  and  they  demand  the  time 
and  the  material  possessions  requisite  to  the  reali- 
zation of  the  ideal.  Not  wholly  by  pressure  from 
below,  from  those  who  are  half  fed  and  scantily 
clothed,  does  the  equalizing  of  material  conditions 
proceed.  Sympathy  goes  down  to  the  less  fortu- 
nate and  does  away  with  injustice  of  slavery  and 
ill-paid  labor.  Education  is  made  general  by  those 


340  ECONOMICS 

who  already  have  it.  A  sense  of  justice  has  moved 
philanthropists  and  reformers.  Democracy  has 
been  extended  by  the  influence  of  the  enfranchised, 
as  well  as  by  the  demands  of  the  disfranchised,  by 
the  influence  of  the  Christian  ideal  of  society,  in 
which  there  is  neither  bond  nor  free,  Greek  nor 
Jew.  The  modern  State  is  due  in  large  part  to  the 
Protestant  Reformation,  which  maintained  the 
right  of  private  judgment.  While  it  would  be  a 
mistake  to  suppose  that  morality  is  ever  separated 
from  physical  welfare  and  political  status,  it  is 
equally  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  material  and 
civic  conditions  are  separate  from  moral  ideals. 
The  two  mistakes  assume  that  humanity  is  in  com- 
partments which  can  be  shut  off  from  each  other. 
When  humanity  is  seen  to  be  an  organic  whole, 
and  every  man,  in  body,  mind,  and  soul  an  organ- 
ism, such  mistakes  are  not  made.  The  moral  ideal 
is  the  fullness  of  physical,  mental,  and  moral  life. 
There  is  no  real  improvement  in  any  part  unless 
there  is  right  proportion  and  adjustment  to  the 
whole.  This  interdependence  is  corroborated  by 
facts  which  appear  as  we  revert  to  the  first  two  es- 
timates of  the  material  values.  It  will  be  seen 
that  the  facts  do  not  run  exclusively  on  the  lines  of 
either  of  those  estimates.  We  pass,  therefore,  to 
a  consideration  of  the  three  relations  of  economics 
to  ethics. 

in 

The  first  estimate,  which  exalts  material  posses- 
sions to  the  supreme  place,  is  not  the  estimate  of 
all,  nor  even  of  the  majority,  and  has  fewer  defend- 
ers in  theory  than  it  has  in  practice.  To  some  by 


MORAL   VALUES  341 

compulsion  and  to  some  by  choice  the  material  is 
supreme,  but,  taken  together,  they  constitute  a  mi- 
nority. Of  those  who  engage  in  manual  labor, 
some  fraction,  perhaps  a  tenth,  possibly  but  not 
probably  a  sixth,  are  struggling  against  or  suc- 
cumbing to  poverty.  Above  that  line  are  multi- 
tudes of  agriculturists,  craftsmen,  traders,  weavers, 
spinners,  who  have  —  or  if  they  choose  may  have 
—  higher  objects  for  which  their  gains  are  used. 
Home  is  an  object.  The  education  of  children,  the 
affairs  of  the  community,  the  newspaper,  some 
knowledge  of  science  and  literature,  the  social  life 
of  the  neighborhood,  the  trade -union,  holidays, 
Sundays,  the  church,  are  objects.  Consider,  for 
example,  the  number  of  church-members  in  the 
United  States.  In  the  Protestant  churches  there 
are  not  less  than  fourteen  millions.  These  repre- 
sent more  than  half  of  the  population,  as  children 
are  not,  as  a  rule,  included.  Not  many  of  these 
millions  are  poor.  The  church  in  its  preaching, 
teaching,  and  activities  is  an  important  interest  to 
them.  It  means  social  life.  It  means  pure  and 
happy  homes.  It  means  a  good  degree  of  intelli- 
gence. It  is  not  true  that  these  people  hear  the 
gospel  of  brotherly  kindness  on  Sundays  and  go  on 
toiling,  moiling,  grasping,  cheating  all  the  week. 
The  great  mass  of  them  are  honest,  faithful,  kindly, 
domestic,  mutually  helpful.  I  am  not  asserting 
that  all  of  them  realize  the  purest  type  of  religious 
character,  but  I  do  affirm  that  they  have  higher  in- 
terests than  physical  subsistence.  Work  may  con- 
sume time  in  the  eight,  ten,  or  twelve  hours  of  the 
day  demanded  by  the  industrial  occupation.  But 


842  ECONOMICS 

the  amount  of  time  devoted  to  work  does  not  de- 
termine its  relative  importance.  It  might  as  well 
be  said  that  because  it  takes  three  hours  to  prepare 
a  dinner  and  only  thirty  minutes  to  eat  it,  there- 
fore the  cooking  is  six  times  as  important  as  the 
eating.  Morality  goes  into  the  work  itself.  Many 
workers  realize  that  they  are  contributing  their 
part  to  the  support  of  their  fellow-men,  and  have 
interest  in  doing  good  work  as  well  as  in  obtaining 
wages.  They  may  receive  less  than  their  share. 
There  may  be  needed  a  more  equitable  division  of 
products.  But  under  existing  conditions  there  are 
higher  than  material  objects  for  manual  laborers, 
and  there  is  conscientiousness  in  work. 

Take  again  those  who  are  wealthy.  Some  of 
them  indeed  exalt  wealth  to  the  supreme  place,  but 
not  all  serve  mammon.  With  too  many  wealth  is 
the  be-all  and  end-all,  but  there  are  many  also  who 
use  wealth  as  means  to  secure  higher  values.  How 
otherwise  could  there  be  all  the  culture  there  is, 
and  science,  and  music,  and  art,  and  statesmanship, 
and  philanthropy,  and  colleges,  and  schools,  and 
churches  ?  To  many  wealth  is  simply  that  which 
makes  such  things  possible.  Addition  to  wealth  is 
not  cared  for  if  it  is  to  be  had  only  by  sacrifice  of 
the  other  interests.  For  many,  also,  luxury  is  not 
the  principal  use  of  wealth.  Indeed,  those  who 
expend  money  lavishly  on  luxurious  appliances, 
just  to  have  horses,  yachts,  liveried  servants,  a 
valet  for  every  guest,  to  have  appointments  more 
elaborate  and  imposing  than  those  of  royal  palaces, 
to  eat  from  dishes  of  gold,  to  load  themselves  with 
jewels,  to  gorge  themselves  with  dainties  and  soak 


MORAL   VALUES  343 

themselves  with  drink,  are  secretly  despised  by 
sensible  persons.  Wealth  has  deference,  it  is  true, 
a  servile  and  contemptible  deference,  but  it  is  not 
the  only  value  that  has  deference,  nor  the  value 
that  has  the  greatest  deference.  There  is  an 
aristocracy  of  letters.  Concerning  those  who  are 
most  highly  honored,  —  cultivated  educators,  broad 
statesmen,  honest  judges,  eloquent  preachers,  de- 
voted philanthropists,  skillful  physicians,  eminent 
authors,  poets,  and  artists,  —  questions  as  to  their 
wealth  do  not  even  arise. 

Neither  do  all  the  facts,  as  I  have  intimated, 
run  on  the  second  line.  It  is  not  true  that  progress 
must  always  wait  for  improved  material  conditions. 
For,  in  the  first  place,  it  has  not  so  waited.  If 
economic  conditions,  as  some  maintain,  are  as  bad 
as  possible,  if  the  industrial  slavery  of  to-day  is 
worse  than  the  legal  slavery  of  yesterday,  how  is 
civilization  to  be  accounted  for?  Whence  came 
home,  education,  laws,  freedom,  and  religion  ?  If 
the  present  economic  system  is  intrinsically  wrong, 
how  is  it  that  so  many  other  things  are  right  and 
good  ?  That  the  industrial  system  needs  improve- 
ment no  one  thinks  of  denying.  But  it  is  folly  to 
suppose  that  all  other  values  and  improvements 
depend  on  economic  reform.  Perhaps  the  laborer 
should  toil  only  eight  hours  instead  of  twelve,  and 
should  have  three  dollars  instead  of  two  for  his 
day's  work.  But,  in  either  case,  he  has  his  duties, 
affections,  faith,  and  ideals.  Although  he  works 
twelve  hours  and  receives  but  a  dollar,  he  loves  his 
child.  When  he  stands,  silent  and  tearful,  over 
the  dead  body  of  the  child,  you  respect  his  grief 


344  ECONOMICS 

and  try  to  express  your  sympathy.  "  One  touch 
of  nature  makes  the  whole  world  kin."  The 
material  is  not  the  controlling,  although  it  is  an 
essential  factor,  in  personal  life  and  in  society. 
And,  in  the  next  place,  why  is  the  improvement  of 
material  conditions  desired  ?  Why,  as  the  advo- 
cates of  this  theory  agree,  it  is  that  men  may  enjoy 
higher  values.  But  they  must  have  had  some  ex- 
perience of  those  values  in  order  to  desire  them. 
Men  are  moral  beings.  They  come  down  to  the 
material  circumstance  from  the  moral  ideal,  and 
desire  to  be  better  fed,  better  clothed,  better 
housed,  in  order  that  they  may  realize  the  ideal 
more  fully  than  they  have  done.  It  is  the  higher 
want  felt  and  partly  satisfied  which  demands  the 
comfort  and  time  needed  for  its  better  gratifica- 
tion. Mr.  Crozier  himself  traces  progress  along 
two  lines,  which  he  calls  horizontal  and  vertical. 
The  horizontal  line  is  the  equalization  of  material, 
political,  and  social  conditions  till  all  are  on  the 
same  level.  But  there  is  also  a  vertical  line. 
"  The  upright  vertical  movement,"  he  says,  "  is 
seen  in  the  gradual  rise  of  men's  ideals  ;  "  from  the 
ideal  of  brute  courage  up  to  the  ideal  of  military 
prowess,  and  from  that  up  to  the  ideal  of  the  pre- 
sent day,  "  when  the  most  serious  sections  of  the 
most  civilized  nations  have  as  their  ideal  that  in- 
tellectual power  which,  in  its  many  different  as- 
pects, has  produced  all  that  is  great  and  admirable 
in  civil  and  national  life."  The  lower  ideals,  he 
thinks,  have  passed  away  or  are  dying  out ;  "  and 
now,  mental  power,  in  its  many  various  applica- 
tions, whether  as  practical  wisdom,  political  saga- 


MORAL   VALUES  345 

city,  artistic,  literary,  or  philosophical  power,  is  su- 
preme." l  So  he  holds  that  there  has  been  a  double 
movement,  the  upward  rise  of  Ideals,  and  the 
lateral  extension  of  Justice  and  Rights,  and  he 
proceeds  at  once  to  argue,  inconsequently,  that 
equalization  of  material  and  social  conditions  pre- 
cedes and  produces  the  higher  ideals.  But  in  the 
end,  he  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  ideals 
are  the  causes,  and  the  equalization  the  effect.  He 
says,  in  direct  contradiction  of  his  own  premises, 
that  "  advancing  knowledge  and  the  diffusion  of 
culture  among  all  classes  are  gradually  equalizing 
men's  social  conditions ;  the  application  of  this 
knowledge  to  the  arts  of  life,  and  the  wealth  accru- 
ing therefrom  in  industry,  merchandise,  mines,  and 
ships,  are  gradually  equalizing  their  material  condi- 
tions." I  am  not  concerned  to  confute  the  theories 
of  Mr.  Crozier,  and  have  noticed  them  only  to  show 
that  social  regeneration  is  not  to  be  expected  by 
so  simple  a  device  as  industrial  adjustment.  Man 
does  not  live  by  economics  alone.  He  does  not 
advance  horizontally  on  an  economic  level  only. 
Extensive  equalization  is  by  intensive  ideals.  Man 
must  be  fed  in  order  to  live,  and  he  must  live  in 
order  to  be  a  good  man. .  But  food  does  not  pro- 
duce goodness.  There  are  such  creatures  as  com- 
fortable sinners  and  full-blooded  fools.  Progress 
is  not  by  bodily  pressure  from  below  so  much  as 
by  moral  and  spiritual  attraction  from  above. 
The  higher  men  raise  the  lower  men.  "  If  you 
would  lift  me  you  must  stand  above  me."  The 
higher  in  man  raises  the  lower.  Having  recognized 
1  Civilization  and  Progress,  p.  396.  2  Ibid.,  p.  410. 


346  ECONOMICS 

the  subordinate  but  essential  place  of  material 
factors  in  human  welfare  and  progress,  we  may 
now  notice  certain  characteristics  and  incidents 
of  economic  conditions  which  are  sources  of  degen- 
eration and  which  should  be  rectified. 

IV 

Some,  perhaps  most,  of  the  evils  and  dangers 
which  are  incident  to  the  existing  system  of  pro- 
duction are  due  to  the  exaggerated  value  placed  on 
wealth.  Their  removal,  then,  as  we  shall  see,  de- 
pends on  higher  standards  more  than  011  improved 
methods. 

The  chief  defect  of  the  modern  economic  system 
is  supposed  by  many  to  be  competition,  which  in 
turn  is  due  to  the  inordinate  desire  for  wealth.  At 
the  door  of  competition  are  laid  insufficient  wages, 
excessive  hours  of  labor,  pauperism,  corruption  of 
politics,  colossal  fortunes  giving  almost  despotic 
power  to  a  few  individuals,  and  other  evils  too 
numerous  to  mention.  I  am  not  disposed  to  deny 
that  some  incidents  of  competition  are  bad,  nor  do 
I  deny  that  the  method  itself  is  necessarily  accom- 
panied with  such  incidents.  But  I  am  not  sure  but 
that,  under  such  checks  as  democracy  may  put  and 
has  put  on  it,  it  is  the  best  system  under  which 
wants  can  be  supplied,  at  least  for  a  long  time  to 
come.  Unchecked  competition  produced  the  Man- 
chester school  of  political  economy,  with  its  iron 
law  of  wages,  its  employment  of  children  and 
women  in  exhaustive  and  unhealthy  occupations 
from  twelve  to  sixteen  hours  a  day,  and  its  let- 
alone  principle  of  laisser  faire  which  imposed 


COMPETITION  347 

oppressions  and  cruelties  that  cried  to  heaven.  It 
was  really  a  protected  competition.  The  power  of 
the  State  was  behind  it.  Boasting  of  freedom,  it 
was  pure  despotism.  At  length  England  extended 
her  protection  to  the  workingmen  who  were  her 
subjects.  Hours  of  labor  were  limited  by  law. 
Safety  of  life  and  limb  was  required.  The  labor  of 
children  and  women  was  reduced  and  in  some  in- 
dustries forbidden.  The  organization  of  labor  for 
its  own  protection  was  legalized.  The  method  of 
competition  was  so  much  restricted  that  the  worst 
evils  disappeared,  while  the  principal  advantages 
were  preserved.  Every  Parliament  passes  addi- 
tional measures  in  the  interest  of  workingmen.  In 
America,  the  legislatures  of  the  several  States  afford 
ample  protection  to  laborers,  and  by  direct  taxation 
distribute  a  large  share  of  the  profits  of  industry 
among  the  people.  A  democracy  has  almost  un- 
limited power  to  prescribe  conditions  on  manufac- 
ture and  business,  and  to  tax  the  gains.  That  some 
evils  still  attend  the  competitive  method  is  undeni- 
able. The  greed  of  gain  cannot  be  wholly  pre- 
vented from  taking  undue  advantage.  Some  of 
the  alleged  evils,  however,  are  chargeable  to  the 
incapacity  and  vices  of  laborers  rather  than  to 
hard-hearted  and  hard-headed  competition.  Yet 
these  in  turn  may  be  due  partly  to  the  grinding 
oppression  of  the  system. 

The  alternative  of  restricted  competition  is  pub- 
lic ownership  and  control  of  industry  ;  the  people, 
that  is,  the  State,  appointing  managers  at  fixed 
salaries,  who  shall  assign  work  and  distribute  pro- 
ducts. The  State  already  owns  and  controls  some 


348  ECONOMICS 

of  the  easier  industries,  the  post-office,  highways, 
schools,  and,  in  some  communities,  the  telegraph, 
the  railway,  water,  and  lights,  the  conveniences 
which  all  the  people  require.  But  when  the  alter- 
native is  presented  as  between  private  and  public 
production  in  all  branches  of  industry,  it  may  well 
be  doubted  if  the  time  is  yet  ripe,  or  even  in  sight, 
for  transferring  all  kinds  of  business  from  indi- 
viduals to  the  State.  The  advantages  of  enterprise 
under  the  incentive  of  profit  are  too  great  to  be 
lightly  relinquished  for  the  uncertain  results  of 
public  management.  It  is  universal  testimony  that 
competition  has  cheapened  staples,  has  invented 
machines  which  multiply  products,  has  provided 
the  means  of  world- wide  transportation  and  com- 
munication, has  enlisted  science  in  the  service  of 
industry,  and  has  thereby  encouraged  science 
itself.  To  substitute  public  control  for  private 
enterprise,  we  should  be  very  sure  that  the  mod- 
erate fixed  compensation  of  officials  would  be  suf- 
ficient incentive  to  inventiveness  and  economical 
production,  or  that  public  spirit  would  be  a  mo- 
tive strong  enough  to  be  trusted,  or  that  all,  the 
inferior  as  well  as  the  superior,  would  be  contented 
with  the  work  assigned  and  the  shares  of  product 
distributed,  or  that  indolence  would  not  take  ad- 
vantage of  assured  support  to  swell  the  mass  of 
pauperism,  or,  indeed,  that  all  these  conditions 
would  not  exist.  We  should  not  overlook  the  pos- 
sibility that  a  despotism  might  arise,  seeing  that 
thus  far  in  the  history  of  the  world  there  have 
always  been  large  numbers  who  work  only  if  they 
are  forced  to.  Penalties,  prisons,  and  poorhouses 


COMPETITION  349 

might  abound  more  than  they  do  now.  What 
seems  to  me  probable  is  that  the  industrial  func- 
tions of  the  State  will  somewhat  increase,  espe- 
cially in  control  of  natural  monopolies  which  do 
not  allow  competition,  but  that  it  will  be  a  very 
long  time  before  private  ownership  and  manage- 
ment can  be  dispensed  with.  The  overproduction 
which  attends  competition  is  less  likely  to  occur 
with  increasing  knowledge  of  harvests,  products, 
and  markets,  that  is,  of  supply  and  demand.  The 
combination  of  capital  into  trusts  and  syndicates 
which  crush  smaller  competitions  must  keep  prices 
down  to  a  point  which  renders  competition  im- 
possible. It  prevents  overproduction,  and  it  is 
exposed  to  legal  checks  under  democracy.  That 
competition  is  attended  with  some  evils  must  be 
admitted.  But  mere  change  of  method  cannot 
insure  perfect  justice  unless  men  themselves  are 
changed,  and  when  men  generally  are  so  changed 
that  public  spirit  may  be  trusted  to  secure  material 
welfare,  it  will  make  little  difference  what  the 
method  is. 

It  should  be  observed  that  the  many  who  carry 
on  business  are  not  conscious  of  competition  with 
each  other.  They  buy  in  the  cheapest  and  sell  in 
the  dearest  market,  but  the  whole  process  is  im- 
personal. The  individual  employer  does  not  fix 
the  amount  of  wages  nor  the  hours  of  labor,  but 
is  governed  by  the  state  of  the  market  and  by  the 
rate  and  time  which  obtain  in  the  entire  industry. 
Some  are  under  the  system  but  do  not  approve  it. 
Multitudes  fail  of  success  under  it.  Many  are  not 
covetous,  but  are  generous  in  the  use  of  gains,  and 


350  ECONOMICS 

intend  to  use  their  wealth  for  its  highest  purposes, 
as  well  as  to  promote  to  their  utmost  power  the 
welfare  of  those  whom  they  employ.  Those  who 
commit  themselves  over,  body  and  soul,  to  compe- 
tition for  gain,  degenerate  into  hard  and  sordid 
characters.  The  evil,  in  that  case,  springs  quite  as 
much  from  the  inordinate  value  placed  on  wealth 
as  from  the  method  by  which  wealth  is  gained. 

I  do  not  defend  the  existing  economic  system  in 
all  its  features.  I  am  aware  that  it  has  developed 
from  conditions  which  were  quite  different  condi- 
tions, in  which  there  was  less  of  private  and  more 
of  common  ownership.  It  is  to  be  expected  that 
important  changes  will  yet  occur.  But  the  changes 
which  are  needed  will  come  about  by  slow  evolu- 
tion, not  by  rapid  revolution.  One  of  the  most  im- 
portant considerations  is  the  fact  that  the  advance 
of  civilization  has  gone  along  with  the  possession 
of  private  property.  Progress  has  accompanied 
increase  of  ownership,  and  especially  increase  in 
the  number  of  owners.  Under  proper  restrictions, 
it  may  be  believed  that  progress  will  continue  to 
rest  on  the  same  basis.  If  history  teaches  any- 
thing, it  teaches  that  common  ownership  and  pro- 
duction would  be  a  backward  step  in  civilization. 


Among  the  specific  evils  which  arise  from  eco- 
nomic causes  is  the  overwork  of  many  persons. 
There  are  some  industries,  in  which  the  competi- 
tion is  sharpest,  which  demand  too  much  work  at 
low  wages.  The  sweating  system  is  one  form  of 
overwork.  Legislation  will,  in  time,  correct  this 


SPECIFIC  EVILS  351 

evil.  Consumers  may  do  something  to  correct 
it,  by  refusing  to  buy  at  places  where  goods  are 
too  cheap.  There  is  a  necessary  limit  to  the  re- 
duction of  hours  in  all  the  industries.  The  mar- 
gin of  time  that  can  be  saved  is  less  than  some 
suppose.  Reduction  from  fourteen  to  twelve  hours 
a  day  is  easier  than  from  twelve  to  ten  hours,  and 
reduction  from  ten  to  nine  is  easier  than  from  nine 
to  eight.  The  nearer  the  practicable  minimum  is 
approached  the  slower  and  smaller  must  be  the 
diminution,  as  increasing  the  speed  of  an  ocean 
steamer  from  twenty  to  twenty-one  knots  requires 
more  coal  and  engine-power  than  increasing  from 
ten  to  fifteen  knots.  Working-hours  may  be  re- 
duced by  the  cessation  of  some  kinds  of  manufac- 
ture. People  might  do  without  some  things  they 
now  have.  Here  again,  however,  there  is  a  minimum 
of  wants  which  cannot  be  passed  without  reducing 
civilization,  in  culture,  art,  beauty,  "and  comfort. 
Too  little  production  is  reversal  toward  savagery. 
But  overwork  is  degeneration,  and  it  may  be 
prevented  by  legislation,  by  public  opinion,  and 
by  the  demands  of  organized  labor. 

Pauperism  is  closely  connected  with  economics, 
although  few  would  claim  that  it  is  entirely  the  re- 
sult of  industrial  competition.  Sickness,  old  age, 
improvidence,  vice  are  causes  which  cannot  in  all 
cases  be  traced  even  indirectly  to  the  greed  and 
competition  of  capital.  But  much  pauperism  is 
due  to  overwork  in  amount  or  in  strain,  to  under- 
pay below  the  value  of  the  work,  and  to  the  un- 
healthy conditions  of  mines,  factories,  or  processes 
of  manufacture.  Moral  sentiment  now  obliges  the 


352  ECONOMICS 

management  of  industry  to  provide  healthy  con- 
ditions, and  so  far  forth  pauperism  is  reduced. 
There  is  also  an  economic  corrective  in  accumula- 
tion and  insurance  from  savings  made  by  individ- 
uals, or  by  societies  of  laborers,  or  even  under 
provision  by  the  State.  Labor  organizations  do 
much  to  reduce  pauperism.  The  direct  treatment 
of  pauperism  is  partly  economic.  Indiscriminate 
aid  is  no  longer  given.  Those  who  can  work  must 
work.  And  the  system  of  industry  affords  oppor- 
tunity of  taking  up  any  —  the  least  amount  —  of 
productive  labor,  and  of  making  the  poorest  partly 
self-supporting.  Even  in  respect  to  overwork  and 
underpay,  a  sound  economy  may  and  should  see 
that  it  is  better  to  reduce  work  and  increase  wages 
than  to  be  loaded  with  an  enormous  burden  of 
taxation  in  support  of  those  whom  the  system  of 
business  has  pauperized.  One  good  result  of  the 
advocacy  of  old-age  pensions  in  England  is  the  ex- 
hibition of  the  vast  amount  of  poor-rates  collected 
by  taxation.  The  tendency  of  philanthropy  and 
of  legislation  is  to  reduce  pauperism  to  the  aged, 
the  infirm,  the  diseased,  and  orphans,  that  is,  to 
those  who  are  actually  incapable  of  self-support. 
The  reduction  goes  on  by  setting  the  lazy  to  work, 
and  by  correcting  those  incidents  of  the  economic 
system  which  induce  pauperism.  It  may  be  doubted 
if  socialism  would  have  a  lighter  burden,  or  if, 
under  any  economic  system,  the  ancient  saying  will 
for  many  centuries  become  obsolete,  "  The  poor 
ye  have  always  with  you." 

I  mention  only  one  more  evil  which  may  fairly 
be  attributed  to  the  exaltation  of  wealth,  the  evil 


CORRECTION  OF  EVILS  353 

of  municipal  and  legislative  corruption.  This,  for 
the  greater  part,  is  venal  corruption.  The  extent 
of  the  evil  is  measured  by  the  millions  of  dollars 
obtained  by  officials  as  patronage,  extortions,  ex- 
actions, and  frauds.  It  is  by  the  use  of  money 
that  gigantic  trusts  and  corporations  obtain  the 
legislation  they  desire.  The  evil  is  greater  in 
America  and  France  than  elsewhere.  There  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  that  the  evil  is  temporary,  for  in 
England  and  Germany  municipal  and  legislative 
corruption  is  almost  unknown,  and  bribery  of  vot- 
ers is  uncommon.  The  American  people  are  at 
last  aroused  and  indignant  in  their  demand  for 
reform.  Economics  finds  in  part  its  own  cor- 
rective. The  cost  of  political  corruption  is  too 
great  to  be  endured  even  by  long-suffering  tax- 
payers. Morality  protests  against  the  protection 
of  vice  by  money.  The  majority  value  honesty 
above  gold,  and  will  in  the  end  have  cities  and 
States  well  governed  even  if  the  cost  is  increased. 

VI 

The  correction  of  those  evils  which  flow  from 
overvaluation  of  material  goods  can  be  found  only 
in  subordination  of  wealth  to  higher  values.  Dom- 
inance of  higher  standards  is  the  only  possible 
recovery  of  proportion.  Laws,  votes,  paper  Uto- 
pias, will  not  secure  adjustment  and  regeneration. 
They  are  effective  only  if  they  express  sentiments 
as  to  the  true  objects  of  life.  So  long  as  wealth  is 
the  supreme  object,  the  skillful  and  shrewd  will 
outstrip  others  in  the  race,  no  matter  what  the 
economic  system  may  be.  A  change  of  tariff  on 


354  ECONOMICS 

foreign  goods  does  not  make  rich  men  poor. 
When  it  is  once  arranged  and  known  they  adapt 
themselves  to  it  and  make  their  business  profitable. 
Let  a  socialistic  scheme  be  put  in  operation  and 
warranted  to  run  twenty  years,  and,  provided  there 
is  no  other  change  in  society,  the  men  who  are  rich 
now  will  be  rich  then.  The  only  regeneration  is  in 
the  higher  standards  of  knowledge,  science,  art, 
culture,  politics,  family-life,  and  religion.  Thus 
only  can  the  individual  be  saved  from  the  corrosion 
of  covetousness.  A  man  of  business  who  does  no 
more  than  to  make  a  study  of  the  laws  of  finance 
and  currency  as  affecting  national  prosperity  is 
the  better  for  it.  One  who  collects  pictures,  or  a 
library,  who  belongs  to  a  literary  club  or  an  histor- 
ical society,  or  is  a  member  of  a  school  committee, 
or  of  a  charitable  association,  or  engages  in  the 
work  of  a  church,  no  longer  makes  the  material 
supreme.  The  church  is  the  salvation  of  many 
business  men  by  giving  them  a  human  and  social 
interest,  quite  apart  from  its  religious  inspirations. 
In  rural  communities  it  is  about  all  there  is  to  save 
men  from  the  narrowness  of  mechanical  and  com- 
mercial pursuits.  It  has  ennobled  men  and  women 
of  all  grades  of  culture  and  in  all  occupations. 
The  agnostic  who  queried  whether  it  was  right 
for  him  to  attend  church  concluded  that  the  harm 
he  might  do  by  appearing  to  sanction  beliefs  he 
did  not  hold  was  more  than  offset  by  encouraging 
an  institution  which  rendered  good  service  to  the 
community.  Every  individual  who  has  a  keen  in- 
terest in  something  higher  than  the  material  is  so 
much  gained  to  social  regeneration.  He  is  dis- 


CORRECTION  OF  EVILS  355 

posed  to  open  those  higher  interests  to  others,  to 
bring  literature,  art,  music,  history,  science,  to  the 
whole  community  in  which  he  lives.  The  higher 
values  he  shares.  The  material  values  he  keeps. 
Unselfishness  takes  the  place  of  selfishness.  Soon 
he  is  disposed  to  make  his  wealth  a  means  of  good 
to  others.  Those  also  who  are  engaged  in  manual 
labor  can  be  saved  from  the  degeneration  of  work- 
ing for  material  good  only  by  caring  more  for 
those  higher  goods  of  knowledge,  of  the  family, 
and  of  religion  which  are  as  open  to  them  as  they 
are  to  the  rich  man.  In  sharing  such  values  dis- 
tinctions of  rich  and  poor  become  insignificant. 

To  promote  simplicity  of  personal,  household, 
and  social  life  is  to  promote  social  regeneration. 
Lavish  expenditure  on  dress,  table,  residence,  en- 
tertainment, is  a  crude  and  barbaric  display  of 
wealth.  The  social  life  suffers  when  people  vie 
with  one  another  in  costliness  of  viands  and  deco- 
rations. Those  who  have  only  moderate  or  even 
considerable  means  cannot  afford  to  entertain  on 
such  a  scale,  and  gradually  withdraw  from  society. 
To  exercise  and  enjoy  hospitality  is  a  means  of 
grace.  But  it  fails  to  gain  its  object  when  leaders 
set  the  fashion  of  extravagant  display.  The  evil 
has,  to  be  sure,  a  tendency  to  correct  itself.  There 
is  a  limit  to  physical  endurance.  The  weariness  of 
twelve-course  dinners  and  the  rebellion  of  the  di- 
gestive apparatus  may  work  a  partial  reform.  The 
social  reductio  ad  absurdum  is  a  company  of  dys- 
peptics, who  have  been  brought  to  their  bad  estate 
by  a  long  succession  of  unassimilated  feasts,  ranged 
around  a  table  to  spend  two  or  three  hours  trying 


356  ECONOMICS 

to  eat  that  for  which  they  have  no  appetite,  and 
which  will  cost  them  a  night  of  torture.  There 
can  be  simplicity  of  entertainment  without  sacrifice 
of  good  taste.  Good  taste,  indeed,  is  always  sim- 
ple. Vulgar  display  is  bad  taste.  One  of  the 
triumphs  of  civilization  is  the  elevation  of  eating 
and  drinking  to  a  social  function,  with  interchange 
of  thought  and  the  sparkle  of  humor.  But  there  is 
reversion  to  barbarism  and  almost  to  savagery 
when  a  feast  is  a  feed  at  which  men  gorge  them- 
selves. Plain  living  and  high  thinking  are  better 
than  plain  thinking  and  high  living.  Fashion  is 
dictating  simpler  and  briefer  entertainment.  It 
encourages  dinners  of  six  courses  which  can  be 
served  within  an  hour,  and  which  consist  of  good 
roast  beef  and  other  dishes  which  disclose  their 
nature  to  the  naked  eye.  This  merciful  change  is 
partly  in  the  interest  of  human  endurance,  but  is 
partly  the  recovery  of  hospitality  to  its  uses.  A 
woman  of  unlimited  wealth  determines  to  entertain 
in  such  ways  that  she  can  invite  the  clergyman,  the 
professor,  and  the  author,  with  their  wives,  and  so 
that  they  in  turn  can  invite  her  to  their  houses,  for 
unless  they  can  entertain  her,  they  cannot  with 
self-respect  continue  to  accept  her  invitations.  She 
will  not  be  deprived  of  the  society  of  the  most  in- 
teresting people  by  asking  only  her  rich  neighbors, 
but  by  simplicity  of  entertainment  will  make  it  easy 
and  pleasant  for  those  in  the  highways  and  hedges 
(that  is,  authors,  professors,  and  clergymen)  to 
come  in.  I  think,  at  least  I  hope,  I  am  not  wrong 
in  the  opinion  that  fashionable  society  is  coming 
to  stand  for  aesthetic  and  intellectual  values,  in 


CORRECTION  OF  EVILS  357 

music,  art,  and  culture  rather  than  for  mere  eating 
and  drinking. 

The  exaggerated  estimate  which  in  America 
has  been  set  upon  mere  wealth  and  its  display  is 
declining  somewhat  in  favor  of  more  correct 
standards.  Parade  and  ostentation  are  not  good 
form.  Wealth  can  no  longer  give  carte  blanche 
to  architects,  artists,  upholsterers,  caterers.  The 
ideas  and  taste  of  the  owner  must  appear  in  the 
new  house,  the  decorations,  the  furnishings,  the 
entertainments.  There  must  be  quiet  and  chaste 
effects,  with  nothing  tawdry,  showy,  and  whole- 
sale. Wealthy  people  wish  to  be  distinguished 
for  other  reasons  than  because  they  have  a  pot  of 
money.  It  is  beginning  to  be  seen  that  possession 
of  wealth  is  the  very  cheapest  distinction,  that 
universal  devotion  to  money-making  marks  the 
newness  of  a  country  and  should  be  followed  by 
better  attainments.  The  rich  man  identifies  him- 
self with  a  reform  or  charity,  is  patron  of  a  col- 
lege, is  a  collector  of  rare  books  or  etchings,  ini- 
tiates some  social  experiment  with  his  workmen, 
does  not  forget  that  his  father  was  a  professor  or 
preacher,  thinks  better  of  himself  because  his  son 
writes  a  clever  story  or  his  daughter's  water-colors 
are  on  exhibition  at  the  Academy.  All  this  is  at 
a  good  remove  from  vulgar  display. 

The  simplicity  of  taste  and  culture  for  which 
I  plead  is  not  cheap  bareness.  I  am  not  arguing 
that  money  should  be  spent  sparingly  or  not  at 
all  on  luxuries,  but  only  that  they  should  not  be 
the  luxuries  of  physical  indulgence  and  vulgar 
ostentation.  Beauty  and  luxury  are  legitimate. 


358  ECONOMICS 

Their  absence  would  be  a  lowering  of  civilization* 
and  a  loss  to  all  classes.  Subtract  from  labor  all 
those  manufactures  and  handicrafts  which  provide 
luxuries,  and  many  skilled  pursuits  would  disap- 
pear. It  is  better  that  some  individuals  should 
be  wasteful  than  that  demand  for  luxuries  should 
cease.  Increase  of  wants  is  progress.  Increase 
of  wants  and  increase  of  wealth  beget  each  other. 
The  many  live  now  as  the  few  lived  a  century 
ago.  What  was  luxury  then  is  necessity  now. 
The  wealth  which  one  expends,  perhaps  with  mis- 
giving, on  luxuries,  is  his  to  expend  only  because 
there  is  a  constant  demand  for  luxuries.  If  all 
in  the  prosperous  classes  should  devote  the  money 
now  spent  on  luxuries  to  the  direct  support  of 
charity  and  religion,  in  an  incredibly  short  time 
they  would  have  no  money  to  give,  for  they  would 
destroy  some  of  the  conditions  on  which  the  exis- 
tence of  wealth  depends.  Shall  the  church  have 
a  spire  ?  The  spire  does  not  keep  out  rain  or 
cold.  In  this  world  of  poverty,  suffering,  and 
wickedness,  why  spend  money  on  a  spire?  But 
if  the  place  where  rich  and  poor  meet  together 
should  be  beautiful,  the  home  should  be  adorned, 
and  the  life  refined.  And  so  the  question  is  not 
about  having  a  spire,  but  about  the  kind  of  spire ; 
not  about  the  enjoyment  of  luxuries,  but  about 
the  proper  enjoyment  of  luxuries.  The  precious 
vase  of  ointment  was  not  wasted,  although  it 
might  have  been  —  but  was  not  —  sold  for  three 
hundred  pence  and  given  to  the  poor. 

A  beautiful  and  attractive  home  is  a  perennial 
source   of   social  regeneration.     It  is  common  to 


CORRECTION  OF  EVILS  359 

•ascribe  the  easy  or  doubtful  morals  of  some  per- 
sons to  reaction  from  the  strict  religious  training 
of  their  childhood,  and  no  doubt  a  severity  un- 
mingled  with  gentleness  was  much  at  fault.  But 
youths  have  broken  loose  from  high  standards  of 
conduct  more  on  account  of  the  poverty  of  home 
life  on  the  side  of  beauty  and  enjoyment,  than 
by  reason  of  undue  extremes  in  religious  teaching 
and  requirements.  Homes  without  books,  with- 
out pictures,  without  comfortable  seats,  without 
amusements,  without  hospitality,  homes  distin- 
guished chiefly  for  economy  of  furnishing,  table, 
and  dress,  were  the  real  sources  of  reaction.  A 
good  deal  of  money  may  be  judiciously  invested 
in  a  roomy,  handsome  house,  ample  grounds,  taste- 
ful decorations,  profusion  of  books  and  periodi- 
cals, choice  pictures,  and  the  entertainment  of 
friends.  When  money  can  be  commanded  it  is 
immoral  to  surround  children  with  haircloth  furni- 
ture, unadorned  walls,  hideous  carpets;  to  have 
them  sit  at  table  in  silence,  meeting  no  guests, 
and  with  no  reading  but  the  daily  newspaper,  the 
denominational  weekly,  and  the  "  Farmer's  Jour- 
nal." The  other  extreme  is  equally  bad  ;  to  build 
and  furnish  a  house  only  with  a  view  to  great 
entertainments,  but  without  providing  a  cosy, 
comfortable  centre.  One  of  the  most  noticeable 
gains  of  the  last  twenty  years  is  the  improvement 
in  household  decoration.  Whereas  formerly  ugli- 
ness and  tiresome  uniformity  were  the  rule,  and 
it  was  difficult  to  find  materials  for  a  tasteful  in- 
terior, now  for  a  moderate  outlay  the  most  pleas- 
ing effects  in  form,  color,  and  combination  can 


860  ECONOMICS 

be  produced.  The  uses  of  money  to  enrich  and* 
beautify  life  are  the  uses  which  promote  the  wel- 
fare of  society.  Simplicity,  dignity,  and  beauty 
are  among  the  saving  powers  of  the  world.  They 
mean  a  higher  value  than  mere  possession  and 
display.  They  convert  wealth  into  means  of  the 
highest  good.  Wealth  becomes  the  servant  and 
not  the  master. 

The  first  and  most  important  step  in  regenera- 
tion, so  far  as  material  goods  are  concerned,  is 
right  use.  The  individual  can  at  least  control 
the  expenditure  of  his  income.  With  his  home, 
his  hospitality,  his  books,  his  culture,  and  his 
friendships,  he  can  enrich  his  own  life  and  the 
life  of  others.  The  next  step  is  to  gain  wealth  by 
methods  which  are  right,  and  which  do  not  con- 
flict with  the  rights  of  others.  The  individual 
cannot  entirely  control  the  methods  of  business. 
But,  as  the  determination  to  make  gain  rightfully 
extends  and  strengthens,  the  system  itself  will  be 
rectified.  The  intention  to  make  best  use  of  gains 
reacts  favorably  on  the  methods  of  acquisition, 
and  even  tempers  the  desire  for  wealth. 

I  have  given  a  chapter  to  material  conditions  as 
affecting  society  in  its  moral  evolution  because  the 
subject  engages  so  much  attention  at  present  and 
because  the  relation  is  so  important.  It  is  evident, 
however,  that  the  material,  as  to  gaining  and  using, 
is  only  one  of  the  forms  through  which  the  social 
ideal  is  to  be  realized.  Taken  by  itself,  it  has  car- 
ried us  directly  to  estimates  of  higher  values.  We 
have  seen  that  the  gospel  of  economics  is  one  phase 
of  the  gospel  of  the  kingdom  of  God  which  is  the 


CORRECTION  OF  EVILS  361 

true  and  complete  ideal  of  society.  And  so  the 
saying  which  expresses  the  theory  that  material 
conditions  are  the  controlling  factor  in  progress 
must  be  reversed  and  put  back  again  into  its  origi- 
nal form.  We  may  not  say,  Seek  ye  first  all  these 
things  and  the  kingdom  of  God  shall  be  added 
unto  you.  Jesus  said  truly,  "  Seek  ye  first  the 
kingdom  of  God  and  his  righteousness."  If  we 
seek  that,  not  only  will  the  material  things,  of 
which,  God  knows,  we  have  need,  be  added  unto 
us,  but  they  also  will  be  instruments  to  advance 
that  kingdom  which  is  the  divine  ideal  of  human 
society. 


CHAPTER  XIV 
SOCIAL  REGENERATION  —  INSTITUTIONS 

SOCIOLOGISTS  differ  somewhat  as  to  the  classifi- 
cation of  social  institutions.  It  is  held  that  the 
old  classification  into  Family,  State,  and  Church  is 
not  true  to  the  historical  evolution  nor  to  the  actual 
structure  of  society ;  that  the  Family  is  not  so  much 
a  distinct  institution  as  a  form  preceding  all  insti- 
tutions, and  entering  organically  into  them.  Some 
would  add  economic  to  domestic,  political,  and 
ecclesiastical  forms.  It  would  carry  us  too  far 
away  from  the  purposes  of  this  discussion  to  con- 
sider these  questions  of  classification.  For  con- 
venience, the  three  great  institutions  or  forms  of 
society  just  mentioned  may  be  chosen  as  adequate 
for  the  further  illustration  of  social  regeneration. 


First,  the  Family.  The  monogamic  family  is  an 
evolution.  The  primitive  condition  was  probably 
polygamy,  in  its  two  forms  of  polygyny,  more  than 
one  wife,  and  polyandry,  more  than  one  husband. 
The  chief  cause  of  polygyny  was  excess  of  females 
over  males,  either  by  birth-rate  or  by  reduction  in 
the  number  of  men  through  the  dangerous  occupa- 
tions of  hunting,  fishing,  and  warfare.  The  chief 
cause  of  polyandry  was  excess  of  males  over  fe- 
males, either  by  birth-rate,  or  by  female  infanticide, 


THE  FAMILY  363 

or  by  migrations  in  which  there  were  fewer  women 
than  men.  In  a  tribe,  the  power  of  the  chief  gave 
him  numerous  wives,  but  in  that  case  other  mem- 
bers of  the  tribe  might  have  only  one  wife,  or  even 
none.  The  capture  of  women  in  war  increased  the 
number  of  wives,  but  men  in  conquered  tribes  would 
then  have  fewer  wives.  The  approximate  numeri- 
cal equality  of  the  sexes  limits  polygamy.  The 
average  number  •  of  wives  or  husbands  must  be 
determined  in  the  long  run  by  the  proportion  of 
males  and  females. 

Various  causes  tend  to  monogamy.  The  numer- 
ical proportion  of  the  sexes  is  one  cause.  The 
change  from  hunting  to  agriculture,  from  a  no- 
madic life  to  a  permanent  abode,  is  another  cause. 
The  prolonged  period  of  infancy,  love  of  children, 
and  jealousy  are  causes.  Professor  Drummond, 
in  his  account  of  the  evolution  of  the  mother  and 
the  evolution  of  the  father,  shows,  somewhat  ideally, 
yet  on  a  sufficient  basis  of  fact,  the  evolution  of 
the  monogamic  family.  While  material  and  politi- 
cal interests  affected  this  development,  it  has  been, 
on  the  whole,  a  moral  evolution.  Limited  poly- 
gamy was  a  great  moral  factor  in  social  progress. 
At  every  period  the  status  of  the  family  marks  the 
moral  condition,  either  degenerate  or  progressive. 

The  theory  that  the  original  relation  of  men  and 
women  was  promiscuity  lacks  evidence.  Affection, 
property-right  in  women,  and  jealousy  would  not 
allow  common  possession  of  women.  Even  in  ani- 
mal societies,  there  is  mating  and  pairing  rather 
than  promiscuous  relations.  Neither  do  facts  sup- 
port the  theory.  Temporary  changing  or  loaning 


364  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS' 

of  wives  is  low  morality,  but  is  not  promiscuity, 
for  ownership  is  not  relinquished.  And,  in  cases 
where  there  is  no  claim  to  possession,  there  has 
been  degeneration  from  previous  polygamy  or  even 
monogamy.1 

At  all  events,  whatever  in  the  relation  of  the 
sexes  and  in  reproduction  is  worthy  the  name  of 
progress  is  towards  the  type  of  the  monogamic 
family,  the  union  of  one  man  with  one  woman  for 
life.  The  strong  civilizations  developed  that  type. 
Long  before  the  time  of  Christ,  the  Jews  had 
abandoned  polygamy.  There  were  many  evasions 
of  law.  It  was  easy  for  a  man  to  put  away  his 
wife.  But  the  wife  had  her  rights.  She  was  en- 
titled to  a  bill  of  divorcement.  And  a  man  could 
have  only  one  wife  at  a  time.  Among  the  Greeks 
and  Romans,  the  wife  was  distinguished  from  the 
mistress,  although,  to  be  sure,  the  mistress  was 
often  the  more  cultivated  and  influential  woman. 
Yet,  in  the  time  of  the  worst  sexual  immorality, 
the  monogamic  family  was  the  ideal,  and  did  not 
lack  beautiful  illustrations.  At  the  present  time, 
no  other  family  is  recognized  either  by  law  or  pub- 
lic sentiment.  In  all  civilized  countries,  sexual 
relations  outside  the  marriage  of  one  man  to  one 
woman  are  regarded  as  illegal  and  immoral.  Civ- 
ilization and  progress  rest  upon  the  preservation 
and  purity  of  the  monogamic  family. 

There  is  a  marked,  and,  as  some  think,  an  alarm- 
ing tendencyto  degeneration  in  the  modern  family. 
The  outward  sign  of  retrogression  is  frequency  of 
divorce,  which  in  some  States  of  the  American 

1  The  History  of  Human  Marriage.     By  Edward  Westermarck. 


THE  FAMILY  365 

Union  is  as  high  as  ten  per  centum  of  the  mar- 
riages each  year,  and  in  no  State  is  less  than  three 
per  centum,  except  South  Carolina,  which  does  not 
permit  divorce.  Wherever  law  is  relaxed  divorces 
increase,  as  in  Germany  and  Scandinavia.  An- 
other sign  of  degeneration  is  the  extent  of  sexual 
immorality  on  the  part  of  married  men.  It  is  al- 
leged that  the  large  majority  of  those  who  keep 
mistresses  and  support  houses  of  ill-fame  are  hus- 
bands. It  is  also  alleged  that  many  wives  ignore 
or  are  even  indifferent  to  such  license,  from  aver- 
sion to  bearing  and  rearing  children,  which  would 
interfere  with  their  life  of  fashion  and  pleasure. 
The  city  is  unfavorable  to  domestic  life.  At  the 
upper  end  are  the  demands  of  society  and  business, 
with  the  relegation  of  children  to  maids  and  gov- 
ernesses, and  early  banishment  to  boarding-schools 
and  academies.  At  the  lower  end  are  small  and 
squalid  tenements,  frequent  change  of  abode,  work 
of  women  and  children  in  factories  and  shops,  the 
trade-union  meeting,  the  engine  company,  the  regi- 
ment, the  lodge,  the  saloon.  Domestic  life  is  re- 
duced to  two  hasty  meals  at  the  same  table  and 
not  always  so  much  as  that,  and  sleeping  a  number 
of  hours  under  the  same  ceiling  or  in  the  same 
room.  At  the  upper  end  are  marriages  of  con- 
venience (convenance)  without  affection.  At  the 
lower  end  are  marriages  of  impulse,  passion,  and 
improvidence.  All  over  America  and  England,  in 
city  and  country,  workingmen  meet  in  clubs,  asso- 
ciations, and  saloons,  where  they  do  not  take  their 
wives  and  children.  Residents  in  university  set- 
tlements regard  it  as  one  of  the  most  discouraging 


366  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

facts  in  the  habits  of  the  average  workingman 
that  he  is  ashamed  to  be  seen  in  any  public  place 
with  his  family.  The  Continental  beer-garden  has 
at  least  one  redeeming  feature ;  fathers,  mothers, 
and  children  are  found  there  together.  I  need  not 
indicate  in  detail  the  evils  which  threaten  the 
family  and  the  home.  It  is  evident  that  the  purity 
and  happiness  of  the  home  are  of  the  first  import- 
ance to  the  welfare  of  society.  Where  there  is 
contented  domestic  life  in  millions  of  homes  nearly 
all  social  evils  are  absent.  While  all  things  hold 
together  and  the  bad  estate  of  the  family  is  due  in 
part  to  untoward  circumstances,  still  the  home  is  a 
cause  as  much  as  it  is  an  effect  amongst  social  con- 
ditions. 

A  direct  work  to  be  done  is  in  respect  to  laws 
of  marriage  and  divorce.  There  is  no  doubt  that 
facility  of  legal  divorce  makes  the  family  insecure  ; 
that,  if  the  causes  were  reduced  and  investigations 
were  more  careful,  quarrels  would  be  composed  or 
would  not  arise,  and  there  would  be  fewer  ill  as- 
sorted and  hasty  marriages.  This  is  an  instance  in 
which  law  may  do  much  for  morals  and  happiness. 
There  will  probably  be,  in  the  United  States,  in- 
creasing strength  to  the  reaction  against  frequent 
divorce,  and  a  nearer  uniformity  in  the  laws  of  the 
several  States. 

Indirectly,  the  value  of  the  family  and  home  are 
enhanced  by  those  sentiments  which  exalt  other 
interests  above  wealth,  which  favor  marriages  of 
affinity  in  tastes,  character,  and  affections,  and 
which  discourage  marriages  for  money  and  position. 
Indirectly,  also,  whatever  improves  the  condition 


THE  FAMILY  367 

of  laborers  and  of  the  poor,  whatever  gives  more 
permanence  to  residence,  more  comfortable  dwell- 
ings, better  education,  healthful  and  innocent 
amusements,  promotes  the  welfare  of  the  family. 
Children  in  happy  homes  are  not  only  hostages  to 
fortune  ;  they  are  hostages  to  all  the  best  interests 
of  society. 

A  returning  current  of  population  to  the  country 
would  be  favorable  to  the  home.  Whether  it  is 
true  or  not  that  life  in  remote  rural  districts  is 
healthier  or  more  natural  than  in  the  cities,  —  a 
question  I  will  not  introduce,  —  a  reflux  from  the 
crowded,  noisy  city  to  the  suburbs  is  decidedly 
advantageous  to  families  of  small  or  moderate 
means.  The  privileges  of  the  city,  and  the  quiet, 
the  healthf  ulness,  and  the  open  spaces  of  the  coun- 
try are  combined.  This  movement  of  population  is 
facilitated  by  the  electric  railway  and  the  bicycle, 
and  will  doubtless  be  promoted  by  other  means  of 
rapid  transit.  There  is  a  natural  limit  to  the  num- 
bers of  people  who  live  in  cities  in  proportion  to 
those  who  live  in  the  country.  That  limit  is  not 
yet  reached.  But  it  will  be  found,  sooner  or  later. 
The  United  States  will  always  be,  to  a  great  ex- 
tent, an  agricultural  country,  and  perhaps  t9  a 
larger  extent  in  the  future  than  in  the  past.  Pros- 
perity depends  chiefly  on  the  crops.  One  year's 
yield  of  corn  makes  the  difference  between  hard 
times  and  good  times.  Farmers,  on  the  whole,  are 
more  prosperous  than  other  classes.  So  far  as  the 
rural  and  suburban  population  increases,  so  far 
will  the  home  retain  and  regain  its  importance. 
But  there  is  no  reason,  in  the  nature  of  the  case, 


368  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

why  towns  and  cities  should  be  unfavorable  to  the 
home.  It  may  be  expected  that  over-crowding  and 
unsanitary  conditions  will  be  prevented,  and  that 
the  decided  advantages  of  the  city  will  promote 
rather  than  hinder  the  domestic  life. 

The  home  is  the  ideal  society  in  miniature.  It 
is  under  the  law  of  reciprocal  service.  Each  has 
his  right  and  his  duty.  The  strong  serve  the  weak. 
The  baby,  not  the  strong  man,  is  on  the  throne. 
One  who,  when  full-grown,  demands  service,  re- 
verses the  order  of  nature  and  of  love,  and  is  con- 
temptuously called  a  great  baby.  To  maintain  a 
true  home,  to  be  charged  with  the  nurture  and 
education_oj_children,jto  engage  as  husband,  wife, 
father,  mother,  child,  brother,  sister,  in  services 
of  mutual  helpfulness  which  are  expressions~ot 
mutual  love,  is  to  bear  a  large  part  in  social  regejT- 
eration.  The  family  is  one  of  the  most  important 
organs  of  the  kingdom  of  God. 

II 

The  State.  Like  the  family,  the  State  promotes 
and  is  promoted  by  social  progress.  It  is  an 
organ  of  social  regeneration  and  is  itself  to  be  con- 
stantly regenerated.  By  the  State  is  meant  the 
political  organization,  having  a  constitution  and 
laws.  It  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  Nation, 
which,  as  defined  by  Professor  John  W.  Burgess, 
is  "a  population  of  an  ethnic  unity  inhabiting  a 
territory  of  a  geographic  unity." 1  Such  a  terri- 
tory is  one  bounded  naturally  by  the  mountains  or 
the  sea.  This  unity  is  modified  as  a  nation  spreads 

1  Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  vol.  i.,  p.  1. 


THE  STATE  369 

beyond  natural  geographical  boundaries,  and  as  a 
dominant  race  assimilates  other  races.  The  Eng- 
lish nation  includes  the  American  States.  The 
German  nation  includes  the  German  and  Austrian 
empires.  The  State  is  the  political  organization 
having  a  constitution  and  laws  and  ordaining  the 
particular  form  of  government.  Thus  there  are 
two  English  States,  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  to  which,  practically,  Australia  may  be 
added  as  a  third.  There  are  two  German  States, 
the  German  and  the  Austro-Hungarian  empires. 
I  note  the  distinction  between  State  and  Nation 
because  I  am  to  consider  only  the  political  institu- 
tion and  not  the  great  national  and  racial  types  of 
civilization.  The  origin  and  historical  evolution  of 
the  State  I  do  not  attempt  to  trace.  How  far  it 
was  developed  from  the  family,  how  far  by  a  con- 
flict between  the  powers  and  rights  of  different 
classes,  how  far  by  convention,  it  is  aside  from  our 
present  object  to  inquire. 

The  evolution  of  the  modern  State  is  distinctly 
towards  democracy,  that  is,  towards  self-govern- 
ment by  the  people.  The  power  of  aristocracy 
is  reduced ;  the  power  of  the  people  is  enlarged. 
There  are,  at  present,  but  two  forms  of  govern- 
ment ;  a  division  of  political  power  between  an  aris- 
tocracy and  the  people,  that  is,  a  partial  democracy, 
and  government  of  the  people  by  the  people  and 
for  the  people,  that  is,  a  complete  democracy. 
There  are  no  monarchies,  except  in  name.  The 
king  or  emperor  shares  power  with  an  hereditary 
nobility,  and  their  power  is  shared  with  represen- 
tatives of  the  people.  The  king  and  nobility 


370  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

constitute  an  aristocracy  or  oligarchy,  so  that 
aristocracy  and  democracy  combined,  or  demo- 
cracy alone,  are  the  only  forms  of  the  modern 
State.  Every  permanent  change  in  a  partial 
democracy  is  some  transfer  of  power  from  the 
aristocracy  to  the  people.  This  movement  is  a 
true  evolution,  for  it  is  a  movement  in  the  line  of 
progress  and  improvement.  There  are,  to  be  sure, 
some  advantages  in  a  political  aristocracy,  and 
some  disadvantages  and  dangers  in  a  pure  demo- 
cracy. But  the  advantage  which  tips  the  scale  is 
in  favor  of  democracy.  The  danger  of  despotism 
in  a  democracy,  the  danger  that  one  man  will 
gather  absolute  power  into  his  own  hands,  is  inap- 
preciable. That  has  been  possible  only  when  the 
people  were  ignorant,  and  war  was  necessary  to 
the  existence  of  the  State  and  the  extension  of  her 
domain  :  as  in  Rome,  when  the  only  change  was  a 
change  of  name  from  king  to  consul ;  or  as  in 
France  under  Napoleon,  when  the  people  were  in 
dense  ignorance,  knew  nothing  of  self-government, 
expected  glory  from  war,  and  were  surrounded 
with  enemies.  But  in  a  real  democracy,  the 
checks  and  counter-influences  which  exist  make  a 
despotism  impossible.  In  America,  the  traditions 
of  independence,  the  sensitiveness  to  infringement 
of  individual  liberty,  the  jealous  guarding  of  legal 
and  civil  equality,  the  high  average  of  intelligence, 
the  local  distribution  of  government  in  States, 
cities,  and  towns,  make  it  almost  impossible  for 
any  man  to  centralize  power  in  his  own  hands. 
Add  to  these  influences  the  mutual  watchfulness 
of  political  parties,  the  diffusion  of  information 


THE  STATE  371 

through  the  press,  the  predominance  of  industrial 
interests,  the  strengthening  of  international  com- 
ity, and  it  is  seen  that  the  danger  of  centralization 
of  power  in  one  man  or  in  a  few  men  is  scarcely 
worth  considering. 

Fear  of  an  aristocracy  of  wealth  is  better 
grounded.  The  concentration  of  wealth  in  a  few 
hands  gives  power  more  enormous  than  that  of 
kings.  In  America,  local  legislatures  can  be  cor- 
rupted by  railway  magnates  and  owners  of  mono- 
polies, and  through  the  legislatures,  which  elect 
the  national  Senate,  the  general  government  can 
be  controlled.  Yet,  on  the  whole,  democracy  is 
more  likely  to  check  this  tendency  than  to  be  over- 
come by  it.  The  people  are  watchful  and  alive  to 
the  danger.  Legislation  may  be  thwarted  for  a 
time,  but  will  be  effectual  in  the  end.  The  power 
of  taxation  is  almost  unlimited.  In  fact,  there  is 
more  danger  that  legislation  will  place  weights  too 
heavy  for  legitimate  enterprise  to  carry  than  that 
an  aristocracy  of  wealth  will  take  political  power 
away  from  the  people. 

As  to  the  tone  of  morals  and  the  manners  of 
people  under  the  two  kinds  of  government,  it  is  so 
difficult  to  make  comparison,  except  by  a  careful 
examination  of  social  as  well  as  political  conditions, 
that  I  do  not  even  attempt  it.  Amongst  the  mem- 
bers of  an  aristocratic  class,  the  code  of  morality 
may  be  high,  but  the  relation  of  superiors  to  in- 
feriors unjust  and  debasing  to  both.  In  a  demo- 
cracy, the  restraining  influence  of  a  class  to  which 
one  belongs  is  wanting,  but  there  is  more  regard 
for  the  rights  of  every  individual.  In  an  aristo- 


372  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

cracy  there  is  more  civility  of  manners  than  in  a 
democracy,  but  the  servile  deference  of  inferiors  is 
worse  than  the  independence  which,  in  a  demo- 
cracy, sometimes  asserts  itself  in  an  unmannerly 
way.  At  all  events  democracy  has  come  to  stay. 
It  may  be  held  as  a  political  axiom  that  democra- 
cies do  not  go  backward.  Progress  must  proceed, 
not  by  reversion  to  aristocratic  government  and 
recovery  of  its  shorn  power,  but  by  the  intelli- 
gence and  honesty  of  the  people  who  have  taken 
and  are  taking  government  into  their  own  hands.1 
The  State  is  a  moral  institution.  Its  principal 
functions  are  moral.  It  has  been  called  the  in- 
stitute of  rights.  It  executes  justice.  Justice  per- 
tains to  rights,  and  the  State  administering  justice 
may  be  regarded  as  protecting  the  rights  of  all. 
It  does  not  cover  the  entire  field  of  morals,  but 
only  outward  acts  which  can  be  brought  under  uni- 
form rules.  It  does  not  punish  falsehood  as  such, 
but  does  annul  contracts  obtained  by  fraudulent 
means,  and  assesses  pecuniary  damages.  Among 
the  rights  conserved  by  the  State  are  the  rights  of 
life,  liberty,  and  property.  The  right  to  life  is  the 
right  of  existence,  a  natural  right  guarded  by  the 
State.  It  includes  the  right  to  the  use  of  one's 
self,  his  body,  his  limbs,  his  senses,  and  as  some 
hold,  the  rights  of  reputation,  that  is,  the  rights  of 
worth  and  character.  These  rights  are  inaliena- 
ble as  against  other  persons,  and  yield  only  for  the 
preservation  of  the  State  when  life  may  be  risked 
and  lost,  or  for  crime  which  is  the  forfeiture  of  per- 
sonal rights.  Liberty  is  the  right  of  external  f  ree- 

1  Civilization  and  Progress,  310-366. 


dom,  to  go  about  as  one  will,  not  to  be  hindered  in 
his  occiipation  and  not  to  be  debarred  from  enter- 
ing any  pursuit  on  the  same  conditions  with  others. 
The  right  of  property  is  the  natural  right  of  man. 
The  earth  is  his.  As  a  citizen  he  has  right  in  the 
territory  of  the  State.  As  the  land  is  the  ultimate 
means  of  subsistence,  it  belongs  to  the  people. 
How  much  any  individual  may  possess  and  for 
how  long  a  time  he  may  hold  it  is  determined  by 
law.  Whatever  the  law  may  be,  the  State  is  bound 
to  defend  the  rights  of  property  under  it,  to  defend 
contracts,  sales,  transfers,  use.  The  State  is  also 
bound  to  establish  rights  of  property  according  to 
justice,  according  to  the  welfare  of  the  nation.  If 
land  and  improvements  on  land  have  been  secured 
under  certain  laws,  and  the  laws  are  changed  so 
that  the  State  acquires  possession  or  corporations 
are  authorized  to  take  the  property,  just  compen- 
sation must  be  made.  The  use  of  property  must 
be  the  means  of  advancing  the  welfare  and  moral 
order  of  the  people,  and  so  existing  tenure  may  be 
changed.  The  moral  order  coincides  with  the  eco- 
nomic order,  and  the  particular  laws  of  property 
should  be  on  a  sound  economic  basis.  But  all 
must  have  equal  rights  under  the  same  conditions. 
Rights  carry  corresponding  duties  which  are  en- 
forced by  law;  such  as  defense  of  country,  aid 
in  an  arrest,  giving  testimony  to  a  crime.  Some 
duties,  such  as  voting,  are  not  usually  enforced 
by  law  but  are  treated  as  rights.  Laws  enacted 
by  majority  of  votes  may,  however,  be  enforced  by 
compelled  service  of  any  citizen.  The  justice  en- 
forced by  the  State  in  rights  and  duties  is  equal- 


874  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

ity.  However  unequal  men  may  be  in  ability  and 
possessions,  as  citizens  they  are  equal  in  all  legal 
and  political  rights.  The  symbols  of  justice  are 
therefore  the  poised  scales  of  equality,  and  the 
blindfolded  eye  which  sees  neither  class,  nor  rank, 
nor  birth.  The  extension  of  democracy  is  a  moral 
extension  which  should  include  all  the  people  in 
political  rights  and  duties.  The  regeneration  of 
democracy  is  in  high  standards  of  justice  and  in 
impartiality.  That  much  remains  to  be  done  is 
evident.  There  may  be  favoritism  towards  man- 
ual laborers  as  well  as  towards  employers  of  labor. 
To  every  man  his  right  and  from  every  man  his 
duty,  is  the  principle  of  good  government. 

The  State  is  also  the  guardian  of  morality.  The 
family  is  under  the  guardianship  of  the  State,  not 
only  as  to  support  of  wife  and  children  and  inheri- 
tance of  property,  but  also  as  to  purity.  Marriage 
is  legalized  by  the  State,  and  so  made  secure.  The 
religious  sanctions  of  marriage  are  recognized  by 
the  State,  so  that  there  may  be  every  possible 
safeguard.  Causes  of  divorce  are  limited  by  law. 
Houses  of  ill-fame  are  not  licensed,  or,  where  a  lim- 
ited number  is  allowed,  as  in  some  European  coun- 
tries, the  alleged  reason  is  avoidance  of  contagious 
disease  and  restriction  of  vice.  The  intimate  de- 
pendence of  State  and  family  is  beautifully  illus- 
trated in  Goethe's  "  Hermann  and  Dorothea,"  a 
story  of  the  betrothal  of  two  lovers  of  different 
nationalities  who  were  thrown  together  by  acci- 
dent amidst  the  horrors  of  war.  The  State  is  pre- 
served in  the  founding  of  new  families.  The  State 
regulates  the  sale  of  liquor,  forbids  gambling  and 


THE  CHURCH  375 

lotteries,  and  in  a  hundred  ways  is  the  guardian  of 
morality.  The  State  also  protects  religion  by  se- 
curing its  public  observances  from  interruption,  by 
protecting  Sunday  from  encroachments  of  industry, 
by  defense  of  personal  liberty  in  religious  opinion, 
and  in  other  ways,  on  the  ground  that  religion 
encourages  morality.  The  intimate  dependence 
of  State,  church,  and  family  is  suggested  in  the 
old  war-cry  when  men  were  battling  in  defense  of 
country :  "  For  our  altars  and  firesides." 

in 

The  Church.  The  church  is  a  social  institution 
and  a  means  of  social  regeneration.  It  has  been 
aptly  called  the  institute  of  humanity.  It  is  not 
the  kingdom  of  God,  but  one  of  the  organs  of  the 
kingdom  of  God.  The  kingdom  comes  in  all  puri- 
fication of  life  and  progress  of  society,  in  business, 
culture,  art,  civilization,  in  the  family  and  in  the 
State,  which  are  also,  each  in  its  own  function, 
organs  of  the  kingdom.  The  church  is  the  organ 
which  most  directly  promotes  that  kingdom,  as 
having  to  do  with  the  worship  of  God  and  with 
the  service  of  humanity,  which  is  the  child  of  God. 
The  church  aims  at  complete  and  universal  regen- 
eration ;  complete  for  the  individual,  universal  for 
all  humanity.  The  entire  moral  life  and  character 
of  the  individual  is  cultivated  by  the  church, 
since  religion  includes  all  aims,  motives,  and  con- 
duct. The  State  controls  only  certain  outward 
acts  in  civil  and  political  relations.  Family  nur- 
ture is  confined  to  nonage,  and  the  members  pass 
from  parental  authority  to  freedom  of  personal 


376  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

affection.  The  church,  as  the  minister  of  religion, 
includes  the  entire  moral  culture  of  the  individual 
and  the  whole  period  of  life.  Personal  regenera- 
tion and  perfection  involve  social  regeneration  in 
the  organic  life  of  the  church.  Individuals  are 
not  isolated  but  constitute  an  organism.  In 
principle  the  church  is  universal,  including  all 
individuals.  It  is  not  limited  by  nationality,  race, 
nor  class.  Any  particular  branch  of  the  church, 
even  if  it  is  a  national  church,  is,  in  principle, 
cosmopolitan  in  its  membership.  Any  church  may 
and  under  some  circumstances  should  receive  to 
its  communion  a  person  of  any  nationality.  Con- 
gress may  forbid  the  immigration  of  Chinese,  but 
there  would  be  universal  consternation  if  by  act  of 
Congress  churches  should  be  forbidden  to  receive 
a  Chinaman  to  membership.  In  the  Southern 
States  slaves  were  members  of  the  churches  to 
which  their  masters  belonged.  The  early  church, 
from  the  first  moment,  was  universal.  It  actually 
included  Gentiles  and  Jews,  women  and  men, 
slaves  and  masters.  Philemon  had  legal  ownership 
of  Onesimus,  but  was  urged  by  Paul  to  treat  the 
slave  as  a  brother  who  like  his  owner  belonged  to 
the  one  master,  who  had  purchased  both  with  his 
own  blood.  The  early  church  was  the  first  inter- 
national institution.  However  narrow  it  may  have 
become  in  practice,  it  has  always  in  theory  been 
cosmopolitan.  Without  the  actual  church  as  a 
living  embodiment  'of  the  universal  society  the 
ideal  of  that  society  might  have  faded  from  men's 
minds.  That  organization,  perpetuated  through 
the  centuries  of  despotism,  of  feudalism,  of  national 


THE  CHURCH  377 

wars,  of  political  revolutions,  has  been  a  silent 
or  indignant  protest  against  the  antagonism  of 
races  and  classes.  In  the  darkest  days  of  its 
own  corruption  it  has  been  a  humane  institution, 
and  has  been  self-reforming  by  virtue  of  its  own 
principle  of  universal  brotherhood.  Every  local 
church  has  the  world  for  its  field,  and,  even  if  it 
is  not  actually  gospeling  in  every  land,  has  vital 
concern  in  the  universal  extension  of  the  gospel. 
Foreign  missions  are  a  standing  reminder  that 
Christianity  is  the  religion  of  humanity.  The 
church,  more  than  commerce,  binds  the  nations 
together.  The  Christian  church  is  the  best  ally, 
as  it  was  the  precursor,  of  democracy.  The  uni- 
versality is  definitely  expressed  in  the  name  as- 
sumed or  in  the  creed  recited.  The  church  is 
not  the  English,  or  American,  or  Greek,  or  Ko- 
man  church.  It  is  the  Holy  Catholic  Church. 
The  first  word  of  the  creed  expresses  belief  in  God 
the  Father  Almighty,  whose  children  therefore 
all  men  are.  The  Fatherhood  of  God  implies 
the  brotherhood  of  men.  Spontaneously  from  the 
beginning  Christians  call  one  another  brethren. 
Beside  this  principle  of  universal  brotherhood  dif- 
ferences of  Protestant  and  Catholic  polity  diminish 
into  insignificance.  The  one  may  exalt  the  organ- 
ization above  the  individual,  giving  the  society 
authority  over  the  person.  The  other  may  subordi- 
nate the  organization  to  the  individual,  exalting  pri- 
vate judgment.  The  one  may  regard  salvation  as 
flowing  to  the  person  only  through  the  church,  ac- 
cording to  the  maxim  :  Ubi  Ecclesia  ibi  Spiritus. 
The  other  may  regard  the  church  as  the  result  of 


378  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

personal  faith,  as  the  company  of  believers,  accord- 
ing to  the  maxim :  Ubi  Spiritus,  ibi  Ecclesia. 
The  one  may  lean  too  heavily  on  the  organiza- 
tion. The  other  may  encourage  excessive  individ- 
ualism. Each  may  need  to  be  corrected  by  the 
other.  But  in  either  case,  the  church  is  the  soci- 
ety of  universal  brotherhood,  the  institute  of  hu- 
manity. 

The  church  is  under  the  law  of  service  accord- 
ing to  the  needs  of  men  on  the  one  hand  and 
ability  on  the  other  hand.  To  the  question,  Who 
is  my  neighbor,  the  answer  is  given  not  by  locality, 
nor  by  affinity  of  class,  nation,  or  culture,  but  by 
sympathy.  A  neighbor  is  one,  wherever  he  is,  and 
whoever  he  is,  who  needs  what  I  can  give,  or  can 
give  what  I  need.  The  church  enlists  strength  in 
the  service  of  weakness,  wisdom  in  the  service  of 
ignorance,  fortune  in  the  service  of  misfortune, 
the  saved  in  search  of  the  lost.  The  State  stands 
chiefly  for  the  protection  of  rights  on  the  basis  of 
justice.  The  church  stands  for  the  discharge  of 
duties  on  the  basis  of  love.  The  family  is  under 
the  law  of  service  by  an  impulse  of  nature,  within 
a  limited  circle,  and  too  often  blindly  and  indul- 
gently. The  church  is  under  the  law  of  service 
in  freedom  and  intelligence,  according  to  the  worth 
and  need  of  men,  and  independent  of  artificial  limi- 
tations. In  scope,  extensively,  it  is  wider  than  the 
family  and  the  State.  In  realization  of  the  per- 
sonal and  social  ideal,  intensively,  it  includes  the 
entire  life  of  human  perfection. 


RELATION  OF  INSTITUTIONS          379 

IV 

The  relations  of  the  church  to  the  family  and 
State  should  be  noticed.  The  church  promotes 
the  welfare  of  the  family  by  insistence  on  personal 
purity.  It  strictly  forbids  those  vices  which  de- 
stroy the  family.  It  consents  to  the  disruption  of 
marriage  only  for  those  causes  which  in  the  nature 
of  the  case  destroy  marriage.  Some  branches  of 
the  church  recognize  but  one  cause  of  div6rce.  In 
States  which  legalize  divorce  for  numerous  causes 
every  branch  of  the  church  maintains  a  higher 
standard.  The  hope  of  legal  restriction  is  based 
chiefly  on  the  social  sentiment  which  the  church 
fosters.  The  formal  religious  sanction  of  marriage 
expresses  the  value  of  conjugal  fidelity  and  domes- 
tic affection.  In  this  respect  alone  the  church  is 
a  valuable  ally  of  civilization.  The  moral  and  re- 
ligious nurture  of  children  is  explicitly  directed  for 
the  home  and  in  some  measure  undertaken  by  the 
church.  In  turn  the  family  promotes  the  power 
of  the  church  by  infusion  of  young,  pure  life  from 
Christian  households  and  by  the  training  of  youth 
in  the  more  personal  and  intimate  life  of  the  home 
under  the  law  of  service  which  is  common  to  the 
family  and  the  church,  and  which  in  the  church  is 
applied  in  all  relations  of  society.  Even  if  it  could 
be  truthfully  alleged  that  the  church  has  at  times 
been  somewhat  indifferent  to  civic  duties,  it  cannot 
be  affirmed  that  marriage  and  the  home  have  ever 
failed  of  the  sanction  of  the  church.  When  celi- 
bacy has  been  regarded  as  a  superior  condition, 
the  purity  of  the  home  has  been  held  sacred,  and 


380  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

violation  of  its  fundamental  law  has  been  severely 
condemned.  The  disparagement  of  marriage  was 
in  the  supposed  interest  of  purity.  The  Protes- 
tant Reformation  was  self-reform  of  the  church 
almost  as  much  to  honor  the  family  as  to  maintain 
the  freedom  of  the  Christian  man. 

The  church  promotes  the  moral  welfare  of  the 
State.  As  already  observed,  democracy  is  chiefly 
indebted  to  the  church  for  existence  and  extension. 
Besides  that,  the  very  presence  of  the  church  in 
all  communities,  its  appearance  in  every  new  settle- 
ment, perpetuating  the  best  traditions  and  associa- 
tions of  the  old  home,  means  order  and  good 
citizenship.  The  religious  beliefs  of  great  numbers 
of  citizens  ensure  honesty  and  purity  in  social  life. 
The  general  observance  of  Sunday,  which  would 
languish  were  it  not  for  the  church,  is  of '  inesti- 
mable importance  to  all  classes  of  people.  Its 
value  is  not  measured  by  actual  attendance  on  re- 
ligious services.  It  is  thought  that  the  churches 
are  losing  their  hold  on  the  people  because  many 
do  not  attend  religious  services  regularly.  There 
has  doubtless  been  a  change  since  the  Puritan 
period.  And  yet  the  number  who  never  attend  nor 
care  to  attend  public  worship  is  not  as  large  as 
sometimes  represented.  After  deducting  young 
children,  the  sick  and  aged  with  those  who  care 
for  them,  and  those  who  attend  occasionally,  the  re- 
maining fraction  is  probably  small.  But  however 
that  may  be,  and  whatever  the  reasons  for  the 
failure  of  the  church  to  attract,  it  is  seldom  argued 
that  non-attendance  is  good  for  people.  It  is  taken 
for  granted  that  it  is  bad  for  them.  The  church 


RELATION  OF  INSTITUTIONS          381 

is  commended  for  efforts  to  bring  all  the  people 
under  its  influence.  Neither  the  church  nor  work- 
ingmen  will  consent  to  encroachments,  for  purposes 
of  gain,  upon  the  seventh  day  of  rest.  It  should 
also  be  remembered  that  nearly  all  the  money  given 
for  the  support  of  philanthropic  and  charitable 
enterprises  is  contributed  by  those  who  also  support 
the  churches,  and  thus  the  State  is  heavily  indebted 
to  the  church. 

It  may  be  added  here  that  in  America  the 
church  is  the  chief  influence  to  raise  life  above  the 
prosaic  and  sordid.  We  have  scarcely  any  historic 
monuments,  and  very  little  that  is  artistic,  except  in 
the  largest  cities,  and  none  too  much  there.  En- 
ergy is  absorbed  in  business  and  work.  Religion, 
keeping  alive  reverence,  awe,  and  sense  of  mystery, 
holding  up  noble  ideals  of  personal  and  social  life, 
elevates  men  and  women  above  sordid  narrowness. 
It  is  a  serious  question,  in  view  of  the  considera- 
tions mentioned,  whether  stability  of  national  life 
in  a  democracy  would  be  secure  without  the  influ- 
ence of  religious  beliefs,  without  the  morality  which 
is  promoted  by  the  influence  of  the  church,  without 
the  Christian  law  which  enthrones  service  in  place 
of  covetous  selfishness. 

The  State,  also,  as  we  have  seen,  renders  service 
to  the  church  by  defense  of  the  equal  rights  of  all, 
by  protection  of  the  church  in  its  observances,  by 
legalizing  Sunday  as  a  day  of  rest  and  worship, 
and  by  various  recognitions  of  Christianity,  such 
as  religious  oaths,  prayer  at  the  opening  of  courts 
and  Congress,  sanctioning  clergymen  to  solemnize 
marriage,  and  other  customs. 


382  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

Social  regeneration  proceeds  as  the  church  is 
true  to  Christianity.  If  it  becomes  narrow,  divi- 
sive, formal,  if  it  substitutes  observance  for  char- 
acter and  humaneness,  it  needs  to  be  recovered  to 
its  true  function  as  an  organ  of  the  kingdom  of 
God,  which  is  the  social  ideal  of  the  brotherhood 
of  men  who  are  children  of  God. 


Besides  the  general  relations  of  church  and 
State,  they  are  in  specific  relation  as  organizations. 
There  are  three  possible  relations;  the  church 
subordinate  to  the  State,  the  State  subordinate  to 
the  church,  the  church  and  the  State  independ- 
ent of  each  other. 

The  first  relation  existed  in  the  time  of  Constan- 
tine,  who  summoned  the  bishops  to  Nicaea  in  the 
hope  of  uniting  the  factions  of  the  church.  The 
experiment  was  repeated  at  the  time  of  the  Ref- 
ormation in  England,  where  the  church  was  es- 
tablished, endowed,  and  supported  from  the  public 
revenues,  and  important  ecclesiastical  appointments 
vested  in  the  crown.  The  Czar  of  Russia  is  head 
of  the  church. 

The  second  relation,  the  subordination  of  State 
to  church,  was  the  scheme  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire.  The  Pope  enthroned  and  dethroned  mon- 
archs,  dissolved  royal  marriages,  and  received  tri- 
bute from  many  kingdoms.  The  kingdoms  of  this 
world  seemed  to  have  become  the  kingdom  of 
Christ.  History  is  stained  with  the  record  of  wars 
and  revolutions  that  followed.  The  Roman  Church 
has  to-day  scarcely  a  vestige  of  temporal  power, 


CHURCH  AND  STATE  383 

although  she  desires  it  in  some  of  the  Italian  States. 
Calvin  attempted  to  bring  the  civil  government  of 
Geneva  under  the  control  of  the  church  in  ap- 
pointment of  magistrates  and  legislation.  The  his- 
tory of  Europe  is  largely  occupied  with  attempts 
more  or  less  successful  to  give  the  church  suprem- 
acy over  the  State  or  the  State  supremacy  over  the 
church.  The  State  has  cleared  itself  from  the 
control  of  the  church,  but  the  church  is  not  yet 
free  from  the  control  of  the  State.  Disestablish- 
ment is  a  political  issue  in  Great  Britain,  and  is 
supported  by  millions  of  Christians  who  have 
withdrawn  from  the  Church  of  England  and  have 
organized  independent  nonconforming  churches. 

In  America,  church  and  State  are  separate  and 
practically  independent  of  each  other.  They  exist 
side  by  side  in  mutual  friendliness  and  recognition, 
but  without  jurisdiction.  So  far  as  the  churches 
have  legal  rights  the  State  maintains  them  in  re- 
spect to  property,  contracts,  and  salaries,  as  with 
individuals  and  corporations.  Some  States  of  the 
Union  grant  churches  immunity  from  taxation  on 
property  devoted  to  religious  uses.  The  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  guarantees  religious  free- 
dom. The  sixth  article  provides  that  "  no  religious 
test  shall  ever  be  required  as  a  qualification  to  any 
office  or  public  trust  under  the  United  States." 
The  first  article  of  amendment  provides  that  "  Con- 
gress shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establish- 
ment of  religion,  or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise 
thereof."  The  several  States  have  inserted  simi- 
lar provisions  in  their  constitutions.  Six  of  the 
Southern  States  exclude  from  office  any  one  who 


384  SOCIAL   INSTITUTIONS 

denies  the  existence  of  a  Supreme  Being.  In 
Pennsylvania  and  Tennessee  a  man  who  does  not 
believe  in  a  God  and  in  a  future  state  of  rewards 
and  punishments  is  ineligible  for  office,  and  in 
Maryland  and  Arkansas  such  a  person  cannot  be  a 
juror  or  a  witness  in  court.  But  these  are  unim- 
portant exceptions  which  are  likely  to  disappear. 
In  some  Territories  the  United  States  enters  into 
cooperation  with  the  church  for  the  purpose  of  ed- 
ucating the  Indians.  Appropriations  are  made  by 
the  legislatures  of  some  States  in  aid  of  charitable 
and  educational  institutions  under  the  control  of 
churches,  but  such  appropriation  is  expressly  for- 
bidden by  the  constitutions  of  other  States.  The 
people  are  jealous  of  any  recognition  of  churches 
by  grants  of  money  from  legislatures.  If  any  serious 
effort  should  be  made  to  exempt  supporters  of  de- 
nominational schools,  such  as  the  parochial  schools 
of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church,  from  taxation  for 
public  schools,  the  effort  would  be  strenuously  and, 
in  all  probability,  successfully  opposed.  The  hos- 
tility would  be  due  to  the  deeply  rooted  conviction 
that  church  and  State  should  be  separate. 

The  reasons  for  complete  separation  are  both 
political  and  religious.  It  is  better  for  the  State 
that  it  should  be  independent  of  the  church.  The 
liberty  and  equality  of  citizens  may  not  be  abridged. 
Religious  disqualification  for  office  creates  inequal- 
ity. To  exempt  certain  sects  from  taxation,  or  to 
confer  favors  on  them,  would  put  members  of  other 
sects  at  a  corresponding  disadvantage.  Unless 
membership  in  a  denomination  or  religious  observ- 
ance obviously  conflict  with  law,  as  the  polygamy 


RELIGION  IN  PUBLIC  SCHOOLS        385 

of  Mormons  did,  there  should  be  no  interference 
with  liberty.  It  is  better  for  the  church  to  be  in- 
dependent of  the  State.  The  church  is  a  moral 
and  spiritual  organization.  It  should  not  be  con- 
trolled by  State  officials,  who  might  be  irreligious 
persons,  nor  supported  from  the  public  revenues, 
for  political  and  material  motives  would  be  intro- 
duced. Self-support  gives  responsibility  and  sin- 
gleness of  aim.  The  resources  of  an  established 
church  may  give  it  more  power  to  work  among  the 
poor,  and  the  clergy  may  be  less  dependent  on  the 
favor  of  parishioners  than  is  the  case  in  free 
churches.  But  comparison  of  the  actual  working 
of  the  established  church  and  the  dissenting 
churches  in  England  does  not  sustain  the  claim. 
The  free,  self-supporting  churches  of  America  are 
not  less  effective  and  independent  than  the  en- 
dowed churches  of  Europe.  The  difference  is  prob- 
ably not  very  great,  and  is  constantly  reduced 
by  the  influences  of  modern  life.  The  spirit  of 
democracy  with  its  liberty  and  equality,  and  the 
spirit  of  philanthropy  in  service  of  the  poor  affect 
all  the  churches,  so  that  they  address  themselves 
more  and  more  to  their  legitimate  work.  Demo- 
cracy undoubtedly  tends  to  the  practical  separation 
of  church  and  State,  which  is  destined  everywhere 
to  become  complete  separation,  but  with  mutual 
influence  and  friendliness. 

VI 

The  relations  of  church  and  State  which  remain 
to  be  noticed  are  exemption  of  the  property  of 
churches  from  taxation  and  religious  instruction  in 
public  schools. 


386  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

.  The  arguments  for  exemption  from  tax  on  prop- 
erty are,  that  the  churches  promote  morality  and 
good  citizenship,  and  that,  as  so  great  a  majority 
of  the  people  support  the  churches,  there  is  no  loss 
of  revenue,  the  amount  being  made  up  by  increased 
taxation  of  the  property  of  the  same  citizens.  An 
additional  argument  is,  that  it  would  be  a  hardship 
to  impose  a  tax  on  churches  which  have  been  built 
with  the  expectation  of  exemption.  An  advantage 
of  taxation  would  be  the  reduction  of  denomination- 
alism.  There  would  not  be  half  a  dozen  churches  in 
communities  which  need  only  one  or  two  churches, 
if  a  tax  were  levied  annually.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  immediate  effect  of  taxation  would  be  the  dis- 
appearance of  some  churches  which  are  needed. 
At  present,  the  question  is  not  agitated,  although 
it  may  be  opened  at  any  time  in  any  State  of  the 
Union.  The  American  people  are  good-natured, 
and  are  not  disposed  to  disturb  customs  which 
appear  to  be  harmless.  But,  in  principle,  consist- 
ency requires  the  taxation  of  property  held  by 
churches. 

Religious  instruction  in  public  schools  presents 
a  more  serious  and  difficult  question.  It  is  not, 
however,  a  question  of  the  relation  of  church  and 
State,  because  the  churches  as  organizations  have 
nothing  to  do  with  the  schools.  As  the  State  rec- 
ognizes the  Christian  religion,  reading  of  the  Bible 
and  prayer  may  be  permitted  in  public  schools. 
But  the  practical  difficulty  has  become  very  great. 
All  citizens  are  taxed  for  the  support  of  schools, 
and  in  some  States  are  required  by  law  to  place 
children  in  the  schools.  But  the  citizens  belong  to 


RELIGION  IN  PUBLIC  SCHOOLS        387 

various  sects,  and  some  of  them  to  no  sect.  Their 
religious  beliefs  differ.  Their  forms  of  prayer  dif- 
fer. They  use  different  versions  of  the  Bible,  and 
interpret  portions  of  it  differently.  Only  such  reli- 
gious teaching  and  observance  as  all  accept  should 
be  permitted.  But  this  agreement  leaves  only  a 
minimum.  And,  in  fact,  religion  in  schools  is  re- 
duced to  reading  without  comment  from  the  Bible 
and  a  brief  prayer,  usually  the  Lord's  prayer. 
Where  no  objection  is  made,  this  minimum  may 
remain.  But  the  State  should  be  prepared  to  relin- 
quish all,  if  conscientious  objection  should  arise. 
Eeligious  instruction  must  be  provided  voluntarily 
in  other  ways.  As  it  is,  the  slight  modicum  is  quite 
inadequate.  It  is  better,  whether  the  fragment 
is  retained  or  not,  to  have  it  understood  that  the 
public  schools  are  not  to  be  depended  on  for  reli- 
gious instruction.  Their  function  is  secular  educa- 
tion. On  certain  days  a  number  of  hours  is  de- 
voted to  reading,  writing,  numbers,  natural  science, 
and  other  studies  more  or  less  useful.  There  is  no 
more  reason,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  why  such 
schools  should  be  opened  with  religious  exercises 
than  for  opening  a  singing-school  or  a  riding-school 
with  prayer.  It  may  even  be  argued,  and  has  been 
argued,  that  the  occupation  of  mind  in  secular 
studies  is  unfavorable  to  religious  impression  and 
feeling.  But,  at  all  events,  if  it  is  fully  under- 
stood that  the  province  of  the  schools  is  secular 
education,  the  churches  are  more  likely  to  pro- 
vide sufficient  religious  instruction.  The  public 
schools  do  really  facilitate  religious  teaching  by  the 
education  of  intellect  and  imagination.  The  church 


388  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

is  thus  relieved  of  the  task  of  elementary  teaching 
and  receives  children  prepared  for  direct  religious 
instruction.  I  said  that  we  must  be  prepared  to 
relinquish  what  remains  of  religious  observance. 
It  may  be  necessary  to  do  this  in  order  to  retain 
the  attendance  or  even  the  support  of  Roman  Cath- 
olics. If  the  schools  are  purely  secular,  Catholics 
will  not  have  even  a  pretext  for  objecting  to  them 
and  withdrawing  from  them.  They  will  stand  on 
the  same  footing  with  other  denominations,  and 
may  support  as  many  private  schools  as  they  please. 
When  it  is  understood  that  the  schools  are  for  sec- 
ular education,  the  outcry  against  godless  schools 
will  be  without  effect,  for  no  pretense  that  they  are 
religious  will  be  made.  It  is  inconsistent  with  our 
principles  for  the  State  to  assume  religious  func- 
tions. Reliance  may  be  placed  on  the  character  of 
teachers,  so  many  of  whom  are  religious  persons, 
and  all  of  whom  are  required  to  be  of  decided 
moral  character.  Beyond  that,  in  principle,  the 
State  may  not  go.  In  this  matter,  however,  the 
disposition  to  let  well  enough  alone  will  leave  reli- 
gious instruction  as  it  is.  But  when  an  issue  is 
made,  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  the  State 
cannot  assume  the  function  of  religious  teaching. 
The  ardent  defenders  of  such  teaching  in  schools 
supported  by  all  citizens  seem  to  have  anything  but 
a  clear  conception  of  one  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  our  government. 

VII 

I  have  dwelt  on  two  aspects  of  social  regenera- 
tion, economics  and  institutions.     Many  other  ele- 


RATE  OF  SOCIAL  PROGRESS  389 

ments  and  phases  of  progress  might  have  been 
considered,  especially  science,  art,  and  culture. 
All  these  elements  and  aspects  are  included  in  the 
kingdom  of  God,  a  kingdom  of  related  personali- 
ties. I  have  attempted  only  to  show  the  direction 
of  progress,  but  have  made  no  prediction  of  the 
rate.  The  kingdom  of  God  is  so  various  that  its 
wheels  within  wheels  have  different  rates  of  motion, 
while  all  revolve  in  obedience  to  one  great  motive 
power.  It  includes  many  climates,  many  civiliza- 
tions, many  literatures,  many  philosophies,  many 
religions  even.  At  some  points  outward  changes 
are  going  on  rapidly,  at  some  there  is  torpid  stag- 
nation, at  some  there  is  the  slow,  noiseless  influence 
of  custom  and  character.  But  the  progress  of  the 
entire  kingdom  is  not  slow  as  measured  by  antece- 
dent stages  in  the  evolution  of  the  universe.  De- 
votion to  the  good  of  mankind  should  not  be 
determined  nor  very  much  affected  by  the  time 
required  for  complete  success.  Ideal  devotion 
would  not  be  discouraged  because  there  must  be  a 
century  rather  than  a  decade  of  toil.  And  yet,  as 
various  kinds  of  workers  are  needed  in  the  com- 
plex movement  of  progress,  the  eager,  impetuous, 
impatient  enthusiasts,  as  well  as  the  calm,  broad, 
and  patient  organizers,  the  illusion  of  nearness  is 
not  always  dispelled,  and  some  tangible  results  are 
realized  on  the  way  to  the  remote  completion,  as  if 
by  a  beneficent  design  of  Him  who  guides  human- 
ity on  its  way.  Even  prophets  seldom  had  per- 
spective beyond  their  own  generation,  and  apostles 
for  a  time  expected  their  Lord  to  come  again  in 
complete  triumph  before  their  own  generation 


890  SOCIAL  INSTITUTIONS 

should  fall  on  sleep.  But  there  are  those  who  are 
stimulated  by  magnitudes  of  large  and  distant  re- 
sults which  they  may  not  live  to  see.  They  are 
stirred  by  reviewing  the  centuries,  each  of  which 
is  seen  to  have  had  its  own  task,  and  by  penetrat- 
ing the  life  of  the  nations,  to  find  that  each  has  had 
its  function.  Thus  they  learn  that  their  plans 
are  cooperative  with  a  divine  and  eternal  purpose, 
and  they  are  more  deeply  moved  than  by  the  hope 
of  snatching  hastily  what  might  prove  to  be  super- 
ficial results.  Jesus  was  of  this  temper,  not  hast- 
ening too  fast,  but  saying  more  than  once,  "  My 
hour  is  not  yet  come."  It  is  the  wisdom  of  the 
Christian  Scriptures,  not  to  indicate  the  definite 
time  within  which  results  will  be  accomplished,  but 
rather  to  emphasize  the  nature  of  the  need,  the 
principle  of  social  service,  and  the  certainty  of 
final  success.  It  gives  an  object,  a  method,  and  a 
prophecy.  With  this  inspiration  we  may  leave 
precise  foresight  of  the  times  and  seasons  with 
Him  who  keeps  them  in  his  own  knowledge  and 
toil  on  with  patience  and  enthusiasm  to  contribute 
our  share  to  social  progress  according  to  our  best 
wisdom  of  circumstance  and  method.  As  the 
angel  in  respect  to  place,  so  we  may  say  with  re- 
spect to  the  time  of  service  and  the  rate  of  pro- 
gress, — 

"  He  did  God's  will ;  to  him,  all  one 
If  on  the  earth,  or  in  the  sun."  l 

1  Robert  Browning,  The  Boy  and  the  Angel. 


CHAPTER  XV 

ETHICS   AND  THEOLOGY 


THERE  is,  at  present,  a  wide-spread  prejudice 
against  theology.  If  "  prejudice  "  seems  too  strong 
a  word,  as  implying  partial  ignorance,  it  may  at 
least  be  said  that  many  persons  who  profess  and 
call  themselves  Christians  regard  theology  and 
creeds  as  of  secondary  importance,  or  indeed,  of  no 
importance  at  all.  It  is  often  remarked  that  char- 
acter is  of  more  consequence  than  belief,  that  or- 
thodoxy is  not  salvation,  that  creeds  are  a  burden 
too  heavy  to  be  borne,  that  they  are  rubbish  or 
lumber  which  should  be  consigned  to  oblivion. 
Whether  this  feeling  is  justified  or  not  we  need  not 
inquire.  A  defense  of  theology  would  be  too  re- 
mote from  the  subject  under  discussion.  But  it  is 
to  be  noticed  that  the  disparagement  of  theology  is, 
in  part,  on  ethical  grounds.  The  criticism  is,  to  a 
considerable  degree,  from  the  moral  point  of  view. 
Metaphysical  opinions  and  abstract  doctrines  are 
unfavorably  contrasted  with  character  and  life. 
Objection  does  not  fasten  on  the  erroneousness  of 
theology,  for  true  as  well  as  false  theologizing  is 
under  condemnation.  The  disparagement  comes 
from  a  comparison  of  values.  It  is  felt  that  a 
metaphysical  should  not  be  made  more  important 


392  ETHICS  AND   THEOLOGY 

than  an  ethical  value.  It  is  held  that  correct  be- 
liefs are  of  infinitely  less  consequence  than  correct 
conduct.  Derogation  of  theology,  as  proceeding 
from  the  ethical  point  of  view,  is  a  very  interesting 
illustration  of  moral  evolution,  and  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  I  call  attention  to  it.  It  exhibits  a 
phase  of  moral  progress  ;  one  of  the  latest  and 
best  phases.  The  criticism,  although  it  is  some- 
what indiscriminate,  marks  both  a  moral  and  a 
theological  advance.  My  object  is,  therefore,  to 
show,  by  several  illustrations,  the  influence  of 
moral  conceptions  on  doctrinal  opinions.  I  think 
that  nearly  all  of  the  improvements  of  theology 
are  ethical  interpretations.  We  have  already  seen 
that  Christian  beliefs  exert  a  marked  influence  on 
moral  ideals  and  conduct.  Beliefs  concerning  the 
fatherhood  of  God,  the  person,  character,  and  teach- 
ing of  Christ,  the  kingdom  of  God,  and  immortal- 
ity, constitute  the  doctrines  of  Christianity,  and 
affect  personal  and  social  life  profoundly.  Now 
we  are  to  observe  that  moral  ideals  have,  in  their 
turn,  modified  and  clarified  doctrine,  or,  in  other 
words,  that  there  has  been  an  ethical  development 
of  theology,  and  that  contempt  of  creed  is  really 
the  substitution  of  a  moral  for  an  immoral  or  a 
non-moral  theology. 

II 

In  the  order  of  time  Christian  doctrine  followed 
Christian  ethics.  Jesus  was  a  moral  teacher.  Pie 
kept  character  and  life  constantly  in  view.  The 
fatherhood  of  God  and  the  brotherhood  of  men 
were  the  truths  he  taught.  These  truths  involved 
corresponding  beliefs,  but  there  was  no  direct  the- 


HISTORICAL  REVIEW  393 

ologizing.  Truth  was  motive.  Truth  was  for  life. 
44  Ye  shall  know  the  truth,  and  the  truth  shall  make 
you  free."  The  epistles  are  more  theological. 
They  present  a  doctrine  of  the  person  of  Christ 
and  of  redemption  from  sin.  A  simple  philosophy 
of  Christianity  appears.  But  it  is  never  separated 
from  character  and  conduct.  The  divorce  of  belief 
from  life  is,  indeed,  severely  condemned.  After- 
wards, correct  belief  was  made  essential  to  salva- 
tion. Definite  and  elaborate  creeds  were  formu- 
lated. Orthodoxy  and  heterodoxy  were  sharply 
distinguished.  Anathemas  were  hurled  against 
those  who  would  not  pronounce  every  word  of  the 
creed.  Salvation  depended  on  intellectual  assent. 
Refinements  and  niceties  of  doctrine,  oritological 
speculations,  psychological  and  metaphysical  theo- 
ries were  set  up  as  part  of  the  Catholic  faith.  All 
this  tended  to  a  separation  of  belief  from  life. 
The  divorce  was  not  complete.  There  were  real 
saints.  Piety  was  not  wanting.  Christians  were 
warned  against  self-deception.  Severe  disciplines 
of  asceticism  were  undergone.  There  was  much 
practical  and  beautiful  charity.  And  yet  empha- 
sis on  correct  belief  was  so  decided  that  reliance 
was  placed  on  orthodoxy  and  outward  observance 
more  than  on  character  and  holiness.  Good  deeds 
and  ascetic  self-denial  were  regarded  as  works  of 
supererogation,  as  a  surplus  of  meritorious  acts 
which  would  be  rewarded  here  or  hereafter,  but 
which  were  not  necessary  to  salvation.  With  the 
Protestant  Reformation,  a  restoration  of  the  moral 
value  of  doctrine  began.  Too  great  importance 
was  still  attached  to  right  belief.  The  Protestant 


394  ETHICS  AND  THEOLOGY 

creeds  of  the  sixteenth  century  are  as  long  and 
minute  as  the  counter  creeds  of  the  Catholics.  The 
Puritans  of  England  and  Scotland  constructed 
Confessions  which  many  of  their  descendants  are 
still  trying  to  believe,  and  which  are  redeemed 
chiefly  by  the  insertion  of  the  Ten  Commandments 
and  the  Lord's  Prayer,  and  the  copious  quotation 
of  Scriptural  texts.  At  the  beginning  of  this 
century  creed-making  was  a  common  occupation 
in  New  England.  Every  church  made  its  own 
creed.  Deacons  formulated  doctrinal  symbols. 
They  brought  forth  from  their  theological  treasures 
things  new  and  old,  with  the  usual  consequences 
which  follow  the  sewing  of  new  cloth  on  old  gar- 
ments. And  yet,  all  along,  character  was  made 
important.  It  was  held  that  life  must  be  consist- 
ent with  belief.  The  virtues  were  conscientiously 
and  severely  practiced.  Separation  of  doctrine 
from  character  was  gradually  reduced.  Belief  was 
transmuted  from  opinion  into  motive,  until  now, 
as  we  have  noticed,  it  is  very  common  for  the  best 
Christians  to  disparage  doctrine,  creed,  and  theo- 
logy, and  to  exalt  character.  There  has  been  a 
return  to  Christ.  "  Back  to  Christ "  is  a  sort  of 
watchword.  The  church  has  been  going  back 
from  creed  to  epistle  and  from  epistle  to  gospel. 
This  movement  of  Protestantism,  which  I  can  only 
suggest,  but  which  furnishes  a  fruitful  and  tempt- 
ing subject,  has  been  an  ethical  movement.  Science, 
I  know,  has  had  a  marked  effect  on  belief  in  the 
miraculous,  and  on  conceptions  of  God  and  his  re- 
lation to  the  universe.  But,  after  all,  theology  has 
been  modified  and  rectified  chiefly  by  moral  ideals 


NOMISM  AND  ANTINOMIANISM        395 

and  ideas.  This  moral  evolution  of  doctrine  may 
be  noticed  first  in  the  correction  of  immoral  be- 
liefs and  practices,  and  afterwards  in  the  ethical 
modification  of  particular  doctrines. 

ill 

There  have  been  certain  unethical  applications 
(which  really  are  abuses  of  Christianity),  some 
traces  of  which  still  remain.  They  are  at  oppo- 
site extremes  in  name,  but  are  two  forms  of  the 
same  thing,  namely,  the  separation  of  belief  from 
character.  One  is  called  Nomism,  the  other  An- 
tinomianism.  Nomism  is  observance  of  laws, — 
legalism.  Antinomianism  is  freedom  from  law, 
according  to  the  principle  that  believers  are  not 
under  the  law  but  under  grace.  Only  the  latter 
has  been  recognized  and  labeled,  perhaps  because 
Antinomianism  has  been  explicitly  held  and  de- 
fended. Nomism  reduces  Christianity  to  the  legal- 
ism  of  numerous  rules  and  observances.  Antino- 
mianism divorces  Christianity  from  morality. 

An  example  of  nomism  is  the  early  Jewish  Chris- 
tian church,  which  retained  some  of  the  legal  and 
ritualistic  observances  of  Judaism  in  connection 
with  faith  in  Christ  as  Messiah.  The  Jewish  Chris- 
tians wished  at  first  to  impose  the  old  legalism  on 
all  Gentile  believers.  Paul  had  to  contend  with 
this  kind  of  narrowness  as  long  as  he  lived.  An- 
other example  is  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  of 
to-day,  which  makes  salvation  dependent  on  obser- 
vances, and  has  brought  over  many  Jewish  prac- 
tices into  its  ritual.  The  tendency  is  found  in 
every  form  of  asceticism,  ancient  and  modern, 


396  ETHICS  AND   THEOLOGY 

from  the  monastic  discipline  of  the  early  and  mid- 
dle ages  to  the  legalism  of  the  so-called  ritualistic 
churches  of  to-day.  There  is  a  nomism  of  nega- 
tions. When  religion  is  thought  to  consist  in  ab- 
stinence from  certain  amusements  and  gratifica- 
tions, it  is  reduced  to  prohibitory  legalism.  Its 
maxim  is  a  saying  which  Paul  branded  as  an  error  : 
"  Touch  not,  taste  not,  handle  not."  He  warned 
Christians  against  teachers  who  laid  down  such 
rules.  The  perversion  of  this  saying  is  so  remark- 
able that  it  is  worth  while  to  quote  the  passage  in 
which  it  occurs  :  "  If  ye  died  with  Christ  from  the 
rudiments  of  the  world,  why,  as  though  living  in 
the  world,  do  ye  subject  yourselves  to  ordinances, 
,  Handle  not,  nor  taste,  nor  touch  (all  which  things 
are  to  perish  with  the  using)  after  the  precepts 
and  doctrines  of  men  ?  Which  things  have  indeed 
a  show  of  wisdom  in  will- worship,  and  humility, 
and  severity  to  the  body;  but  are  not  of  any 
value  against  the  indulgence  of  the  flesh."  Chris- 
tianity gives  freedom  from  self-indulgence  and 
vice  by  enthroning  the  law  of  love.  Those  who 
walk  in  the  Spirit  do  not  fulfill  the  lusts  of  the 
flesh.  Rules  and  prohibitions  can  never,  of  them- 
selves, make  a  man  pure  and  holy.  A  legalistic 
religion  is  immoral,  because  it  tries  to  substitute 
a  lower  and  self-righteous  morality  for  the  higher 
morality  of  love.  The  protest  against  it  is  in  the 
name  of  morality.  The  protest  is  often  indignant, 
even  to  anger,  as  in  one  of  the  letters  of  Thackeray : 
"  Who  says  that  we  are  to  sacrifice  the .  human 
affections  as  disrespectful  to  God?  The  liars,  the 
wretched,  canting  fakirs  of  Christianism,  the  con- 


NOMISM  AND  ANTINOMIANISM        397 

vent  and  conventicle  dervishes,  —  they  are  only  less 
unreasonable  now  than  the  eremites  and  holy 
women  who  whipped  and  starved  themselves,  never 
washed,  and  encouraged  vermin  for  the  glory  of 
God.  Washing  is  allowed  now,  and  bodily  filth 
and  pain  not  always  enjoined ;  but  still  they  say, 
shut  your  ears,  and  don't  hear  music ;  close  your 
eyes,  and  don't  see  nature  and  beauty ;  shut  your 
hearts,  and  be  ashamed  of  love  for  your  neighbor. 
.  .  .  What  a  history  is  that  in  the  Thomas  a 
Kempis  book  ;  the  scheme  of  the  book  carried  out 
would  make  the  world  the  most  wretched,  useless, 
dreary,  doting  place  of  sojourn  ;  there  would  be  no 
manhood,  no  love,  no  tender  ties  of  mother  and 
child,  no  use  of  intellect,  no  trade  or  science,  a  set 
of  selfish  beings  crawling  about  avoiding  one  an- 
other and  howling  a  perpetual  miserere."  1 

Gnosticism  was  favorable  to  Aiitinomianism. 
Some  Gnostic  sects  of  the  early  Christian  centuries 
separated  faith  from  life  and  practiced  immorality 
openly.  It  was  maintained  that  the  gospel  confers 
liberty,  that  men  are  saved  by  faith,  not  by  works, 
and  that  therefore  the  physical  appetites  and  lusts 
may  be  indulged.  The  idea  of  liberty  was  intoxi- 
cating. There  was  violent  reaction  from  legalism. 
Apostolic  warning  was  necessary.  Peter  said, 
You  are  free,  to  be  sure  ;  but  liberty  is  not  license. 
"  As  free,  and  not  using  your  freedom  for  a  cloak 
of  wickedness."  Mormonism  is  an  organized  form 
of  antinomianism.  Polygamy  is  justified,  and  would 
be  practiced  but  for  the  laws  of  the  land.  Some 
evangelistic  and  revivalistic  preaching  in  effect 

1A  Collection  of  Letters,  pp.  95,  96. 


398  ETHICS  AND  THEOLOGY 

represents  salvation  as  independent  of  character. 
It  is  said  that  out  of  gratitude  one  who  is  saved  by 
Christ  will  lead  a  pure  life,  but  that  the  salvation 
of  a  redeemed  sinner  does  not  rest  on  his  own 
works  of  righteousness.  It  is  proclaimed  as  a  re- 
cent and  original  discovery  of  the  preacher,  and 
with  an  emphasis  intended  to  be  startling,  that  a 
Christian  should  be  honest,  that  a  genuine  Chris- 
tian will  give  sixteen  ounces  to  the  pound  and 
thirty-six  inches  to  the  yard.  It  is  a  rather  sad 
commentary  on  current  conceptions  of  Christianity 
that  any  other  idea  of  what  a  Christian  should 
be  ever  crossed  anybody's  mind. 

I  am  not  sure  but  that  the  antinomianism  which 
has  taken  shelter  under  the  liberty  of  the  gospel 
is  partly  responsible  for  the  opinion  that  certain 
persons,  especially  persons  of  genius  and  talent, 
are  free  from  the  rules  of  common  morality ;  that 
they  may  fail  to  fulfill  promises,  may  incur  debts 
which  they  do  not  intend  to  pay,  may  be  intem- 
perate and  licentious  without  blame ;  that  genius 
condones  sin.  I  am  even  inclined  to  lay  at  the  door 
of  this  old,  easy-going  antinomianism  the  notion 
that  there  are  different  standards  of  morality  for 
private  and  for  public  life,  —  the  notion  that  a  cor- 
poration may  do  what  the  individuals  who  compose 
it  may  not  do,  the  notion  that  ordinary  honesty  is 
not  required  of  politicians,  the  notion  that  a  city 
may  be,  but  a  citizen  may  not  be,  cheated.  Per- 
haps these  notions  are  due  to  other  causes;  but, 
at  all  events,  if  morality  had  never  been  separated 
from  religion  under  cover  of  the  gospel,  if  faith  and 
righteousness  had  always  been  regarded  as  cause 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  FATHERHOOD     399 

and  effect,  the  moral  standard  of  the  community 
would  have  been  higher.  Whatever  the  forms  of 
legalism  and  of  license  may  be,  it  is  very  clear 
that  at  the  present  time  they  suffer  severe  condem- 
nation in  the  name  both  of  morality  and  of  religion. 
The  opinion  is  well-nigh  universal  that  the  teaching 
of  Christ  requires  righteousness  and  love.  It  is 
expected  that  Christians  will  be  good.  Character 
is  the  test  of  belief.  Belief  is  the  motive  power 
of  conduct.  A  Christian  who  cheats  and  lies,  or 
even  is  ill-tempered  and  selfish,  is  called  a  hypo- 
crite. This  means  that  Christianity  is  seen  to  be 
an  ethical  religion,  and  that  every  essential  doc- 
trine has  a  moral  value.  It  shows  that  there  has 
been  a  moral  evolution  of  theology. 

IV 

More  definite  evidence  of  ethical  modifications 
of  theology  is  found  in  recent  changes  of  doctrine 
itself.  A  short  perspective  of  twenty  or  thirty 
years,  which  can  be  covered  by  the  memory  of 
many  of  us,  shows  the  influence  of  a  purer  and 
more  virile  morality  on  doctrinal  beliefs. 

The  doctrme  of  God  has  been  moralized,  or,  if 
a  rather  barbarous  term  may  be  used,  has  been 
ethicized.  The  change  has  been  from  the  concep- 
tion of  Sovereignty  to  the  conception  of  Father- 
hood. Speaking  broadly,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
Latin  theology  made  sovereignty  the  central  doc- 
trine. The  Roman  government  was  a  type  of  the 
divine  government.  Augustinianism  exalted  God 
as  the  great  and  mighty  ruler.  This  theology 
yielded  the  doctrines  of  decrees,  of  predestination 


400  ETHICS  AND   THEOLOGY 

and  reprobation,  and  of  the  mere  good  pleasure  of 
God  as  the  cause  of  all  events.  There  was  a 
severe  and  rugged  nobleness  in  this  doctrine. 
Faith  was  unquestioning.  It  was  sacrilegious  to 
inquire  into  the  reasons  of  the  divine  government  of 
the  world.  But  the  belief  created  fear  and  awe 
rather  than  love  and  confidence.  The  Puritan, 
Calvinistic  theology  passed  this  doctrine  on  into 
the  Presbyterian  and  Congregational  churches. 
Methodism  was  a  protest  against  it.  One  of  the 
Wesleys  said  to  a  Calvinist,  "Your  God  is  my 
devil."  It  was  an  immoral  doctrine.  It  made  Al- 
mightiness  superior  to  Love.  When  the  sovereignty 
of  God  is  the  final  resort  of  religious  thought  and 
the  central  idea  of  theology,  the  assumption  is  made 
that,  in  the  last  analysis,  it  cannot  be  known  for 
what  reasons  God  administers  his  kingdom  of 
providence  and  redemption  as  he  does,  and  there- 
fore that,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  the  divine 
action  is  arbitrary.  When  speculations  and  in- 
quiries concerning  the  reasons  of  God's  dealings 
with  men  are  declared  to  be  presuming  and  even 
impious,  the  assumption  is  made  that  right  rests 
back  on  the  will  of  the  omnipotent  God  rather 
than  on  reason  and  love  which  make  us  akin  to 
God.  When  the  mystery  of  God's  purposes, 
rather  than  the  revelation  of  his  love,  is  dwelt 
upon,  so  that  the  deepest  impressions  are  thoughts 
of  inscrutableness,  vagueness,  and  incomprehensible 
power,  the  assumption  is  made  that  God's  omnipo- 
tent sovereignty  controls  the  displays  of  his  love 
and  mercy.  Happy  are  those  who  have  received 
from  the  religious  instruction  of  childhood,  from 


SOVEREIGNTY  AND  FATHERHOOD     401 

the  emphasis  of  preaching,  and  from  the  atmo- 
sphere of  the  church's  life  no  such  misconception 
of  their  Heavenly  Father,  the  God  of  eternal  love. 
The  centre  of  doctrine  has  been  shifting  from  sov- 
ereignty to  fatherhood.  It  is  believed  that  power 
is  directed  by  reason,  and  reason  by  love.  Even  if 
we  cannot  understand  the  counsels  of  God  fully, 
we  may  not  receive  nor  make  the  impression  that 
his  dealings  are  arbitrary.  We  say  with  the 
prophet  of  old,  "Doubtless  thou  art  our  Father, 
though  Abraham  be  ignorant  of  us  and  Israel 
acknowledge  us  not ; "  venturing  perhaps  to  sub- 
stitute the  names  of  Augustine  and  Calvin. 

Another  unethical  representation  of  God  is  the 
opinion  that  there  is  a  kind  of  opposition  among 
the  attributes  of  God,  as  if  one  attribute  had 
claims  against  another.  It  has  been  represented 
that  the  justice  and  mercy  of  God  seek  different 
ends,  one  demanding  the  punishment  of  the  sinner, 
the  other  desiring  his  pardon.  It  has  also  been 
thought  that  a  just  God  requires  strong  induce- 
ments to  be  persuaded  to  forego  his  purpose  of 
punishment,  and  that  it  could  hardly  have  been 
expected,  is  forever  a  wonder  and  a  mystery,  that 
the  claims  of  justice  should  be  relinquished.  Even 
then,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  exercise  of 
mercy  is  not  grounded  in  moral  necessity  as  deeply 
as  the  exercise  of  justice.  There  have  been  theolo- 
gies which  adopt  as  a  fundamental  principle  the  no- 
tion that  God  must  be  just  and  may  be  merciful. 
This  means  that  justice  acts  necessarily,  but  mercy 
acts  optionally.  It  has  been  held  that  it  is  morally 
necessary  for  God  to  hate  and  punish  the  sinner, 


402  ETHICS  AND  THEOLOGY 

but  only  in  an  inferior  degree,  if  at  all,  necessary 
that  in  love  he  should  energize  to  save  the  sinner. 
It  is  almost  needless  to  say  that  these  notions  are 
being  abandoned.  There  is  no  conflict  of  divine 
attributes.  God  is  the  God  of  holy  love.  Love 
hates  and  condemns  sin,  cannot  tolerate  sin,  visits 
penalties  on  sin,  and  therefore  tries  to  restore  the 
sinner  to  righteousness,  goes  out  in  sympathy  and 
suffering  to  save  him  from  the  self-destruction  of 
sin. 

Still  another  immoral  conception  of  God  is  that 
which  represents  him  as  leaving  vast  multitudes 
of  his  children  to  perish  or  to  sink  into  hopeless 
perdition  without  giving  them  the  truth  which  can 
save  them.  The  apprehension  that  some  may  be 
lost  is  not  inconsistent  with  a  worthy  conception 
of  God,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  character  deter- 
mines destiny.  But  the  opinion  that  character 
will  be  unchangeably  established  for  millions  of 
human  beings  under  relatively  obscure  knowledge 
of  God,  while  other  millions  will  be  saved  because 
they  have  clear  knowledge,  is  an  opinion  which 
makes  God  an  arbitrary  and  unethical  Being. 
The  moral  sense  revolts  from  such  an  idea.  Few 
preachers  and  theologians  can  now  be  found  who 
believe  that  the  masses  of  heathendom  are  eter- 
nally lost.  From  the  logic  of  the  premise  that  the 
earthly  life  is  decisive  of  the  destiny  of  all  men, 
escape  is  sought  in  various  ways ;  as,  that  all  souls 
have  the  essential  Christ,  that  multitudes  of  hea- 
then are  renewed  in  character  before  death  and 
only  need  the  sunlight  of  Christ's  presence  to 
develop  those  seeds  of  holy  character  which  have 


THE  HUMANITY  OF  CHRIST  403 

already  begun  to  germinate.  These  lame  devices 
show  that  the  conception  of  God  is  changing. 
Theologians  and  others  find  it  impossible  to  believe 
that  God  deals  unequally  with  men.  As  it  cannot 
be  believed  that  the  majority  of  men  who  have 
lived  down  to  this  time  are  hopelessly  lost,  there 
must  be,  and  there  really  is,  a  corresponding 
change  in  the  conception  of  God's  character  and 
government.  This  is  a  marked  instance  of  the 
ethical  modification  of  doctrine,  or,  as  I  prefer  to 
call  it,  the  moral  evolution  of  doctrine. 


Another  signal  example  of  the  ethical  develop- 
ment of  doctrine  is  found  in  conceptions  of  the 
person  of  Christ.  The  change  has  amounted  to  a 
recovery  of  his  humanity.  Until  recently,  the 
Christians  of  America  and  England,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  the  Unitarians,  believed  that  Jesus 
possessed  and  exercised  all  the  attributes  of  God. 
Proofs  of  his  divinity  were  looked  for  in  the  omni- 
science and  omnipotence  he  was  thought  to  have 
claimed.  Any  representation  of  his  humanness 
was  regarded  with  suspicion,  lest  it  should  be  pre- 
judicial to  belief  in  his  divinity.  If  humanity  was 
recognized,  it  was  thought  to  have  been  only  in  a 
mechanical,  not  in  an  organic  union  with  divinity. 
As  his  weariness,  hunger,  thirst,  sleep,  surprise, 
and  disappointment  could  not  be  denied,  a  com- 
mon explanation  was  that  he  acted  sometimes  in 
his  human  and  sometimes  in  his  divine  nature. 
His  divinity  and  his  humanity  were  like  two 
spheres  having  only  external  contact.  Practically, 


404  ETHICS  AND   THEOLOGY 

his  humanity  was  lost  or  was  unreal.  Such  was  the 
current  conception  of  twenty-five  years  ago.  But 
now,  although  there  are  many  who  retain  the  old 
view,  the  theologians,  thinkers,  and  scholars  of 
the  church  believe  that  Christ  was  under  the  ac- 
tual limitations  of  human  nature.  In  knowledge 
he  was  not  omniscient.  He  gained  information 
as  other  men  did.  He  shared  the  opinions  of 
his  time  as  to  the  universe,  and  in  other  essential 
respects  was  truly  human.  He  had  wonderful  in- 
sight, but  did  not  have  omniscience.  Theology 
starts  now  with  the  historical  human  person,  and 
finds  divinity  in  that  which  transcends  human  na- 
ture, especially  in  his  moral  perfection,  in  his  one- 
ness with  God,  in  his  sonship,  in  his  health-power, 
in  his  revelation  of  the  character  of  God.  I  do 
not  say  that  the  humanity  of  Christ  had  always 
been  ignored.  The  apostolic  and  early  church, 
and  for  a  long  time  the  Greek  fathers,  saw  divinity 
in  and  through  humanity.  But  in  later  times,  for 
several  centuries,  the  prevailing  belief  was  like  an- 
cient Docetism,  which  regarded  the  human  as  only 
an  appearance  or  seeming,  or  at  most  a  mere  gar- 
ment of  divinity.  Strauss'  "  Life  of  Jesus,"  which 
appeared  in  1835,  marked  a  turning-point,  almost 
a  revolution  of  doctrine.  It  created  consternation, 
but  led  to  a  study  of  the  history  of  Christ,  to  num- 
berless books  on  the  actual  life  of  Christ,  and  to  the 
recovery  of  his  real  humanity.  The  great  majority 
of  Christians  could  never  be  satisfied  with  a  purely 
humanitarian  doctrine  of  the  person  of  Christ. 
But  now  he  is  believed  on  as  the  human  incarna- 
tion and  revelation  of  the  God  of  holy  love.  This 


TOTAL  DEPRAVITY  405 

is  a  marked  instance  of   the  moral   evolution   of 
theology. 

VI 

The  doctrine  of  sin  furnishes  another  example. 
The  doctrines  of  total  depravity  and  the  fall  of  man 
are  seldom  mentioned.  Knowledge  of  primitive 
men  and  of  the  progress  of  the  race  from  lowly  be- 
ginnings has  changed  the  conception  of  man's  orig- 
inal state.  Knowledge  of  moral  development  and 
of  the  virtues  which  promote  civilization  has  un- 
dermined the  doctrine  of  total  depravity.  The 
opinion  that  men  are  guilty  for  sins  they  did  not 
commit,  and  for  dispositions  with  which  they  were 
born,  is  no  longer  maintained  in  the  pulpit,  nor 
defended  by  theologians,  although  that  for  which 
the  theory  of  original  sin  stood  is  now  recognized 
in  the  facts  of  moral  heredity.  Wholesale  condem- 
nation is  no  longer  heard.  Formerly,  the  feelings 
which  may  finally  be  experienced  in  consequence 
of  existing  moral  conditions  were  attributed  in- 
discriminately to  men  in  the  various  stages  of  a 
selfish  life,  and  even  to  children.  Feelings  of  hos- 
tility to  God,  of  hatred  of  his  law,  of  opposition  to 
goodness,  were  charged  upon  those  who  were  not 
conscious  of  having  such  feelings,  and,  in  fact,  did 
not  have  them.  Tendencies  which  in  their  unhin- 
dered development  might  induce  certain  feelings 
were  not  distinguished  from  the  final  result  of  those 
tendencies.  The  fault  in  such  representations  was 
a  failure  to  discriminate  between  religious  charac- 
ter and  religious  nature.  Man  has  a  religious 
nature,  but  not  on  that  account  a  religious  charac- 
ter. Before  character  is  established  by  fixed  pur- 


406  ETHICS  AND  THEOLOGY 

pose,  the  religious  nature  goes  out  at  times  in  sweet 
and  pure  desires.  Not  until  character  has  become 
decidedly  irreligious  do  sinful  feelings  predominate, 
and  even  then  better  desires  often  arise.  There- 
fore representations  of  human  nature  as  absolutely 
and  totally  corrupt  and  depraved  were  misrepre- 
sentations of  the  facts,  and  were  untrue  to  the 
feelings  which  men  actually  have.  With  such  ex- 
aggerations false  impressions  concerning  the  feel- 
ings of  God  towards  his  children  were  given.  The 
stern,  forbidding,  angry  God  was  seen,  and  the  love 
of  God  for  his  erring  children  was  almost  wholly 
lost  sight  of.  But  now  there  is  a  more  discrimi- 
nating analysis,  to  which  men  respond.  No  one 
takes  offense  at  truthful  delineation  of  charac- 
ter, but  every  one  recoils  indignantly  from  exag- 
gerated representations.  The  assumption  is  now 
made  that  every  man  has  remaining  capability  of 
goodness,  that  he  is  capable  of  redemption  under 
appropriate  influences.  Sin  is  estimated,  not  in 
relation  to  Adam,  but  in  relation  to  Christ.  It  is 
not  measured  by  the  Jewish  law  or  prophets,  but 
by  the  revelation  in  Christ  of  the  true  ideal  of 
character  and  the  love  of  God.  The  consciousness 
of  sin  and  knowledge  of  real  sinfulness  are  given 
by  the  truth  which  has  its  positive  and  highest  dis- 
closures in  Christ.  The  world  is  convicted  of  sin 
because  it  believes  not  on  him  who  is  the  perfect 
ideal  of  character,  but  goes  on  in  its  old  selfish, 
self-righteous,  self-satisfied  ways.  The  change  is 
due  to  the  replacement  of  a  lower  by  a  higher 
moral  standard,  of  the  negative  law  of  prohibition 
by  the  positive  law  of  love. 


REDEMPTION  407 

VII 

The  doctrine  which  has  undergone  the  greatest 
modification  from  purely  ethical  influences  is  the 
doctrine  of  redemption  from  sin.  Until  recently 
the  usual  representations  of  atonement  were  justly 
open  to  the  charge  of  immorality.  Even  now, 
such  representations  continue  to  be  made  to  a  con- 
siderable degree.  The  moral  sense  is  shocked  at 
some  of  the  reasons  given  for  atonement.  The 
imputation  of  our  sins  to  Christ  has  been  so 
stated  that  it  seemed  as  if  all  regard  for  righteous- 
ness had  been  overlooked.  The  penal  suffering  of 
Christ  was  regarded  as  the  philosophy  of  atone- 
ment. It  was  believed  that  God  laid  on  Christ 
the  penalty  of  our  sins,  or  a  suffering  equivalent 
to  that  penalty.  The  atonement  was  represented 
as  an  arrangement  satisfactory  to  God,  but  incom- 
prehensible to  us.  The  fact  that  character  and  its 
consequences  cannot  be  transferred  from  one  per- 
son to  another  was  contradicted  by  the  theory  that 
Christ  suffered  what  we  otherwise  should  have  suf- 
fered. It  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  atone- 
ment was  represented  as  a  device  by  which  God 
escapes  from  apparently  insuperable  difficulties  to 
the  forgiveness  of  sinners,  as  if  it  would  be  impos- 
sible for  God  to  forgive  outright,  even  on  genuine 
repentance,  but  becomes  possible  by  reason  of  the 
sufferings  and  death  of  Christ.  The  love  of  Christ 
making  its  great  way  to  men  at  the  cost  of  suffer- 
ing is  the  motive  which  leads  men  to  repentance, 
but  has  been  represented  as  the  motive  which  in- 
duces God  to  forgive.  This  disappearing  theory 


408  ETHICS  AND  THEOLOGY 

fails  to  satisfy  because  it  is  immoral,  because  it 
places  salvation  somewhere  else  than  in  character, 
because  it  converts  the  sympathy  and  love  of 
Christ  into  legal  fictions,  because  it  places  the 
ethical  demands  of  justice  above  the  ethical  neces- 
sities of  love.  It  is,  indeed,  through  the  self-sac- 
rifice of  Christ  that  we  are  recovered  from  selfish- 
ness to  goodness  and  love.  He  bore  our  sins.  He 
suffered  on  account  of  our  sins.  He  brings  us 
back  to  God,  for  he  reveals  God  to  us  in  his  real 
character.  But  that  is  very  different  from  mer- 
cantile or  forensic  transference  of  the  penalty  of  sin 
from  one  person  to  another.  When  the  doctrine 
of  atonement  is  traced  through  its  successive 
phases,  as  a  ransom  paid  to  the  devil,  as  the  satis- 
faction of  justice,  as  the  vindication  of  divine  gov- 
ernment, and  finally  as  the  great  motive  power 
which  transforms  character,  it  is  seen  that  there 
has  been  a  progressive  moral  evolution.  The  doc- 
trine of  redemption  through  sacrifice  remains,  but 
is  no  longer  made  to  rest  on  an  unethical  philoso- 
phy.1 

VIII 

One  more  illustration  is  found  in  the  restoration 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  kingdom.  It  is  the  doctrine 
of  a  renewed  society  on  earth,  a  society  of  right- 
eousness and  love.  The  very  overworking  of  this 
idea  shows  how  prominent  it  has  become.  The 
gospel  of  the  kingdom  is  the  gospel  of  humaneness. 

1  It  is  only  thirty  years  since  Horace  Bushnell's  great  book, 
The  Vicarious  Sacrifice,  appeared.  He  denied  all  theories 
of  a  substitutionary  bearing  of  penalty  or  its  equivalent.  A 
heated  controversy  followed.  But  now  his  views  are  more  gener- 
ally accepted  than  any  other  views  of  the  sacrifice  of  Christ. 


THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD  409 

This  recovery  of  a  great  moral  value  shows  con- 
clusively the  influence  of  moral  conceptions  and 
ideals  upon  theology. 

Sovereignty  is  not  lost  in  Fatherhood,  but  is 
recovered  as  the  divine  law  of  righteous  love ;  the 
divinity  of  Christ  is  not  obscured,  but  is  more 
clearly  seen  shining  through  his  humanity;  sal- 
vation by  character  is  not  self-righteousness,  but 
Christ  in  us;  the  kingdom  of  God  includes  the 
redemption  of  the  individual  to  faith  in  God  and 
love  of  his  fellow-men. 

It  is  not  theology,  then,  which  is  disparaged,  but 
false,  irrational,  and  immoral  theology.  So  long  as 
religion  endures,  there  will  be  theology,  for  reli- 
gion rests  on  beliefs  concerning  God,  and  theology 
is  simply  the  beliefs  which  are  justified  to  reason. 
Religion  is  a  moral  value.  Theology  therefore  must 
be  ethical.  The  evolution  of  theology  is  both  in- 
tellectual and  moral,  but  prevailingly  moral,  since 
it  is  the  science  or  philosophy  of  religion,  and  re- 
ligion is  the  life  of  faith  and  love.  The  doctrines 
of  Christianity  are  still  further  considered  in  the 
following  chapter,  which  closes  the  discussion  of 
moral  evolution. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CHRISTIANITY    AND    EVOLUTION 

IN  several  of  the  preceding  chapters  evolution 
has  been  traced  along  religious  lines.  It  has  been 
seen  that  nature,  humanity,  personality,  society, 
and  morality  imply  religion  and  are  also  harmo- 
nious with  evolution.  It  may  not  seem  necessary, 
therefore,  to  consider  more  definitely  the  relation 
of  the  Christian  religion  to  the  observed  evolution 
of  the  race.  And  yet,  as  it  is  supposed  by  some 
that  science  invalidates  certain  beliefs  which  are 
distinctively  Christian,  beliefs,  too,  which  are 
thought  to  be  essential  to  Christianity,  I  deem  it 
best  to  conclude  the  discussion  with  a  review  of 
those  beliefs,  in  order  to  show  their  harmony  with 
the  nature,  history,  and  progress  of  man,  or  at 
least  to  show  that  there  is  no  contradiction.  I  shall 
not  take  a  defensive  attitude  from  which  to  parry 
particular  objections,  but  shall  attempt  to  point  out 
some  of  the  large  correspondences  of  Christianity 
with  evolution  and  to  suggest  the  continuity  of  pro- 
gress under  the  influence  of  Christian  beliefs. 


The  most  general  view,  and  the  view  most  gen- 
erally taken  of  Christianity,  is  that  it  claims  to  be 
a  revelation.  The  Christian  religion  is  commonly 
spoken  of  as  the  Christian  revelation.  In  the  name 


REVELATION  411 

of  science  this  claim  has  been  denied.  The  univer- 
sal reign  of  law,  in  the  constant  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  is  thought  to  exclude  intervention  and 
revelation.  The  denial  proceeds  on  a  mistaken 
view  of  revelation  and  on  a  superficial  view  of  evo- 
lution. Revelation  and  evolution  are  two  sides  of 
one  and  the  same  reality.  Physical  nature,  in  its 
successive  phenomena,  in  its  laws,  forces,  organisms 
and  progress,  is  a  revelation  of  the  power  and 
thought  of  God.  Science  leads  to  philosophy  of 
cause  and  end  for  a  rationale  of  the  universe, 
and  philosophy  leads  to  religion.  As  soon  as  the 
question  How  is  answered,  the  questions  Whence 
and  Why  arise.  Nature  is  best  understood  as  hav- 
ing its  origin,  movement,  and  progress  in  the  wis- 
dom and  power  of  the  eternal  reason.  Nature  is  an 
embodiment  of  the  divine  purpose.  Its  phenomena, 
laws,  and  development  are  a  revelation  of  God.  It 
is  a  superficial  view  of  nature  which  sees  in  it  only 
successive  phenomena  and  blind  forces.  On  the 
other  hand  it  is  a  mistaken  view  of  revelation  which 
sees  in  it  only  intervention,  only  an  exceptional 
and  disconnected  breaking  in  upon  orderly  move- 
ment. Revelation  is  the  embodiment  of  God  in 
the  very  existence  and  evolution  of  nature.  It  is 
not  power  outside  nature  manifesting  itself  by 
occasional  interjection,  but  is  the  resident  forces 
and  life  of  nature  controlling  and  animating  the 
universe.  Nature  is  both  evolution  and  revelation. 
An  oak  is  composed  of  chemical  elements  taken  up 
from  the  soil  and  atmosphere.  But  the  oak  has 
magnificence  and  beauty.  Its  chemical  composi- 
tion and  its  beautiful  strength  are  two  aspects  of 


412       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

the  same  thing.  It  is  a  revelation  and  an  evolu- 
tion. The  one  is  in  and  through  the  other.  Start- 
ing with  evolution  on  the  surf  ace,  we  come  to  reve- 
lation in  the  depths.  Starting  with  revelation  in 
interior  cause  and  purpose,  we  find  its  wonderful 
and  beautiful  manifestations  in  exterior  effects. 
The  Bible  contains  sublime  representations  of  God 
as  revealing  himself  in  nature.  The  heavens  de- 
clare the  glory  of  God,  and  the  firmament  showeth 
his  handiwork.  The  sea  is  his  and  he  made  it.  The 
strength  of  the  hills  is  his  also.  He  calleth  the 
stars  by  name  and  leadeth  them  out.  One  writer 
makes  the  fine  and  striking  suggestion  that  nature 
is  to  God  what  speech  is  to  thought.  "  There  is 
no  speech  nor  language ;  their  voice  cannot  be 
heard  ;  their  line  is  gone  out  through  all  the  earth 
and  their  words  to  the  end  of  the  world."  When 
evolution  traces  the  process  as  age-long  and  world- 
wide, it  has  nothing  to  say  against  revelation. 
Vastness  in  space  and  illimitableness  in  time  only 
enhance  the  grandeur  of  the  revelation. 

The  derivation  of  man  from  lower  animals,  his 
psychical  and  moral  evolution,  may  be  traced  in 
successive  differentiations  and  attainments.  The 
influences  of  soil  and  climate,  the  advance  from 
nomadic  to  agricultural  conditions,  the  stone  and 
iron  ages,  the  arts,  sciences,  philosophies,  and  reli- 
gions may  be  observed  in  relations  of  cause  and 
effect.  But  human  evolution  is  best  understood  as 
a  revelation  of  the  wisdom  and  purpose  of  God. 
Man,  knowing  the  universe  in  which  he  lives, 
guiding  nature  to  his  uses,  perceiving  ideals  of 
character,  cultivating  affection  in  the  family,  living 


REVELATION  413 

consciously  as  a  member  of  the  social  organism, 
capable  of  the  thought  of  a  God  whom  he  wor- 
ships and  loves,  knowing  himself  thus  as  the 
crowning  product  of  nature,  is,  indeed,  a  result 
which  has  been  produced  by  a  great  number  of  ob- 
served causes,  yet  he  knows  his  own  evolution,  he 
perceives  his  high  intent,  and  is  best  explained  to 
himself  as  a  revelation.  His  body,  his  reason, 
his  conscience  are  a  revelation.  The  families,  the 
tribes,  the  races,  the  nations  of  men  are  a  revela- 
tion. Man  long  ago  said  of  himself,  "  I  am  fear- 
fully and  wonderfully  made.  .  .  .  My  frame  was 
not  hidden  from  thee,  when  I  was  made  in  secret, 
and  curiously  wrought  in  the  lowest  parts  of  the 
earth.  Thine  eyes  did  see  mine  unperfect  sub- 
stance ;  and  in  thy  book  were  all  my  members 
written,  which  day  by  day  were  fashioned,  when  as 
yet  there  was  none  of  them."  As  to  the  process, 
what  more  can  evolution  say  ?  And  jsvhat  can  it 
say  against  the  belief  that  man  is  a  revelation  of 
the  thought  of  God?  Evolution  only  deepens  the 
wonder*  when  it  shows  that  this  creature,  —  "  how 
noble  in  reason  !  how  infinite  in  faculties !  in  form 
and  moving  how  express  and  admirable !  in  action, 
how  like  an  angel !  in  apprehension,  how  like  a 
god  !  the  beauty  of  the  world  !  the  paragon  of  an- 
imals !  " l  —  was  once  a  savage  or  even  a  brute.  It 
is  a  mistaken  view  that  men  first  exist  and  develop 
to  some  given  point,  and  that  then  in  an  external 
manner  God  makes  a  revelation.  God  could  not 
reveal  himself  to  man  unless  he  first  revealed  him- 
self in  man.  If  it  should  be  written  in  letters  on 

1  Hamlet,  act  ii.,  sc.  2. 


414       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

the  sky,  —  God  is  good,  —  the  words  would  have 
no  meaning  unless  goodness  had  already  been 
made  known  in  human  relations.  Revelation  is 
not  by  an  occasional  stroke,  but  by  a  continuous 
process.  It  is  not  superimposed  but  inherent. 

Great  and  unique  men  have  appeared  from  time 
to  time,  and  have  exerted  a  profound  influence  on 
their  fellow-men.  They  have  been  new  and  origi- 
nal causes  of  progress.  Science  affirms  that  they 
were  products  in  the  evolution  of  humanity,  and 
this  belief  need  not  be  disputed,  although  all  the 
causes  which  produced  them  cannot  be  pointed 
out.  When,  for  instance,  it  is  said  that  Shake- 
speare was  a  product  of  the  Elizabethan  period  and 
could  not  have  appeared  at  any  other  period,  it  is 
rather  natural  to  ask  why  there  was  only  one 
Shakespeare.  If  the  science  of  to-day  had  been 
stationed  a  half  century  or  even  a  year  previous  to 
the  birth  of  the  great  dramatist,  it  could  not  have 
predicted  him.  Still,  the  human  race  is  capable 
of  producing  geniuses,  for  it  has  produced  them. 
They  certainly  are  in  intellectual  and  sympathetic 
relation  with  the  race,  for  their  creations  are  ap- 
preciated by  men.  In  fact,  the  more  unique  they 
are,  in  distinction  from  inferior  men,  the  more 
universal  is  their  knowledge  of  human  motives 
and  passions.  Their  uniqueness  is  their  univer- 
sality. Now,  allowing  that  genius  can  be  regarded 
from  the  evolutionary  side,  as  part  and  parcel  of 
a  great  connected  process,  it  may  also  be  regarded 
as  the  revelation  of  a  thought  of  God  which  comes 
to  expression  in  actual  persons,  a  revelation  through 
which,  also,  the  divine  purpose  for  humanity  is 


THE  IDEA   OF  GOD  415 

promoted.  These  men  see  deep  into  the  truth  of 
things.  They  interpret  the  realities  in  which  God 
expresses  his  thoughts.  They  read  God's  thoughts 
after  him  and  read  them  out  to  men.  Hence  we 
say  that  genius  is  inspired,  for  the  mind  which 
perceives  truth  in  things  must  be  responsive  to, 
and  so  inspired  by,  the  mind  which  made  things 
the  vehicles  of  thought.  The  inspirations  of  genius 
are  discoveries,  not  creations  of  truth.  All  reali- 
ties, then,  are  revelations.  Nature,  humanity,  and 
genius  which  is  the  epitome  of  humanity,  are  em- 
bodiments of  divine  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty. 
As  beauty  is  the  splendor  of  truth,  so  law  and  in- 
tellect and  society  and  genius  are  the  out-shining 
of  truth.  Evolution,  then,  an  observed  and  con- 
nected process,  is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  idea 
of  revelation  through  that  process.  It  certainly 
has  no  occasion  to  deny  a  revelation.  It  only  asks 
what  kind  of  revelation  is  made  in  and  through 
the  realities  of  nature  and  humanity. 

From  the  idea  of  revelation  in  general  we  now 
proceed  to  the  beliefs  which  are  characteristic  of 
Christianity,  to  observe  that  the  essential  truths 
of  the  Christian  religion  are  harmonious  with  the 
evolution  of  nature  and  humanity. 

II 

The  Christian  idea  of  God  as  supreme  reason 
and  perfect  goodness  is  not  only  consistent  with 
evolution,  but  is  indispensable  to  it.  The  cause 
which  realizes  purpose  in  progressive  development 
must  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  highest  part  of 
the  process,  in  terms  therefore  of  personality.  Mat- 


416       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

ter,  which  is  understood  and  interpreted  by  mind, 
expresses  mind.  It  is  not  mere  matter  nor. blind 
force.  The  force  which  produces  self-conscious 
reason  is  not  less  than  self-conscious.  The  power 
which  makes  for  righteousness  is  itself  righteous. 
God  is  not  inferior  to  man.  He  that  formed  the 
eye,  shall  he  not  see  ?  He  that  formed  the  intel- 
lect, shall  he  not  think  ?  He  that  formed  the  heart, 
shall  he  not  love  ?  God  transcends  man,  indeed, 
but  man  does  not  transcend  God.  If,  as  science 
holds,  man  is  evolved,  and  is  not  independent  of 
antecedent  development,  it  must  follow  that  God 
did  not  first  know  himself  in  the  consciousness  of 
man,  but  knew  the  end  from  the  beginning  and  all 
the  way  through  in  the  precedent  processes  which 
led  up  to  man.  And  man  himself  is  but  one 
expression  of  the  self-conscious,  originating  God. 
The  only  idea  of  God  to  which  science  may  prop- 
erly object  is  the  idea  of  a  God  external  to  nature, 
who  either  constructed  a  mechanism  which  goes  of 
itself  by  the  agency  of  second  causes  (an  unmean- 
ing and  impossible  conception)  while  he  stands 
outside,  an  absentee  God,  interfering  now  and 
then  to  repair  the  machinery,  or  took  material 
ready  to  his  hand  from  which  he  contrived  certain 
curious  and  useful  designs.  But  this  is  not  the 
Christian  idea  of  God.  To  be  sure,  there  have 
been  Christians  who  entertained  such  an  idea. 
Mechanical  analogies  have  been  employed  by  apol- 
ogists to  illustrate  design  in  nature.  But  such 
analogies  were  used  at  a  time  when  invention  was 
prolific  and  new  contrivances  created  astonishment. 
Paley  was  a  contemporary  of  Watt  and  Arkwright. 


THE  IDEA   OF  GOD  417 

At  other  times,  also,  human  art  has  suggested  di- 
vine purpose,  although  the  analogy  has  been  recog- 
nized as  incomplete.  But  such  analogy  has  been 
discredited  by  the  profoundest  reasoning  of  other 
Christians,  as  well  as  by  scientists,  in  view  of  the 
organic  processes  of  evolution.  Latin  Christianity 
regarded  God  as  a  Sovereign.  It  applied  the  con- 
ditions of  the  Koman  State  to  the  divine  govern- 
ment. The  analogy  has  held  its  place  persistently 
and  expresses  important  truth,  but  is  now  yielding 
to  the  conception  of  God  as  a  Father.  But  the 
Greek  fathers  believed  in  the  immanence  of  God 
and  employed  analogies  of  life.  "  They  regarded 
Deity,"  says  Mr.  John  Fiske,  who  certainly  is  not 
a  prejudiced  witness,  "  as  immanent  in  the  uni- 
verse, and  eternally  operating  through  natural 
laws.  In  their  view  God  is  not  a  localizable  per- 
sonality, remote  from  the  world,  and  acting  upon 
it  only  by  means  of  occasional  portent  and  prodigy  ; 
nor  is  the  world  a  lifeless  machine  blindly  working 
after  some  preordained  method,  and  only  feeling 
the  presence  of  God  in  so  far  as  he  now  and  then 
sees  fit  to  interfere  with  the  normal  course  of  pro- 
cedure. On  the  contrary,  God  is  the  ever-present 
life  of  the  world ;  it  is  through  him  that  all  things 
exist  from  moment  to  moment,  and  the  natural 
sequence  of  events  is  a  perpetual  revelation  of  the 
divine  wisdom  and  goodness."  Of  Athanasius 
Mr.  Fiske  says  that  while  his  metaphysic  is  alien 
to  the  metaphysic  of  our  time,  "  yet  through  this 
vast  difference  it  is  all  the  more  instructive  to 
note  how  closely  Athanasius  approaches  the  confines 
of  modern  scientific  thought,  simply  through  his 


418       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

fundamental  conception  of  God  as  the  indwelling 
life  of  the  universe."  1  Jesus  employed  analogies 
of  life  and  organism  —  seeds,  flowers,  trees  — 
from  nature ;  and  the  organic  relations  —  the 
family  and  the  political  kingdom  —  from  society. 
I  fail  to  perceive  that  the  science  of  organic  evolu- 
tion has  any  objection  to  make  to  the  Biblical  and 
Christian  idea  of  God,  as  it  was  held  by  prophets, 
apostles,  and  Jesus  himself,  as  it  has  always  been 
held  in  some  branches  of  the  church,  and  as  it  is 
generally  held  by  Christian  thinkers  to-day. 

in 

Take,  again,  the  Christian  doctrine  of  sin.  The 
existence  of  sin  is  a  fact  of  common  knowledge 
and  experience,  and  has  been  a  problem  to  all  ages 
and  religions.  But  the  Christian  doctrine  is  es- 
pecially consonant  with  the  theory  of  evolution.  I 
have  traced  the  correspondence  in  the  chapter  on 
Degeneration.  Sin  is  departure  from  the  type.  It 
is  missing  the  mark.  It  is  reversion  and  per- 
version. As  any  species  might  become  extinct 
through  degeneration,  so  the  human  species  might 
fail  of  self-preservation  and  lose  its  place  by  moral 
perversion.  Immorality  is  a  disease  which  makes 
men  unfit  to  survive.  Morality  is  natural  selec- 
tion and  makes  men  fit  to  survive.  Evolution 
does  not  consist  in  uninterrupted  progress.  Some 
societies  of  men  are  unprogressive  and  retro- 
gressive. Selfishness,  greed,  cruelty,  hinder  pro- 
gress, although  they  are  sometimes  the  incidents 
of  progress.  As  conflicting  with  cooperation  and 

1  The  Idea  of  God,  pp.  82,  86. 


THE  CHARACTER   OF  JESUS  419 

mutual  helpfulness  they  retard  progress.  Theo- 
logy has  at  times  exaggerated  the  extent  and  the 
effect  of  sin.  But  the  fact  of  sin  as  degeneration 
will  not  be  disputed  by  evolution.  Christianity,  in 
contrast  with  other  philosophies  of  sin,  is  near  the 
facts.  It  does  not  hold  to  a  sensuous  origin  of  sin, 
nor  place  it  in  matter,  nor  regard  it  as  fate,  but 
places  it  in  the  choices,  aims,  and  character  of  per- 
sons, where  also  there  is  power  of  recovery.  It 
also  recognizes  and  emphasizes  heredity  as  trans- 
mitting moral  disease,  and  so  is  in  complete  accord 
with  modern  science. 

IV 

Evolution  has  no  objection  to  offer  against  the 
moral  character  of  Jesus,  but  on  the  contrary  rec- 
ognizes him  as  a  potent  cause  of  progress.  The 
character  of  Jesus  illustrates  the  perfect  type  of 
humanity.  He  was  more  than  a  Jew,  more  than 
the  son  of  David.  He  was  the  son  of  Man.  In 
one  individual  the  human  type  was  incarnated. 
Not  only  is  he  in  accordance  with  the  evolution  of 
humanity  up  to  the  point  where  the  perfect  ideal 
is  epitomized  in  one  person,  but  also  he  is  a  cause 
in  the  progress  of  the  race,  —  a  cause  which  must 
be  taken  into  account  in  explanation  of  the  great 
movements  of  civilization.  We  find  something 
more  than  a  character  who  was  the  fruitage  of 
moral  evolution,  a  human  phenomenon  to  be  clas- 
sified properly  and  which  need  not  be  further  con- 
sidered. We  find  a  character  which,  rightly  or 
wrongly  understood,  has  been  the  most  potent 
force  in  the  progress  of  the  race.  Therefore  evo- 


420       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

lution  in  its  highest  form  of  philosophy  of  history 
cannot  rest  in  a  negative  attitude  towards  Jesus, 
in  the  admission  that  he  contradicts  no  law  of  so- 
cial evolution,  but  must  recognize  him  as  an  origi- 
nal force  which  has  affected  and  is  still  profoundly 
affecting  the  course  of  moral,  political,  and  social 
progress. 

The  harmony  of  Christianity  and  evolution  is 
still  more  clearly  seen  when  the  moral  power  of 
Jesus  is  defined  as  self-realization  in  self-love  and 
love  to  others.  Personal  degeneration  is  arrested 
as  the  type  of  character  which  Jesus  realized  is 
reproduced  in  those  who  are  like  him.  Social  de- 
generation is  arrested  as  love  makes  its  great  way 
among  men  in  suffering,  pain,  and  death,  to  bring 
them  to  their  true  worth  and  into  the  mutual  ser- 
vice of  love.  The  law  of  love  diminishes  the 
wasteful  strife  and  competition  which  hinders  pro- 
gress. It  does  this  as  self-love  which  seeks  those 
values  that  gain  by  sharing,  and  as  love  of  others 
which  serves  them  according  to  need  and  worth. 
Social  progress  is  most  real  and  rapid  when  mutual 
service  in  cooperation  takes  the  place  of  selfish  and 
destructive  rivalry.  The  progressive  societies  are 
those  in  which  there  is  the  least  waste  of  life.  The 
stationary  and  retrogressive  societies  are  those  in 
which  there  is  the  most  waste  and  failure.  The 
progressive  societies  are  those  in  which  the  individ- 
ual seeks  for  himself  the  values  which  gain  by 
sharing  and  finds  his  welfare  in  promoting  the 
common  good.  The  unprogressive  societies  are 
those  in  which  the  individual  seeks  for  himself 
the  possessions  which  are  reduced  by  sharing  and 


THE  CHARACTER   OF  JESUS  421 

obtained  by  violent  seizure  from  others.  There  is 
greatest  waste  of  life  in  savage  and  uncivilized  so- 
cieties. Struggle  for  subsistence,  self-indulgence, 
vice,  and  disease  carry  destruction  to  a  fraction 
much  larger  than  decimation.  There  is  most  com- 
petition with  least  progress.  Excessive  struggle 
and  rivalry  tend  to  extermination.  There  is  least 
waste  in  civilized  countries  where  each  regards  the 
rights  and  welfare  of  others,  where  the  home,  the 
community,  the  State,  and  the  church  combine  in- 
dividuals in  organizations  which  are  strong  and 
sound  through  mutual  service,  in  which  the  aim  is 
to  make  as  many  as  possible  fit  to  survive.  Pro- 
portion of  competition  and  progress  is  reversed 
when  society  is  on  the  higher  Christian  plane.  On 
the  lower  grade  there  is  most  struggle  and  least 
progress,  on  the  higher  grade  there  is  least  strug- 
gle and  most  progress.  This  is  no  reversal  of 
evolution.  It  is  progressive  evolution.  The  evo- 
lution of  the  individual  proceeds  a  certain  distance 
by  strife.  But  as  self-preservation  becomes  self- 
realization,  evolution  proceeds  the  remaining  dis- 
tance chiefly  by  cooperation  and  reciprocity,  each 
person  promoting  the  self-realization  of  others  as 
he  promotes  his  own.  The  progressive  societies 
are  not  engaged  in  struggle  for  bare  existence,  but 
in  combined  effort  for  comfort,  knowledge,  culture, 
art,  character,  friendship,  love,  patriotism,  religion. 
As  in  physical  nature  the  organic  is  superimposed 
on  the  inorganic,  and  the  vital  on  the  chemical,  the 
higher  taking  up  the  lower  ;  as  physical  evolution 
in  the  animal  is  followed  by  psychic  evolution  in 
man,  and  this  in  turn  proceeds  by  moral  and  social 


422       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

development ;  so  in  society  combination  is  super- 
imposed on  competition.  The  path  of  progress  is 
most  clearly  marked  by  the  Christian  law  of  love, 
the  self-love  which  seeks  one's  own  true  worth,  the 
love  of  others  which  seeks  their  true  worth  and  in 
seeking  that  gains  the  true  self-realization.  Chris- 
tianity not  only  marks  the  path  of  progress,  but 
marks  it  out  and  breaks  it  out,  till  it  becomes  a 
highway  and  a  way  along  which  mountains  are 
brought  low  and  valleys  are  exalted.  Unless  evo- 
lution insists  on  limiting  itself  to  one  law,  the  law 
of  struggle  for  existence,  it  can  raise  no  objection 
to  the  controlling  law  of  Christianity.  If  it  rec- 
ognizes, as  it  must,  social  cohesion  and  progress  by 
cooperation,  it  welcomes  the  Christian  law  of  love 
as  completely  harmonious  with  the  observed  evolu- 
tion of  all  progressive  societies.  This  law  found 
its  best  expression,  we  may  almost  say  its  intro- 
duction, in  the  life  of  Jesus.  He  gave  the  idea  of 
social  welfare  and  progress  in  the  kingdom  he 
founded,  which  is  the  kingdom  of  righteousness 
and  peace  and  love. 

v 

The  doctrine  of  the  Holy  Spirit  is  the  doctrine 
of  the  divine  immanence.  The  spirit  of  truth,  the 
spirit  of  holiness,  the  spirit  of  love,  are  the  best 
and  highest  expressions  of  God.  Such  qualities 
are  well  characterized  as  spirit.  There  is  a  spirit 
in  man  and  the  Almighty  giveth  him  understand- 
ing. Belief  in  the  indwelling  spirit  signifies  the 
deepest  and  the  final  truth,  that  the  life  of  man  is 
in  and  from  the  life  of  God.  In  his  light  we  see 
light.  Although  an  unreal  and  vague  mysticism 


IMMORTALITY  423 

has  rested  on  this  belief,  yet  the  belief  has  always 
saved  men  from  formalism  and  externalism.  An 
evolution  which  finds  God  in  nature  and  humanity 
may  welcome  the  truth  that  God  who  was  in 
Christ  dwells  in  our  minds  and  hearts  by  his 
Spirit  which  he  has  given  us. 

VI 

The  belief  in  immortality  is  not  peculiar  to 
Christianity,  but  Christianity  makes  it  firm  at  the 
roots.  The  more  deeply  man  knows  himself  a 
child  of  God,  the  Eternal  One,  the  more  probable 
becomes  his  survival  of  death  and  his  complete 
perfection.  That  the  spiritual  and  moral  nature 
of  man  survives  material  changes  is  a  reasonable 
belief.  Man  needs  more  time  to  realize  his  capa- 
bilities. Evolution  expects  that  incompleteness  will 
be  brought  to  completeness.  To  quote  Mr.  Fiske 
once  more :  "  Now  the  more  thoroughly  we  compre- 
hend that  process  of  evolution  by  which  things  have 
come  to  be  what  they  are,  the  more  we  are  likely  to 
feel  that  to  deny  the  everlasting  persistence  of  the 
spiritual  element  in  Man  is  to  rob  the  whole  process 
of  its  meaning.  It  goes  far  toward  putting  us  to 
permanent  intellectual  confusion,  and  I  do  not  see 
that  any  one  has  as  yet  alleged,  or  is  ever  likely  to 
allege,  a  sufficient  reason  for  our  accepting  so  dire 
an  alternative.  .  .  .  According  to  Mr.  Spencer,  the 
divine  energy  which  is  manifested  throughout  the 
knowable  universe  is  the  same  energy  that  wells 
up  in  us  as  consciousness.  Speaking  for  myself,  I 
can  see  no  insuperable  difficulty  in  the  notion  that 
at  some  period  in  the  evolution  of  Humanity  this 


424       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

divine  spark  may  have  acquired  sufficient  concen- 
tration and  steadiness  to  survive  the  wreck  of  ma- 
terial forms  and  endure  forever.  Such  a  crowning 
wonder  seems  to  me  no  more  than  the  fit  climax  to 
a  creative  work  that  has  been  ineffably  beautiful 
and  marvelous  in  all  its  myriad  stages." l 

VII 

Still  further,  the  harmony  of  Christianity  with 
evolution  may  be  perceived  when  the  observed  de- 
velopment of  religion  is  traced  from  the  lowest 
forms  of  fetichism  to  spiritual  Christianity.  There 
has  been  an  evolution  of  religion,  and  Christianity 
is  the  religion  which  survives,  is  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  religion.  In  this  sense,  it  comes  dis- 
tinctly within  the  lines  of  human  evolution.  The 
main  direction  of  the  development  can  be  clearly 
followed.  Widening  knowledge  of  nature  reduces 
the  number  of  gods.  The  forces  which  were 
thought  to  be  many  are  found  to  be  one.  Reli- 
gion therefore  passes  from  belief  in  many  gods  to 
belief  in  one  God,  from  polytheism  to  monotheism. 
Moral  perceptions  and  standards  affect  the  idea  of 
God.  He  is  not  mere  Power  which  goes  crashing 
through  the  universe.  He  is  Power  which  makes 
for  Righteousness.  He  is  holy  and  good.  He 
deals  with  men  and  with  nations,  not  by  arbitrary 
favoritism,  but  by  character.  This  idea  animates 
the  religion  of  Israel.  The  righteous  character  of 
Jehovah  was  probably  recognized  before  his  Al- 
mightiness  as  the  one  and  only  God  was  believed. 
The  gods  of  the  other  nations,  of  Assyria,  of  Phe- 

1  The  Destiny  of  Man,  pp.  115-118. 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  RELIGION        425 

nicia,  of  Egypt,  were  thought  to  be  real  divinities, 
but  immoral  in  character,  and  inferior  to  Jehovah. 
Later  he  is  believed  to  be  the  only  God,  the  high 
and  lofty  One,  inhabiting  eternity,  whose  name 
is  Holy.  He  dwells  with  the  man  who  is  of  a 
humble  and  contrite  spirit.  He  rules  the  nations 
in  righteousness,  building  up  the  nations  that  exe- 
cute justice,  pulling  down  the  nations  that  practice 
iniquity.  The  actual  fortunes  of  individuals  and 
peoples  are  a  perplexity  to  faith,  but  the  belief 
that  God  rules  in  righteousness  does  not  waver. 
It  rises  to  sublimity.  The  nations  are  a  drop  in 
the  bucket.  The  gods  of  silver  and  gold  are  no- 
thing. Judgment  impends  on  the  idolatrous  and 
corrupt  peoples.  The  kingdom  of  God  is  coming. 
All  things  are  in  his  power,  for  he  is  the  Creator 
of  the  universe  and  the  Ruler  of  all  the  nations. 
The  individual  overwhelmed  by  misfortune  stands 
steadfast  in  his  faith ;  trusts  when  he  cannot  un- 
derstand. These  beliefs  prepared  the  way  for 
faith  in  the  Fatherhood  of  God  which  Jesus  re- 
vealed. The  faiths  as  well  as  the  unfaith  and 
skepticism  of  Greek  and  Roman  prepared  the  way 
for  faith  in  the  Fatherhood  of  God.  At  an  earlier 
time  this  belief  could  not  or  might  not  have  been 
received.  In  the  fullness  of  time  God  sent  forth 
his  Son.  Every  new  differentiation  of  belief,  if  so 
clumsy  a  term  may  be  employed,  was  articulated 
into  previous  knowledge  and  faith.  The  prophet, 
possessed  with  a  new  idea,  which  was  a  word  of 
God  and  not  of  man,  a  "  thus  saith  the  Lord," 
grafted  his  teaching  upon  the  religious  truths 
already  accepted.  Jesus  came,  not  to  destroy,  but 


426       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

to  fulfill,  to  enlarge  and  to  deepen  the  idea  of 
righteousness  into  the  idea  of  love,  to  break  down 
the  walls  of  partition  between  Jew  and  Gentile  by 
teaching  that  all  are  children  of  one  Father.  Re- 
ligion, from  animism  to  Christianity,  is  a  continu- 
ous moral  evolution,  a  development  from  fear  to 
love.  It  is  not  altogether  true  that  "  fear  creates 
the  gods,"  for  wonder,  reverence,  and  dependence 
are  universal  religious  sentiments.  But  fear  of 
divine  judgments  is  a  true  sentiment  springing  up 
in  the  conscience  of  unholy  man.  The  hope  of  re- 
covery from  sin  through  the  mercy  of  God  trans- 
forms fear  into  love,  until  perfect  love  casts  out 
fear.  The  evolution  of  religion  in  correspondence 
with  the  moral  evolution  of  man  does  not  signify 
that  the  belief  in  God  is  a  human  creation,  for 
man  did  not  create  his  own  convictions  and  senti- 
ments, did  not  create  himself.  Knowing  himself 
in  his  ideal  character  he  knows  his  Creator  and 
Father.  Evolution  explains  religion,  but  does  not 
explain  it  away. 

Christian  doctrine  has  itself  developed  through 
the  centuries  since  the  time  of  Jesus.  The  essen- 
tial truths  of  Christianity  have  not  changed  nor 
been  superseded,  but  have  combined  with  Greek 
thought,  with  Latin  thought,  with  modern  thought, 
with  science,  and  with  philosophy,  in  the  evolution 
of  doctrine.  The  development  has  been  determined 
by  the  essential  truths  of  the  gospel.  The  evolution 
is  Christian,  not  heathen.  But  it  is  evolution.  The 
fundamental  truths  are  not  foreign  or  hostile  to 
the  increments  of  knowledge  which  come  from  any 
source  of  truth  open  to  men.  In  new  and  broader 


THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST  427 

applications  these  beliefs  find  interpretations  which 
disclose  their  deepest  truth.  The  history  of  reli- 
gion culminating  in  Christianity,  the  evolution  of 
Christian  doctrine,  and  the  application  of  Christian 
principles  to  personal  and  social  life,  are,  then,  in 
perfect  accordance  with  the  progressive  evolution 
of  humanity.  They  are  not  mere  effects  of  pro- 
gress. The  progress  does  not  come  first  by  other 
causes,  and  produce  the  beliefs.  The  beliefs  are 
causes  of  progress  while  at  the  same  time  they  are 
affected  by  it.  Nothing  in  the  world  is  purely 
cause  or  purely  effect.  Christianity  and  evolution 
are  not  contradictory,  but  are  in  complete  harmony, 
so  far  as  the  essential  moral  and  religious  truths 
of  Christianity  are  concerned. 

VIII 

There  are  certain  questions  which  pertain  more 
to  the  metaphysics  than  to  the  ethics  of  Christian- 
ity, and  yet  which  cannot  be  passed  over  in  the 
comparison  we  are  making.  The  most  important 
of  those  questions  pertains  to  the  person  of  Christ. 
It  is  asked  whether  the  current  belief  that  Christ 
was  a  person  transcending  ordinary  humanity  is 
not  discredited  by  evolution.  Must  he  not  be  re- 
garded as  one  man  among  others,  as  a  religious 
teacher  excelling  all  others  in  purity,  but  not  differ- 
ent in  nature  or  personality  ?  The  doctrine  of  the 
person  of  Christ  has  sometimes,  I  admit,  been 
formulated  in  an  irrational  and  unintelligible  man- 
ner. And  yet  the  reality  which  even  such  doctrine 
has  attempted  to  express  is,  I  think,  the  reality  of 
a  transcendent  person,  and  is  not  invalidated  by 


428       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

theories  of  physical  and  human  evolution.  Here, 
again,  I  defend  no  particular  theory,  but  suggest 
important  facts.  That  Jesus  was  true  man  has  al- 
ways been  maintained.  The  docetic  doctrine  that 
he  was  man  only  in  appearance  received  early  and 
swift  condemnation.  The  humanity  of  Jesus  has 
always  been  reasserted  when,  in  defense  of  the 
divinity,  it  had  been  ignored  or  minimized.  His 
favorite  designation  of  himself  was  the  Son  of 
Man.  In  him  humanity,  in  all  its  qualities  and 
perfections,  was  incarnated.  If  he  transcended 
humanity,  it  was  in  such  mode  as  included  rather 
than  excluded  it,  even  as  the  human  type  tran- 
scends while  it  includes  the  inferior  animal  organi- 
zation. 

In  many  respects  Jesus  was  a  distinct  type.  He 
transcended  all  other  men  in  his  consciousness  of 
God  and  in  his  moral  and  spiritual  affinity  with 
God.  He  brought  God  to  the  world  in  his  very 
person.  He  was  seen  to  be  one  continually  coming 
forth  from  God.  It  has  been  said  that  God  was 
in  him  as  far  as  God  can  be  in  a  human  being. 
But  God  was  in  Christ  as  he  has  not  been  in 
any  human  being  before  or  since.  He  transcends 
all  men  in  that  respect.  He  stands  alone  in  his 
God-consciousness.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  any  other  man  will  be  thus  God-filled.  He  is 
unique  in  this  respect.  As  transcending  all  others 
he  was  a  new  cause,  the  power  of  God  in  a  higher 
potency. 

I  do  not  see  that  evolution  presents  insuperable 
objection  to  this,  or,  indeed,  any  objection  at  all. 
The  appearance  of  that  which  is  new  and  distinc- 


THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST  429 

tive  is  the  condition  of  progress.  Something  dif- 
ferent appears.  Variations  or  differentiations  are 
points  of  new  departure.  How  the  variations  are 
produced  is  not  known.  It  is  only  known  that  new 
types  date  back  to  the  slight  or  important  varia- 
tions which  appear.  I  think  that  all  of  them  must 
ultimately  be  referred  to  that  force  or  life  which  is 
the  divine  power  and  wisdom.  A  man  unique  in 
spiritual  quality,  a  God-filled  man,  might  not,  in- 
deed, be  predicted.  But  then  it  is  doubtful  if  any 
type-producing  variation  could  be  predicted.  The 
psychical  creature  man,  with  his  variation  from  the 
physical  creature  which  preceded  him,  could  not 
have  been  foreseen.  Relations  and  variations  can 
be  traced  afterwards,  but  not  beforehand.  They 
fit  in,  but  could  not,  in  most  cases,  have  been  fore- 
seen. 

I  hesitate  to  apply  these  analogies  to  the  tran- 
scendent person  of  Christ,  and  yet  as  suggesting 
that  every  advance  is  from  a  new  point  of  depar- 
ture, that  progress  is  by  epochs,  they  are  appro- 
priate. The  only  question  that  might  arise  is  the 
question  why  there  has  been  only  one  Christ,  — 
why  not  many  God-filled  men,  transcendent  in 
moral  and  spiritual  creative  power?  But  here 
again  analogy  answers  the  question.  There  has 
been  only  one  Shakespeare,  only  one  Plato,  only 
one  Homer,  only  one  Raphael.  It  has  been  said, 
as  I  have  remarked,  that  Shakespeare  is  accounted 
for  by  the  historic  and  literary  conditions  of  the 
Elizabethan  period,  that  he  could  not  have  ap- 
peared at  any  other  time,  before  or  since.  But 
if  he  was  the  product  of  that  period,  why  does 


430       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

he  stand  alone  ?  Why  were  there  not  many  im- 
mortal  Shakespeares  ?  And  was  not  Shakespeare 
as  much  a  cause  as  an  effect  of  those  condi- 
tions ? 

The  fact  is  that  genius  is  not  accounted  for  by 
causes  to  which  thousands  are  subject,  although 
genius  is  vitally  related  to  those  causes.  Genius  is 
solitary  and  unheralded.  It  enters  humanity  with 
creative  or  recreative  power.  Progress  dates  from 
single  points.  This  amounts  to  a  law,  even  in  the 
appearance  of  physical  types.  It  is  probable  that 
the  human  race  descended  from  one  man  or  one 
pair.  The  theory  that  the  various  races  were  au- 
tochthonous, that  they  appeared  independently  in 
many  places,  is  abandoned.  From  one  initial  point 
of  psychic  and  moral  variation  the  human  species, 
in  all  probability,  sprung.  So,  from  one  individ- 
ual, a  new  moral  creation  proceeded.  The  apostle 
Paul  seizes  on  this  very  analogy.  There  was  a  first 
man,  Adam,  the  progenitor  of  the  race,  and  a 
second  man,  Christ,  the  progenitor  of  a  renewed 
race.  Mortal  men  came  from  the  first ;  immortal 
men  from  the  second.  As  in  Adam  all  die,  so  in 
Christ  all  are  made  alive.  That  a  person,  unique 
in  moral  perfection,  transcendent  in  God-conscious- 
ness, and  the  revealer  of  God's  character  of  holy 
love,  should  appear  as  a  creative  moral  power,  is 
quite  in  the  line  of  the  observed  method  of  all  pro- 
gress. It  certainly  is  not  inconceivable,  irrational, 
nor  improbable.  That  he  stands  alone  is  not  with- 
out analogy  in  the  solitariness  of  genius.  In  phy- 
sical reproduction  from  an  initial  point  there  is 
repetition  and  equality.  But  intellectually  and 


- 

THE  PERSON  OF  CHRIST  431 

spiritually  it  is  otherwise.  And  when  we  consider 
all  that  Jesus  revealed  and  produced,  we  find  re- 
sults commensurate  with  a  unique  cause,  and  may 
well  believe  that  he  was  one  who  transcended  the 
human  into  which  he  was  incarnated,  and  tran- 
scended it  by  reason  of  his  life  in  God.  If  human 
and  divine  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  if  the  per- 
sonality and  consciousness  of  every  man  rest  back 
on  God,  if  all  the  manifestations  of  thought  and 
life  in  the  universe  are  expressions  of  God,  and  if 
humanity  is  the  child  of  God,  why  should  it  be 
thought  a  thing  incredible  that  one  person  should 
perfectly  express  the  character  of  God,  and,  as  the 
Son  of  God,  transcend  all  other  men  ? 

How  his  person,  as  human,  yet  transcending  the 
human,  is  to  be  understood  depends  on  concep- 
tions of  the  personality  of  man  and  of  God.  Spe- 
cific theories  would  carry  us  over  into  philosophy 
and  theology.  Various  opinions  have  been  held  by 
those  who  believe  in  the  divinity  of  Christ.  But, 
as  the  last  word  of  science  is  the  first  word  of  reli- 
gion, as  science  ends  with  the  conclusion  that  there 
is  a  God,  and  religion  says  on  the  first  page  of  its 
Bible,  "  in  the  beginning,  God,"  so  in  respect  to  the 
revelation  of  God  in  Christ.  Science,  tracing 
physical  and  human  evolution,  perceives  numerous 
points  of  new  departure  which  account  for  results, 
but  are  not  themselves  accounted  for ;  it  perceives 
great  men  who  determined  subsequent  progress  ;  it 
perceives  one  man  unique  in  moral  perfection  and 
transcendent  in  God-consciousness  who  produced  a 
new  moral  type.  There  science  stops,  and  remits 
to  philosophy  and  theology  theories  of  his  person- 


432       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

ality.1  The  science  which  finds  God  in  nature  and 
history,  or  else  breaks  down  in  sheer  phenomenal- 
ism, need  not  hesitate  to  find  God  in  Christ. 
Crude  and  inconsistent  theories  have  been  ad- 
vanced to  define  the  person  of  Christ,  but  all 
theories  rest  on  the  facts  of  his  consciousness,  his 
revelation,  and  his  power.  They  are  simply  at- 
tempts, more  or  less  successful,  to  account  for  the 
person  who  convinced  the  world  of  the  Fatherhood 
of  God,  and  made  real  the  Brotherhood  of  man. 

IX 

But  does  not  science  absolutely  prohibit  belief 
in  miracles  and  the  supernatural  ?  It  is  to  be  re- 
membered that  the  Bible  nowhere  uses  the  term 
"  supernatural."  It  says  nothing  of  interruptions 
or  contradictions  of  the  laws  of  nature.  All  things, 
usual  and  unusual,  are  regarded  as  manifestations 
of  the  power  of  God.  Not  only  is  the  word  "  super- 
natural "  absent,  but  also  the  idea.  No  distinction 
is  made  between  the  natural  and  the  supernatural. 
Both  the  word  and  idea  are  modern,  and  are  due 

1  The  modern  theologian  is  building-  a  doctrine  of  the  person 
of  Christ  on  the  perfect  humanity  and  the  unique  God-conscious- 
ness of  Jesus.  The  Rev.  Dr.  George  A.  Gordon,  in  The  Christ  of 
To-day,  a  noble  contribution  to  theological  thought,  finds  the 
identity  of  Christ  with  humanity  in  his  very  difference  from  men 
as  the  one  who  brings  the  absolute  and  eternal  into  the  human 
and  finite.  Other  recent  and  notable  books  of  a  similar  purport 
are  Rev.  Frederic  Palmer's  Studies  in  Theologic  Definition,  Presi- 
dent William  DeWitt  Hyde's  Outlines  of  Social  Theology,  and 
Rev.  Dr.  J.  H.  Denison's  Christ's  Idea  of  the  Supernatural.  All 
these  books  connect  Christ  with  the  organic  evolution  of  nature 
and  history,  which  he  includes,  interprets,  and  completes  in  his 
divine-human,  human-divine  person. 


MIRACLES  AND  RESURRECTION       433 

to  the  extension  of  scientific  knowledge.  As  laws 
of  nature  became  known,  the  conception  of  God's 
relation  to  the  universe  was  changed.  He  was 
thought  of  as  outside  the  universe.  Events,  the 
causes  of  which  were  unknown,  were  attributed  to 
God,  and  were  characterized  as  supernatural.  The 
miracles  of  the  Bible  were  so  regarded.  But  when 
the  conception  of  the  universe  as  mechanism  run- 
ning in  grooves  by  the  agency  of  second  causes 
gives  place  to  the  conception  of  the  universe  as 
organism  throbbing  with  force  and  life,  nature 
in  all  its  movements  is  regarded  as  having  its 
power  and  law  in  God,  and  the  supernatural  (if 
the  term  is  retained)  signifies  the  higher  revelations 
of  God  in  Christ  rather  than  that  which  over-rides 
or  interrupts  the  processes  of  natural  law.  The 
sharp  contrast  between  supernatural  and  natural 
is  too  large  a  concession  to  materialistic  science 
and  too  narrow  a  limitation  on  the  revelation  of 
God. 

Let  it  also  be  remembered  that  Jesus  attached 
only  secondary  importance  to  the  cures  and  miracles 
he  performed.  He  wished  to  be  believed  for  himself 
and  his  truth.  "  The  words  that  I  speak  unto  you, 
they  are  spirit  and  they  are  life."  He  himself  is 
the  real  miracle. 

I  cannot  but  believe  that  Jesus  did  many  of  the 
things  which  are  ascribed  to  him.  The  narratives 
fall  to  pieces  if  they  are  torn  out  of  his  life  and 
teaching.  They  were  unusual  deeds.  But  Jesus 
was  an  unusual  person.  May  we  not  at  least  say 
that  he  who  was  pure  and  holy  had  health-power, 
by  which  he  could  cure  diseases  of  body  and  mind  ? 


• 
434       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

Remarkable  power,  which  nobody  yet  understands, 
resides  in  certain  persons,  —  power  over  bodily 
conditions  and  over  imagination,  will,  and  faith. 
That  a  greater  power  resided  in  Jesus  is  far  from 
incredible.  His  miracles  would  not  be  effects 
without  causes,  but  unique  effects  produced  by  a 
unique  person.  The  motive  was  beneficence,  never 
display. 

The  power  of  Jesus  over  physical  nature,  as 
shown  in  the  stilling  of  the  tempest,  the  multipli- 
cation of  loaves,  the  draught  of  fishes,  is  not  as 
intelligible.  If  these  miracles  stood  alone,  we 
might  be  incredulous.  But  he  who  had  such  power 
over  men,  over  mind  and  body,  even  after  death 
seemed  to  have  occurred,  may  have  been  aware,  at 
times,  of  a  control  over  nature  which  was  unusual. 
If  he  transcended  ordinary  humanity,  if  he  em- 
bodied the  character  of  God  so  as  to  bring  in  a 
new  revelation,  it  would  be  hazardous  to  mark  a 
line  beyond  which  his  power  could  not  be  exercised, 
and  especially  to  make  the  boundary  coincide  with 
the  limits  of  facts  which  at  present  can  be  made 
clearly  intelligible  to  us.  The  nature-miracles  are 
very  few,  and  are  not  important  to  an  adequate 
knowledge  of  his  person,  his  teachings,  and  his 
kingdom.  And  as  to  all  the  miracles,  the  remark 
may  be  repeated,  that  they  are  secondary  in  impor- 
tance to  his  teachings  and  redemption,  as  he  him- 
self insisted,  and  are  to  be  understood,  not  chiefly 
as  proofs  that  he  is  divine,  but  as  exercises  of  a 
beneficence  in  keeping  with  his  gracious  purposes. 
The  doubts  which  might  arise  if  such  powers  were 
ascribed  to  any  one  disappear  when  it  is  remein- 


MIRACLES  AND  RESURRECTION       435 

bered  that  they  belonged  to  one  who  in  his  very 
person  and  life  gave  a  new  revelation  of  God,  pro- 
duced a  new  type  of  character,  and  created  a  new 
humanity. 

Christ  himself,  I  have  said,  is  the  real  miracle. 
He  was  a  creative  moral  power.  But  is  it  not 
impossible  to  believe  in  his  resurrection  ?  And  is 
not  belief  in  the  resurrection  essential  to  Chris- 
tianity, even  if  belief  in  miracles  is  not  essential  ? 
I  admit  that  the  reappearance  of  an  individual 
after  death  in  his  recognizable  bodily  form,  and  in 
a  form  which  after  a  few  weeks  vanishes  alto- 
gether, is  highly  improbable.  The  chemical  prop- 
erties of  the  body  are  such  that  when  death  occurs 
there  is  no  reanimation.  There  are,  indeed,  thou- 
sands of  people  who  have  no  difficulty  in  believing 
that  the  dead  reappear  in  a  body  visible  but  ethe- 
realized.  Spiritualists,  in  fact,  are  numbered  by 
millions  rather  than  thousands.  But  these  appear- 
ances are  produced  by  simple  devices,  or  are  illu- 
sions of  the  imagination,  or  are  phenomena  due  to 
peculiar  power  possessed  by  so-called  mediums. 
The  scientific  temper  refuses  to  accept  this  popular 
explanation  of  occult  phenomena.  Science  does  not 
refuse  to  believe  in  many  startling  occurrences,  but 
does  refuse  to  accept  so-called  supernatural  agen- 
cies as  accounting  for  them.  There  is  a  strong  pre- 
supposition against  the  resurrection  of  a  human 
being. 

Many  important  beliefs  of  Christianity  would 
remain  even  if  Christ  did  not  rise  from  the  dead. 
Some  of  those  beliefs  have  already  been  indicated. 
It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  there  would  be 


436       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

a  very  considerable  modification  of  doctrine  if  be- 
lief in  the  resurrection  should  be  relinquished. 
Faith  in  Christ  as  a  Redeemer  originally  rested  on 
his  supposed  victory  over  death,  and  has  always 
rested  on  confident  belief  in  his  resurrection.  At 
the  same  time,  there  have  been  sincere  Christians 
who  have  not  held  that  belief,  and  yet  have  seen  in 
Christ  the  revelation  of  God. 

Against  the  presupposition  must  be  placed  evi- 
dence of  the  fact  of  resurrection,  sufficient  reasons 
for  it,  and  a  meaning  in  it.  Into  the  evidence  I 
do  not  enter.  It  consists,  directly,  of  the  testimony 
of  many  honest  witnesses,  and,  indirectly,  of  the 
results  which  flowed  from  the  belief,  namely,  the 
Christian  church  with  its  power  in  the  world,  the 
observance  of  the  Lord's  Day,  and,  in  a  word, 
Christianity  itself.  It  is  almost  impossible  to  sup- 
pose that  these  results  proceeded  from  deception, 
dishonesty,  or  heated  imagination. 

The  reason  for  the  belief  is  found  in  the  person 
and  work  of  Christ.  If  he  was  a  unique  person, 
perfect  in  holiness,  having  his  life  consciously  and 
completely  in  God,  and  having  power  for  the  re- 
covery of  men  from  sin  to  holiness,  death  might  be 
different  to  him  from  what  it  is  to  unholy  and 
degenerate  men.  This  reason  was  perceived  by  the 
first  preacher  of  Christianity,  who  said  that,  as  for 
death,  it  was  not  possible  that  Christ  should  be 
holden  of  it.  Death,  as  an  event  to  be  dreaded,  is 
a  result  of  sin,  and  Christ,  who  was  sinless  and 
broke  the  power  of  sin  for  men,  may  have  been 
superior  to  death,  in  all  that  makes  it  a  dread,  and 
may  have  transcended  some  of  its  physical  condi- 


MIRACLES  AND  RESURRECTION       437 

tions.  His  resurrection  was  the  complete  demon- 
stration that  sin  was  destroyed,  and  that,  for  man, 
what  remains  of  death  is  only  transition  to  a  better 
life.  Such,  at  least,  has  been  the  meaning  attached 
to  the  resurrection  of  Christ.  The  presupposition 
against  is  opposed  by  strong  presuppositions  for 
the  abolition  of  death  in  the  person  of  Christ. 

Belief  in  immortality  strengthens  belief  in  the 
resurrection  of  Christ.  Against  any  survival  after 
death  there  are  strong  presuppositions.  We  cer- 
tainly have  no  power  to  conceive  the  manner  of  it. 
Experience  stops  this  side  of  death.  How  the 
person  in  his  identity  and  consciousness  continues 
to  exist  when  bodily  functions  cease  we  are  un- 
able to  imagine.  But  the  reasons  for  believing  it 
are  so  cogent  that  they  more  than  offset  the  pre- 
supposition against  it,  although  some  cannot  bring 
themselves  to  believe  that  there  is  personal  life 
after  death.  Those  who  believe  that  men  are  im- 
mortal believe  that  Jesus  continued  to  exist  after 
the  crucifixion.  Only  one,  perhaps,  out  of  a  thou- 
sand who  doubt  his  resurrection  doubts  his  con- 
tinued personal  existence.  That  such  a  person, 
who  in  the  body  had  revealed  God  to  men,  might 
manifest  himself  after  death,  and  to  convince  men 
that  he  had  destroyed  the  power  of  death,  can 
hardly  be  considered  impossible  or  inconceivable. 

As  to  the  mode  of  manifestation,  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  spiritual  body  in  which  he  appeared,  we  may 
not  have  a  definite  opinion.  But  the  fact,  so 
strongly  supported  by  evidence  and  fortified  by 
the  reason  and  meaning  of  the  manifestations,  may 
very  well  be  accepted.  If  science  does  not  deny 


438       CHRISTIANITY  AND  EVOLUTION 

immortality,  nor  the  existence  of  a  personal  God, 
nor  the  revelation  of  God  in  Jesus  Christ,  although 
these  truths  lie  beyond  the  region  of  empirical 
observation,  then  also  the  appearance  of  Jesus 
after  death  need  not  be  denied,  although  science 
does  not  canvass  the  reason  and  meaning  of  it. 
The  point  I  make  is  that  evolution,  tracing  pro- 
gress up  through  nature  and  humanity  to  God  and 
to  immortality,  presents  no  insuperable  objection 
to  the  resurrection  of  Jesus,  but  leaves  the  belief  to 
stand  or  fall  with  its  meaning  and  reason  and  evi- 
dence. To  say  the  least,  evolution  fixes  no  point 
beyond  which  there  can  be  no  further  advance  in 
the  development  of  man.  It  cannot  absolutely 
affirm  that  death  is  other  than  a  temporary  phase 
in  the  evolution  of  man,  and  certainly  not  that  the 
one  man  who  was  unique  in  perfection  of  character 
had  not  a  unique  power  which,  for  him  at  least, 
overcame  death. 

Belief  in  the  birth  of  Jesus  from  a  virgin  I  do 
not  regard  as  an  essential  doctrine  of  Christianity. 
The  belief  that  he  transcended  humanity  rests  on 
his  life,  teachings,  work,  and  power,  not  on  the 
manner  of  his  birth.  The  accounts  of  the  Concep- 
tion given  by  Matthew  and  Luke  have  not  the  his- 
torical value  of  the  accounts  of  the  Resurrection. 
The  virgin  birth  is  not  directly  referred  to  else- 
where in  the  New  Testament.  Belief  in  the  divin- 
ity of  Christ  was  placed  on  other  grounds.  But 
that  such  a  person  may  have  been  born  into  the 
human  race  in  an  exceptional  manner  cannot  be 
proved  impossible.  My  own  opinion  is  that  the 
narratives  of  the  virgin  birth  are  consonant  with 


MIRACLES  AND  RESURRECTION       439 

the  person  of  one  who  transcended  human  nature 
in  some  respects  and  revealed  the  character  of 
God  to  the  world,  but  that  on  his  actual  personal- 
ity and  work  rather  than  on  a  miraculous  origin 
belief  in  his  divinity  depends. 

The  historical  Christ  is  the  ideal  Christ.  He 
was  the  expression  in  time  of  that  which  is  eternal, 
in  the  human  of  the  absolute  perfection,  in  man 
of  God.  To  some  the  historical  form  is  of  more, 
to  others  of  less  importance.  But  to  all  Christ  is 
the  renewer  of  moral  life,  the  deliverer  from  sin, 
the  conqueror  of  death,  the  revealer  of  God,  the 
brother  of  men,  the  ruler  of  society,  the  ideal  of 
humanity.  There  is  no  contradiction  between  the 
processes  of  evolution  from  lower  to  higher  moral 
life,  and  the  principles,  the  character,  and  the 
society  which  are  realized  in  Christ.  In  this  chap- 
ter I  have  only  attempted  to  show  that  nature  and 
history  present  no  contradiction  to  the  facts  and 
truths  of  Christianity,  that  evolution  is  not  antag- 
onistic to  nor  independent  of  the  development  of 
man  from  a  low  to  a  high  estate  according  to  the 
law  of 


CONCLUSION 

THE    PATH    AND    THE    GOAL 

A  CONTINUOUS  and  ascending  path  has  been  fol- 
lowed. At  some  points  it  has  been  little  more  than 
a  trail  scarcely  distinguishable.  At  some  remote 
points  it  has  disappeared,  and  but  for  the  fixed 
guiding  stars  overhead  would  have  been  lost  alto- 
gether in  the  dense  forest  and  matted  undergrowth. 
But  again  it  has  emerged  plain,  broad,  much  trav- 
eled. Long  stretches  of  that  path  are  unused  and 
so  are  thickly  overgrown.  It  is  now,  and  perhaps 
always  will  be  impossible  to  trace  the  entire  course 
of  life  in  its  plant,  animal,  and  human  direction. 
It  is  here ;  it  was  there.  The  connection  of  pres- 
ent with  past  inferred  by  speculation  may  be  quite 
different  from  the  actual  connection,  yet  we  are 
certain  it  is  a  continuous  although  a  devious  and 
winding  path.  The  ascent  of  a  mountain  is  not 
in  a  straight  line.  But  if  a  goal  is  reached,  the 
path  by  which  it  has  been  gained  is  of  compara- 
tively little  importance.  If  the  path  cannot  be 
retraced  it  is  because  there  is  no  need  of  reenter- 
ing  it.  So  far  as  it  can  be  retraced  it  is  still  a 
guide  towards  the  goal. 

No  one  can  be  better  aware  than  the  writer  that 
there  are  lacuna  in  the  arguments  which  have  been 
presented,  corresponding  in  part  with  the  lacunae 
of  existing  knowledge.  The  gaps  may  yet  be  filled 


THE  PATH  AND   THE  GOAL  441 

as  the  history  and  nature  of  life  in  its  myriad 
forms  are  better  understood.  Possibly  some  of 
these  breaks  do  not  exist  now  to  the  clearer  in- 
sight and  broader  perspective  of  other  students. 
We  all  must  admit,  however,  that  origins  are 
obscure  and  that  life  reproducing  life  is  a  mystery. 

I  have  freely  admitted  that  morality  cannot  be 
so  sharply  defined  as  to  leave  no  vagueness  in  the 
theory  of  it,  and  for  the  reason  that  it  must  be 
defined  in  terms  of  the  man  himself  and  of  the 
whole  man,  who  cannot  fully  understand  his  errors 
nor  his  perfectness. 

I  have  not  been  so  presumptuous  as  to  suppose 
that  a  demonstration  of  human  freedom  has  been 
accomplished  on  these  pages,  but  have  been  con- 
tent to  recognize  the  unique,  self-originating  power 
of  man  within  impassable  limits  and  within  the 
great  and  unfailing  purpose  of  the  Power  which 
makes  for  righteousness. 

Concerning  the  age-long  mystery  of  suffering, 
waste,  evil,  and  cruelty,  it  would  be  the  conceit  of 
ignorance  to  claim  that  this  discussion  has  ex- 
plained it  away.  I  am  satisfied  if  a  use  of  painful 
and  apparently  wasteful  strife  has  been  perceived, 
and  if  exaggeration  of  the  amount  of  it  has  been 
removed. 

In  what  has  been  presented  I  value  chiefly  the 
self-realization  of  personality,  as  recovering  a  na- 
tive impulse  of  human  evolution  to  a  moral  mean- 
ing. It  is  indeed  true  that  the  love  and  service  of 
others  is  an  element  in  the  life  of  man  from  the 
earliest  and  lowliest  to  the  latest  and  noblest  forms 
of  that  life.  The  monopoly  of  the  law  of  struggle 


442  THE  PATH  AND  THE  GOAL 

and  survival  has  been  rightly  invaded  by  the  law 
of  altruism  without  which  the  reproduction  of  life 
and  the  well-being  of  society  are  alike  impossible. 
To  admit  this  law  in  the  final  result  and  to  banish 
it  from  the  incipient  and  intermediate  conditions 
would  be  an  insulation  of  effect  from  cause  of 
which  no  scientist  would  care  to  be  guilty.  Evo- 
lution has  therefore  yielded  its  monopoly  of  self- 
preservation  to  make  room  for  the  parallel,  or,  as 
some  regard  it,  the  opposite  law  of  altruism.  All 
honor  to  those  who  have  corrected  the  one-sided- 
ness  of  evolutionary  theory  by  the  restoration  of  a 
great  moral  value.  And  yet  the  other-regarding 
impulses  have  been  thus  far  recognized  chiefly  as 
an  offset  to  the  self -regarding  impulses.  The  realm 
of  evolution  has  been  more  or  less  amicably  di- 
vided, with  an  increasing  encroachment  of  altruism 
upon  self-regard.  I  have  tried  to  show  that  this  is 
only  half  of  the  truth  and  half  of  the  advantage ; 
that  the  true  significance  of  self-regard,  misdirected, 
narrow,  selfish,  cruel,  and  foolish  though  it  has  often 
been,  is  self-perfection,  which  is  the  very  essence  of 
morality ;  that  self-realization  of  personal  worth  is 
the  power  which  gives  love  and  service  of  others 
value  or  even  possibility ;  and  that  in  the  last  ana- 
lysis it  is  just  the  self-perfection  of  another  which 
altruism  promotes.  The  importance  of  personal 
culture  is  a  needed  corrective  also  of  the  insistence 
with  which  just  at  present  the  service  of  others 
is  emphasized  by  socialistic  theories  and  the  over- 
working of  the  Christian  idea  of  the  kingdom  of 
God.  I  have  endeavored  to  show  that  the  Chris- 
tian ideal  is  personal  as  much  as  social,  is  persona] 


THE  PATH  AND  THE  GOAL  443 

in  order  to  be  social,  that  this  ideal  is  the  complete 
and  rounded  truth,  the  human  curve  swept  around 
the  foci  of  personality  and  society.  Jesus  said  that 
he  was  guiding  men  into  the  whole  truth,  that  is,  into 
the  wholeness  of  the  truth,  so  that  they  should  not 
rest  in  partial,  one-sided,  fragmentary  truth.  The 
whole  truth  is  self-realization  of  personality  in  the 
reciprocities  of  society.  As  the  social  line  of  pro- 
gress is  not  lost  sight  of,  however  far  it  can  be 
traced,  even  into  animal  gregariousness,  so  the  per- 
sonal line  of  progress  does  not  fade  out,  but  can 
be  seen,  prophetic  of  the  perfected  personality,  in 
all  the  wild  and  heartless  struggle  for  existence 
and  enjoyment.  A  breach  in  the  moral  path  of 
evolution  is  thus  filled,  I  venture  to  believe.  He 
may  be  happy  of  whom  it  can  be  said :  "  And  thou 
shalt  be  called  the  repairer  of  the  breach,  the 
restorer  of  paths  to  dwell  in."  I  am  not  so  foolish 
as  to  claim  that  the  problem  of  suffering,  waste, 
and  cruelty  is  completely  solved.  But  I  do  make 
bold  to  affirm  that  the  problem  is  reduced  to  lower 
terms  when  it  is  seen  that  all  the  native  impulses 
of  humanity  are  essential  to  the  making  of  a  man 
and  to  the  well-being  of  society.  To  find  myself 
mistaken  in  this  matter  would  be  a  sad  surprise 
which  would  make  me  doubtful  of  my  mental  and 
moral  sanity. 

The  path,  I  have  said,  is  of  less  importance  than 
the  goal.  The  method  by  which  values  have  been 
attained  is  a  small  interest  compared  with  the  pos- 
session. Man  is  what  he  is,  however  he  may  have 
become  what  he  is.  The  line  of  approach  may  even 
be  concealed  or  forgotten.  Ars  est  celare  artem. 


444  THE  PATH  AND   THE  GOAL 

The  statue  is  carried  away  from  the  workshop  and 
placed  in  the  square ;  chisel,  dust,  and  mechanism 
are  not  piled  up  at  the  base.  The  preacher  does 
not  retrace  the  methods  of  his  solitary  thought,  but 
gives  results.  The  skeleton  of  his  discourse  is  left 
in  the  closet,  or,  rather,  to  avoid  so  gruesome  a 
simile,  is  covered  with  flesh  and  concealed  by  its 
covering.  God's  methods  in  his  world  of  nature 
and  humanity  are  not  obtruded,  are  in  part  con- 
cealed, and  especially  those  methods  which  are  not 
repeated.  The  results,  the  values,  are  better  known 
than  the  process,  and  are  of  greater  consequence. 
Yet  we  know  in  part  how  he  works.  We  need  to 
know  so  far  as  results  are  yet  to  be  gained  by  the 
old  methods  which  are  ever  new.  Humanity  itself 
forgets  the  long,  hard  path  it  has  traveled  as  it 
sees  and  reaches  the  goal.  The  toil  and  struggle 
of  our  fathers  we  can  only  guess  at.  We  do  not 
care  that  posterity  should  know  our  endurance,  if 
only  they  inherit  a  goodly  legacy  and  do  their  part 
to  add  some  increment  to  it.  The  joy  of  posses- 
sion obliterates  the  pain  of  attainment.  So  it  is 
always  from  the  birth  of  a  child  to  the  birth  of  a 
nation.  Humanity  when  it  is  at  the  goal  has  a 
blessed  oblivion  of  the  path.  Yet  it  is  well,  it  is 
necessary  to  know  the  way  that  has  been  traveled, 
because  the  goal,  to  borrow  Dr.  Gordon's  felicitous 
word,  is  a  flying  goal.  The  ideal  moves  on  and 
is  progressively  realized.  Heights  are  gained,  but 
there  are  loftier  heights  beyond.  We  reach  the 
promised  land.  The  wilderness  lies  behind  and  is 
soon  forgotten.  But  the  promised  land  is  full  of 
unsubdued  Philistines.  This  is  the  law  of  progress. 


THE  PATH  AND  THE  GOAL  445 

Attainment  of  real  and  present  good  demands  the 
subjugation  of  evil  and  the  realization  of  higher 
good. 

Here  is  the  refutation  of  pessimism  and  the  cor- 
rective of  superficial  optimism.  It  has  been  said 
of  pessimism  that  it  sees  no  goal.  It  thinks  the 
human  path  is  a  circle.  As  one  lost  in  the  forest 
comes  upon  tracks  which  he  follows,  thinking  they 
lead  somewhere,  only  to  find  that  they  are  his 
own  footsteps,  so  humanity  wanders  hither  and 
thither  in  a  path  which  ever  returns  into  itself. 
An  old  fragment  of  pessimistic  literature  repeats] 
the  dismal  refrain,  "the  thing  that  hath  been  is 
that  which  shall  be,  and  there  is  no  new  thin| 
under  the  sun." 

Optimism  sees  a  goal,  far-off  or  near.  The  op- 
timist is  sobered  when  he  looks  back.  Progress 
has  been  slow  and  fitful.  There  has  been  retro- 
gression. Yet  he  sees  that  the  path  has  had  a 
direction.  The  movement  has  not  been  aimless. 
Man  has  grown  to  be  of  a  larger  stature.  Society 
has  improved.  By  distant  contrast,  the  moderns 
are  better  than  the  ancients.  The  retrospect  which 
sobers  also  animates.  At  a  slow  rate  indeed  man- 
kind advances,  but  it  does  advance.  And  so  op- 
timism is  more  than  a  hope  for  the  future.  It  is 
based  on  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  present 
value.  Science,  culture,  art,  friendship,  love,  coun- 
try, religion,  are  actual  possessions.  Pessimism 
cannot  gainsay  these,  although  they  have  not  yet 
reclaimed  all  outlying  provinces.  The  friendship 
which  is  true,  in  spite  of  faults  and  affronts,  the 
love  which  binds  hearts  together,  and  the  aspira- 


446  THE  PATH  AND  THE  GOAL 

tion  to  be  worthy  of  friendship  and  love,  "are 
human  and  spiritual  values  which  the  pessimistic 
materialist  cannot  take  away.  After  two  friends, 
whom  Stevenson  introduces  as  principal  characters 
in  "  Prince  Otto,"  had  composed  a  quarrel,  and 
reaffirmed  their  affection,  one  of  them  says  to  the 
other,  "  What  matters  it  how  bad  we  are,  if  others 
can  still  love  us,  and  we  can  still  love  others  ? " 
"Ay,"  replied  the  doctor,  "it  is  very  well  said. 
It  is  the  true  answer  to  the  pessimist,  and  the 
standing  miracle  of  mankind."  The  very  genius  of 
Christianity  is  the  present  realization  of  the  ideal. 
Now  are  we  the  sons  of  God.  The  kingdom  of 
God  is  among  you.  The  kingdom  comes  on  earth 
because  the  will  of  God  is  done  by  his  children. 
And  such  a  present  is  the  prophecy  of  a  greater 
future. 

"  I  answer,  Have  ye  yet  to  argue  out 
The  very  primal  thesis,  plainest  law, 
—  Man  is  not  God  but  hath  God's  end  to  serve, 
A  master  to  obey,  a  course  to  take, 
Somewhat  to  cast  off,  somewhat  to  become  ? 
Grant  this,  then  man  must  pass  from  old  to  new, 
From  vain  to  real,  from  mistake  to  fact, 
From  what  once  seemed  good,  to  what  now  proves  best. 
How  could  man  have  progression  otherwise  ? 

**  While  man  knows  partly  but  conceives  beside, 
Creeps  ever  on  from  fancies  to  the  fact, 
And  in  this  striving,  this  converting  air 
Into  a  solid  he  may  grasp  and  use, 
Finds  progress,  man's  distinctive  mark  alone, 
Not  God's,  and  not  the  beasts' :  God  is,  they  are, 
Man  partly  is  and  wholly  hopes  to  be."  1 

1  Robert  Browning,  A  Death  in  the  Desert. 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


13  2003 


LD  21A-60m-7,'66 
(G4427slO)476B 


General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


re  2263} 


